Kyoto Protocol

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Carlos A Nobre - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • tropical deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol
    Climatic Change, 2005
    Co-Authors: Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel C Nepstad, Lisa M Curran, Carlos A Nobre
    Abstract:

    The current annual rates of tropical deforestation from Brazil and Indonesia alone would equal four-fifths of the emissions reductions gained by implementing the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period, jeopardizing the goal of Protocol to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. We propose the novel concept of “compensated reduction”, whereby countries that elect to reduce national level deforestation to below a previously determined historical level would receive post facto compensation, and commit to stabilize or further reduce deforestation in the future. Such a program could create large-scale incentives to reduce tropical deforestation, as well as for broader developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and leverage support for the continuity of the Protocol beyond the 2008–2012 first commitment period.

Marcio Santilli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • tropical deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol
    Climatic Change, 2005
    Co-Authors: Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel C Nepstad, Lisa M Curran, Carlos A Nobre
    Abstract:

    The current annual rates of tropical deforestation from Brazil and Indonesia alone would equal four-fifths of the emissions reductions gained by implementing the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period, jeopardizing the goal of Protocol to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. We propose the novel concept of “compensated reduction”, whereby countries that elect to reduce national level deforestation to below a previously determined historical level would receive post facto compensation, and commit to stabilize or further reduce deforestation in the future. Such a program could create large-scale incentives to reduce tropical deforestation, as well as for broader developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and leverage support for the continuity of the Protocol beyond the 2008–2012 first commitment period.

  • Tropical deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol. An editorial essay
    2005
    Co-Authors: Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel C Nepstad, L Curran, C Nobre
    Abstract:

    The current annual rates of tropical deforestation from Brazil and Indonesia alone would equal four-fifths of the emissions reductions gained by implementing the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period, jeopardizing the goal of Protocol to avoid 'dangerous anthropogenic interference' with the climate system. We propose the novel concept of 'compensated reduction', whereby countries that elect to reduce national level deforestation to below a previously determined historical level would receive post facto compensation, and commit to stabilize or further reduce deforestation in the future. Such a program could create large-scale incentives to reduce tropical deforestation, as well as for broader developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and leverage support for the continuity of the Protocol beyond the 2008-2012 first commitment period.

Chien Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • multi gas assessment of the Kyoto Protocol
    Nature, 1999
    Co-Authors: John M Reilly, Ronald G Prinn, Jochen Harnisch, Jean Fitzmaurice, Henry D Jacoby, David W Kicklighter, Peter H Stone, Andrei P Sokolov, Chien Wang
    Abstract:

    The Kyoto Protocol allows reductions in emissions of several ‘greenhouse’ gases to be credited against a CO2-equivalent emissions limit, calculated using ‘global warming potential’ indices for each gas. Using an integrated global-systems model, it is shown that a multi-gas control strategy could greatly reduce the costs of fulfilling the Kyoto Protocol compared with a CO2-only strategy. Extending the Kyoto Protocol to 2100 without more severe emissions reductions shows little difference between the two strategies in climate and ecosystem effects. Under a more stringent emissions policy, the use of global warming potentials as applied in the Kyoto Protocol leads to considerably more mitigation of climate change for multi-gas strategies than for the—supposedly equivalent—CO2-only control, thus emphasizing the limits of global warming potentials as a tool for political decisions.

Christoph Bohringer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol – Just Symbolic Policy!
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2004
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

  • The Kyoto Protocol: A Review and Perspectives
    Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer
    Abstract:

    International concern about climate change has led to the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, which contains legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries to be achieved during the commitment period 2008-2012. While proponents of the Protocol celebrate it as a breakthrough in international climate policy, opponents criticize that its approach, namely setting targets and timetables for emission reductions, is seriously flawed. This paper provides a critical assessment of the Protocols potential performance and discusses amendments to foster its effectiveness and efficiency. It concludes that, even without any effective emission reductions in the initial commitment period, the ratification of Kyoto is important for the further policy process of climate protection. The Kyoto Protocol has established a flexible broad-based international mechanism that provides a valuable starting point for shaping efficient climate policies in the future.

  • economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    In 2003 the Kyoto Protocol, which imposes legally binding greenhouse gas emission constraints on industrialized countries, is likely to enter into force. The Protocol has been celebrated as a milestone in climate protection, but standard economic theory casts doubt that it will go beyond symbolic policy. In this paper, we show that the final concretion of the Kyoto Protocol is consistent with the theoretical prediction: Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual without significant compliance costs to ratifying parties. JEL Classification: D58, Q43, Q58 Consequences economiques et environnementales du Protocole de Kyoto En 2003, le Protocole de Kyoto, qui impose aux pays industrialises l’obligation de reduire leurs emissions de gaz a effet de serre, entrera probablement en vigueur. Si le Protocole a ete accueilli comme un grand pas en avant dans le combat pour proteger l’environnement, la theorie economique jette un regard sceptique sur la portee reelle d’un tel accord et le considere comme un geste symbolique. Dans ce memoire, on montre que la concretisation finale de l’accord de Kyoto s’arrime aux predictions theoriques : Kyoto n’est rien de plus que « business-as-usual » et n’impliquera pas de couts significatifs pour les parties qui ont signe le Protocole.

  • assessing the costs of compliance the Kyoto Protocol
    European Environment, 2002
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Andreas Loschel
    Abstract:

    After the political agreement at the Bonn climate talks, the Kyoto Protocol is now ready for ratification. Key policy questions surrounding the ultimate implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and any follow-up international agreement on climate protection require quantitative assessment, i.e. the use of analytical models that mimic the potential economic impacts of alternative emission reduction policies. In this paper, we assess the costs of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. The simulation results reveal why the USA has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, while several other Annex B countries have pushed for an implicit relaxation of their Kyoto targets. International trade in emissions significantly reduces the total costs of compliance with Kyoto. We also explore the robustness of results with respect to changes in the values of key elasticities as well as other major assumptions, such as the baseline growth path or the scope of the abatement coalition (Kyoto with and without the USA). The sensitivity analysis helps to create an understanding of key assumptions that determine the quantitative model results and the policy conclusions to be drawn. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment

  • Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just Symbolic Policy!
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

Carsten Vogt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol – Just Symbolic Policy!
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2004
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

  • economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    In 2003 the Kyoto Protocol, which imposes legally binding greenhouse gas emission constraints on industrialized countries, is likely to enter into force. The Protocol has been celebrated as a milestone in climate protection, but standard economic theory casts doubt that it will go beyond symbolic policy. In this paper, we show that the final concretion of the Kyoto Protocol is consistent with the theoretical prediction: Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual without significant compliance costs to ratifying parties. JEL Classification: D58, Q43, Q58 Consequences economiques et environnementales du Protocole de Kyoto En 2003, le Protocole de Kyoto, qui impose aux pays industrialises l’obligation de reduire leurs emissions de gaz a effet de serre, entrera probablement en vigueur. Si le Protocole a ete accueilli comme un grand pas en avant dans le combat pour proteger l’environnement, la theorie economique jette un regard sceptique sur la portee reelle d’un tel accord et le considere comme un geste symbolique. Dans ce memoire, on montre que la concretisation finale de l’accord de Kyoto s’arrime aux predictions theoriques : Kyoto n’est rien de plus que « business-as-usual » et n’impliquera pas de couts significatifs pour les parties qui ont signe le Protocole.

  • Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just Symbolic Policy!
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
    Co-Authors: Christoph Bohringer, Carsten Vogt
    Abstract:

    We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.