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Thomas Uebel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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American Pragmatism and the Vienna Circle. The Early Years
2015Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Discussions of the relation between pragmatism and Logical Empiricism tend to focus on the period when the Logical empiricists found themselves in exile, mostly in the United States, and then attempt to gauge the actual extent of their convergence. My concern lies with the period before that and the question whether pragmatism had an earlier influence on the development of Logical Empiricism, especially on the thought of the former members of the “first” Vienna Circle. I argue for a substantially qualified affirmative answer.
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The Berlin Group of Logical Empiricism
Metascience, 2014Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:This volume offers a very welcome in-depth look at a particular group of the philosophers associated with the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy (from 1931: Scientific Philosophy). The editors stress that these two groupings differ and call only the former the ‘‘Berlin Group for scientific philosophy’’ (though not all contributors observe this distinction): Hans Reichenbach, Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Paul Oppenheim and Carl Gustav Hempel. Parts I and II provide introductions and historical context for the group as a whole and Parts III–VI consider highly specific aspects of the work of its members but for two overview papers on Grelling and Hempel (by the editors written separately). To appreciate the volume best, it may be helpful to distinguish between the straightforward historical investigations and the more revisionist historiographical contributions, the latter much smaller in number but prominently placed by one of the editors. While the former will be applauded unreservedly for enriching and deepening our understanding of the philosophers discussed, the latter certainly will—and perhaps was intended—to provoke dissent. I begin with an outline of the former before turning to the latter. Part II provides deep historical background in Helmut Pulte’s ‘‘J.F. Fries’ Philosophy of Science, the New Friesian School and the Berlin Group: On Divergent Scientific Philosophies, Difficult Relations and Missed Opportunities’’. Pulte fulfils his agenda with a very accessible account of the philosophy of science that Fries inherited from Kant, its reception by both the New Friesians (Leonard Nelson) and the Berlin Group and the relations between these two groups (Grelling, Dubislav and Reichenbach had associations with Nelson). Special attention is paid to the critical reception of the special theory of relativity by the New Friesians (Bernays) and the debates over truth in geometry which led Grelling to switch his
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Logical positivism Logical Empiricism what s in a name
Perspectives on Science, 2013Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Do the terms “Logical positivism” and “Logical Empiricism” mark a philosophically real and signiacant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the arst term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “Logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “Logical Empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society for Scientiac Philosophy around Hans Reichenbach which included Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin and a young Carl Gustav Hempel. The person who called the co-referentiality of the two terms into question was Reichenbach himself. He did so in two publications of the second half of the 1930s—in an article in Journal of Philosophy (1936) and in his Experience and Prediction (1938)—in order to alert readers to important differences between his own philosophy and that of the Vienna Circle. Reichenbach’s distinction was taken up by his former student Wesley Salmon. Not only did Salmon restate it, but he also asserted, categorically and very much in Reichenbach’s spirit, that “our chief inheritance from Logical positivism” is “Logical Empiricism” ([1985] 2005, p. 7). The story of this inheritance is the story of “twentieth-century scientiac philosophy”:
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"Logical Positivism"— "Logical Empiricism": What's in a Name?
Perspectives on Science, 2013Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Do the terms “Logical positivism” and “Logical Empiricism” mark a philosophically real and signiacant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the arst term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “Logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “Logical Empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society for Scientiac Philosophy around Hans Reichenbach which included Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin and a young Carl Gustav Hempel. The person who called the co-referentiality of the two terms into question was Reichenbach himself. He did so in two publications of the second half of the 1930s—in an article in Journal of Philosophy (1936) and in his Experience and Prediction (1938)—in order to alert readers to important differences between his own philosophy and that of the Vienna Circle. Reichenbach’s distinction was taken up by his former student Wesley Salmon. Not only did Salmon restate it, but he also asserted, categorically and very much in Reichenbach’s spirit, that “our chief inheritance from Logical positivism” is “Logical Empiricism” ([1985] 2005, p. 7). The story of this inheritance is the story of “twentieth-century scientiac philosophy”:
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Opposition to 'Verstehen' in Orthodox Logical Empiricism
Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen, 2009Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Let’s begin with an unexciting commonplace about Logical Empiricism in order to raise a question about what follows from it. In trying to answer it we shall find that matters are not as cut and dried as is often supposed - even before we get to heterodox representatives of the movement like Otto Neurath.
