The Experts below are selected from a list of 222 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Martin Hopner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe
West European Politics, 2010Co-Authors: Martin Hopner, Armin SchäferAbstract:In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the persistence of different national varieties of Capitalism. While product market integration intensified competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative advantage. To date, this no longer unequivocally holds true. We contend that a new, 'Post-Ricardian' phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the ECJ's attempts to further economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of Organized Capitalism. This quest for liberalization has reached a point at which its output legitimacy is increasingly uncertain. As a result, the de-politicization of EU decisions proves increasingly unsuccessful. In addition, liberalization measures rely on a very generous interpretations of the 'four freedoms' that exceeds the amount of liberalization the member states agreed upon in the European treaties and, therefore, lacks input legitimacy. We show this by discussing recent struggles over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European integration, the Commission?s and the ECJ's liberalization attempts either transform the institutional foundations on which some of the member states' economic systems rely or they create political resistance to an extent that calls into question the European project. The case studies reveal evidence for both of these possibilities.
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Coordination and organization: The two dimensions of nonliberal Capitalism
2007Co-Authors: Martin HopnerAbstract:This paper suggests a two-dimensional concept of nonliberal Capitalism: coordinated Capitalism (as described in the varieties of Capitalism framework) and Organized Capitalism. While the coordination function of institutions canalizes individual maximization strategies of firms in order to adjust for collective action problems, the organization function transcends maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective interests beyond maximization. Political economies are highly Organized when firms are not only the private business of owners and insiders but, in addition, quasi-public infrastructures and, therefore, highly constrained in their economic decisions by institutionally sanctioned collective interests (such as sectoral interests, class interests, or political interests). I construct an index on Organized Capitalism by combining data on ownership structures, board level codetermination, the density of employers' associations and trade union density in order to allow for comparison between varying extents of coordination and organization in 20 OECD countries. The German example is used to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of the coordinationorganization distinction in qualitative terms. The distinction allows for differentiation between two forms of liberalization: declining coordination and disorganization.
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Una nuova fase dell'integrazione europea: i Capitalismi organizzati nell'Europa post-ricardiana
2007Co-Authors: Martin Hopner, Armin SchäferAbstract:In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the persistence of different national varieties of Capitalism. To date, this no longer unequivocally holds true. We contend that a new, "Post-Ricardian" phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the ECJ's attempts to further economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of Organized Capitalism. This quest for liberalization has reached a point at which its output legitimacy is increasingly uncertain. As a result, the de-politicization of EU decisions proves increasingly unsuccessful. In addition, liberalization measures rely on a very generous interpretations of the "four freedoms" that exceeds the amount of liberalization the member states agreed upon in the European treaties and, therefore, lacks input legitimacy. We show this by discussing recent struggles over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law.
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the political paradox of finance Capitalism interests preferences and center left party politics in corporate governance reform
Politics & Society, 2006Co-Authors: John W Cioffi, Martin HopnerAbstract:A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of Organized Capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.
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Das parteipolitische Paradox des Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Aktionärsorientierte Reformen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und den USA
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2006Co-Authors: John W Cioffi, Martin HopnerAbstract:Addressing the debate over the political dynamics of different varieties of Capitalism, this article tests the partisan hypothesis in the field of corporate governance. The state of research on distributional consequences of shareholder oriented corporate governance and on institutional complementarity between corporate governance and labor relations suggests that the center-left should oppose shareholder oriented reforms. In fact, our comparison of reforms during the last 15 years reveals the contrary. In Germany, France, Italy and the US, the center-left turned out the be the driving force behind the reforms, while the center-right parties tended to protect Organized Capitalism, state Capitalism, family Capitalism, and managerialism. The comparison allows specification of the impulses that made the center-left push for reforms while making the center-right protect traditional institutional arrangements. We present a conflict model that, beside class conflicts and insider/outsider-conflicts, includes conflicts over managerial control. The recent economic reforms cannot be understood without consideration of the significance of this conflict line. An die „Spielarten des Kapitalismus“-Diskussion anknüpfend, überprüft dieser Beitrag die Parteiendifferenzhypothese am Beispiel der gegenwärtigen aktionärsorientierten Transformationen der Unternehmenskontrolle. Aus dem Forschungsstand über die Verteilungswirkungen aktionärsorientierter Unternehmenskontrolle und über die institutionelle Komplementarität zwischen Unternehmenskontrolle und Arbeitsbeziehungen ist die Erwartung abzuleiten, dass das Mitte-Links-Spektrum aktionärsorientierten Reformen besonders reserviert gegenüber stehen sollte. Tatsächlich zeigt ein Vergleich von Reformen der vergangenen anderthalb Dekaden das Gegenteil. In Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und den USA waren die politischen Mitte-Links-Spektren die treibenden Kräfte hinter den aktionärsorientierten Reformen, während Parteien der rechten Mitte die traditionellen Institutionen von organisiertem Kapitalismus, Staatskapitalismus, Familienkapitalismus und Managerialism zu bewahren suchten. Die vergleichende Betrachtung ermöglicht die Benennung von Impulsen, die in systematisch unterschiedlicherWeise auf die jeweiligen politischen Spektren der betrachteten Länder wirkten. Die beobachtete Konfliktkonstellation lässt sich als „Konflikt um Managerherrschaft“ modellieren. Wir argumentieren, dass dieser neben den von Klassentheorie und Principal-Agent-Ansatz beschriebenen Grundkonflikten kapitalistischer Gesellschaften eine eigenständige Konfliktdimension repräsentiert, ohne die die Reformen der Unternehmenskontrolle seit den frühen 1990er Jahren nicht zu verstehen sind.
