The Experts below are selected from a list of 243 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Harry De Gorter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the economics of administering Import Quotas with licenses on demand in agriculture
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Jana Hranaiova, Harry De Gorter, James E FalkAbstract:A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand Import Quotas where licenses are allocated on a prorated basis. Inefficiency is incurred because licenses are allocated to high-cost firms. The ability to overbid exacerbates the inefficiency due to proportionate reductions in licenses. Quota expansion causes high-cost firms to decrease their bids but reduces inefficiency. The entry of a new firm causes all incumbent firms to increase bids or bid the quota. Not penalizing firms for the non-use of licenses increases inefficiency. The inefficiency impacts of tariff reductions, license fees, limits per firm, and imperfect information are also addressed.
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rent seeking with politically contestable rights to tariff rate Import Quotas
Review of International Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Jana Hranaiova, Harry De GorterAbstract:This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural Import Quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both Importers and exporters. In a two -stage simultaneous contest where firms rent seek for licenses and then bargain over the Import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of rights, (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre-existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent-seeking outlays.
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Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas*
Review of International Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Jana Hranaiova, Harry De GorterAbstract:This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural Import Quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both Importers and exporters. In a two -stage simultaneous contest where firms rent seek for licenses and then bargain over the Import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of rights, (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre-existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent-seeking outlays.
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tariff rate Import Quotas domestic market structure and agricultural support program the case of taiwanese rice Import
2004 Annual Meeting June 30-July 2 2004 Honolulu Hawaii, 2004Co-Authors: Hunghao Chang, Harry De GorterAbstract:After joining the WTO in 2002, Taiwan allowed rice Imports for the first time by implementing an Import quota subject to a special safeguard tariff. In 2003, the Import quota was expanded to a two-tier tariff rate Import quota system. Although Taiwan maintained land set-asides and domestic support prices for producer sales to the State Trading Enterprise, the latter was limited to Importing only 65 percent of the Import quota with the rest sold to private traders. This sudden transformation of the Taiwanese Import regime and rice market along with the government proposal for a "strategic alliance" amongst traders highlights the Importance of studying the effects of policy reforms in the framework of imperfect domestic market structure. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Taiwanese rice policy reforms using a computational partial equilibrium model. The impact of Import controls, price supports, land set-aside and alternative market structures are assessed, including the potential change in regimes within the tariff quota system. Our results show that the "strategic alliance" proposed by the agricultural authority will further distort the domestic market. Elimination of the domestic support price and land set-aside improves social welfare independent of the market structure while a change in the market structure towards competition is always social welfare improving regardless of domestic policy instruments. But the policy regime of the tariff quota (the in-quota tariff versus the out-of-quota tariff versus the quota) and hence social welfare is sensitive to changes in both domestic policy instruments and market structure.
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the economics of administering Import Quotas with licenses on demand
2003Co-Authors: Jana Hranaiova, James E Falk, Harry De GorterAbstract:This paper examines the effects of rationing Import Quotas by licenses-on-demand. We analyze the Nash equilibrium for a game where prizes are allocated on a prorated basis and bidding is costless. Factors affecting the degree of inefficiency and rent shares among firms are assessed. With licenses-on-demand, a reduction of in-quota tariffs may result in decreased quota fill, and an increase in the quota may result in a 100 percent quota fill rate. This result is opposite to that when licenses are allocated on an historical share basis, for example. Other policy implications for the implementation of licenses-on-demand include the efficacy of non-use penalties and the inefficiency of (a) license fees (equivalent to an increase in in-quota tariffs); and (b) limits on the number of licenses a firm is allowed to receive.
Ian M Sheldon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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issues in reforming tariff rate Import Quotas in the agreement on agriculture in the wto
Commissioned Papers, 2001Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, Devry S Boughner, Philip C Abbott, Richard R Barichello, Jeanchristophe Bureau, Jungsup Choi, Jonathan R Coleman, Roland Herrmann, Marc Kramb, Ian M SheldonAbstract:Table of Contents: The Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas and the Effects of Trade Liberalization; TRQs and GATT Rules; An Overview of Tariffs, Quotas and Imports Worldwide; TRQs in the European Union; U.S. TRQs for Sugar, Tobacco and Peanuts; Dairy TRQs in the United States; Tariff Rate Quota Implementation and Administration by Developing Countries; Management of Tariff Rate Quotas in Korea and Japan; Tariff Rate Quota Administration in Canadian Agriculture; The Case of Australia and New Zealand Facing TRQs; The 1999 WTO Panel Report on the EU's Common Market Organization for Bananas; Assessment
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the economics of two tier tariff rate Import Quotas in agriculture
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2000Co-Authors: Devry S Boughner, Harry De Gorter, Ian M SheldonAbstract:This paper analyzes the economics of two-tier tariff Import Quotas (TRQs) and implications of alternative trade liberalization scenarios. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture had tariffs replace nontariff barriers as the protective mechanism while Quotas ensured minimum trade flows. Our framework isolates the effects of changes either in the second-tier tariff, and first-tier tariff, or the quota. We show how market conditions or relative policy instrument levels determine which tariff or quota affects trade and domestic and world prices. Whether or not exporting countries have been allocated export Quotas and the procedures for the distribution of the rights to export and Import also influences the efficiency of TRQs.