Thomas Mormann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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philipp frank s austro american Logical Empiricism
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017Co-Authors: Thomas MormannAbstract:The aim of this article is to discuss the “Austro-American” Logical Empiricism proposed by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, which he considered the charter of Logical Empiricism as a scientific world conception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas of Mach and Poincare, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, Frank intended to bring about a rapprochement between the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle in exile and American pragmatism. In the course of this project, in the last years of his career, Frank outlined a comprehensive, socially engaged philosophy of science that could serve as a “link between science and philosophy.”
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Philipp Frank’s Austro-American Logical Empiricism
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017Co-Authors: Thomas MormannAbstract:The aim of this article is to discuss the “Austro-American” Logical Empiricism proposed by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, which he considered the charter of Logical Empiricism as a scientific world conception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas of Mach and Poincare, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, Frank intended to bring about a rapprochement between the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle in exile and American pragmatism. In the course of this project, in the last years of his career, Frank outlined a comprehensive, socially engaged philosophy of science that could serve as a “link between science and philosophy.”
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Appropriating Kuhn’s Philosophical Legacy. Three Attempts: Logical Empiricism, Structuralism, and Neokantianism
2010Co-Authors: Andoni Ibarra, Thomas MormannAbstract:In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical Logical Empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-Logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of Logical Empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called structuralist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori.
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appropriating kuhn s philosophical legacy three attempts Logical Empiricism structuralism and neokantianism
2010Co-Authors: Andoni Ibarra, Thomas MormannAbstract:In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical Logical Empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-Logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of Logical Empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called structuralist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori.
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Carnap’s Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2007Co-Authors: Thomas MormannAbstract:Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature Logical Empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between Logical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a Logical and empiricist scientific philosophy.
Friedrich Stadler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the vienna circle studies in the origins development and influence of Logical Empiricism
2015Co-Authors: Friedrich StadlerAbstract:Preface to the 2nd English Edition.- Prologue: On the Rise of Scientific Philosophy - An Overview.- Chapter 1.The Origins of Logical Empiricism - Roots of the Vienna Circle before the First World War.- Part I: The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism Between The Wars - Emergence and Banishment.- Chapter 2. The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism in the First Republic.- Chapter 3.The Non-Public Phase of the Vienna Circle 1918-1928.- Chapter 4.The Public Phase of the Vienna Circle: From 1929 until the "Anschluss".- Chapter 5. Karl Menger's Vienna Circle: The Mathematical Colloquium 1928-1936.- Chapter 6. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Thought Style and Thought Collective.- Chapter 7. Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper, and the Vienna Circle - Between Demarcation and Family Resemblance.- Chapter 8. The Philosophical and Political Pluralism of the Vienna Circle - The Example of Otto Neurath and Moritz Schlick.- Chapter 9. The Role of the Universities and Institutions of Adult Education - The Demise of Reason.- Chapter 10: Epilogue: The Exodus of Scientific Reason.- Part II: The Vienna Circle - The Biographical and Bibliographical Dimension.- Chapter 11: An Overview of the Vienna Circle.- Chapter 12. The Vienna Circle and its Periphery - Biographies and Bibliographies.- Chapter 13. Documentation: The Murder of Moritz Schlick.- Sources and Literature.- Index of Names.
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Vienna Circle: Logical Empiricism
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2015Co-Authors: Friedrich StadlerAbstract:The Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism or Logical Positivism, sometimes better known as ‘Schlick-Circle,’ is described as a philosophical movement between the two World Wars in Vienna with its main proponents and its theoretical program based on the manifesto of 1929 covering ‘scientific philosophy’ and ‘scientific conception of the world.’ On the one side, the international networking and acknowledgment is characterized, and at the same time the marginalization in Austria and Central Europe caused by the rise of Fascism and National Socialism, on the other, which resulted in the forced migration and placement in the Anglo-Saxon world. As one typical member of this movement Otto Neurath is characterized, who was also dealing with sociology, the social sciences including picture language, although the Vienna Circle is mainly known by its focus on logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences.
