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Peter Slezak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Philosophers, Autistics & Three Year Olds - Semantics & Intuition.
    2013
    Co-Authors: Peter Slezak
    Abstract:

    Externalist theories in natural language semantics have become the orthodoxy since Kripke is widely thought to have refuted descriptive theories of reference. This shift may be seen in developments in philosophy of language of the 1970s – the direct reference “revolution against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66). I consider Fodor’s (2004) heretical thought that something has gone “awfully wrong” in this philosophical consensus, perhaps confirming Chomsky’s (1992) view that the whole field of philosophical semantics is “utterly wrongheaded” and “crazy” by virtue of its non-naturalist assumptions and “Methodological Dualism.” Kripke acknowledges that he was led to his views by his “natural intuition”. Accordingly, I take up the aetiological question Chomsky poses, suggesting that we may go beyond the usual analysis of those doctrines that have been assumed too uncritically “to ask why they seem so compelling” (2000b, 105). Considering the literature on experimental philosophy (X-Phi) I suggest that even conceding the “expertise defence” leaves philosophers’ intuitions vulnerable to fatal flaws. I suggest that the externalist orthodoxy is a kind of cognitive illusion seen elsewhere in philosophy and cognitive science. In particular I consider Devitt’s development of the Kripke-Donnellan idea of links in a causal chain or network of proper names which has the virtue of being a naturalistic, scientific alternative to “magical” direct reference theories, but cannot explain naming ability or competence.

  • CogSci - Semantics: Intuition, Experiment or Illusion?
    Cognitive Science, 2013
    Co-Authors: Peter Slezak
    Abstract:

    Semantics: Intuition, Experiment or Illusion? Peter Slezak (p.slezak@unsw.edu.au) Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 Australia Abstract Externalist theories in natural language semantics have become the orthodoxy since Kripke is widely thought to have refuted descriptive theories involving internal cognitive representation of meaning. This shift may be seen in developments in philosophy of language of the 1970s – the direct reference “revolution against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66). Almog (2005, 493) writes of the “uprising against Frege’s doctrines” that “spread like fire” based on the work of Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam and Kaplan. However, I consider Fodor’s (2004) heretical thought that something has gone “awfully wrong” in this philosophical consensus, perhaps confirming Chomsky’s (1992) view that the whole field of philosophical semantics is “utterly wrongheaded” and “crazy” by virtue of its non-naturalist assumptions and “Methodological Dualism.” I suggest that the externalist orthodoxy is a kind of cognitive illusion seen elsewhere in philosophy and cognitive science. Keywords: semantics; externalism; meaning; intuition. Externalist Orthodoxy Externalism is widely acknowledged to be the orthodoxy in the theory of mental content and psychological states. However, despite its subjective force, externalism may be undermined by attending to its aetiology and showing how the intuitions evoked arise from deceptive mechanisms. Instead of defending internalism directly, we may ask: Why does externalism seem so convincing? This is a cognitive science of biases and illusions among philosophers. Kripke (1972) is regarded as having “ushered in a new era in philosophy” (Soames 2005, 1) by refuting a widely held descriptive conception of proper names. In the philosophy of language, this was part of the 1970s direct reference “revolution against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66). Frege held that something about the speaker’s cognitive state must explain the difference between sentences such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and “Hesperus is Hesperus.” The first is cognitively significant but the second is knowable a priori as necessarily true, even though the substituted terms are co-referential. However, Kripke’s externalist doctrine of “rigid designators” has become the orthodoxy – essentially the view of J.S. Mill that proper names have no meaning other than the name’s denotation, and a name refers to the same individual in any possible situation. In Putnam’s slogan, the externalist orthodoxy holds that “meanings ain’t in the head” since mental content is individuated by referents in the world. This view rests on intuitions elicited by thought-experiments such as Putnam’s (1975) famous Twin Earth story, characterized as “a sort of paradigm in the philosophies of language and mind” (Segal 2000, 24). On another planet, Twin Earth, the only difference is that the clear, potable liquid in rivers and lakes has chemical structure XYZ rather than H 2 O. An atom-for- atom replica of an Earth person might have identical internal psychological/brain states and yet not have the same water- thoughts since Twin Earth thoughts are about XYZ. Also influential has been Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about Pierre who believes both that Londres est jolie and also that London is ugly, not realizing that London is the same city as Londres. Kripke says “I know of no answer” to the question “Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that London is pretty?” Kripke regards the puzzle as comparable to the Liar Paradox (1979, 904). On this point, Salmon (2011, 236) endorses Kripke’s “sound methodology” quoting Tarski’s classic discussion of the Liar antinomy and its intellectual challenge. Kripke’s “primary moral” is that “the puzzle is a puzzle” (1979) and he insists that it can not be resolved by re- describing the problem, but this conception is open to challenge. A re-description need not avoid the problem but rather it may show how a pseudo-problem arises. After all, the indeterminacy of Pierre’s belief about London is not like the contradictory state of Shrodinger’s cat or the quantum wave/particle duality. To be sure, in another case, restating Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise (e.g. with a distance/time graph) is to sidestep the puzzle rather than solving it since the re-description doesn’t expose the flaw in Zeno’s reasoning. Kripke is right to say that talk of ‘what is really going on’ doesn’t answer his original question, but it does show clearly what’s wrong with the original question and why the puzzle isn’t a puzzle, after all. With Kripke, we can point out that “No answer has yet been given” to the question of whether Lois Lane loves Clark Kent, but we understand why. Or, seeing the Necker Cube on two different occasions, Pierre might not recognize it as the same geometrical figure. Adapting Kripke’s (1979) words, we may ask “Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that the Figure (not the shape satisfying such-and-such descriptions, but the Figure) is facing upwards to the left? No answer has yet been given.” Fodor (2008, 76) pointedly asks “But why on earth should we suppose that the question [concerning Pierre] has a definite right answer when it’s phrased that way? And, once one sees why it doesn’t, why does it matter that it doesn’t?” However, while sharing Fodor’s dismissive attitude, we may go further to ask why the puzzle should have such a firm grip on philosophical imagination. Thus, Devitt (1984, 385) has made a salutary distinction: “Thoughts are one thing, their ascription another.” Devitt

