The Experts below are selected from a list of 77208 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Sajid Anwar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Factor Mobility, wage inequality and welfare
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2008Co-Authors: Sajid AnwarAbstract:Abstract This paper shows that inflow of skilled (unskilled) labour increases wage inequality and its effect on foreign investment in the industrial sector and welfare in the shortrun is positive (negative) as long as the positive (negative) impact on the output of varieties of producer services is sufficiently large. An increase in the supply of domestic capital decreases wage inequality and its effect on foreign investment and welfare in the shortrun is positive as long as the positive impact on the output of varieties of producer services is sufficiently large. The magnitude of the longrun effect on foreign investment, wage inequality and welfare depends on the size of external economies in the industrial sector. Inflow of skilled labour leads to an unambiguous increase in foreign investment, wage inequality and welfare, whereas inflow of unskilled labour decreases foreign investment and its effect on wage inequality and welfare is negative as long as the size of external economies is sufficiently large. An increase in the supply of domestic capital increases foreign investment and its effect on wage inequality and welfare is positive as long as the size of external economies is sufficiently large.
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Factor Mobility and wage inequality in the presence of specialisation-based external economies
Economics Letters, 2006Co-Authors: Sajid AnwarAbstract:Abstract By making use of a simple general-equilibrium model that is relevant to a high-income developing country or a newly industrialised country, this paper examines the link between Factor Mobility and wage inequality. It is shown that, in the presence of specialisation-based external economies, emigration of skilled as well unskilled labour increases wage inequality even if the income shares of capital are identical across industries. On the other hand, outflow of capital decreases wage inequality.
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International Factor Mobility, Government Size and Welfare
Australian Economic Papers, 2004Co-Authors: Sajid Anwar, Mingli ZhengAbstract:An examination of the available data reveals that the size of government varies considerably across time and countries. By making use of a simple general equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates that size of government is affected by the availability of capital and labour within an economy. Specifically, this paper utilises a model of a closed economy that produces one-private and one-public good. Both goods are produced by means of capital and labour. Production functions are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition prevails in all markets. The elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good is greater than unity and there is no international Factor Mobility in the initial equilibrium. The size of government is measured by total spending on the public good as a proportion of the total expenditure on the private and public goods. It is shown that capital (labour) inflow can decrease (increase) the size of government. Capital inflow increases welfare if the private good is relatively capital intensive whereas labour inflow increases welfare if the public good is relatively capital intensive.
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Commercial policy and international Factor Mobility in the presence of monopolistic competition
Journal of Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Sajid AnwarAbstract:This paper utilizes a well-known specification of returns to specialization (a variation of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model) to explore the implications of local agglomeration effects for commercial policy and restricted Factor Mobility. The paper initially considers a small open economy where it is shown that a tariff reduces the degree of specialization and hence the size of the external economies to the producers. An inflow of labor increases the degree of specialization while a capital inflow decreases it. The paper then considers a two-country world where both countries are large and deals with the pattern of trade and Factor Mobility.
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Public Spending on Industries, International Factor Mobility, and Fiscal Coordination
International Economic Journal, 1992Co-Authors: Sajid AnwarAbstract:This paper develops a two-country, two-Factor, and one-good general equilibrium model with (non-traded) pure public intermediate good and international Factor Mobility. International transmission of fiscal policy and the implications of potential fiscal coordination are examined under alternative assumptions regarding international Factor Mobility. [F21]
Jacquesfrancois Thisse - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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integration agglomeration and the political economics of Factor Mobility
Journal of Public Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Gianmarco I P Ottaviano, Jacquesfrancois ThisseAbstract:This paper tackles the issue of the optimality of agglomeration in a two-region economy with skilled/mobile and unskilled/immobile workers. The market leads to the optimal outcome when transport costs are high or low. However, for intermediate values, it yields agglomeration whereas dispersion is socially desirable. We show that competitive lobbying on Factor Mobility by the two groups of workers sustains the second best optimum.
Pierre Pestieau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Factor Mobility and redistribution
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Helmuth Cremer, Pierre PestieauAbstract:This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the effect of Factor Mobility and the ensuing tax competition on the capacity of governments to raise revenue and redistribute income. It focuses on three issues: the relevance and limitations of the "race to the bottom" result, the benefits and pitfalls of partial coordination and the incidence of Factors Mobility on social security systems.
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Chapter 57 - Factor Mobility and Redistribution
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Helmuth Cremer, Pierre PestieauAbstract:This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the effect of Factor Mobility and the ensuing tax competition on the capacity of governments to raise revenue and redistribute income. It focuses on three issues: the relevance and limitations of the “race to the bottom” result, the benefits and pitfalls of partial coordination and the incidence of Factors Mobility on social security systems
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Factor Mobility and Redistribution: A Survey
2003Co-Authors: Helmuth Cremer, Pierre PestieauAbstract:This chapter presents a survey of the theoretical literature on tax competition. Specifically, it reviews recent work on the effect of Factor Mobility and the ensueing tax competition on the capacity of governments to raise revenue and redistribute income. It focuses on three issues: the relevance and limitations of the “raise against the bottom” result, the benefits and pitfalls of partial coordination and the incidence of Factors Mobility on social security systems.
Michael J. Hiscox - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation
American Political Science Review, 2002Co-Authors: Michael J. HiscoxAbstract:The extent to which political conflict over U.S. trade policy has led to clashes between broad-based class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries. I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry Factor Mobility. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry Mobility is high; when Mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital Mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns.
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INTERINDUSTRY Factor Mobility AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: EVIDENCE ON WAGE AND PROFIT DISPERSION ACROSS U.S. INDUSTRIES, 1820 1990
The Journal of Economic History, 2002Co-Authors: Michael J. HiscoxAbstract:Interindustry Factor Mobility is a crucial determinant of the income-distribution effects of exogenous changes in relative commodity prices. This examination of interindustry variation in wages and profits using data from manufacturing industries from 1820 to 1990 suggests that interindustry Factor Mobility may be strongly related to the processes of industrialization. Development in the nineteenth century produced a sharp rise in Mobility (a decline in interindustry wage and profit differentials) due to rapid improvements in transportation and the introduction of Factory production. Twentieth-century industrialization, involving greater reliance on specialized equipment and knowledge, reduced levels of interindustry Mobility.
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Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade
International Organization, 2001Co-Authors: Michael J. HiscoxAbstract:Domestic political conflict has been a constant companion to international trade, but the nature of that conflict has varied greatly in Western democracies over the last two centuries. Political battles over trade policy appear to have sometimes divided societies along broad class lines and at other times split them into narrow industry-based coalitions. I argue that this diversity stems from historical and cross-national variation in inter-industry Factor Mobility. Class coalitions are more likely where Factor Mobility is high, whereas narrow, industry-based coalitions are more likely where Mobility is low. Evidence from six Western economies for the last two centuries indicates that levels of Factor Mobility have varied historically and cross-nationally in accord with industrialization and regulation. This variation corresponds broadly with observable differences in the formation of trade policy coalitions.
Gianmarco I P Ottaviano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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integration agglomeration and the political economics of Factor Mobility
Journal of Public Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Gianmarco I P Ottaviano, Jacquesfrancois ThisseAbstract:This paper tackles the issue of the optimality of agglomeration in a two-region economy with skilled/mobile and unskilled/immobile workers. The market leads to the optimal outcome when transport costs are high or low. However, for intermediate values, it yields agglomeration whereas dispersion is socially desirable. We show that competitive lobbying on Factor Mobility by the two groups of workers sustains the second best optimum.