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The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism in the First Republic
The Vienna Circle, 2015Co-Authors: Friedrich StadlerAbstract:As we have seen above, between 1907 and 1911 the proto-circle of what would later emerge as the Vienna Circle was formed with Hans Hahn, Philipp Frank, Otto Neurath, and also Richard von Mises. Essential elements of Logical Empiricism were already anticipated in that discussion group, but World War 1 represented a radical caesura within this intellectual development. It could not, however, permanently stop the efforts to bring about a renewal and a “turn in philosophy.” The return of Hans Hahn to Vienna as professor for mathematics in the summer semester of 1921 signified the launching of scientific philosophy in terms of content and organization.
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The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-Evaluation and Future Perspectives
2003Co-Authors: Friedrich Stadler, Paolo Parrini, Arne Naess, Anita Von Duhn, David Jalal Hyder, Hubert SchleichertAbstract:A: The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. What is the Vienna Circle? Some MethodoLogical and Historiographical Answers F. Stadler. I: Origins and History. Pluralism of Tenable World Views A. Naess. On the Formation of Logical Empiricism P. Parrini. Bolzano's Account of Justification A. Von Duhn. Kantian Metaphysics and Hertzian Mechanics D.J. Hyder. II: Moritz Schlick. Moritz Schlick's Idea of Non-territorial States H. Schleichert. An Unknown Side of Moritz Schlick's Intellectual Biography: the Reviews for the 'Vierteljahrschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie' (191 1-1916) M. Ferrari. Between Meaning and Demarcation H.J. Wendel. 'Let's Talk about Flourishing!' - Moritz Schlick and the Non-cognitive Foundation of Virtue Ethics D. Borchers. III: Hans Reichenbach. Coordination and Convention in Hans Reichenbach's Philosophy of Space C. Klein. Reichenbach's epsilon-Definition of Simultaneity in Historical and Philosophical Perspective R. Rynasiewicz. IV: Other Proponents and Periphery. Towards a Physicalistic Attitude J. Manninen. Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Felix Kaufmann W. Huemer. Bela von Juhos and the Concept of 'Konstatierungen' A. Koterski. Wittgenstein's Constructivization of Euler's Proof of the Infinity of Primes P. Mancosu, M. Marion. Quine's Historical Argument for Epistemology Naturalized G. DePierris. V: Unity and Plurality. Two Uses of Unification E. Sober. Unity and Plurality in the Concept of Causation C. Hitchcock. Edgar Zilsel's Research Programme: Unity of Science as an Empirical Problem D. Raven. VI: Contexts ofScience. Criticizing a Difference of Contexts - On Reichenbach's Distinction between 'Context of Discovery' and 'Context of Justification' G. Schiemann. Contextualizing an EpistemoLogical Issue: the Case of Error in Experiment G. Hon. The Contexts of Scientific Justification. Some Reflections on the Relation between EpistemoLogical Contextualism and Philosophy of Science J. Schickore. VII: Epistemology. Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology D. Cohnitz. Structure and Heuristic: in Praise of Structural Realism in the Case of Niels Bohr F.O. Engler. VIII: Ethics. The Neutrality of Meta-Ethics Revisited - How to Draw on Einstein and the Vienna Circle in Developing an Adequate Account of Morals U. Czaniera. IX: Women of Logical Empiricism. No Woman, no Try? - Else Frenkel-Brunswik and the Project of Integrating Psychoanalysis into the Unity of Science D. Borchers. Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis M. Beaney. Susan Stebbing's Criticism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus N. Milkov. Rose Rand: a Woman in Logic A. Hamacher-Hermes. B: General Part. Report - Documentation. Logical Positivism in Russia O. Nazarova. Reviews. Ernst Mach's Vienna 1895-1930 or Phenomenalism as Philosophy of Science. Edited by John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht 2001 Erik Banks. Herbert Hochberg, The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism, Rodopi: Amsterdam/Atlanta 2001 E. Tegtmeier. Liliana Albertazzi / Dale Jacquette / Roberto Poli (eds.), The School of Alexius Meinong (= Western philosophy series 57), Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2001 Maria Reicher. M. Ferr
Alan Richardson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism
