The Experts below are selected from a list of 5622 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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climate change negotiations and first mover advantages the case of the wind turbine industry
Energy Policy, 2006Co-Authors: Urs Steiner Brandt, Gert Tinggaard SvendsenAbstract:Individual EU member countries, such as Denmark and Germany, may have a rational economic interest in creating comparative advantages for renewable energy sources in order to capitalise on their first-mover advantages in these industries. We demonstrate that different means of implementing the Kyoto Agreement affect the potential to market new renewable technologies, e.g. wind turbines, to other countries subsequent to their ratification of the Kyoto target levels. This article shows that a transnationally grandfathered Tradable Permit System (TPS) renders the shadow price of emissions reductions lower in the high-cost reduction countries. Export opportunities to these countries will consequently be reduced under a transnational TPS, e.g. from the EU to the US. This could also serve to explain EU opposition to a fully flexible TPS in The Hague in 2001. Instead, the latest EU proposal delivered in Johannesburg pushed for setting a target of 15% of all energy to come from sources of renewable energy, e.g. wind turbines, solar panels, biomass and waves, by 2015. Such initiative would further EU industrial interests globally. Future research should, however, attempt to provide more empirical evidence concerning this proposition and its importance compared to other concerns.
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industry lobbying and the political economy of ghg trade in the european union
Energy Policy, 2005Co-Authors: Peter Markussen, Gert Tinggaard SvendsenAbstract:The European Union (EU) has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target level following the Kyoto Agreement. In September 2003 the EU member states has agreed on the Directive for establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the European Union. This directive is the outcome of a policy process started by the EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final directive proposal. Comparing the initial Green Paper proposal (before lobbyism) to the final directive (after lobbyism) gave us a unique possibility for measuring the effect of lobbyism. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final design of an EU GHG market. This industrial rent-seeking most prominently leads to a grandfathered permit allocation rule like the one found in the US tradeable permit systems.
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the political economy of the european union institutions policy and economic growth
2003Co-Authors: Gert Tinggaard SvendsenAbstract:Political economy: political economy public choice school - welfare effects, tariff and quota the collective good analysis - group action, full market liberalization, status quo, asymmetrical political pressure institutional economics - formal and informal institutions, lobbyism, corruption economic growth - modern economic growth theories, production factors, free-trade critics - societal norms, excess co-operation social capital - definition, why social capital?, measurement, building social capital EU disease. European Union: Rome Treaty cost-sharing EU institutions - voting rules, the EU Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Court of Justice, staff and budget common agricultural policy lobbyism - interest groups, regulating lobbyism corruption - 1999 crisis, Paul Van Buitenen, corruption perceptions index SC measurement - world values survey, Western and Eastern Europe economic growth - EU protectionism, enlargements, EU, Eastern Europe and United States conclusion. Interest group theory and the case of environmental regulation: environmental regulation green paper and directive proposal why CO2 first? potential gains from CO2 trade in the EU industrial rent-seeking bureaucratic rent-seeking - cost maximization, free access resource, choice of policy instrument lobbyism and allocation rule measuring lobbyism, industrial interest groups, bureaucracy, explanations design - target group and price manipulation, allocation, mix with other instruments, control system conclusion and policy recommendation. International climate negotiations and wind energy: introduction Kyoto Agreement - flexible mechanisms and ratification, burden-sharing and Kyoto target levels the Hague failure - United States withdrawal, supplementary principle, carbon sinks, control system, carbon leakage net gains for countries participation of the United States wind energy as backstop technology - switch point, empirical results wind turbine pioneers subsidies and the wind turbine market - subsidies, wind energy market, future market development conclusion.
Bengt Hillring - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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world trade in forest products and wood fuel
Biomass & Bioenergy, 2006Co-Authors: Bengt HillringAbstract:Abstract Wood fuel is a strategic resource for future energy supply and is usually utilised locally. Traditional use of wood fuel and other bioenergy has a share of 10–15% energy supply, used mainly for the household sector. The utilisation for industrial purposes is much smaller but is a strategic resource in the effort to fulfil the Kyoto Agreement to replace fossil fuels and to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Many industrialised countries already use a significant share of biofuels in their energy supply e.g. Nordic countries while others like some other European Union countries are planning to increase their use. Production and use of biofuels need to be carried out sustainable. Official statistics do not report trade in such detail that international trade in different biomass types can be fully identified. However, FAO and European Forestry Institute are important sources. In some countries, there is a growing interest in the international trade, because the trade can provide biofuels at lower prices, larger quantities and better quality than domestic alternatives. The first signs of an international market price for wood fuel are indicated in Europe. For the future both the use and the trade of wood fuel is expected to increase. Analyses for trade in charcoal, wood chips, fuel wood and wood residues made in this report identify ‘hot’ trade spots in Europe, in south East Asia and in North America.
Dirk T G Rubbelke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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climate policy and ancillary benefits a survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change
Ecological Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Karen Pittel, Dirk T G RubbelkeAbstract:Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future Agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto Agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.
Peter Markussen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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industry lobbying and the political economy of ghg trade in the european union
Energy Policy, 2005Co-Authors: Peter Markussen, Gert Tinggaard SvendsenAbstract:The European Union (EU) has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target level following the Kyoto Agreement. In September 2003 the EU member states has agreed on the Directive for establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the European Union. This directive is the outcome of a policy process started by the EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final directive proposal. Comparing the initial Green Paper proposal (before lobbyism) to the final directive (after lobbyism) gave us a unique possibility for measuring the effect of lobbyism. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final design of an EU GHG market. This industrial rent-seeking most prominently leads to a grandfathered permit allocation rule like the one found in the US tradeable permit systems.
Karen Pittel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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climate policy and ancillary benefits a survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change
Ecological Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Karen Pittel, Dirk T G RubbelkeAbstract:Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future Agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto Agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.
