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Antitrust Division - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

John Mckay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account
    Social Science Research Network, 2007
    Co-Authors: John Mckay
    Abstract:

    Account of Firing of U.S. Attorneys in 2006 and the possiblity of criminal investigations against former Justice Department officials, including analysis of applicable criminal statutes.

  • Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account
    Seattle University Law Review, 2007
    Co-Authors: John Mckay
    Abstract:

    In a series of early morning phone calls on December 7, 2006, seven United States Attorneys were ordered to resign. Despite initial denials, it would later be revealed that two other U.S. Attorneys had also been ordered to submit their resignations, bringing the total number to nine. Each was given no explanation for the dismissal and most were led to believe that they alone were being dismissed, raising the specter of unstated wrongdoing and encouraging silent departures. Those dismissed uniformly cited the maxim that they “served at the pleasure of the President” and most sought to avoid publicly disputing the Justice Department or the White House. So what happened? Why were the nine dismissed? Were political considerations allowed to trump the proud heritage of non-partisan, independent prosecutions in a Justice Department widely trusted as the guardian of civil rights? Did the White House or senior Justice Department officials direct the removal of U.S. Attorneys for failing to satisfy local partisans or to retaliate for certain public corruption prosecutions? Have officials lied to cover up wrongdoing and to avoid criminal prosecution? Can the damage to the Justice Department be undone, restoring the role of federal prosecutors as disdainful of politics and devoted to accountability, fairness, and the firm execution of the nation’s laws? These questions were the subject of a public forum on May 9, 2007, sponsored by Seattle University School of Law, and serve in part as the basis for this Article by one of the participants of the forum (and a fired U.S. Attorney).

Tony G. Poveda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Clinton, Crime, and the Justice Department
    Social Justice, 1994
    Co-Authors: Tony G. Poveda
    Abstract:

    Ideological Confusion? In his influential book on criminal Justice policy, Samuel Walker (1994:21) argues that crime policy in the 1990s is characterized by ideological confusion, with some liberals and conservatives crossing over on certain issues, such as drug legalization and the death penalty. One implication of this observation is that the old conservative-liberal dichotomy may not be as useful as it once was as today's intellectuals and policymakers depart from their ideological positions of a generation ago. Although this may be true, what is even more striking about the crime policy debate of the 1990s is that it has considerably narrowed in terms of the range of policy options on the table for discussion. Liberals of the 1960s often called for an examination of the root causes of crime, the rehabilitation of offenders, and for procedural safeguards in the administration of Justice. Conservatives of that period, like today, emphasized punishment and crime control in their crime agenda. These poles (crime prevention venus punishment and due process versus crime control) of the traditional liberal-conservative dialogue have largely disappeared, as measures emphasizing punishment far overshadow any consideration of crime prevention. Instead, the major policy debate in the 1990s, at least in the congressional arena and in the media, centers on the punishment/crime control end of the continuum. Both conservatives and liberals attempt to outdo each other in their posturing and proposals to be increasingly punitive toward criminals. Insofar as this analysis is concerned with criminal Justice policy in the Clinton era and how it departs from, or simply extends, the policies of the Reagan-Bush years, the focus will be on the congressional crime debate of 1993 and 1994, which spanned the first year and one-half of President Bill Clinton's first term in office. During that period both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House passed their own versions of a crime bill (The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act): the Senate bill passed on November 19, 1993, and the House bill on April 21, 1994. The two versions were sent to a joint committee of the Senate and the House to iron out their differences. After much partisan wrangling, a $30 billion crime bill finally passed both legislative chambers in August (Wines, 1994a: A1; Clymer, 1994). The Congressional Crime Debate of 1993-1994 The narrowing of the ideological spectrum was clearly in evidence in the congressional crime debate of 1993-1994. The crime bills of both the House and Senate expanded the federal death penalty by more than 50 additional offenses. In its first day of deliberations, the House passed 47 amendments in one vote with little debate; many of those provisions related to extending capital punishment. One of the more contentious issues related to how difficult to make the appeal process for death-row inmates, including whether statistical evidence of racial bias could be used in such appeals (Seelye, 1994a: A23; Wines, 1994b: A13). In the House, gun-control legislation to ban certain types of assault weapons was an especially divisive issue, which finally passed in a separate bill by two votes (Seelye, 1994b: A1). Moreover, the slogan that captured much of the public discourse on crime in the first months of 1994 was a baseball metaphor, "three strikes and you're out." The basic idea behind this measure was to have mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for offenders convicted of three violent crimes. This proposal quickly gained widespread popularity with conservatives and liberals, including President Clinton, endorsing some version of the idea.(1) The major issue in this measure was which offenses to count as violent crimes toward the "three strikes" and some questioned whether "three strikes" were too many. Both the Senate and House crime bills contained provisions for mandatory life sentences for three-time violent offenders (which included drug offenders). …