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issues in the administration of tariff rate Import Quotas in the agreement on agriculture in the wto an introduction
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2000Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, Ian M SheldonAbstract:The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) put in place a set of rules that may, in the future, have significant effects on the conditions for market access for agricultural products. Bound tariffs replaced non-tariff barriers in most cases, and rules facing exporters are now more transparent. In addition, minimum access commitments were made through the use of Import Quotas, with a lower tariff for Imports within the quota. Although agriculture is now integrated into the multilateral trading system, most commentators agree that the URAA did little actually to liberalize agricultural trade. Bound out-of-quota tariffs remain very high while Quotas have resulted in the institutionalization of rents for specific countries and firms or state trading enterprises, thereby potentially increasing resistance by these stakeholders to any trade liberalization initiatives.
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Selling Import Quota Licenses: The U.S. Cheese Case
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1994Co-Authors: Steve Mccorriston, Ian M SheldonAbstract:Recent discussions on U.S. trade policies suggest that Import Quotas should be auctioned to ensure the U.S. Treasury acquires the quota rent. However, studies estimating the potential benefits have ignored Important details of Import quota regimes and have assumed perfect competition and no exporter retaliation. We explore these three issues with an application to the U.S. cheese Import quota regime. We show that when features of the U.S. dairy quota regime and structure of the cheese processing sector are accounted for, likely quota rents and potential welfare consequences of selling Import licenses change significantly. While quota license sales may raise Treasury receipts, they may also cause a net welfare loss.
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Selling Import Quota Licenses: The U.S. Cheese Case
1992Co-Authors: Steve Mccorriston, Ian M SheldonAbstract:Recent discussions on U.S. trade policies suggest that Import Quotas should be auctioned to ensure the U.S. Treasury acquires the quota rent. However, studies which have estimated the potential benefits have ignored Important details of Import quota regimes, assumed perfect competition and no retaliation from exporters. This paper aims to deal with these three criticisms with an application to the U.S. Import quota regime for cheese. The results show that in oligopolistic settings, the government could maximize potential rents from Import restrictions by auctioning off an optimal quota. However, preventing retaliation reduces Treasury gains. Further, license sales have distributional implications for U.S. cheese processing firms and consumers. Depending on the source of rent dissipation, selling cheese quota licenses may result in a net welfare loss.
Eden S H Yu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Import Quotas tied aid capital accumulation and welfare
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Chichur Chao, Eden S H YuAbstract:Aid conditional on the purchase of an Imported capital good increases the supply of, and demand for, the good. Examining the effects of tied aid on capital accumulation, the current account, and welfare, we find that two resultant conflicting forces render the price of the capital good indeterminate. If the demand pressure is larger than the supply response, the capital stock increases at the expense of the current account and welfare improves. Alternatively, if the demand pressure is less than the supply response, capital is reduced. This may be detrimental to welfare.
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Land-releasing policy and welfare in a dual economy
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Chichur Chao, Eden S H YuAbstract:This article examines a variety of impacts of the policy of releasing public land for agricultural in the Harris-Todaro economy for the short run as well as the long run. We contrast the effects for the economy under Import Quotas versus tariffs. Our analysis suggests that the land-grant policy in the presence of a tariff is effective in promoting welfare for both the short run and the long run. However, the policy in the presence of an Import quota may not be effective in the long run.
Mats Ramstedt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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changes in alcohol related harm in sweden after increasing alcohol Import Quotas and a danish tax decrease an interrupted time series analysis for 2000 2007
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2011Co-Authors: Ninakatri Gustafsson, Mats RamstedtAbstract:Background Denmark decreased its tax on spirits by 45% on 1 October 2003. Shortly thereafter, on 1 January 2004, Sweden increased its Import Quotas of privately Imported alcohol, allowing travellers to bring in much larger amounts of alcohol from other European Union countries. Although these changes were assumed to increase alcohol-related harm in Sweden, particularly among people living close to Denmark, analyses based on survey data collected before and after these changes have not supported this assumption. The present article tests whether alcohol-related harm in southern Sweden was affected by these changes by analysing other indicators of alcohol-related harm, e.g. harm recorded in different kinds of registers. Methods Interrupted time-series analysis was performed with monthly data on cases of hospitalization due to acute alcohol poisoning, number of reported violent assaults and drunk driving for the years 2000–07 in southern Sweden using the northern parts of Sweden as a control and additionally controlling for two earlier major changes in Quotas. Results The findings were not consistent with respect to whether alcohol-related harm increased in southern Sweden after the decrease in Danish spirits tax and the increase in Swedish alcohol Import Quotas. On the one hand, an increase in acute alcohol poisonings was found, particularly in the 50–69 years age group, on the other hand, no increase was found in violent assaults and drunk driving. Conclusions The present results raise Important questions about the association between changes in availability and alcohol-related harms. More research using other methodological approaches and data is needed to obtain a comprehensive picture of what actually happened in southern Sweden.
