The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Casey B Mulligan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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recent marginal labor Income Tax Rate changes by skill and marital status
Tax Policy and the Economy, 2013Co-Authors: Casey B MulliganAbstract:This paper calculates monthly time series for the overall safety net's statutory marginal labor Income Tax Rate as a function of skill and marital status. Marginal Tax Rates increased significantly for all groups between 2007 and 2009, and dramatically so for unmarried household heads. The relationship between incentive changes and skill varies by marital status. Unemployment insurance and related expansions contribute to the patterns by skill while food stamp expansions contribute to the patterns by marital status. Remarkably, group changes in hours worked per capita line up with the statutory measures of incentive changes.
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recent marginal labor Income Tax Rate changes by skill and marital status
Tax Policy and the Economy, 2013Co-Authors: Casey B MulliganAbstract:Executive SummaryThis paper calculates monthly time series for the overall safety net’s statutory marginal labor Income Tax Rate as a function of skill and marital status. Marginal Tax Rates increased significantly for all groups between 2007 and 2009, and dramatically so for unmarried household heads. The relationship between incentive changes and skill varies by marital status. Unemployment insurance and related expansions contribute to the patterns by skill while food stamp expansions contribute to the patterns by marital status. Remarkably, group changes in hours worked per capita line up with the statutory measures of incentive changes.
Michel Strawczynski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal Income Tax Rate at the top: a measure of labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution. We find that the asymptotic Tax Rate is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion as long as the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution, we find that the optimal marginal Tax Rate at the top should be between 33% and 60%, which is in line with the existing Rates in the real world.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal Income Tax Rate at the top: the compensated elasticity of labor supply and the shape of Income distribution. Unlike recent results in the literature our paper shows that Income effects are immaterial for the optimal asymptotic Tax Rate while the degree of non-linearity of the utility of consumption does play a role in determining the asymptotic Rate. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of Income distribution, we find that the optimal marginal Tax Rate at the top should be relatively high, which is in line with the existing Rates in the real world.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:Recent works on optimal Income Tax found that for unbounded distributions of earnings the optimal Tax Rate at the top is relatively high (around 60 percent). This finding is puzzling in light of the well-known result for bounded distributions of a zero optimal Tax Rate at the top. Our paper shows that the more recent papers have used assumptions that favor a high asymptotic Tax Rate: Pareto instead of Log-normal distribution and linear instead of non-linear utility of consumption. Using these two assumptions along with a logarithmic utility of leisure leads to an optimal Rate of 100%, a result that is avoided in recent literature by assuming a constant compensated elasticity of labor. We find that even when using a Pareto distribution of earnings the optimal asymptotic Tax Rate is about a half compared to recent literature.
Rao S Aiyagari - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal capital Income Taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting
Journal of Political Economy, 1995Co-Authors: Rao S AiyagariAbstract:For a wide class of infinitely lived agent models, Christophe Chamley (1986) has shown that the optimal capital Income Tax Rate is zero in the long run. Robert E. Lucas (1990) has argued that, for the U.S. economy, there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy. This paper shows that, for the Bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints, the optimal Tax Rate on capital Income is positive, even in the long run. Therefore, cutting the capital Income Tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
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optimal capital Income Taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting
Journal of Political Economy, 1995Co-Authors: Rao S AiyagariAbstract:For a wide class of infinitely lived agent models, Chamley has shown that the optimal capital Income Tax Rate is zero in the long run. Lucas has argued that for the U.S. economy, there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy. This paper shows that for the Bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints, the optimal Tax Rate on capital Income is positive, even in the long run. Therefore, cutting the capital Income Tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses.
Alan D Viard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal categorical transfer payments the welfare economics of limited lump sum redistribution
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001Co-Authors: Alan D ViardAbstract:Despite their importance in Tax-transfer systems, categorical transfer payments, based on (nearly) exogenous characteristics such as disability or date of birth, have been deemphasized in optimal-Tax analysis. I use the well-developed theory of first-best redistribution to clarify the welfare economics of categorical transfers, which are a form of limited lump-sum redistribution. The comparison to first-best redistribution explains how categorical transfers affect groups' labor supplies and utility levels, why the use of categorical transfers is inversely related to the planner's inequality aversion, and why their use reduces the optimal Income Tax Rate.
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some results on the comparative statics of optimal categorical transfer payments
Public Finance Review, 2001Co-Authors: Alan D ViardAbstract:To alleviate equity-efficiency trade-offs, Tax transfer systems pay categorical transfers to groups defined by characteristics correlated with earnings ability. The author examines the comparative statics of categorical transfer payments in a linear Income Tax model through analysis of first-order conditions and numerical calculations. The analysis sharpens previous results on the size of categorical transfers, the resulting reduction in the Income Tax Rate, and the associated welfare gain. Notably, the author finds that categorical transfers should vary more across groups when earnings ability is more equal within each group, when labor supply is more elastic, and when less revenue is required for public goods.
Momi Dahan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal Income Tax Rate at the top: a measure of labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution. We find that the asymptotic Tax Rate is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion as long as the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution, we find that the optimal marginal Tax Rate at the top should be between 33% and 60%, which is in line with the existing Rates in the real world.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal Income Tax Rate at the top: the compensated elasticity of labor supply and the shape of Income distribution. Unlike recent results in the literature our paper shows that Income effects are immaterial for the optimal asymptotic Tax Rate while the degree of non-linearity of the utility of consumption does play a role in determining the asymptotic Rate. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of Income distribution, we find that the optimal marginal Tax Rate at the top should be relatively high, which is in line with the existing Rates in the real world.
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the optimal asymptotic Income Tax Rate
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Momi Dahan, Michel StrawczynskiAbstract:Recent works on optimal Income Tax found that for unbounded distributions of earnings the optimal Tax Rate at the top is relatively high (around 60 percent). This finding is puzzling in light of the well-known result for bounded distributions of a zero optimal Tax Rate at the top. Our paper shows that the more recent papers have used assumptions that favor a high asymptotic Tax Rate: Pareto instead of Log-normal distribution and linear instead of non-linear utility of consumption. Using these two assumptions along with a logarithmic utility of leisure leads to an optimal Rate of 100%, a result that is avoided in recent literature by assuming a constant compensated elasticity of labor. We find that even when using a Pareto distribution of earnings the optimal asymptotic Tax Rate is about a half compared to recent literature.
