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Gindis David - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Ernst Freund as Precursor of the Rational Study of Corporate Law
    'Elsevier BV', 2020
    Co-Authors: Gindis David
    Abstract:

    Gindis, David, Ernst Freund as Precursor of the Rational Study of Corporate Law (October 27, 2017). Journal of Institutional Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905547, doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905547The rise of large business corporations in the late 19th century compelled many American observers to admit that the nature of the corporation had yet to be understood. Published in this context, Ernst Freund's little-known The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) was an original attempt to come to terms with a new legal and economic reality. But it can also be described, to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, as the earliest example of the rational study of corporate law. The paper shows that Freund had the intuitions of an Institutional Economist, and engaged in what today would be called comparative Institutional analysis. Remarkably, his argument that the corporate form secures property against insider defection and against outsiders anticipated recent work on entity shielding and capital lock-in, and can be read as an early contribution to what today would be called the theory of the firm.Peer reviewe

  • From Cambridge Keynesian to Institutional Economist: The Unnoticed Contributions of Robert Neild
    'Cambridge University Press (CUP)', 2018
    Co-Authors: Gindis David, Hodgson Geoffrey, Gagliardi Francesca
    Abstract:

    This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Robert Neild (born 1924) has made a major contribution to economics and to peace studies. This paper provides a brief sketch of Neild’s life and work. While noting his research in economic policy and peace studies, this essay devotes more attention to his largely-unnoticed contributions to Institutional and evolutionary economics since 1984. These are important in their own right, but they are especially notable because Cambridge heterodox Economists have been devoted mainly to other approaches, including Marxism and post-Keynesianism. Neild’s distinctive contribution is partly explained by his closeness to both Nicholas Kaldor and Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal made explicit his adherence to the original American Institutionalism: Neild extended that link to Cambridge.Peer reviewe

  • Ernst Freund as Precursor of the Rational Study of Corporate Law
    'Elsevier BV', 2017
    Co-Authors: Gindis David
    Abstract:

    Gindis, David, Ernst Freund as Precursor of the Rational Study of Corporate Law (October 27, 2017). Journal of Institutional Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905547, doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905547The rise of large business corporations in the late nineteenth century compelled many American observers to admit that the nature of the corporation had yet to be understood. Published in this context, Ernst Freund’s (1897) little-known The Legal Nature of Corporations was an original attempt to come to terms a new legal and economic reality. But it can also be described, to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, as the earliest example of the rational study of corporate law. The paper shows that Freund had the intuitions of an Institutional Economist, and engaged in what today would be called comparative Institutional analysis. Remarkably, his argument that the corporate form secures property against insider defection and against outsiders anticipated recent work on entity shielding and capital lock-in, and can be read as an early contribution to what today would be called the theory of the firm.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Gerald F. Vaughn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Stefan Kesting - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Boulding's welfare approach of communicative deliberation
    Ecological Economics, 2010
    Co-Authors: Stefan Kesting
    Abstract:

    British Institutional Economist Shaun Hargreaves Heap once wrote: "... that orthodox welfare economics runs into problems generating public policy prescriptions because it works with a picture of individuals as solely a bunch of well-behaved preferences, which they are motivated in their actions to satisfy in an instrumental fashion" (1989, 206). Most ecological Economists will probably agree with this critique, because it is certainly true, when the welfare objective shifts from quantitative economic growth to preserving this planet as a life provisioning and enjoyable habitat for future generations. So what constitutes and enhances ecologically sustainable welfare? To answer this question a number of scholars have highlighted the need for an alternative model of behaviour -- be it as a micro-foundation for a sustainability oriented welfare theory or as a normative guiding post to direct our concrete action and Institutional change. This article will show that Kenneth E. Boulding developed such an alternative welfare approach, based on a communicative behavioural conception over about forty years of his academic career. Founded on a communicative action his welfare theory is based on deliberative valuation.

  • Institutional Change and Globalization
    Review of Political Economy, 2009
    Co-Authors: Stefan Kesting
    Abstract:

    John L. Campbell Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2004, 247 pp., $17.95 paperback ISBN 0-691-08921-3 John Campbell's book is a valuable resource for any Institutional Economist who...

Bruce E. Kaufman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Institutional theory of john r commons foundation for a heterodox labor economics
    2006
    Co-Authors: Bruce E. Kaufman
    Abstract:

    Over the last three decades neoclassical economic theory has become the dominate approach for the study of labor, most clearly in North America but also increasingly in Europe and elsewhere. Rival heterodox approaches, on the other hand, are threatened with marginalization, partly due to the imperializing tendencies of neoclassical economics and partly due to the inability of heterodox Economists to articulate an alternative unified theoretical framework. The purpose of this paper is to push forward the heterodox project by outlining a theoretical framework and set of core ideas that may provide the basis for an alterative paradigm. Toward this end, I re-examine the theoretical writings of Institutional Economist John R. Commons and describe and synthesize his theory of Institutional economics. Although his theory is general, I focus on its application to the study of labor. Key concepts are bounded rationality, property rights, working rules, institutions, transactions, and incomplete contracts. I argue that these concepts not only form a coherent body of theory but also give rise to numerous insights and predictions about labor markets and the employment relationship, highlight crucial weaknesses and lacunas in the neoclassical approach, and provide a theoretical framework for an integration of the economic and social dimensions of human behavior.

  • The organization of economic activity: insights from the Institutional theory of John R. Commons
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003
    Co-Authors: Bruce E. Kaufman
    Abstract:

    This paper develops a theory of economic organization based on the concepts of property rights, sovereignty, transactions, bounded rationality, the interdependence of preferences and economies of scale in production. All of these concepts were central to the work of Institutional Economist John R. Commons. My new synthesis of his ideas delineates the structure upon which the market and non-market systems of an economy rest, or in modern terminology the choice between make and buy. It provides a more comprehensive framework for comparative analysis that encompasses much of the contemporary literature in the economics of organization, while providing alternative interpretations and implications at critical points.

  • Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999
    Co-Authors: Bruce E. Kaufman
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper proposes an alternative psychological explanation for bounded rationality. According to Herbert Simon, bounded rationality arises from human cognitive limitations. Following the suggestion of Institutional Economist John R. Commons, I argue that extremes in emotional arousal also contribute to bounded rationality. This idea is formalized and developed using the Yerkes–Dodson law from psychology. Examples from the popular press and the academic literatures of law, management and economics are presented to illustrate the impact of this type of bounded rationality on human behavior.

Geoffrey M. Hodgson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • From Cambridge Keynesian to Institutional Economist: The Unnoticed Contributions of Robert Neild
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Francesca Gagliardi, David Gindis
    Abstract:

    Robert Neild (born 1924) has made a major contribution to economics and to peace studies. This paper provides a brief sketch of Neild's life and work. While noting his research in economic policy and peace studies, this essay devotes more attention to his largely unnoticed contributions to Institutional and evolutionary economics since 1984. These are important in their own right, but they are especially notable because Cambridge heterodox Economists have been devoted mainly to other approaches, including Marxism and post-Keynesianism. Neild's distinctive contribution is partly explained by his closeness to both Nicholas Kaldor and Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal made explicit his adherence to the original American Institutionalism: Neild extended that link to Cambridge.

  • Toward an evolutionary and moral science remarks upon receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award
    Journal of Economic Issues, 2012
    Co-Authors: Geoffrey M. Hodgson
    Abstract:

    Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that Economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British Institutional Economist John A. Hobson — who was an acquaintance of Veblen — foreshadowed this approach.