The Experts below are selected from a list of 45957 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Daniel L Rubinfeld - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
subsidiarity and the european union
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998Co-Authors: Robert P Inman, Daniel L RubinfeldAbstract:The European Union is at a crossroads. At issue will be each of the three decisions which define a federal constitution: the number of participating governments, the assignment of policy responsibilities to the new EMU, and the representation of local interests in, and the decision-making rules for, the Union. Subsidiarity is to be the guiding principle. This essay reviews three alternative models of subsidiarity -- decentralized Federalism, centralized Federalism, and democratic Federalism -- and argues the current European Economic Community has evolved from decentralized to centralized to a fully democratic federalist state. The structure of EMU governance is in place and it closely resembles that of the United States: an institutionally weak executive, a country-specific Council of Ministers and a locally representative Parliament. The remaining issues to be decided are the number of participating members and the assignment of policy responsibilities to levels of government. A large Union with significant fiscal policy responsibilities is likely to replicate U.S. economic policy performance.
-
designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview
Journal of Public Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Robert P Inman, Daniel L RubinfeldAbstract:Abstract The emerging economic federations of the European Union, Russia, and South Africa, along with the established federations in Australia, Canada, and the United States, confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy. This paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies. We conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities. The usual ‘assignment’ view of federalis recommends central government policies — for example, resident-based taxation or grants-in-aid — to correct these failures. These recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner. The ‘political economy’ view of Federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered. Alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered.
Robert P Inman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
subsidiarity and the european union
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998Co-Authors: Robert P Inman, Daniel L RubinfeldAbstract:The European Union is at a crossroads. At issue will be each of the three decisions which define a federal constitution: the number of participating governments, the assignment of policy responsibilities to the new EMU, and the representation of local interests in, and the decision-making rules for, the Union. Subsidiarity is to be the guiding principle. This essay reviews three alternative models of subsidiarity -- decentralized Federalism, centralized Federalism, and democratic Federalism -- and argues the current European Economic Community has evolved from decentralized to centralized to a fully democratic federalist state. The structure of EMU governance is in place and it closely resembles that of the United States: an institutionally weak executive, a country-specific Council of Ministers and a locally representative Parliament. The remaining issues to be decided are the number of participating members and the assignment of policy responsibilities to levels of government. A large Union with significant fiscal policy responsibilities is likely to replicate U.S. economic policy performance.
-
designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview
Journal of Public Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Robert P Inman, Daniel L RubinfeldAbstract:Abstract The emerging economic federations of the European Union, Russia, and South Africa, along with the established federations in Australia, Canada, and the United States, confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy. This paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies. We conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities. The usual ‘assignment’ view of federalis recommends central government policies — for example, resident-based taxation or grants-in-aid — to correct these failures. These recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner. The ‘political economy’ view of Federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered. Alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered.
Olga Shvetsova - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Does Federalism Really Matter
Comparative Politics, 2006Co-Authors: Jan Erk, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova, Mikhail Filippov, Edward L. Gibson, Ugo M. Amoretti, Nancy Bermeo, Alain Noël, R. Daniel Kelemen, Pradeep ChhibberAbstract:"Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It Matter?."'1 As the title suggests, the conclusions of the review were not very kind to the field of comparative Federalism. Riker, in fact, questioned the very existence of Federalism itself by stating that "Federalism is no more than a constitutional legal fiction which can be given whatever content seems appropriate at the moment."2 When it came to whether or not Federalism mattered, he was equally harsh. "Does Federalism make any difference in the way people are governed? And the answer appears to be: Hardly any at all."3 Riker's bleak verdict on the state of the literature reflected the divisions in Federalism studies in 1969. More than thirty-five years later, the field of
-
designing Federalism a theory of self sustainable federal institutions
2004Co-Authors: Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga ShvetsovaAbstract:1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism 1.2 Definitions 1.3 The long search for stability Federalism as nuisance Federalism as engine of prosperity Riker as intermediary 1.4 The fundamental problem of stability 1.5 Basic premises and conclusions 2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations 2.2 The private character of public goods 2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution 2.4 The 'federal problem' 2.5 Bargaining for control of the center 2.6 Allocating jurisdictions 2.7 Three levels of institutional design 3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution 3.2 The Soviet dissolution 3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining 3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation 4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism 4.2 A national venue for bargaining 4.3 Within versus without 4.4 Direct versus delegated representation 4.5 Other parameters of design 4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia 5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement 5.2 The court 5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design 5.4 Voters versus elites 5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle 6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis 6.2 Parties in a democracy 6.3 The idealized party system 6.4 Integrated parties 6.5 Integration outside the United States Australian Federalism and the role of parties Canada 6.6 India Leadership incentives Rank and file incentives The party and Federalism 1967 and thereafter 7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Level 2 and the federalist 7.3 Level 3 institutions 7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited Germany Canada Canada vs Australia and India 7.3 Local and regional design parameters 8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures Representation Ethnicity Defining federal subjects Number of local jurisdictions Authority over local governments 8.2 Bicameralism Symmetry Presidential authority Presidential selection Electoral connections 8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate 8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design 9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia Electoral arrangements Regional autonomy Constitutional matters Parties and the current status quo 9.2 The European Union Background The role of parties The puzzle of the collusion France versus Britain EU institutional design 9.4 Conclusion.
