The Experts below are selected from a list of 10764 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Atsushi Yamagishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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transboundary Pollution Tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Atsushi YamagishiAbstract:Under capital Tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first-best outcome even in the presence of transboundary Pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum ("race to the bottom"). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve an international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. If the decisive voter's capital endowment is below the average, uncoordinated regulation is always looser than the optimum. On the contrary, uncoordinated regulation may become inefficiently strict if it is above the average ("race to the top").
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transboundary Pollution Tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Atsushi YamagishiAbstract:Under capital Tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary Pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all. Pollution transfrontaliere, competition fiscale et efficacite des politiques environnementales non coordonnees. En matiere de competition fiscale sur le capital, Ogawa et Wildasin (2009) ont decouvert de maniere surprenante que l'elaboration de politiques non coordonnees genere de meilleurs resultats, meme en presence de Pollution transfrontaliere. Neanmoins, l'auteur montre que si le niveau de reglementation environnementale est endogeneise, ce dernier devient trop laxiste (« nivellement par le bas ») et s'ecarte de l'ideal. Par consequent, malgre les resultats d'efficacite d'Ogawa et Wildasin (2009), des efforts sont necessaires pour parvenir a des politiques environnementales coordonnees sur le plan international. L'auteur examine ensuite la dependance de ce resultat relativement au niveau de dotation en capital de l'electeur decisif. Dans de nombreux cas, la reglementation est inefficace et laxiste mais peut s'averer trop stricte si la dotation en capital de l'electeur decisif est au‐dessus de la moyenne. Ainsi, la possibilite d'un « nivellement par le haut » ne peut etre ecartee. Les resultats d'inefficacite ne dependent generalement pas du calendrier d'elaboration des politiques, bien que l'efficacite peut etre restauree dans le cas restreint ou l'electeur decisif ne possede aucun capital.
Holly Monti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Can Pollution Tax rebates protect low-wage earners?
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013Co-Authors: Don Fullerton, Holly MontiAbstract:Pollution Taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share of income on Pollution-intensive goods. Some proposals offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor Tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, and we solve for the change in real net wage of each group. Decomposition shows the separate effects of the Tax rebate, higher product prices, and the changes in relative wage rates. We also include numerical examples. Even though the Pollution Tax injures both types of labor, in most cases we find that returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset higher product prices. Changes in relative wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. Protecting low-income workers is possible in this model only if they are defined as those below a relatively low wage threshold, but we discuss many possible elaborations of this model that could affect those results.
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Can Pollution Tax Rebates Protect Low-Income Families? The Effects of Relative Wage Rates
2010Co-Authors: Don Fullerton, Holly MontiAbstract:Pollution Taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share of income on Pollution-intensive goods. Some propose to offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor Tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both skilled and unskilled labor, and we solve for expressions that show the change in the real net wage of each group. A decomposition shows the effect of the Tax rebate, the effect on the uses side of income (higher product prices), and the effect on the sources side of income (relative wage rates). We also include numerical examples. Even though the Pollution Tax injures both types of labor, we find that returning all of the revenue to the low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset the effect of higher product prices. Moreover, changing wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. In almost all of our examples, the rebate of all revenue to low-skilled labor still does not prevent a reduction in their overall real net wage.
Per G Fredriksson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues
Public Choice, 2001Co-Authors: Per G FredrikssonAbstract:This paper develops a positive theory of Pollution Taxation by a federal authority when Pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental and industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, Pollution may increase in the Pollution Tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the Tax, and Pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a Pollution Tax reform. Second, Pollution Taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, Pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a Pollution Tax may be negative.
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How Pollution Taxes may increase Pollution and reduce net
2001Co-Authors: Per G FredrikssonAbstract:This paper develops a positive theory of Pollution Taxation by a federal author- ity when Pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental and industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, Pollution may increase in the Pollution Tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the Tax, and Pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a Pollution Tax reform. Second, Pollution Taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, Pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a Pollution Tax may be negative.
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the political economy of trade liberalization and environmental policy
Southern Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Per G FredrikssonAbstract:A pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable Pollution Tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium Pollution Tax in sectors protected by tariffs. The political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated. The Pollution Tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus. The level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. Pollution may increase because of a reduction of the Pollution Tax, and Tax revenues may fall simultaneously as Pollution increases.
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the political economy of Pollution Taxes in a small open economy
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1997Co-Authors: Per G FredrikssonAbstract:Abstract This paper develops a positive theory explaining Pollution Tax policy outcomes in a small open economy. The equilibrium Tax rate depends on lobby group membership, the relative importance of lobbying activities, and the Tax elasticity of Pollution. The equilibrium properties are investigated. The model is extended to incorporate Pollution abatement and a Pollution abatement subsidy. We show that total Pollution may be increasing in the Pollution abatement subsidy rate. This effect arises because the equilibrium Pollution Tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium.
