The Experts below are selected from a list of 312 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Paul Gill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The Rational Foraging Terrorist: Analysing the Distances Travelled to Commit Terrorist Violence
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2017Co-Authors: Paul Gill, John Horgan, Emily CornerAbstract:This paper applies the distance-to-crime approach to the case of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and shooting attacks conducted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Northern...
-
Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2016Co-Authors: Paul GillAbstract:ABSTRACTThis article provides an overview of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) innovations with regards to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It situates PIRA's tactical innovations within the broad organizational psychology literature focused on the nature and drivers of creativity and innovation. This discussion helps frame the two empirical analyses that follow. The first analysis provides a graphical timeline of PIRA's radical innovations (and their drivers) in relation to IED technology. This helps provide a sense of the specific occasions in which PIRA innovations were numerous and when they were sparse. The second analysis looks at the locations in which PIRA radical innovations debuted. This provides us with an understanding of the specific PIRA units responsible for these innovations. The results demonstrate that while PIRA operations spanned the six counties of Northern Ireland for 29 years, radical IED innovations were conceived, developed, and initially implemented within only two are...
-
spatio temporal patterns of ied usage by the provisional Irish Republican Army
European Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2016Co-Authors: Stephen Tench, Hannah Fry, Paul GillAbstract:In this paper, a unique dataset of improvised explosive device attacks during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland (NI) is analysed via a Hawkes process model. It is found that this past dependent model is a good fit to improvised explosive device attacks yielding key insights about the nature of terrorism in NI. We also present a novel approach to quantitatively investigate some of the sociological theory surrounding the Provisional Irish Republican Army which challenges previously held assumptions concerning changes seen in the organisation. Finally, we extend our use of the Hawkes process model by considering a multidimensional version which permits both self and mutual-excitations. This allows us to test how the Provisional Irish Republican Army responded to past improvised explosive device attacks on different geographical scales from which we find evidence for the autonomy of the organisation over the six counties of NI and Belfast. By incorporating a second dataset concerning British Security Force (BSF) interventions, the multidimensional model allows us to test counter-terrorism (CT) operations in NI where we find subsequent increases in violence.
-
Tiocfaidh ár Mná: Women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2012Co-Authors: Mia Bloom, Paul Gill, John HorganAbstract:This article seeks to answer the question of who were the women of the Provisional IRA and to assess any demographic patterns of PIRA involvement. We use a multi-method approach to describe the many roles and functions of female members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1970 to 1998. Drawing on a sample of 61 convicted or deceased PIRA members, we outline the shifting socio-demographic and operation profile of these women and how structural, tactical and strategic needs of PIRA accounted for those changes. Women in the Provisional IRA played crucial operational roles throughout the period both front-line and behind the scenes. From the outset of the conflict, women consistently took part in violent operations. We also provide a historical case study of Mairead Farrell's PIRA career to provide further illustrations of these themes in greater detail.
Robert W. White - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Provisional IRA Attacks on the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Implications for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2011Co-Authors: Robert W. WhiteAbstract:This article continues a discussion begun in the 1990s on the degree to which Provisional Irish Republican Army activities were sectarian. Henry Patterson's recent contribution raises issues that concern not only interpretations of the Irish conflict but also have implications for the more general study of the causes and consequences of political violence and terrorism. After addressing some of these issues, Patterson's contribution is placed more firmly into the framework of the previous discussion. Then follows a careful examination of Irish Republican Army attacks on the locally recruited security forces in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, from the 1950s to today.
-
Don't confuse me with the facts: More on the Irish Republican Army and sectarianism
Terrorism and Political Violence, 1998Co-Authors: Robert W. WhiteAbstract:In an article published in Terrorism and Political Violence 9/1 (Spring 1997), I carefully assessed the words and deeds of the Irish Republican Army. The assessment suggested that the motives of IRA members are political and not sectarian. The article prompted a comment by Steve Bruce in the same issue and my response to Bruce (TPV 9/2 (Summer 1997)). The current article is a response to James Dingley's comments on the initial article and my exchange with Steve Bruce. Dingley disputes the claims of the initial article and argues that, among other things, I have focused too much on a quantitative assessment of who the IRA kills. My response notes several errors and misstatements by Dingley, and shows that he has failed to seriously question my initial assessment.