-
If Hamilton and Madison were merely lucky, what hope is there for Russian Federalism?
Constitutional Political Economy, 1995Co-Authors: Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga ShvetsovaAbstract:Just as the two-headed eagle of imperial and contemporary Russia looks in two different directions, this essay has two objectives: to evaluate, on the basis of the American experience, the prospects for stable democratic Federalism in Russia and to reconsider the insights into Federalism offered by Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist . The swirl of events in Russia make it difficult if not impossible to confidently render conclusions about the future direction of events and the prospects for meaningful federal domestic relations. However, some theoretical perspective can be gained by looking at the theory of Federalism offered in The Federalist Papers , with special attention to Madison and Hamilton's failure to appreciate fully the role political parties would play in the eventual integration of American political institutions so as to establish, in Madison's words, a “properly structured” federation. Looking as well at the early history of parties in the United States we see, in addition to the usual constitutional provisions associated with Federalism, the importance of those things that structure political competition within states. Properly designed, these things encourage the development of political parties that mirror federal relations and integrate regional and national political elites so as to avert center-periphery conflict. Unfortunately, a review of the provision currently in place for Russia reveals that electoral practices and regional and republic constitutions and proposals are unlikely to encourage parties of the sort that facilitate a stable federal system. This fact, in conjunction with several other trends (notably, corruption and the political instincts of political elites in Moscow), leads to the conclusion that a “federation” of the type currently observed in, say, Mexico is a better scenario of the future for Russia than is a federation that imitates the United States, Australia, Germany, or Switzerland.
Jenna Bednar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Federalism as a Public Good
Constitutional Political Economy, 2005Co-Authors: Jenna BednarAbstract:This paper suggests that stabilizing Federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for Federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of Federalism.
Abbe R. Gluck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the new health care Federalism on the ground
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Abbe R. Gluck, Nicole HuberfeldAbstract:This essay, part of a symposium investigating methods of empirically evaluating health policy, focuses on American health care Federalism, the relationship between the federal and state governments in the realm of health care policy and regulation. We describe the results of a five year study of the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) from 2012-2017. Our study focused on two key pillars of the ACA, which happen to be its most state-centered — expansion of Medicaid and the implementation of health insurance exchanges — and sheds light on Federalism in the modern era of nationally-enacted health laws that preserve key roles for state leadership. The full study is detailed in the Stanford Law Review; here, we offer a more accessible snapshot and highlight a key aspect of the research: interviews of approximately twenty high ranking former state and federal officials at the forefront of ACA implementation. The interviews corroborate the study data and substantiate our conclusions about the defining characteristics of the ACA’s implementation from a Federalism perspective. Specifically, we found that the ACA’s implementation process has been 1) dynamic; 2) pragmatic; 3) negotiated; and 4) and marked by intrastate politics. We observed waves of engagement and estrangement between states and the federal government, and state decisions to participate in the ACA’s programs have not been binary, in/out choices. Vertical and horizontal negotiation and copying have been near constants. The findings also reveal theoretical and empirical challenges for quantitatively evaluating health care Federalism. Does it exist? Is it successful? We found the traditional Federalism attributes pop up in inconsistent ways under the ACA and emerge from virtually every structural arrangement of the law. We tried, for instance, to measure how “cooperative” the states were, only to find that concept meaningless. Some states attempted implementation but failed; other states rebelled by refusing to run their own programs at all. The federal government stepped in for both. Were such states equally “cooperative” or “autonomous”? The same challenges occurred for all of the classic Federalism metrics. For example, we saw local experimentation emerge from every kind of governance structure under the ACA, including nationalist ones. Our work leads us to a key question: Why choose Federalism-oriented health reform models in the first place? In ACA implementation, it sometimes appeared that federalist arrangements did not aim to improve health outcomes but rather reflected “Federalism for Federalism’s sake”—Federalism to advance political or constitutional values, such as reserving power to the states in the interest of sovereignty and balance of power — regardless of the effect on health care coverage, cost, quality, or other measures of health policy success. At other times, it seems Federalism was intended as a means to an end — e.g., that state-led health policy is assumed to produce better health outcomes. In the end, we were able to conclude more assuredly that the ACA’s many structural arrangements served state power than that any particular one of those arrangements was more federalist or that any particular one produced better health policy. Clearly, we cannot evaluate Federalism — whether it exists, whether it is working, whether it is worth defending — without knowing what it is for in the first place.
