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Richard M Bird - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations universal principles local applications
Research Papers in Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Richard M BirdAbstract:The key aspects of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations must be dealt with in the specific circumstances of each country. Nonetheless, certain basic questions invariably come up in every country. The present paper attempts to digest and reflect upon what we have learned to date about such ‘universal’ issues. After a brief introduction, Sections 2 through 4 of the paper review the three key instrumental components of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in any country – expenditures, revenues, and transfers. Section 5 discusses sub-national borrowing and the implications of decentralization for macroeconomic management. Section 6 considers several institutional aspects of decentralization. A brief Section 7 concludes.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Govinda M Rao, Richard M Bird, Jennie I LitvackAbstract:Key issues of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations arise in all three aspects of Viet Nam's poverty alleviation strategy: Broad-based growth, human resource development, and safety nets. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that pro-poor expenditures (such as local infrastructure, health care, and education) reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different localities. The central government can ensure a minimum social safety net throughout the country by designing intergovernmental transfers accordingly. A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: (1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do, (2) analyzing why they are poor, (3) developing policies to improve their standards of living (usually aimed at accelerating economic growth and improving their income-earning opportunities), and (4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct safety net policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption entitlements. The precise mixture of capacity-improving investments and safety net policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are to be held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province. This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division, East Asia and Pacific, Country Department I - is part of a larger effort in the department to develop a comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy for Viet Nam. This paper was prepared as a background document for the Viet Nam Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report 13442VN, January 1995.
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Fiscal decentralization in developing countries
1999Co-Authors: Richard M Bird, Francois VaillancourtAbstract:List of tables List of contributors Preface 1. Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: an overview Richard M. Bird and Francois Vaillancourt 2. China: evaluating the impact of intergovernmental Fiscal reform Roy W. Bahl 3. India: intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in a planned economy M. Govinda Rao 4. Indonesia and Pakistan: Fiscal decentralization - an elusive goal? Anwar Shah 5. Morocco and Tunisia: financing local governments - the impact on infrastructure finance Francois Vaillancourt 6. Colombia: the central role of the central government in Fiscal decentralization Richard M. Bird and Ariel Fiszbein 7. Argentina: Fiscal federalism and decentralization Ernesto Rezk 8. South Africa: an intergovernmental Fiscal system in transition Junaid K. Ahmad 9. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Fiscal federalism - the Dayton challenge William Fox and Christine Wallich Index.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Research Papers in Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Richard M Bird, Jennie I Litvack, Govinda M RaoAbstract:A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: 1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do; 2) analyzing why they are poor; 3) developing policies to improve their standards of living; and 4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct"safety net"policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption etitlements. The precise mixture of"capacity-improving"investments and"safety net"policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are tobe held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province.
Jennie I Litvack - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Govinda M Rao, Richard M Bird, Jennie I LitvackAbstract:Key issues of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations arise in all three aspects of Viet Nam's poverty alleviation strategy: Broad-based growth, human resource development, and safety nets. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that pro-poor expenditures (such as local infrastructure, health care, and education) reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different localities. The central government can ensure a minimum social safety net throughout the country by designing intergovernmental transfers accordingly. A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: (1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do, (2) analyzing why they are poor, (3) developing policies to improve their standards of living (usually aimed at accelerating economic growth and improving their income-earning opportunities), and (4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct safety net policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption entitlements. The precise mixture of capacity-improving investments and safety net policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are to be held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province. This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division, East Asia and Pacific, Country Department I - is part of a larger effort in the department to develop a comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy for Viet Nam. This paper was prepared as a background document for the Viet Nam Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report 13442VN, January 1995.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Research Papers in Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Richard M Bird, Jennie I Litvack, Govinda M RaoAbstract:A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: 1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do; 2) analyzing why they are poor; 3) developing policies to improve their standards of living; and 4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct"safety net"policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption etitlements. The precise mixture of"capacity-improving"investments and"safety net"policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are tobe held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province.
Govinda M Rao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Govinda M Rao, Richard M Bird, Jennie I LitvackAbstract:Key issues of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations arise in all three aspects of Viet Nam's poverty alleviation strategy: Broad-based growth, human resource development, and safety nets. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that pro-poor expenditures (such as local infrastructure, health care, and education) reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different localities. The central government can ensure a minimum social safety net throughout the country by designing intergovernmental transfers accordingly. A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: (1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do, (2) analyzing why they are poor, (3) developing policies to improve their standards of living (usually aimed at accelerating economic growth and improving their income-earning opportunities), and (4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct safety net policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption entitlements. The precise mixture of capacity-improving investments and safety net policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are to be held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province. This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division, East Asia and Pacific, Country Department I - is part of a larger effort in the department to develop a comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy for Viet Nam. This paper was prepared as a background document for the Viet Nam Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report 13442VN, January 1995.
