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Satoru Takahashi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2017
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    Abstract We study agents whose expected utility Preferences are Interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of Interdependent Preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) , who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel et al., 2006 , Dekel et al., 2007 , who characterize strategic distinguishability without Interdependent Preferences.

  • 2011): Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability,Discussion paper
    2014
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi, Dirk Bergemanny, Stephen Morrisz, Satoru Takahashix
    Abstract:

    We identify a universal type space of possible Interdependent (expected utility) Preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a detail freedescription, in a natural language, of the agentsInterdependent Preferences. Second, distinct types in the universal type space must be strategically distinguishable in the sense that there must exist a mechanism where those types are guaranteed to behave di¤erently in equilibrium. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) (who character-ized strategic distinguishability on \u85xed \u85nite type spaces) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on type spaces without preference uncertainty and thus without Interdependent Preferences)

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    We study agents whose expected utility Preferences are Interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of Interdependent Preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007), who characterize strategic distinguishability without Interdependent Preferences.

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    A universal type space of Interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) Preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional Preferences; and so on.Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.

Burkhard Hehenkamp - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The strategic advantage of Interdependent Preferences in rent-seeking contests
    Public Choice, 2006
    Co-Authors: Tobias Guse, Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract:

    We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains two groups of players – one with independent Preferences and the other with (negatively) Interdependent Preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing marginal efficiency. For general n-player contests with increasing marginal efficiency, the strategic advantage prevails provIDed convexity of contest technologies is sufficiently weak. For strongly convex contest technologies, other types of equilibria exist, including one where indivIDualists receive strictly higher pay-off.

  • The strategic advantage of negatively Interdependent Preferences in action-monotonic games
    2005
    Co-Authors: Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract:

    Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively Interdependent Preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.

  • on the strategic advantage of Interdependent Preferences in rent seeking contests
    Research Papers in Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Tobias Guse, Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract:

    We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains both players with independent Preferences and players with Interdependent Preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing returns to scale technologies. Finally, we illustrate our findings for the special cases of an additively separable preference function.

Dirk Bergemann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2017
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    Abstract We study agents whose expected utility Preferences are Interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of Interdependent Preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) , who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel et al., 2006 , Dekel et al., 2007 , who characterize strategic distinguishability without Interdependent Preferences.

  • 2011): Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability,Discussion paper
    2014
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi, Dirk Bergemanny, Stephen Morrisz, Satoru Takahashix
    Abstract:

    We identify a universal type space of possible Interdependent (expected utility) Preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a detail freedescription, in a natural language, of the agentsInterdependent Preferences. Second, distinct types in the universal type space must be strategically distinguishable in the sense that there must exist a mechanism where those types are guaranteed to behave di¤erently in equilibrium. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) (who character-ized strategic distinguishability on \u85xed \u85nite type spaces) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on type spaces without preference uncertainty and thus without Interdependent Preferences)

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    We study agents whose expected utility Preferences are Interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of Interdependent Preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007), who characterize strategic distinguishability without Interdependent Preferences.

  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
    Co-Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    A universal type space of Interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) Preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional Preferences; and so on.Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.

Levent Koçkesen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Negatively Interdependent Preferences
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000
    Co-Authors: Efe A. Ok, Levent Koçkesen
    Abstract:

    We develop a theory of representation of Interdependent Preferences that reflect the widely acknowledged phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses (i.e. of those Preferences which maintain that well-being depend on "relative standing" in the society as well as on material consumption). The principal ingredient of our analysis is the assumption that individuals desire to occupy a (subjectively) better position than their peers. This is quite a primitive starting point in that it does not give any reference to what is actually regarded as "status" in the society. We call this basic postulate negative interdependence, and study its implications. In particular, combining this assumption with some other basic postulates that are widely used in a number of other branches of the theory of individual choice, we axiomatize the relative income hypothesis, and obtain an operational representation of Interdependent Preferences.

  • Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in aggregative games
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2000
    Co-Authors: Levent Koçkesen, Rajiv Sethi
    Abstract:

    Abstract We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with Interdependent Preferences (who care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) earn strictly higher material payoffs than do the material payoff maximizers. Implications of this finding for the theory of preference evolution are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.

  • The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2000
    Co-Authors: Levent Koçkesen, Rajiv Sethi
    Abstract:

    Abstract We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively Interdependent Preferences and care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payoffs than do players who seek to maximize their material payoffs. The conditions are satisfied by a number of games of economic importance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolutionary theory of preference formation and the theory of strategic delegation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.

  • evolution of Interdependent Preferences in aggregative games
    Research Papers in Economics, 1998
    Co-Authors: Levent Koçkesen, Rajiv Sethi
    Abstract:

    We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. Specifically, some players have Interdependent Preferences (in the sense that they care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) while the remainder are (material) payoff maximizers in the standard sense.

  • the strategic advantage of negatively Interdependent Preferences
    Research Papers in Economics, 1997
    Co-Authors: Levent Koçkesen, Rajiv Sethi
    Abstract:

    We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoofs. Specially, a subset of players have negatively Interdependent Preferences and care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payoffs than do players who seek to maximize their material payoffs.

Tobias Guse - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On Interdependent Preferences and sequential structures in rent-seeking contests
    2011
    Co-Authors: Tobias Guse
    Abstract:

    The work focuses on two different extensions to the standard rent-seeking model by Gordon Tullock (1980). The first part analyzes the effects of changing the objection function of players in a rent-seeking contest. If players do not only focus on their own payoff, but also on the payoff of their competitors, individual payoff maximization does not yield the highest absolute payoff. Instead, relative payoff maximization yields a higher payoff. The second part focuses on the question of endogenous order of moves. While Leininger (1993) showed for rent-seeking contests with two player that the player with higher valuation will always move later, this work finds for rent-seeking contests with more than two players, that simultaneous moves can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium even for heterogenous players, as long as the equilibrium effort of the player with highest valuation does not exceed aggregate equilibrium effort of her opponents (in both the simultaneous and respective sequential subgame). Therefore, the assumption of simultaneous moves can be justified as subgame-perfect for a large set of contests.

  • The strategic advantage of Interdependent Preferences in rent-seeking contests
    Public Choice, 2006
    Co-Authors: Tobias Guse, Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract:

    We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains two groups of players – one with independent Preferences and the other with (negatively) Interdependent Preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing marginal efficiency. For general n-player contests with increasing marginal efficiency, the strategic advantage prevails provIDed convexity of contest technologies is sufficiently weak. For strongly convex contest technologies, other types of equilibria exist, including one where indivIDualists receive strictly higher pay-off.

  • on the strategic advantage of Interdependent Preferences in rent seeking contests
    Research Papers in Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Tobias Guse, Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract:

    We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains both players with independent Preferences and players with Interdependent Preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing returns to scale technologies. Finally, we illustrate our findings for the special cases of an additively separable preference function.