-
The Irish Republican Army: An assessment of sectarianism
Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997Co-Authors: Robert W. WhiteAbstract:Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been active for more than 25 years, interpretations of the motivation of the IRA are varied. For some, it is a sectarian organization engaged in a tit‐for‐tat campaign with Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. For others, it is a guerrilla Army waging a military campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland. This article assesses the degree to which the IRA was or was not engaged in sectarian activity between July 1969 and December 1993. Although the Irish Republican Army killed more than 340 Protestant civilians in this time period, this examination suggests that the IRA, in general, was not a sectarian organization.
John Horgan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The Rational Foraging Terrorist: Analysing the Distances Travelled to Commit Terrorist Violence
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2017Co-Authors: Paul Gill, John Horgan, Emily CornerAbstract:This paper applies the distance-to-crime approach to the case of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and shooting attacks conducted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Northern...
-
Tiocfaidh ár Mná: Women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2012Co-Authors: Mia Bloom, Paul Gill, John HorganAbstract:This article seeks to answer the question of who were the women of the Provisional IRA and to assess any demographic patterns of PIRA involvement. We use a multi-method approach to describe the many roles and functions of female members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1970 to 1998. Drawing on a sample of 61 convicted or deceased PIRA members, we outline the shifting socio-demographic and operation profile of these women and how structural, tactical and strategic needs of PIRA accounted for those changes. Women in the Provisional IRA played crucial operational roles throughout the period both front-line and behind the scenes. From the outset of the conflict, women consistently took part in violent operations. We also provide a historical case study of Mairead Farrell's PIRA career to provide further illustrations of these themes in greater detail.
-
The provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and functional structure
Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997Co-Authors: John Horgan, Max TaylorAbstract:The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has long been regarded as one of the most highly organised and sophisticated terrorist groups the world has seen. The command and functional structure of this large, hierarchically‐organised movement is outlined here. The adaptability of the PIRA is noteworthy as demonstrated through a major structural and functional reorganisation accentuated by external pressures. While the threat of PIRA terrorism continues, recommendations are emphasised for understanding and encouraging analyses of the command and functional structures of an organisation such as this.
-
Proceedings of the Irish Republican Army general Army convention, December 1969
Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997Co-Authors: John Horgan, Max TaylorAbstract:(1997). Proceedings of the Irish Republican Army general Army convention, December 1969. Terrorism and Political Violence: Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 151-158.
Anthony Mcintyre - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Timothy Shanahan: The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism
Democracy and Security, 2011Co-Authors: Anthony McintyreAbstract:The status of most violent liberal democracy in the world is not one that any country or region, unless perversely enamoured of dysfunction, would seek to covet. Yet, some place has to get it, and ...
Thomas Leahy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The Influence of Informers and Agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army Military Strategy and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1976–94
Twentieth Century British History, 2014Co-Authors: Thomas LeahyAbstract:This article investigates the impact of British informers and agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) military strategy and British counter-insurgency strategy in Northern Ireland between 1976 and 1994. The importance of this topic was highlighted by revelations in 2003 and 2005 concerning two senior Republicans who had both been working for British intelligence for decades. While acknowledging other important factors, various authors believe that these intelligence successes were vital in containing the IRA, and significantly influenced that organization to end its military campaign in the 1990s. Yet after cross-referencing new interview material primarily with memoirs from various participants in the Northern Ireland conflict, this article reveals that the nature of many rural IRA units, its cellular structure in Belfast, and the isolation of the IRA leadership from the rest of the movement, prevented it from being damaged to any considerable extent by informers and agents. In fact, by the 1990s the resilience of the IRA was a crucial factor encouraging the British government to include Provisional Republicans in a political settlement. The IRA’s military strength by the 1990s also points towards the prominence of political factors in persuading the IRA to call a ceasefire by 1994. The role of spies in Northern Ireland and the circumstances in which the state permitted negotiations with paramilitaries such as the IRA, are key considerations for those interested in other recent and current conflicts.
