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Robert Moser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • strategic ticket splitting and the personal vote in mixed member Electoral Systems
    Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2005
    Co-Authors: Robert Moser, Ethan Scheiner
    Abstract:

    This article examines ticket splitting in five different mixed-member Electoral Systems—Germany, New Zealand, Japan, Lithuania, and Russia—and indicates the shortcomings inherent in any analysis of such ticket splitting that does not take into account the presence of the personal vote. We find that the personal vote plays a central part in shaping ticket splitting in all of our cases except for Germany, a heavily party-oriented system in which we find evidence of only a weak personal vote but evidence of substantial strategic voting. Mixed-member Electoral Systems have gained substantial attention as growing numbers of states have adopted Systems that provide voters with two ballots in elections for legislative office—one for a party list in a proportional representation (PR) tier and one for a candidate in a single-member district (SMD) tier (see, for example, Massicotte and Blais 1999; Moser 2001; and Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Analysis of strategic voting in such Systems is particularly well established in the literature. Scholars cite ticket splitting, in which voters cast a greater number of votes for large parties in the SMD tier than in the PR tier and, conversely, a smaller number of votes for minor parties in the SMD tier, as evidence that voters react strategically to Electoral rules that tend to deny representation to minor parties. 1 Yet such analyses often do not account sufficiently for another factor that can drive ticket splitting: the personal vote, defined here as additional SMD votes cast for a candidate due to the candidate’s personal appeal to voters rather than his or her strategic behavior. In this article, we examine ticket splitting in five different mixedmember Electoral Systems—Germany, New Zealand, Japan, Lithuania,

  • unexpected outcomes Electoral Systems political parties and representation in russia
    2001
    Co-Authors: Robert Moser
    Abstract:

    Can democratization be promoted by getting the institutions right? In "Unexpected Outcomes," Robert G. Moser offers a compelling analysis of the extent to which institutions can be engineered to promote desired political outcomes. The introduction of democracy in Eastern Europe and the former USSR has enabled scholars to bring new perspectives to the debate about Electoral Systems. Russia is arguably the most important of the postcommunist states and its mixed Electoral system provides an interesting controlled experiment for testing the impact of different Electoral Systems.Moser examines the effects of Electoral Systems on political parties and representation in Russia during the 1990s. Moser s study is not only a highly original contribution to our understanding of contemporary Russian politics, but also a significant step forward in the comparative study of Electoral Systems. Through his comprehensive empirical analysis of Russian elections, Moser provides the most detailed examination of a mixed Electoral system to date. This system was introduced in Russia to encourage party formation and benefit reformist parties allied with President Yeltsin. However, the effects were contrary to what the creators of the system expected and also defied the most well-established hypotheses in Electoral studies. Parties proliferated under both the PR and plurality halves of the election and patterns of women and minority representation ran counter to prevailing theory and international experience.With an epilogue that updates the study through the December 1999 elections, "Unexpected Outcomes" makes an important and timely contribution to the ongoing debate over the ability and inability of elites to fashion preferred political outcomes through institutional design."

  • Electoral Systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states
    World Politics, 1999
    Co-Authors: Robert Moser
    Abstract:

    Scholars studying Electoral Systems have consistently found that single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation Systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the postcommunist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of Electoral Systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of Electoral Systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states. These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the Electoral system that promotes the use of party labels--proportional representation--may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.

Josep M. Colomer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Party System Effects on Electoral Systems
    The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, 2017
    Co-Authors: Josep M. Colomer
    Abstract:

    A long tradition of empirical studies has focused on the consequences of Electoral Systems on party Systems. A number of contributions have turned this relationship upside down by postulating that it is the parties that choose Electoral Systems and manipulate the rules of elections. The most remote shaping of innovative Electoral rules, the choice of Electoral Systems in new democracies, and further Electoral reforms in well-established regimes can be explained on the basis of political parties’ relative strength, expectations, and strategic decisions. In a broader institutional context, political parties can also trade off Electoral Systems with choices and changes of other institutional rules.

  • personal representation the neglected dimension of Electoral Systems
    2011
    Co-Authors: Josep M. Colomer
    Abstract:

    Personal representation is an essential element to achieve a high quality of democracy. Many studies of Electoral Systems, by focusing on the allocation of seats to parties, have neglected the study of this essential dimension. In democratic countries a huge variety of ballot forms and rules exist to vote for individual candidates and to allocate seats to persons. This book studies different voting procedures and formulas for personal representation, their origins and consequences, their compatibility with party representation and the strategies and normative criteria for Electoral system choice. This book provides: - a ground-breaking study of voting procedures and formulas ballot forms and rules to allocate seats to persons; - a discussion on the relationship between party representation and personal representation; - new empirical data on voting forms; - an innovative classification of Electoral Systems; - reproductions of ballots from different countries; - comparative and single-case studies of different rules for candidate selection and for voting for individual candidates.

