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Fiona J. Hibberd - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Received View of Logical Positivism and Its Relationship to Social Constructionism
Unfolding Social Constructionism, 2005Co-Authors: Fiona J. HibberdAbstract:A survey of the psychoLogical literature, though not exhaustive, reveals substantial consensus amongst theoretical psychologists concerning (i) the features common to Logical Positivism and Logical empiricism, and (ii) the differences between positivist philosophy of science and social constructionist metatheory.
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Gergen's Social Constructionism, Logical Positivism and the Continuity of Error: Part 2: Meaning-as-Use
Theory & Psychology, 2001Co-Authors: Fiona J. HibberdAbstract:This paper provides further evidence for the thesis that K.J. Gergen's social constructionism and Logical Positivism are not antithetical. Gergen's metatheory, the later version of Schlick's verificationism and the operationism of Bridgman and S.S. Stevens, each in their own way, incorporate forms of the meaning-as-use thesis. Schlick and Gergen, in particular, are heirs of Wittgenstein's legacy. Yet the identification of meaning with use involves an incomplete characterization of meaning. It is inconsistent with the fact that the intension of any genuine term is always a set of general characteristics. Not surprisingly, the semantic similarities between Logical Positivism and social constructionism are driven by a common epistemology. Despite surface differences, both retain Kant's belief that the constituents of reality are not directly knowable. To the extent that Positivism, operationism and social constructionism have influenced psychology, psychology has been aligned with anti-realist meta-theory an...
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Logical Positivism and Gergen’s Social Constructionism: No Radical Disjunction in Twentieth Century PsychoLogical Metatheory
Theoretical Issues in Psychology, 2001Co-Authors: Fiona J. HibberdAbstract:K. J. Gergen’s postmodernist metatheory of psychoLogical science — a radical form of social constructionism — is judged by many to be antithetical to positivist philosophy. However, the radical aspects of Logical Positivism are masked by their expressed empiricist intentions and there are, in fact, significant similarities between this philosophy and Gergen’s metatheory. Both subscribe to conventionalism and both (mis)appropriate Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use thesis. These semantic similarities have their roots in a shared anti-realist epistemology in that both retain a link to Kant — they support the idea that we cannot know things as they are in themselves because we cannot know them directly. In psychology, the tradition of anti-realist metatheory continues.
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Logical Positivism and gergen s social constructionism no radical disjunction in twentieth century psychoLogical metatheory
2001Co-Authors: Fiona J. HibberdAbstract:K. J. Gergen’s postmodernist metatheory of psychoLogical science — a radical form of social constructionism — is judged by many to be antithetical to positivist philosophy. However, the radical aspects of Logical Positivism are masked by their expressed empiricist intentions and there are, in fact, significant similarities between this philosophy and Gergen’s metatheory. Both subscribe to conventionalism and both (mis)appropriate Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use thesis. These semantic similarities have their roots in a shared anti-realist epistemology in that both retain a link to Kant — they support the idea that we cannot know things as they are in themselves because we cannot know them directly. In psychology, the tradition of anti-realist metatheory continues.
Yoshihiro Maruyama - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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prior s tonk notions of logic and levels of inconsistency vindicating the pluralistic unity of science in the light of categorical Logical Positivism
Synthese, 2016Co-Authors: Yoshihiro MaruyamaAbstract:There are still on-going debates on what exactly is wrong with Prior’s pathoLogical “tonk.” In this article I argue, on the basis of categorical inferentialism, that (i) two notions of inconsistency ought to be distinguished in an appropriate account of tonk; (ii) logic with tonk is inconsistent as the theory of propositions, and it is due to the fallacy of equivocation; (iii) in contrast to this diagnosis of the Prior’s tonk problem, nothing is actually wrong with tonk if logic is viewed as the theory of proofs rather than propositions, and tonk perfectly makes sense in terms of the identity of proofs. Indeed, there is fully complete semantics of proofs for tonk, which allows us to link the Prior’s old philosophical idea with contemporary issues at the interface of categorical logic, computer science, and quantum physics, and thereby to expose commonalities between the laws of Reason and the laws of Nature, which are what logic and physics are respectively about. I conclude the article by articulating the ideas of categorical Logical Positivism and pluralistic unified science as its goal, including the unification of realist and antirealist conceptions of meaning by virtue of the categorical Logical basis of metaphysics.
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Prior’s tonk, notions of logic, and levels of inconsistency: vindicating the pluralistic unity of science in the light of categorical Logical Positivism
Synthese, 2015Co-Authors: Yoshihiro MaruyamaAbstract:There are still on-going debates on what exactly is wrong with Prior’s pathoLogical “tonk.” In this article I argue, on the basis of categorical inferentialism, that (i) two notions of inconsistency ought to be distinguished in an appropriate account of tonk; (ii) logic with tonk is inconsistent as the theory of propositions, and it is due to the fallacy of equivocation; (iii) in contrast to this diagnosis of the Prior’s tonk problem, nothing is actually wrong with tonk if logic is viewed as the theory of proofs rather than propositions, and tonk perfectly makes sense in terms of the identity of proofs. Indeed, there is fully complete semantics of proofs for tonk, which allows us to link the Prior’s old philosophical idea with contemporary issues at the interface of categorical logic, computer science, and quantum physics, and thereby to expose commonalities between the laws of Reason and the laws of Nature, which are what logic and physics are respectively about. I conclude the article by articulating the ideas of categorical Logical Positivism and pluralistic unified science as its goal, including the unification of realist and antirealist conceptions of meaning by virtue of the categorical Logical basis of metaphysics.