2007Co-Authors: Thomas Uebel, Alan RichardsonAbstract:Introduction Part I. The Historical Context of Logical Empiricsm: 1. The Vienna circle: context, profile, and development Friedrich Stadler 2. The Berlin 'Society for Empirical/Scientific Philosophy' Dieter Hoffman 3. From 'The Life of the Present' to the 'Icy Slopes of Logic': Logical Empiricism, the unity of science movement and the Cold War George Reisch Part II. Logical Empiricism: Issues in General Philosophy of Science: 4. Coordination, constitution, and convention: the evolution of the a priori in Logical Empiricism Michael Friedman 5. Confirmation, probability, and Logical Empiricism Maria Carla Galavotti 6. The structure of scientific theories in Logical Empiricism Thomas Mormann Part III. Logical Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Special Sciences: 7. The turning point and the revolution: philosophy of mathematics in Logical Empiricism from Tractatus to Logical Syntax Steve Awodey and A.W. Carus 8. Logical Empiricism and the philosophy of physics Thomas Ryckman 9. Logical Empiricism and the philosophy of psychology Gary L. Hardcastle 10. Logical Empiricism and the history and sociology of science Elisabeth Nemeth 11. Philosophy of social science in early Logical Empiricism: the case of radical physicalism Thomas Uebel Part IV. Logical Empiricism and Its Critics: 12. Wittgenstein, the Vienna circle, and physicalism: a reassessment David Stern 13. Vienna, the city of Quine's dreams Richard Creath 14. That sort of everyday image of Logical positivism: Thomas Kuhn and the decline of Logical empiricist philosophy of science Alan Richardson.
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‘Logical Empiricism’ and the philosophy of science
Minerva, 2007Co-Authors: Alan RichardsonAbstract:'Philosophy of science' suggests to many a highly technical project that offers Logical analyses of scientific and metascientific terms a perspective that may not greatly appeal to historians, sociologists, or scientists. This image of philosophy of science owes much to a common understanding of Logical Empiricism (nee positivism), a project that seemed to attempt to force all of science, and all of our understanding of science, into the Procrustean bed of formal logic. George Reisch laments this vision of the philosophy of science, and seeks to complicate it in a novel way, by arguing that Logical Empiricism might have bequeathed to us a very different philosophy of science. In so doing, he conducts us through a history of Logical Empiricism in its European phase during the 1920s and 1930s. He recovers the socialist agenda then at the heart of Logical Empiricism, and notes its alliances with progressivist wings in early twentieth-century American philosophy. He then offers a history of the technical and apolitical project that philosophy of science has become. As the title telegraphs, Reisch argues that the Cold War led the Logical empiricists many of them immigrants from Germany or Austria, often Jewish, and often with socialist leanings away from their youthful political engagement, towards philosophical isolationism. That there is an important political history to the philosophy of science in the twentieth century is largely unknown to many in the profession. Most philosophers of science tacitly endorse a 'liberal neutralist' account of science: they believe that scientific knowledge
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Logical Empiricism in North America
2003Co-Authors: Gary L. Hardcastle, Alan RichardsonAbstract:This latest volume in the longest-standing and most influential series in the field of the philosophy of science extends and expands on the discipline's recent historical turn. These essays take up the historical, socioLogical, and philosophical questions surrounding the particular intellectual movement of Logical Empiricism-both its emigration from Europe to North America in the 1930s and 1940s and its development in North America through the 1940s and 1950s. With an introduction placing them in their philosophical and historical context, these essays bear witness to the fact that the history of the philosophy of science, far more than a mere repository of anecdote and chronology, might be able to produce a decisive transformation in the philosophy of science itself. Contributors: Richard Creath, Arizona State U; Michael Friedman, Stanford U; Rudolf Haller, U of Graz; Don Howard, Notre Dame; Diederick Raven, U of Utrecht; George Reisch; Thomas Ricketts, Northwestern U; Friedrich K. Stadler, U of Vienna; Thomas E. Uebel, U of Manchester.