Don Fullerton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Can Pollution Tax rebates protect low-wage earners?
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013Co-Authors: Don Fullerton, Holly MontiAbstract:Pollution Taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share of income on Pollution-intensive goods. Some proposals offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor Tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, and we solve for the change in real net wage of each group. Decomposition shows the separate effects of the Tax rebate, higher product prices, and the changes in relative wage rates. We also include numerical examples. Even though the Pollution Tax injures both types of labor, in most cases we find that returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset higher product prices. Changes in relative wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. Protecting low-income workers is possible in this model only if they are defined as those below a relatively low wage threshold, but we discuss many possible elaborations of this model that could affect those results.
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Can Pollution Tax Rebates Protect Low-Income Families? The Effects of Relative Wage Rates
2010Co-Authors: Don Fullerton, Holly MontiAbstract:Pollution Taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share of income on Pollution-intensive goods. Some propose to offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor Tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both skilled and unskilled labor, and we solve for expressions that show the change in the real net wage of each group. A decomposition shows the effect of the Tax rebate, the effect on the uses side of income (higher product prices), and the effect on the sources side of income (relative wage rates). We also include numerical examples. Even though the Pollution Tax injures both types of labor, we find that returning all of the revenue to the low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset the effect of higher product prices. Moreover, changing wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. In almost all of our examples, the rebate of all revenue to low-skilled labor still does not prevent a reduction in their overall real net wage.
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environmental investment and policy with distortionary Taxes and endogenous growth
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006Co-Authors: Don FullertonAbstract:Recent studies consider public R&D spending that affects abatement knowledge and endogenous growth, distortionary Taxes that affect physical and human capital formation, Pollution Taxes that affect environmental degradation, and regeneration that restores natural capital. Our model combines all of those elements. We show how the combination affects results from each prior model, focusing on two parameters that represent the need for distorting Taxes, and the productivity of abatement knowledge relative to Pollution. First, either of these two extensions can reverse the prior finding that Pollution Tax revenue is more than enough to pay for public abatement R&D. Second, Tax distortions and externalities substantially alter prior findings that the ratio of public to private capital is based only on output elasticities. Third, our dynamic model affects prior static findings about how other public spending "crowds out" provision of the environmental public good. Fourth, we show whether a greater need for public spending leads to greater increases in the distorting Tax or Pollution Tax. Fifth, while prior research is optimistic that environmental regulation can boost economic growth, we show how it may increase or decrease the growth rate --even if it raises welfare.
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Second-Best Pollution Taxes
1996Co-Authors: Don FullertonAbstract:When government needs more revenue than is available from a Pollution Tax rate equal to marginal environmental damage, our intuition tells us to raise the Tax on the clean good above zero and to raise the Tax on the dirty good above that first-best Pigouvian rate. Yet new results suggest that the second-best Pollution Tax is below the Pigouvian rate. This note reconciles these views by pointing out that these new results use a labor Tax to acquire additional revenue, and that the labor Tax is equivalent to a uniform Tax on both clean and dirty goods. Thus, depending on the normalization, the total Tax on the dirty good can be above the Pigouvian rate. These recent results are meant to show that the difference between the Tax on the dirty good and the Tax on the clean good is less than the Pigouvian rate. Any one Tax rate can be set to zero as a conceptual matter, but implementation of some Taxes might be easier than others as a practical matter.
Michael S Michael - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Pollution and capital Tax competition within a regional block
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Costas Hadjiyiannis, Panos Hatzipanayotou, Michael S MichaelAbstract:The paper examines the interaction among Taxes on factors income, environmental quality and welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and cross-border Pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, in response to a Pollution Tax and by the public sector utilizing income and Pollution Tax revenue. We demonstrate, among other things, that due to the existence of cross-border Pollution in many cases the Nash optimal policy on capital income is a positive Tax, even if Taxes on the income of immobile factors are chosen optimally. This Tax rate increases with the degree of cross-border Pollution.
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Pollution and capital Tax competition within a regional block
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Costas Hadjiyiannis, Panos Hatzipanayotou, Michael S MichaelAbstract:The paper examines the interaction among Taxes on factors income, environmental quality and welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and cross-border Pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, in response to a Pollution Tax and by the public sector utilizing income and Pollution Tax revenue. We demonstrate, among other things, that in many cases the Nash optimal policy on capital income is a positive Tax, even if Taxes on the income of immobile factors are chosen optimally. This Tax rate increases with the degree of cross-border Pollution.