Jonathan D. Mayer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Challenges to understanding spatial patterns of disease: Philosophical alternatives to Logical Positivism
Social science & medicine (1982), 1992Co-Authors: Jonathan D. MayerAbstract:Most studies of disease distribution, in medical geography and other related disciplines, have been empirical in nature and rooted in the assumptions of Logical Positivism. However, some of the more newly articulated philosophies of the social sciences, and of social theory, have much to add in the understanding of the processes and mechanisms underlying disease distribution. This paper represents a plea for creative synthesis between Logical Positivism and realism or structuration, and uses specific examples to suggest how disease distribution, as a surface phenomenon, can be explained using deeper analysis.
Thomas Uebel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Logical Positivism Logical empiricism what s in a name
Perspectives on Science, 2013Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Do the terms “Logical Positivism” and “Logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and signiacant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the arst term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “Logical Positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “Logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society for Scientiac Philosophy around Hans Reichenbach which included Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin and a young Carl Gustav Hempel. The person who called the co-referentiality of the two terms into question was Reichenbach himself. He did so in two publications of the second half of the 1930s—in an article in Journal of Philosophy (1936) and in his Experience and Prediction (1938)—in order to alert readers to important differences between his own philosophy and that of the Vienna Circle. Reichenbach’s distinction was taken up by his former student Wesley Salmon. Not only did Salmon restate it, but he also asserted, categorically and very much in Reichenbach’s spirit, that “our chief inheritance from Logical Positivism” is “Logical empiricism” ([1985] 2005, p. 7). The story of this inheritance is the story of “twentieth-century scientiac philosophy”:
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"Logical Positivism"— "Logical Empiricism": What's in a Name?
Perspectives on Science, 2013Co-Authors: Thomas UebelAbstract:Do the terms “Logical Positivism” and “Logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and signiacant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the arst term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “Logical Positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “Logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society for Scientiac Philosophy around Hans Reichenbach which included Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin and a young Carl Gustav Hempel. The person who called the co-referentiality of the two terms into question was Reichenbach himself. He did so in two publications of the second half of the 1930s—in an article in Journal of Philosophy (1936) and in his Experience and Prediction (1938)—in order to alert readers to important differences between his own philosophy and that of the Vienna Circle. Reichenbach’s distinction was taken up by his former student Wesley Salmon. Not only did Salmon restate it, but he also asserted, categorically and very much in Reichenbach’s spirit, that “our chief inheritance from Logical Positivism” is “Logical empiricism” ([1985] 2005, p. 7). The story of this inheritance is the story of “twentieth-century scientiac philosophy”:
Siobhan Chapman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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getting the philosopher out of the armchair j l austin s response to Logical Positivism in comparison to that of arne naess
2014Co-Authors: Siobhan ChapmanAbstract:The story of the development of Austin’s views on language begins with his growing disquiet over Logical Positivism, or at least over a version of Logical Positivism filtered through his personal discussions with A.J. Ayer and subsequently through his reading of Ayer’s 1936 polemic Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer explained that, for the Logical positivists, the fact that a statement could be expressed in everyday language was no guarantee that it was meaningful. Meaningful statements, those which could play a legitimate part in scientific discussion, were restricted to analytic statements that were necessarily true by virtue of the meanings of the words they contained, to the statements of mathematics and logic, and to that subset of synthetic sentences which could be subject to empirical verification (Ayer 1971: 7ff.). Austin considered such claims to be unempirical, a priori and, crucially, at odds with everyday experience of language use.
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Getting the Philosopher Out of the Armchair: J.L. Austin’s Response to Logical Positivism in Comparison to That of Arne Naess
J.L. Austin on Language, 2014Co-Authors: Siobhan ChapmanAbstract:The story of the development of Austin’s views on language begins with his growing disquiet over Logical Positivism, or at least over a version of Logical Positivism filtered through his personal discussions with A.J. Ayer and subsequently through his reading of Ayer’s 1936 polemic Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer explained that, for the Logical positivists, the fact that a statement could be expressed in everyday language was no guarantee that it was meaningful. Meaningful statements, those which could play a legitimate part in scientific discussion, were restricted to analytic statements that were necessarily true by virtue of the meanings of the words they contained, to the statements of mathematics and logic, and to that subset of synthetic sentences which could be subject to empirical verification (Ayer 1971: 7ff.). Austin considered such claims to be unempirical, a priori and, crucially, at odds with everyday experience of language use.
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Logical Positivism and Philosophy of Language
Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense, 2013Co-Authors: Siobhan ChapmanAbstract:On 6 June 1932, Stebbing wrote to the Principal of Bedford College requesting permission to accept an invitation to deliver the annual British Academy philosophy lecture. ‘It is a very great honour,’ she wrote, ‘and I feel that the Council of the British Academy have made a mistake. But it would be foolish to refuse’.1 For the topic of her lecture she chose some recent developments in continental philosophy, as she had for her masters dissertation. This time she looked to Austria and Germany rather than to France, and spoke about Logical Positivism.
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Ordinary Language Philosophy
2008Co-Authors: Siobhan ChapmanAbstract:The Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle exerted a firm, but relatively brief, hold on British philosophical imagination. This hold was loosened soon after the Second World War as a result of a growing conviction among many British philosophers that, despite its obvious appeals, Logical Positivism was ultimately untenable as a philosophical approach. A number of philosophers commented on what was wrong with Logical Positivism in general, and with what it said about language in particular. In this way they presented for themselves the task of establishing an alternative stance on the place of language in philosophy, and indeed on the type of subject matter than language constituted. One set of responses to this task formed the basis of what soon became known as ‘ordinary language philosophy’.