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Changes in alcohol-related harm in Sweden after increasing alcohol Import Quotas and a Danish tax decrease—an interrupted time-series analysis for 2000–2007
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2010Co-Authors: Ninakatri Gustafsson, Mats RamstedtAbstract:Background Denmark decreased its tax on spirits by 45% on 1 October 2003. Shortly thereafter, on 1 January 2004, Sweden increased its Import Quotas of privately Imported alcohol, allowing travellers to bring in much larger amounts of alcohol from other European Union countries. Although these changes were assumed to increase alcohol-related harm in Sweden, particularly among people living close to Denmark, analyses based on survey data collected before and after these changes have not supported this assumption. The present article tests whether alcohol-related harm in southern Sweden was affected by these changes by analysing other indicators of alcohol-related harm, e.g. harm recorded in different kinds of registers. Methods Interrupted time-series analysis was performed with monthly data on cases of hospitalization due to acute alcohol poisoning, number of reported violent assaults and drunk driving for the years 2000–07 in southern Sweden using the northern parts of Sweden as a control and additionally controlling for two earlier major changes in Quotas. Results The findings were not consistent with respect to whether alcohol-related harm increased in southern Sweden after the decrease in Danish spirits tax and the increase in Swedish alcohol Import Quotas. On the one hand, an increase in acute alcohol poisonings was found, particularly in the 50–69 years age group, on the other hand, no increase was found in violent assaults and drunk driving. Conclusions The present results raise Important questions about the association between changes in availability and alcohol-related harms. More research using other methodological approaches and data is needed to obtain a comprehensive picture of what actually happened in southern Sweden.
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changes in alcohol related harm in sweden after increasing Import Quotas and a danish tax decrease
35th Kettil Bruun Society Symposium Copenhagen Denmark, 2009Co-Authors: Ninakatri Gustafsson, Mats RamstedtAbstract:Changes in alcohol-related harm in Sweden after increasing Import Quotas and a Danish tax decrease
Xenia Matschke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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on the impact of Import Quotas on a quantity fixing cartel in a two country setting
Jahrbucher Fur Nationalokonomie Und Statistik, 1999Co-Authors: Xenia MatschkeAbstract:In a static supergame context, a model is presented in which a foreign and a domestic firm form a cartel for selling a homogeneous good. In order to maximize joint cartel profit, the two firms have agreed to restrict sales to their own home market. Due to transfer costs, this market split paretodominates other cartel solutions. Side payments are assumed to be feasible. The introduction of an Import quota may affect cartel stability as measured by a so-called critical interest rate. The two-country setting and the feasibility of side payments lead to results very different from previous findings that mild Import regulations foster cartelization whereas severe restrictions destabilize quantity-setting cartels.
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on the impact of Import Quotas on a quantity fixing cartel in a two country setting der einflus von Importquoten auf die stabilitat eines mengenkartells eine analyse im rahmen eines zwei lander modells
Journal of Economics and Statistics, 1999Co-Authors: Xenia MatschkeAbstract:In a static supergame context, a model is presented in which a foreign and a domestic firm form a cartel for selling a homogeneous good. In order to maximize joint cartel profit, the two firms have agreed to restrict sales to their own home market. Due to transfer costs, this market split paretodominates other cartel solutions. Side payments are assumed to be feasible. The introduction of an Import quota may affect cartel stability as measured by a so-called critical interest rate. The two-country setting and the feasibility of side payments lead to results very different from previous findings that mild Import regulations foster cartelization whereas severe restrictions destabilize quantity-setting cartels.
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On the Impact of Import Quotas on a Quantity-Fixing Cartel in a Two-Country-Setting / Der Einfluß von Importquoten auf die Stabilität eines Mengenkartells – Eine Analyse im Rahmen eines Zwei-Länder-Modells
Journal of Economics and Statistics, 1999Co-Authors: Xenia MatschkeAbstract:In a static supergame context, a model is presented in which a foreign and a domestic firm form a cartel for selling a homogeneous good. In order to maximize joint cartel profit, the two firms have agreed to restrict sales to their own home market. Due to transfer costs, this market split paretodominates other cartel solutions. Side payments are assumed to be feasible. The introduction of an Import quota may affect cartel stability as measured by a so-called critical interest rate. The two-country setting and the feasibility of side payments lead to results very different from previous findings that mild Import regulations foster cartelization whereas severe restrictions destabilize quantity-setting cartels.