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Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism
Philosophical Review, 2000Co-Authors: Thomas Uebel, Alan RichardsonAbstract:Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Reconstructing the Aufbau 2. The problem of objectivity: an overview of Carnap's constitutional project 3. An outline of the constitutional projects for objectivity 4. The background to early Carnap: themes from Kant 5. The fundamentals of neo-Kantian epistemology 6. Carnap's neo-Kantian origins: Der Raum 7. Critical conventionalism 8. Epistemology between logic and science: the essential tension 9. After objectivity: Logical Empiricism as philosophy of science Bibliography Index.
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Origins Of Logical Empiricism
1996Co-Authors: Ronald N. Giere, Alan RichardsonAbstract:Part 1 The cultural and philosophical context: constructing modernism - the cultural location of "Aufbau", Peter Galison overcoming metaphysics - Carnap and Heidegger, Michael Friedman Neurath against method, Nancy Cartwright and Jordi Cat the Enlightenment ambition of epistemic utopiansim - Otto Neurath's theory of science in historical perspective, Thomas E. Uebel. Part 2 Science, philosophy and scientific philosophy: relativity, "eindeutigkeit" and monomorphism - Rudolf Carnap and the development of the categoricity concept in formal semantics, Don Howard Einstein "agonists" - Weyl and Reichenbach on geometry and the general theory of relativity, T.A. Ryckman. Part 3 Logic, mathematics and philosophy: the philosophy of mathematics in early positivism, Warrent Goldfarb Carnap - from Logical syntax to semantics, Thomas Ricketts languages without logic, Richard Creath. Part 4 Experience, empirical knowledge and Empiricism: postscript to protocols - reflections on Empiricism, Thomas Oberdan conceptual knowledge and intuitive experience - Schlick's dilemma, Joia Lewis Turner from epistemology to the logic of science - Carnap's philosophy of empirical knowledge in the 1930s, Alan W. Richardson.
Adam Tamas Tuboly - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Philipp Frank’s decline and the crisis of Logical Empiricism
Studies in East European Thought, 2017Co-Authors: Adam Tamas TubolyAbstract:The aim of the paper is to consider the narrative that Philipp Frank’s decline in the United States started in the 1940s and 1950s. Though this account captures a kernel of truth, it is not the whole story. After taking a closer look at Frank’s published writings and at his proposed book, one can see how he imagined the reunion of Logical Empiricism. His approach was centered on sociology and on the socioLogical aspects of science and knowledge. As I will argue, Frank’s longstanding interest in the reunion of the sciences and the humanities can be detected in his sociology and philosophy of science as well as in his reading of Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. But Frank’s intention was never fully recognized, partly due to the atmosphere of American philosophy and sociology in the second half of the twentieth century. As a result, his conception of unified science and Logical Empiricism died with him.
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philipp frank s decline and the crisis of Logical Empiricism
Studies in East European Thought, 2017Co-Authors: Adam Tamas TubolyAbstract:The aim of the paper is to consider the narrative that Philipp Frank’s decline in the United States started in the 1940s and 1950s. Though this account captures a kernel of truth, it is not the whole story. After taking a closer look at Frank’s published writings and at his proposed book, one can see how he imagined the reunion of Logical Empiricism. His approach was centered on sociology and on the socioLogical aspects of science and knowledge. As I will argue, Frank’s longstanding interest in the reunion of the sciences and the humanities can be detected in his sociology and philosophy of science as well as in his reading of Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. But Frank’s intention was never fully recognized, partly due to the atmosphere of American philosophy and sociology in the second half of the twentieth century. As a result, his conception of unified science and Logical Empiricism died with him.
