The Experts below are selected from a list of 53106 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Abdul Ghafar Noury - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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after enlargement voting patterns in the sixth European Parliament
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2009Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar NouryAbstract:We examined how voting behavior in the European Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member-states in 2004. Using roll-call votes, we compared voting behavior in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004-December 2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999–2004). We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left-right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role.
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voting patterns and alliance formation in the European Parliament
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2009Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have voluntarily formed transnational political groups and invariably follow the voting instructions of these groups. This is intriguing as there are few obvious incentives for doing so. Unlike national parties, for example, the political groups in the European Parliament are not punished by the electorate if they are divided on key issues, as citizens know very little about what goes on inside the European Parliament. This paper pieces together an explanation of why the European political groups exist and why they have become so powerful by looking at the determinants of group cohesion and by undertaking a spatial analysis of voting in the European Parliament. MEPs who share preferences on a range of issues on the European Union policy agenda have an incentive to establish a division-of-labour contract and to share the costs of collecting information. Once internal party policy specialization and agenda setting has been established, MEPs have incentives to follow the voting instructions of their group owing to the advantages of cohesion in a context of repeated voting.
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democratic politics in the European Parliament
2007Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:Introduction 1. Development of the European Parliament 2. Democracy, transaction costs and political parties 3. Ideological not territorial politics 4. Participation 5. Trends in party cohesion 6. Agenda setting and cohesion 7. Who controls the MEPs? 8. Competition and coalition formation 9. Dimensions of politics 10. Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission 11. The takeover directive Conclusion.
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dimensions of politics in the European Parliament
American Journal of Political Science, 2006Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:We investigate the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament by applying a scaling method to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using these methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the European Union's only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which captures government-opposition conflicts as well as national and European party positions on European integration. ©2006, Midwest Political Science Association.
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Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament - eScholarship
2005Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:We investigate the dimensionality of political conflict in the European Parliament by applying scaling method techniques to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using scaling methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the EU’s only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which is explained by conflicts between the parties in ‘government’ in the EU Council and Commission and the parties in ‘opposition’ in the Parliament.
Gérard Roland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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voting patterns and alliance formation in the European Parliament
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2009Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have voluntarily formed transnational political groups and invariably follow the voting instructions of these groups. This is intriguing as there are few obvious incentives for doing so. Unlike national parties, for example, the political groups in the European Parliament are not punished by the electorate if they are divided on key issues, as citizens know very little about what goes on inside the European Parliament. This paper pieces together an explanation of why the European political groups exist and why they have become so powerful by looking at the determinants of group cohesion and by undertaking a spatial analysis of voting in the European Parliament. MEPs who share preferences on a range of issues on the European Union policy agenda have an incentive to establish a division-of-labour contract and to share the costs of collecting information. Once internal party policy specialization and agenda setting has been established, MEPs have incentives to follow the voting instructions of their group owing to the advantages of cohesion in a context of repeated voting.
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Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament
CESifo Economic Studies, 2008Co-Authors: Gérard RolandAbstract:This article summarizes research on the analysis of roll call votes in the European Parliament since the European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage and draws lessons about legislative behavior in the European Parliament. The research shows that voting in the European Parliament occurs along supranational party lines and not along geographical lines. Party cohesion has increased with the powers of the European Parliament. This increased cohesion is the reflection of European party discipline based on cohesion of national party groups. Moreover, coalition frequency is related mostly to ideological closeness between party groups. (JEL codes: D72, F53, P 16) Copyright , Oxford University Press.
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democratic politics in the European Parliament
2007Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:Introduction 1. Development of the European Parliament 2. Democracy, transaction costs and political parties 3. Ideological not territorial politics 4. Participation 5. Trends in party cohesion 6. Agenda setting and cohesion 7. Who controls the MEPs? 8. Competition and coalition formation 9. Dimensions of politics 10. Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission 11. The takeover directive Conclusion.
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dimensions of politics in the European Parliament
American Journal of Political Science, 2006Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:We investigate the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament by applying a scaling method to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using these methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the European Union's only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which captures government-opposition conflicts as well as national and European party positions on European integration. ©2006, Midwest Political Science Association.
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Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament - eScholarship
2005Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Gérard RolandAbstract:We investigate the dimensionality of political conflict in the European Parliament by applying scaling method techniques to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using scaling methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the EU’s only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which is explained by conflicts between the parties in ‘government’ in the EU Council and Commission and the parties in ‘opposition’ in the Parliament.
William T Bernhard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political ambition and legislative behavior in the European Parliament
The Journal of Politics, 2009Co-Authors: Stephen A Meserve, Daniel Pemstein, William T BernhardAbstract:Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) typically follow one of two career paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher offices in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group leadership votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national-level variables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs’ roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999–2004) using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes.
Ga Rard Roland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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power to the parties cohesion and competition in the European Parliament 1979 2001
British Journal of Political Science, 2005Co-Authors: Abdul Ghafar Noury, Ga Rard RolandAbstract:How cohesive are political parties in the European Parliament? What coalitions form and why? The answers to these questions are central for understanding the impact of the European Parliament on European Union policies. These questions are also central in the study of legislative behaviour in general. We collected the total population of roll-call votes in the European Parliament, from the first elections in 1979 to the end of 2001 (over 11,500 votes). The data show growing party cohesion despite growing internal national and ideological diversity within the European party groups. We also find that the distance between parties on the left-right dimension is the strongest predictor of coalition patterns. We conclude that increased power of the European Parliament has meant increased power for the transnational parties, via increased internal party cohesion and inter-party competition.
Bjørn Høyland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A "real-time" database of the European Parliament
2020Co-Authors: Bjørn Høyland, Indraneel SircarAbstract:The paper presents the first “real-time” database to the European Parliament (EP) research community. Quantitative research on the European Parliament has until now been associated with large start-up costs as an informative dataset about the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) has not been available. We offer a drastic reduction of these start-up costs through an online resource with updated information about membership of party groups, committee assignments and posts in the EP leadership since the first direct elections in 1979 until the present day. As a demonstration of the dataset, we conduct a natural experiment on the effect of party groups, comparing the voting behaviour of MEPs pre and post party switching.
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Political Behaviour in the European Parliament
The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, 2014Co-Authors: Bjørn HøylandAbstract:This chapterexamines political behavior and legislative politics in the European Parliament. It begins with a review of research findings on the political behavior of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), focusing on the last decade or so. It considers the process of recruitment and election of the members of Parliament and how this process affects them and their political preferences. It then looks at the formation of political parties and committees in the European Parliament—the so-called “equilibrium institutions”—and how they
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empowerment of the European Parliament
Annual Review of Political Science, 2013Co-Authors: Bjørn HøylandAbstract:One of the most remarkable democratic developments in Europe in recent decades has been the empowerment of the only directly elected supranational assembly in the world: the European Parliament (EP). We first review the development of the legislative powers of the EP vis-a-vis the other European Union (EU) institutions, discussing the theoretical models of the power of the EP and the main empirical methods that have been used to evaluate these models. We then turn to the impact of the growing power of the EP on political organization and behavior inside the legislature. We demonstrate that the “electoral connection” is weak and discuss what this means for understanding legislative politics in the EP. The concluding section demonstrates differences in behavior across policy areas, which have received scant attention, and suggests avenues for further research.