-
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For
Stanford law review, 2018Co-Authors: Abbe R. Gluck, Nicole HuberfeldAbstract:The Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a window into modern American Federalism--and modern American nationalism--in action. The ACA's Federalism is defined not by separation between state and federal, but rather by a national structure that invites state-led implementation. As it turns out, that structure was only a starting point for a remarkably dynamic and adaptive implementation process that has generated new state-federal arrangements. States move back and forth between different structural models vis-a-vis the federal government; internal state politics produce different state choices; states copy, compete, and cooperate with each other; and negotiation with federal counterparts is a near constant. These characteristics have endured through the change in presidential administration. This Article presents the results of a study that tracked the details of the ACA's Federalism-related implementation from 2012 to 2017. Among the questions that motivated the project: Does the ACA actually effectuate "Federalism," and what are Federalism’s key attributes when entwined with national statutory implementation? A federal law on the scale of the ACA presented a rare opportunity to investigate implementation from a statute's very beginning and to provide the concrete detail often wanting in Federalism scholarship. The findings deconstruct assumptions about Federalism made by theorists of all stripes, from formalist to modern. Federalism’s commonly invoked attributes--including autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and variation--have not been dependent on any particular architecture of either state-federal separation or entanglement, even though theorists typically call on "Federalism" to produce them. Instead, these attributes have been generated in ACA implementation across virtually every kind of governance model--that is, regardless whether states expand Medicaid; get waivers; or operate their own insurance exchanges or let the federal government do it for them. This makes it extraordinarily challenging to measure which structural arrangements are most "federalist," especially because the various Federalism attributes are not always present together. The study also uncovers major theoretical difficulties when it comes to healthcare: Without a clear conception of the U.S. healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which structural arrangements serve it best, much less whether they are working? If healthcare Federalism is a mechanism to produce particular policy outcomes, we should determine whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states versus the federal government positively affects, for example, healthcare cost, access, or quality. If, instead, healthcare Federalism serves structural aims regardless of policy ends--for instance, reserving power to states in the interest of sovereignty or checks and balances--we should examine whether it does in fact accomplish those goals, and we should justify why those goals outweigh the moral concerns that animate health policy. The ACA did not cause this conceptual confusion, but it retained and built on a fragmented healthcare landscape that already was riddled with structural and moral compromises. This does not mean that Federalism is an empty concept or that it does not exist in the ACA. Federalism scholars tend to argue for particular structural arrangements based on prior goals and values. The ACA's architecture challenges whether any of these goals and values are unique to Federalism or any particular expression of it. At the same time, the ACA's implementation is clearly a story about state leverage, intrastate democracy, and state policy autonomy within, not apart from, a national statutory scheme. Its implementation illustrates how Federalism is a proxy for many ideas and challenges us to ask what we are really fighting over, or seeking, when we invoke the concept in healthcare and beyond.
-
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond
Yale Law Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Abbe R. GluckAbstract:State implementation of federal law is commonplace, but has been largely ignored by the interpretive doctrines of legislation and administrative law. We have no Chevron, Federalism canon, or anything else for state implementation, nor any doctrines that ask how Congress’s decisions to delegate implementation duties to states should affect how ambiguous statutes should be interpreted. For theories of Federalism, state implementation raises a different question, namely, whether this “intrastatutory Federalism” - an informal Federalism that comes from the inside of federal statutes - is something that doctrine should protect. The prevailing functional and sovereignty accounts of Federalism seem less relevant for a Federalism that comes at the grace of Congress; this Federalism belongs to the domain of statutory interpretation. This Essay argues that state implementation of federal law plays many different roles, and that those differences should affect both how statutes are interpreted and how they are conceived from a Federalism perspective. Sometimes state implementation effectuates traditional Federalism values like experimentation, but at other times it seems to serve more nationalizing functions, like statutory entrenchment and even federal law encroachment. This variety poses challenges for legislation doctrine, because the prevailing canons of interpretation are not designed to capture such differences, and it illustrates that the broad category of cooperative Federalism is more nuanced than commonly acknowledged.