Sam S. Rakover - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A PLEA FOR Methodological Dualism AND A MULTI - EXPLANATION FRAMEWORK IN PSYCHOLOGY
    2012
    Co-Authors: Sam S. Rakover
    Abstract:

    At present there is no explanation for the mind/brain relationship; it is hard to conceive mentalistic explanations in terms of mechanistic explanations, where mechanistic explanations refer to explanations common in the sciences such as neurophysiological and computational, and mentalistic explanations are based on the individual's inner world such as will, belief, intention, and purpose. It is also difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation of behavior and its components by an appeal to mechanistic explanations only. It therefore it makes sense to develop a new Methodological approach, Methodological Dualism, which leads to the construction of a Multi-Explanation Framework for developing specific psychological theories. This approach is not based on the usual attempt to reduce mental processes to neurophysiological processes. On the contrary, it addresses behavior by means of multiple explanations (mechanistic and mentalistic) which are not reducible to each other but still satisfy the Methodological requirements for scientific explanation. This approach offers a deeper understanding of behavior than that provided by mechanistic explanations alone.

  • Methodological Dualism and Multi-Explanation Framework: Replies to Criticisms and Further Developments
    2011
    Co-Authors: Sam S. Rakover
    Abstract:

    I am indebted to the commentators for their thought-provoking reviews. For different reasons, they do not accept my plea for including mentalistic explanations under the umbrella of the scientific methodology (except perhaps Foxall, 2011/2012, who welcomes my Methodological pluralism approach). I will attempt to show that their arguments against my approach are incorrect.The paper is organized in the following way: first I comment on the reasons that motivated me to develop the approach of Methodological Dualism (MD) and Multi-Explanation Framework (MEF) and present a brief summary of its main ideas; second, I respond to the commentators' criticisms; and finally, I present further developments.MD and MEF: Motivation and Brief SummaryIn Rakover (2011/2012) I reviewed the literature and reached the following conclusions: (a) there is not yet any theory of the mind/body relationship [T(m/b)], (b) it is hard to conceive mentalistic explanations in terms of mechanistic explanations, and (c) it is hard to provide a complete account of behavior by appeal to mechanistic explanations only. These conclusions motivated me to develop an alternative approach: MD, which leads to the construction of MEF for developing specific theories in psychology. This approach does not suggest a new way to solve the consciousness/brain problem, but attempts to circumvent it by taking a Methodological route that provides a comprehensive and coherent explanation of behavior by appeal to two kinds of explanations: mechanistic (e.g., neurophysiological, cognitive-computational processes) and mentalistic (e.g., will, belief, purpose, intention).The present article provides me with an opportunity to say something more (perhaps something more personal) about the reasons that motivated me to develop MD and MEF.1 A major reason for developing MD and MEF is my cumulative impression that the attempts to solve the mind/body problem, after all these years, seem to be going nowhere. We are going in circles, or perhaps more accurately, oscillating between two opposing pulls: one pull is our certainty in our conscious experiences, and the other is our certainty in the knowledge provided by science. Apparently we are unable to reconcile these two pulls because their several implications contradict. Let me illustrate this with the following line of thought (based on Kim, 2011).Many philosophers and psychologists are committed to the view that understanding of the world and of behavior is achieved by appeal to physical and neurophysiological events. Furthermore, these researchers believe that these phenomena cannot be explained or affected by appeal to events that do not belonging to the physical and neurophysiological domain. Since it seems that mental states, conscious experience (will, belief, etc) do not belong to this domain (and the attempts to conceive them neurophysiologically encounter impassable obstacles), it follows that consciousness cannot affect the events in this domain- our brain and behavior (i.e., they are epiphenomenal). If this is true, it is impossible for one to report on one's own conscious experience. But this conclusion seems self-contradictory, as the very fact that we are trying to understand consciousness attests that conscious experience does have an effect on behavior. Otherwise, how could we report on our conscious experience? This situation strikes me as a paradox, call it the "consciousness paradox," and it reminds me of Zeno's famous paradox of Achilles and the turtle. The two run a race, with the turtle starting to run ahead of the Greek warrior. The argument ingeniously convinces us that Achilles will never overtake the turtle! But we all know what really happened: the truth. Apparently, something is wrong with this argument. Apparently, something is wrong with the consciousness paradox, with the argument that consciousness is epiphenomenal.2In fact, I was so impressed by the knowledge that the T(m/b) has not yet been discovered that I begin to conceive of psychology as an associational science. …

  • To Understand a Cat: Methodology and philosophy
    2007
    Co-Authors: Sam S. Rakover
    Abstract:

    To understand a cat: methodology and philosophy rests on the realization that the everyday behavior of a cat (but other animals too) should be understood through a new approach, namely Methodological Dualism . It appeals to mechanistic explanation models and to mentalistic explanation models. It puts up the Methodological idea that these models have to be combined in one theoretical structure according to the scientific game-rules. This approach shows that specific mentalistic explanations are generated from explanation models or schemes, which meet the demands of the scientific games-rules; and it proposes a new theoretical structure called the multi-explanation theory to generate particular theories, which provide us with efficient explanations for behavioral phenomena. The book delves deep into anthropomorphism, and the complex question of whether a cat has consciousness and free will, and examines the intricate relations of the mental, the computational, and the neurophysiological.(Series A)

Ludwig Van Den Hauwe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Hayek, Gödel, and the Case for Methodological Dualism
    2011
    Co-Authors: Ludwig Van Den Hauwe
    Abstract:

    On a few occasions F.A. Hayek made reference to the famous Godel theorems in mathematical logic in the context of expounding his cognitive and social theory. The exact meaning of the supposed relationship between Godel´s theorems, on the one hand, and the essential proposition of Hayek´s theory of mind, on the other, remains subject to interpretation, however. The author of this paper argues that the relationship between Hayek´s thesis that the human brain can never fully explain itself on the one hand and the essential insight provided by Godel´s theorems in mathematical logic, on the other, has the character of an analogy, or a metaphor. Furthermore the anti-mechanistic interpretation of Hayek´s theory of mind is revealed as highly questionable. Implications for the Socialist Calculation Debate are highlighted. It is in particular concluded that Hayek´s arguments for Methodological Dualism, when compared with those of Ludwig von Mises, actually amount to a strengthening of the case for Methodological Dualism.

  • Hayek, Gödel, and the case for Methodological Dualism
    Journal of Economic Methodology, 2011
    Co-Authors: Ludwig Van Den Hauwe
    Abstract:

    On a few occasions F.A. Hayek made reference to the famous Godel theorems in mathematical logic in the context of expounding his cognitive and social theory. The exact meaning of the supposed relationship between Godel's theorems and the essential proposition of Hayek's theory of mind remains subject to interpretation, however. The author of this article argues that the relationship between Hayek's thesis that the human brain can never fully explain itself and the essential insight provided by Godel's theorems in mathematical logic has the character of an analogy, or a metaphor. Furthermore the anti-mechanistic interpretation of Hayek's theory of mind is revealed as highly questionable. Implications for the Socialist Calculation Debate are highlighted. It is in particular concluded that Hayek's arguments for Methodological Dualism, when compared with those of Ludwig von Mises, actually amount to a strengthening of the case for Methodological Dualism.

Lo, Giacco L. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Eureka! On Courts' Discretion in 'Ascertaining' Rules of Customary International Law
    'Hanzehogeschool Groningen University of Applied Sciences', 2019
    Co-Authors: Lo, Giacco L.
    Abstract:

    The ascertainment of rules of customary international law has been typically inserted in the Methodological Dualism between induction and deduction. By induction, lawyers find existing legal rules on the basis of the empirical material – state practice and opinio juris. By deduction, instead, lawyers find legal rules by deducing them from existing principles and rules of international law. Notably, while induction is portrayed as empirically grounded – therefore objective – deduction is presented as a logical exercise, thus disguising the margin of manoeuvre that interpreters enjoy in ascertaining rules of customary international law.  The present contribution contends that the Methodological Dualism informing the discourse on the ascertainment of rules of customary international law shall be revisited to reflect the argumentative nature of such an ascertainment. The alternative Dualism between discovery and justification is thus proposed. This twist is conducive to unveil the range of discretion exercised by courts in the formulation of rules of customary international law, instead of embracing the Methodological lens which rather mystifies it. Accordingly, courts operate within an argumentative framework in that they necessarily select and appreciate evidence of practice and opinio juris, which is far from being incontrovertible, let alone fully representative of the majority of states. In other terms, the selection and assessment of practice and opinio juris are but the result of an act of judicial discretion, which is obscurely surfacing every act of legal interpretation. Yet, owing to the authority of courts in a legal order, their formulation of presumably existing rules of customary international law is a necessary endeavour for the materialization of such ‘rules’ and their fruition by the legal practice

Roger Koppl - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Scientific hermeneutics: A tale of two Hayeks
    Explorations in Austrian Economics, 1
    Co-Authors: Roger Koppl
    Abstract:

    Hayek favored both classical hermeneutics and science. His scientific reasoning shows the logical necessity of Methodological Dualism. Bruce Caldwell and Viktor Vanberg oppose hermeneutics and Methodological Dualism in favor of science. Their arguments depend on inappropriate interpretations of the doctrine of Methodological Dualism and an impoverished understanding of hermeneutics that fails to distinguish classical hermeneutics from universal hermeneutics. Hayek showed that “scientific” and “humanistic” approaches to social science can and should be compatible and complementary. Opposing (classical) hermeneutics in favor of science may cause a loss of knowledge by tending to deprive “scientific” social science of insights arising from more “humanistic” traditions.