The Experts below are selected from a list of 17847 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Neil Bjorksten - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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voluntary import expansions and voluntary export restraints in an oligopoly model with capacity constraints
Canadian Journal of Economics, 1994Co-Authors: Neil BjorkstenAbstract:In a three-Country generalization of the Kreps-Scheinkman (1983) duopoly model with price competition and capacity constraints, the author analyzes the effects of discriminatory voluntary import expansions and voluntary export restraints on equilibrium capacity and pricing decisions. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be bad for the Exporting Country, contradicting recent results in the literature by R. Harris (1985) and K. Krishna (1989). Voluntary import expansions are shown to decrease competition. Cases are analyzed where voluntary import expansions may actually lead to import contraction or to increases in efficiency in the home Country.
Ankai Xu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trade in Virtual Water: Do Property Rights Matter?
Water Resources Management, 2018Co-Authors: Ankai XuAbstract:This paper examines the determinants of virtual water trade – embodied in agricultural products – and tests the relationship between property rights and the export of water-intensive products. Using two different measures of property rights protection, I show that countries with weaker property rights have an apparent comparative advantage in the export of water-intensive products. After controlling for economic size, natural resource endowments and bilateral trade determinants, the trade flow of virtual water is negatively and significantly correlated with the property rights index of the Exporting Country. The results are robust across different estimation methods.
Makoto Tawada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Endogenous Timing Decision on Trade Policies Between Importing and Exporting Countries with Many Firms
New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 2016Co-Authors: Yordying Supasri, Makoto TawadaAbstract:This chapter examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and Exporting countries differs and each firm plays as a Cournot oligopolist. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the Exporting Country exceeds that of the importing Country by more than three, the government of the Exporting Country chooses to behave as a leader and imposes an export tax on home firms. The government of the importing Country becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff on foreign firms. The result is opposite to that of the previous study, where each Country has only one firm.
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endogenous timing in a strategic trade policy game a two Country oligopoly model with multiple firms
Review of Development Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Yordying Supasri, Makoto TawadaAbstract:This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and Exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the Exporting Country exceeds that in the importing Country by more than three, the government of the Exporting Country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing Country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each Country.
Giovanni Anania - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Gains from trade liberalization with imperfectly competitive world markets. A note
Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales, 2011Co-Authors: Giovanni AnaniaAbstract:The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of the expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. In the first case, the Exporting Country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening in the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm playing the role of «pure middleman» in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that estimates of the impact of a tariff reduction in terms of prices and volume traded obtained assuming perfect competition when this postulate does not hold, are distorted. When domestic demand and supply functions are assumed to be linear, the impact is overestimated; a ranking of the size of such distortions in the three cases analyzed is provided. When no restriction is imposed on the demand and supply functions, the error in the estimated impact of a tariff reduction involves the magnitude as well as the sign of the expected changes in prices and volume traded. Finally, it is proved that when a private firm exerts monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, both the importing and the Exporting countries may well be better off if, rather than making a move towards trade liberalization, the importing Country «compensates» the Exporting Country by means of a direct transfer.
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Gains from Trade Liberalization with Imperfectly Competitive World Markets. A Note
2002Co-Authors: Giovanni AnaniaAbstract:The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of the expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. In the first case, the Exporting Country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening in the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm playing the role of "pure middleman" in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that under all three scenarios, if perfect competition is assumed when market imperfections exist, the impact of a tariff reduction on prices and volume traded is overestimated. A ranking of the size of such distortions in the three cases analyzed is provided. Finally, it is proved that when a private firm exerts monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, both the importing and the Exporting countries may well be better off if, rather than making a move towards trade liberalization, the importing Country "compensates" the Exporting Country by means of a direct transfer.
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united states export subsidies in wheat strategic trade policy or expensive beggar thy neighbor tactic
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992Co-Authors: Giovanni Anania, Mary Bohman, Colin A CarterAbstract:This paper examines the domestic and international impacts of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) for wheat. EEP uses targeted in-kind subsidies to expand U.S. exports and was designed specifically to compete with subsidized exports from the European Community (EC). We argue EEP cannot be welfare-improving for the U.S., even considering strategic trade theory. We then model EEP as an in-kind, constrained, targeted export subsidy and determine its price, quantity, and budgetary effects. Empirical results show that no Exporting Country gains from EEP and that the intended loser, the EC, is only slightly harmed. We find the export subsidies generate only a small increase in U.S. wheat exports. EEP is an expensive program; based on our estimates for 1988, government cost of additional wheat exports under EEP reached $469 per metric ton.
S.c Hathaway - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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New Zealand approaches to HACCP systems
Food Control, 2000Co-Authors: J.a Lee, S.c HathawayAbstract:Abstract HACCP is becoming an increasingly important component of food safety assurances for international trade and this includes the expectation that the Exporting Country will meet similar or equivalent HACCP requirements to those of the importing Country. The influence of market access requirements and the existing legislative requirements and infrastructure of New Zealand determine the government’s role in assessing HACCP systems. Recent structural changes in New Zealand has introduced flexibility in this role. The importance of building blocks for HACCP such as prerequisite programmes, food safety objectives, generic HACCP plans, HACCP specifications, and audit competency requirements are emphasised. Government role in assessment is discussed, including the initial “recognition” of a validated HACCP plan followed by performance-based compliance audits.