  • On the Origins of Electoral Systems and Political Parties
    Electoral Studies, 2007
    Co-Authors: Josep M. Colomer
    Abstract:

    The old, under-studied Electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented in this article as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new Electoral Systems. A survey of the uses of this set of Electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its widespread use. A model of voting by this Electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce citizens’ consensual representation, it also provides incentives for potential leaders to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many Electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th centurydincluding the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited ballot, and proportional representation rulesdderived from the search to reduce the effects of the ‘originating’ multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and Electoral Systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed. 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  • it s parties that choose Electoral Systems or duverger s laws upside down
    Political Studies, 2005
    Co-Authors: Josep M. Colomer
    Abstract:

    This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of Electoral Systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose Electoral Systems that, rather than generate new party Systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between Electoral Systems and party Systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule Electoral Systems, while multiparty Systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of Electoral Systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

André Blais - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Votes for Women: Electoral Systems and Support for Female Candidates
    Politics and Gender, 2017
    Co-Authors: Sona N. Golder, André Blais, Laura B. Stephenson, Karine Van Der Straeten, Damien Bol, Philipp Harfst, Jean-françois Laslier
    Abstract:

    It is a well-established finding that proportional representation (PR) Electoral Systems are associated with greater legislative representation for women than single member Systems. However, the degree to which different types of PR rules affect voting for female candidates has not been fully explored. The existing literature is also hampered by a reliance on cross-national data in which individual vote preferences and Electoral system features are endogenous. In this study, we draw upon an experiment conducted during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections to isolate the effects of different PR Electoral Systems. Participants in the experiment were given the opportunity to vote for real EP candidates in three different Electoral Systems: closed list, open list, and open list with panachage and cumulation. Because voter preferences can be held constant across the three different votes, we can evaluate the extent to which female candidates were more or less advantaged by the Electoral system itself. We find that voters, regardless of their gender, support female candidates, and that this support is stronger under open Electoral rules. It is a well-established finding that proportional representation (PR) Electoral Systems are associated with greater legislative representation for women than single member Systems. However, the degree to which different types of PR rules affect voting for female candidates has not been fully explored. The existing literature is also hampered by a reliance on cross-national data in which individual vote preferences and Electoral system features are endogenous. In this study, we draw upon an experiment conducted during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections to isolate the effects of different PR Electoral Systems. Participants in the experiment were given the opportunity to vote for real EP candidates in three different Electoral Systems: closed list, open list, and open list with panachage and cumulation. Because voter preferences can be held constant across the three different votes, we can evaluate the extent to which female candidates were more or less advantaged by the Electoral system itself. We find that voters, regardless of their gender, support female candidates, and that this support is stronger under open Electoral rules.

  • the mechanical and psychological effects of Electoral Systems a quasi experimental study
    Comparative Political Studies, 2011
    Co-Authors: André Blais, Romain Lachat, Airo Hino, Pascal Doraydemers
    Abstract:

    Having two votes for the same election or two simultaneous elections with different Electoral Systems provides a golden opportunity to ascertain the impact of the Electoral system and to sort out t...

  • mixed Electoral Systems a conceptual and empirical survey
    Electoral Studies, 1999
    Co-Authors: Louis Massicotte, André Blais
    Abstract:

    Abstract Until recently, mixed Electoral Systems have attracted minimal academic attention. Recent developments warrant reconsideration. At present no less than 29 countries, totalling about one-fifth of the world's population, use mixed Systems for elections to their first or single chamber. However, there is no consensus in the literature as to whether mixed Electoral Systems are in a category of their own. Numerous scholars use the concept but do not agree on what it means exactly. We propose a rigorous definition of mixed Systems, and argue that Electoral Systems should not be classified as mixed for the sole reason that they produce results in between those resulting from plurality or majority and PR. Rather, the crucial feature of a mixed system is that its mechanics involves both PR and plurality or majority. We distinguish between independent and dependent combinations, the latter corresponding to those cases where the application of one formula depends on the outcome produced by the other formula. We identify five basic types of hybrids: superposition (now exemplified by Japan), correction (Germany), coexistence (French Senate), fusion (French municipal elections) and conditional (the 1923 and 1953 Italian election laws). Existing and older Systems are classified under those headings and their main features are described.

Frank C. Thames - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Understanding the Impact of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation
    Politics & Gender, 2016
    Co-Authors: Frank C. Thames
    Abstract:

    The study of Electoral Systems is a key area of research within political science. In part, the attention paid to Electoral Systems reflects their importance to democratic political Systems. Electoral Systems define “what constitutes” a vote, establish “a rule for how votes are totaled,” and create a mechanism for “translating vote share into seat allocations” for representative institutions (Bawn 1993, 966). These roles mean that Electoral Systems impact not only how interests are represented, but also how accountability is structured.

  • Understanding the Impact of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Frank C. Thames
    Abstract:

    For some scholars, women’s legislative underrepresentation is, in part, explained by the choice of Electoral system. The Electoral system’s literature broadly concludes that proportional-representation Systems promote gender equality in comparison to other Systems (e.g., Matland and Studlar 1996; Matland 1998; Salmond 2006; SchwindtBayer and Mishler 2005; Vengroff, Nyiria, and Fugiero 2003; Caul Kittelson and Schwindt Bayer 2012). Recent research on Electoral system reform casts doubt on the efficacy of institutions, finding that short-term changes in Electoral Systems do not necessarily lead to increased levels of women’s representation (Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012; Roberts, Seawright, and Cyr 2013). I argue that the expectation that Electoral system reform will instantly increase women’s representation ignores the fact that Electoral Systems produce equilibriums that often take time to reach. Using a dataset of 98 democratic countries between 1955 and 2012, I show that Electoral Systems have both long-term and short-term effects. However, the effects of Electoral institutions are greatest over the long term.

Pascal Doraydemers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.