Andreas Nolke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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liberal versus organised Capitalism a historical comparative perspective
2019Co-Authors: Andreas NolkeAbstract:This chapter develops a research programme for comparing different stages of Capitalism, using a fundamental juxtaposition of liberal and organised phases of Capitalism. Departing from historically comparative theories of Capitalism, we sketch a heuristic model that draws especially on Polanyi’s pendulum and theories of organised Capitalism. In our view, the current crisis of liberal financialised Capitalism as well as state Capitalism in emerging economies are indicative of a new stage of Organized Capitalism. Our model allows us to put many contemporary developments into their place, such as the emergence of economic patriotism in Western Capitalism, state-capitalist economic systems in Eastern Europe, growing concerns about corruption, opposition to supranational liberal institutions such as the EU and the rise of state-permeated Capitalism in emerging markets.
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Brexit: Towards a new global phase of Organized Capitalism?
Competition & Change, 2017Co-Authors: Andreas NolkeAbstract:The main argument in the article is that the Brexit vote and strategy of the government of the UK post-Brexit should be seen as part of wider developments in global Capitalism. It is suggested that...
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Vergleichende Kapitalismusforschung im Zeitalter der Krise der Finanzialisierung: Vom inter-nationalen zum inter-temporalen Studium ökonomischer Institutionen
Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2013Co-Authors: Andreas Nolke, Christian MayAbstract:In this article we develop a research programme for the historical comparison of different stages of Capitalism. Starting from historically comparative theories of Capitalism, we sketch a model that draws especially on Polanyi and theories of Organized Capitalism. We validate this model by discussing the current crisis of financialization as well as the contemporary economic model of state Capitalism in large emerging economies as a potentially new stage of Capitalism. In diesem Beitrag formulieren wir ein Forschungsprogramm zum historischen Vergleich von Phasen des Kapitalismus. Ausgehend von historisch vergleichenden Kapitalismustheorien skizzieren wir ein Modell, welches maßgeblich auf Polanyi und Theorien des organisierten Kapitalismus beruht. Wir untermauern dieses Modell anhand der aktuellen Krisentendenzen der Finanzialisierung sowie des aktuellen Wirtschaftsmodells in großen Schwellenländern als potenziell neue Entwicklungsphase des Kapitalismus.
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The Rise of the ‘B(R)IC Variety of Capitalism’ - Towards a New Phase of Organized Capitalism?
Neoliberalism in Crisis, 2012Co-Authors: Andreas NolkeAbstract:It is somewhat ironic that scholars of international political economy take inspiration from a 10-year old study by Goldman Sachs. Still, it has become more than obvious that the future face of Capitalism will be influenced in fundamental ways by countries such as Brazil, Russia, India or China (BRIC). In order to understand the development of Capitalism after neoliberalism/financialization,1 we need to link the study of global regulation - the focus of the previous section of this book - with an investigation into the capitalist developments within these countries. In order to do so, this chapter combines approaches from international political economy with concepts derived from comparative political economy, thereby complementing a historical diachronic perspective on Capitalism with a spatial synchronic one. In doing so, it shares the concerns of the notion of ‘variegated Capitalism’ (Peck and Theodore 2007; Dixon 2010; Jessop 2011) that is highlighting the commonalities of Capitalism besides the specifics of national models. Still, for the purpose of complexity reduction, this analysis is based on rather precise and operational models that have been developed for the analysis of national and inter-temporal variation of Capitalism, instead of the rather broad notion of ‘Capitalism in the singular, but more importantly as a dynamic polymorphic process whose development is uneven and “variegated”’ (Dixon 2010: 5).
J. Ronald Shearer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlichkeit: Fordism and Organized Capitalism in Germany, 1918–1945
Business History Review, 1997Co-Authors: J. Ronald ShearerAbstract:The Reichskuratorium (RKW) was founded in 1921 by Carl Friedrich von Siemens and his subalternate, Carl Kottgen. The organization strove to implement measures of industrial and organizational efficiency in Germany in the interwar era following the American models of Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Ford. This study uses the organization as a vehicle to evaluate varieties of Organized Capitalism in German business and industrial history since the late nineteenth century. Most recent research has identified forms of Organized Capitalism that include significant input from Organized labor along with state and industry as the most “modern” forms. While these efforts stagnated and eventually failed in Germany's interwar Weimar Republic, they are still seen as the origin of a characteristic and successful postwar model of Organized Capitalism. Acknowledging that this view is accurate, this study draws attention to the alternate model of the RKW which strove to implement technical and organizational measures of industrial and economic efficiency using state funding but avoiding significant input from Organized labor. This variation of German Organized Capitalism emerged from the more traditional, self-regulating patterns of the late nineteenth century. It persisted through the Weimar Republic, through World War II, and into the postwar era. Less fruitful for understanding the character of the RKW are models from the 1970s Cold War era which elaborated a strongly symbiotic version of Organized Capitalism between state and big business, which allegedly subordinated efforts of big business to state interests.