  • White-collar crime and the Justice Department: The institutionalization of a concept
    Crime Law and Social Change, 1992
    Co-Authors: Tony G. Poveda
    Abstract:

    The sudden and unexpected incorporation of white-collar crime as a top investigative priority of the U.S. Justice Department of the 1970s is the focus of this inquiry. This pursuit of white-collar crime is especially problematic for instrumentalist and structuralist variants of conflict theory, which generally view the origins of law in terms of the interests of a ruling or capitalist class. This apparent contradiction between official concern for white-collar crime and instrumentalist and structuralist theories of law creation is examined in the context of the “discovery” of white-collar crime by the Justice Department. It is noted that in the process of operationalizing white-collar crime, the Justice Department transformed the traditional (Sutherland) definition of white-collar crime so that targeted offenders are not limited to the economic and political elite, but instead are drawn from all social classes. This modification of the definition has far-reaching implications for assessing the nature of the Justice Department's response to the problem of elite crime and provides insight into the ongoing theoretical debate on the origins of law.

Linda S. Gottfredson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Racially gerrymandering the content of police tests to satisfy the U.S. Justice Department: A case study.
    Psychology Public Policy and Law, 1996
    Co-Authors: Linda S. Gottfredson
    Abstract:

    Discrimination law and its aggressive enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice both falsely assume that all racial-ethnic groups would pass job-related, unbiased employment tests at the same rate. Unreasonable law and enforcement create pressure for personnel psychologists to violate professional principles and lower the merit relatedness of tests in the service of race-based goals. This article illustrates such a case by describing how the content of a police entrance examination in Nassau County, New York, was stripped of crucial cognitive demands to change the racial composition of the applicants who seemed most qualified. The test was thereby rendered nearly worthless for actually making such determinations. The article concludes by examining the implications of the case for policing in Nassau County, Congressional oversight of Justice Department activities, and psychology's role in helping its members to avoid such coercion.

Steven J. Mulroy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • limited cumulative evidence divining Justice Department positions on alternative electoral schemes
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Steven J. Mulroy
    Abstract:

    The Department of Justice has never explicitly stated a policy regarding the appropriateness of alternative, non-district electoral systems, such as limited voting, cumulative voting, or preference voting, to remedy minority vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, except to say that they may be appropriate in certain circumstances to correct the problem of under-representation of minorities. However, an examination of the Department's administrative preclearance determinations, and the position taken during litigation, reveals certain patterns in Department treatment of these issues. Specifically, the Department supports the use of such systems, provided that the minority group is sufficiently numerous to make use of them, and provided that a sufficiently ambitious voter education program is used to ensure that voters understand them.

  • Limited, cumulative evidence: Dividing Justice Department positions on alternative electoral schemes
    National Civic Review, 1995
    Co-Authors: Steven J. Mulroy
    Abstract:

    The U.S. Justice Department exhibits an inclinaton to preclear modified at-large voting plans where the viability of a conventional single-member district scheme is low, and the local jurisdiction's commitment to voter education and outreach is high.

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