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Fiscal decentralization in developing countries india intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in a planned economy
1999Co-Authors: Govinda M RaoAbstract:There has been a resurgence of interest in Fiscal decentralization in virtually every part of the world in the last three decades. Interest has not merely been confined to constitutionally declared federations but has also been seen in unitary countries; it spans both the ideological spectrum and levels of development across countries. While the emergence of the European Union as an economic entity has underlined the advantages of having an enlarged common market with a distinct regional identity, the economic collapse of the former Soviet Union has demonstrated the dangers of economic and administrative centralization. In general, administrative and Fiscal decentralization has been prompted by the emphasis placed on providing efficient and responsive public services. However, Fiscal decentralization has often been warranted by market decentralization arising from economic liberalization. In India too, in keeping with the general trend, decentralization has been a much debated issue. India represents a classic case of a federation with constitutional demarcation of functions and finances between the center and the states. The 920 million people in the federation are spread over twenty-five states and seven centrally administered territories (two with their own elected governments). Separate legislative, executive, and judicial arms of government are constituted at both central and state levels. The upper house, or Rajya Sabha , in the federal parliament is the House of States, to which members are elected by an electoral college from each of the states.
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intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and poverty alleviation in viet nam
Research Papers in Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Richard M Bird, Jennie I Litvack, Govinda M RaoAbstract:A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct elements: 1) identifying who the poor are, where they are located, and what they do; 2) analyzing why they are poor; 3) developing policies to improve their standards of living; and 4) supplementing income-improving policies with direct"safety net"policies to increase the poor's short-term consumption etitlements. The precise mixture of"capacity-improving"investments and"safety net"policies appropriate for any country will depend on the country's income level, the extent and nature of its poverty problem, and many other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need to be more decentralized to ensure that the poverty alleviation policies adopted reflect the preferences, needs, and Fiscal abilities of different regions of the country. The nature of that decentralization depends on the country. Pro-poor services throughout Viet Nam are underfunded. This problem is particularly acute in the poorer areas. Improvements in the system of intergovernmental finances could help ensure that each level of government, even in the poorer provinces, is adequately funded - and provided with sufficient expenditure and revenue raising autonomy - to support local investments and their operation and maintenance. Since poor provinces are less able to mobilize additional local revenues to support services, well-designed intergovernmental transfers are particularly important. Provinces must play a greater role both in raising revenues and in allocating expenditures, with incentives built in to ensure that they do so responsibly and efficiently. Local governments must - if they are tobe held accountable for their actions - have some responsibility for determining local tax rates. This will allow them to vary rates to collect more revenues to finance higher levels of public services if they so choose, and at the same time allow the central government to design its transfers in such a way as to ensure that local Fiscal efforts are not discouraged by the receipt of such transfers. Richer provinces will tend to collect greater revenues. When transfers are needed to finance local spending in poorer areas, they should provide incentives for local revenue mobilization and allow for some degree of equalization. Services deemed of national importance (for example, a minimum level of education, health care, and social relief) can be promoted by designing specific-purpose transfers. These services must be identified and varying matching requirements established for different provinces depending on such factors as their own revenue base and the cost of providing services in that province.
Jr Charles E Mclure - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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electronic commerce state sales taxation and intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
National Tax Journal, 1997Co-Authors: Jr Charles E MclureAbstract:State sales taxes, designed to tax local merchants selling manufactured products, cannot easily accommodate electronic commerce, "the use of computer networks to facilitate... the production, distr...
Alberto Zanardi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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designing intergovernmental Fiscal Relations some insights from the recent italian reform
Fiscal Studies, 2004Co-Authors: Giampaolo Arachi, Alberto ZanardiAbstract:During the last decade, the Italian system of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations has been involved in a radical process of reform that is still under way. The reform has assigned Regions new taxing powers and has introduced a new system of interregional transfers. This paper provides a review of the recent reform and offers some tentative answers to the issues still open, relying on a series of simulations and projections. A number of conclusions have been reached. First, when the long-run performance of the new financing systems is investigated, regional resources may no longer be adequate to meet future health needs. Second, the incentives for active tax policies seem either to prove too weak or even to cause undesirable results. Finally, the complete devolution to the Regions of some significant public expenditure functions risks strengthening the polarisation of financial flows between the Northern and Southern Regions in the long run.
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designing intergovernmental Fiscal Relations some insights from the recent italian reform
Social Science Research Network, 2002Co-Authors: Giampaolo Arachi, Alberto ZanardiAbstract:During the last decade the Italian system of intergovernmental Fiscal Relations has been involved in a radical process of reform that is still under way. The reform has assigned to Regions a mix of new autonomous taxes and the sharing of national taxes, has abolished discretionary transfers and any constraints in the use of regional resources, and finally has introduced a new system of interregional transfers based on some generally recognized equalizing criteria. The paper provide a review of these recent developments and offer some tentative answers to the issues still open, also relying on a series of simulations and projections. A number of conclusions have been reached. Firstly, when the long-run performance of the new financing systems are investigated, regional resources may result no longer adequate to meet the future health needs, and this may lead to a weakening of the NHS, by allowing large inter-regional differences in health standards, high mobility of patients from "poor" to "rich" Regions, and hard restrictions of the access to health services for non-residents. Secondly, the incentives provided by the reform to active tax policies seem either to prove too weak or even to cause undesirable results. Finally, the complete devolution to the Regions of some relevant public expenditure functions, that is currently under discussion in Italy, risks strengthening the polarisation of financial flows between the Northern Regions and the Southern Regions in the long-run.