Ronald J Shearer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the reichskuratorium fur wirtschaftlichkeit fordism and Organized Capitalism in germany 1918 1945
Business History Review, 1997Co-Authors: Ronald J ShearerAbstract:The Reichskuratorium (RKW) was founded in 1921 by Carl Friedrich von Siemens and his subalternate, Carl Kottgen. The organization strove to implement measures of industrial and organizational efficiency in Germany in the interwar era following the American models of Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Ford. This study uses the organization as a vehicle to evaluate varieties of Organized Capitalism in German business and industrial history since the late nineteenth century. Most recent research has identified forms of Organized Capitalism that include significant input from Organized labor along with state and industry as the most “modern” forms. While these efforts stagnated and eventually failed in Germany's interwar Weimar Republic, they are still seen as the origin of a characteristic and successful postwar model of Organized Capitalism. Acknowledging that this view is accurate, this study draws attention to the alternate model of the RKW which strove to implement technical and organizational measures of industrial and economic efficiency using state funding but avoiding significant input from Organized labor. This variation of German Organized Capitalism emerged from the more traditional, self-regulating patterns of the late nineteenth century. It persisted through the Weimar Republic, through World War II, and into the postwar era. Less fruitful for understanding the character of the RKW are models from the 1970s Cold War era which elaborated a strongly symbiotic version of Organized Capitalism between state and big business, which allegedly subordinated efforts of big business to state interests.
Jan Greitens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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From “Finance Capital” to “Organized Capitalism:” Socialization in Rudolf Hilferding’s Writings Under the Influence of Ferdinand Tönnies
The First Socialization Debate (1918) and Early Efforts Towards Socialization, 2019Co-Authors: Jan GreitensAbstract:Rudolf Hilferding’s ideas regarding the development of Capitalism, as presented in his seminal work entitled “Finance Capital” (published 1910) and in his concept of “Organized Capitalism” (developed after the war and finalized in 1927) both describe the transition to socialism. They differ in the instruments used to reach this aim, their understanding of property, and the role of the state. This paper presents the development to socialism as described by Hilferding in “Finance Capital,” his ideas during his time in the Socialization Commissions in Germany (1918–1920), and his concept of “Organized Capitalism.” Afterwards, the ideas of Ferdinand Tonnies regarding socialism and property, along with his enormous influence on Hilferding’s concepts, are presented. The astonishing thing about Hilferding’s ideas is the unbroken continuity in his theoretical constructions. The experiences of the years around 1918 did not make Hilferding change his theoretical positions. Only the question of how socialism can be achieved, whether revolutionary (as in “Finance Capital”) or democratic (as in the “Organized Capitalism”), has changed. Instead of despairing on the failure of the 1919 revolution, he interpreted the new political situation positively and adapted his theory with the new concept of “Organized Capitalism” into one that posits a democratic and gradual transformation instead of a revolution. He now regards the state as a political instrument with which to build socialism. Hilferding rejects a (second, which would mean a Bolshevik) revolution, a political overthrow, and wants to effectively transform the economy over a longer period by means of a democratic state. Along with this continuity, Hilferding was not able to include new approaches focusing on the demand side of the economy.
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from finance capital to Organized Capitalism socialization in rudolf hilferding s writings under the influence of ferdinand tonnies
2019Co-Authors: Jan GreitensAbstract:Rudolf Hilferding’s ideas regarding the development of Capitalism, as presented in his seminal work entitled “Finance Capital” (published 1910) and in his concept of “Organized Capitalism” (developed after the war and finalized in 1927) both describe the transition to socialism. They differ in the instruments used to reach this aim, their understanding of property, and the role of the state. This paper presents the development to socialism as described by Hilferding in “Finance Capital,” his ideas during his time in the Socialization Commissions in Germany (1918–1920), and his concept of “Organized Capitalism.” Afterwards, the ideas of Ferdinand Tonnies regarding socialism and property, along with his enormous influence on Hilferding’s concepts, are presented. The astonishing thing about Hilferding’s ideas is the unbroken continuity in his theoretical constructions. The experiences of the years around 1918 did not make Hilferding change his theoretical positions. Only the question of how socialism can be achieved, whether revolutionary (as in “Finance Capital”) or democratic (as in the “Organized Capitalism”), has changed. Instead of despairing on the failure of the 1919 revolution, he interpreted the new political situation positively and adapted his theory with the new concept of “Organized Capitalism” into one that posits a democratic and gradual transformation instead of a revolution. He now regards the state as a political instrument with which to build socialism. Hilferding rejects a (second, which would mean a Bolshevik) revolution, a political overthrow, and wants to effectively transform the economy over a longer period by means of a democratic state. Along with this continuity, Hilferding was not able to include new approaches focusing on the demand side of the economy.