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Herbert C Kelman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the israeli palestinian Peace Process and its vicissitudes insights from attitude theory
American Psychologist, 2007Co-Authors: Herbert C KelmanAbstract:The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based Peace Process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the Process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the Peace Process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled Peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples. Language: en
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The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and its vicissitudes: insights from attitude theory.
The American psychologist, 2007Co-Authors: Herbert C KelmanAbstract:The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based Peace Process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the Process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the Peace Process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled Peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples.
Madeline Penny - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what causes changes in opinion about the israeli palestinian Peace Process
Journal of Peace Research, 2009Co-Authors: David Fielding, Madeline PennyAbstract:In this article, the authors present a statistical analysis of the factors that have driven monthly variations in the aggregate level of support among Israeli Jews for the Oslo Peace Accords since the onset of the intifada. Using data from monthly opinion polls, they find that there is a stable relationship between the fraction of respondents supporting the Peace Process and variables captuting the current level of conflict intensity. Different dimensions of the conflict have very different effects on Jewish-Israeli public opinion, with substantial heterogeneity in the response of attitudes to conflict events on either side of the Green Line. Although variations in the number of Jewish-Israeli casualties have a large impact on opinion, some Palestinian casualties also matter, suggesting that there is a 'sympathy' effect. For a given
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what causes changes in opinion about the israeli palestinian Peace Process
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: David Fielding, Madeline PennyAbstract:In this paper we present a statistical analysis of the factors that drive monthly variations in the aggregate level of support among Israeli Jews for the Oslo Peace Process. Attitudes depend on both the state of the Israeli economy and the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the onset of the Intifada. Moreover, different dimensions of the conflict have very different effects on Jewish public opinion. In particular, there is substantial heterogeneity in the response of attitudes to conflict events on either side of the Green Line.
Paul Dixon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an honourable deception the labour government the good friday agreement and the northern ireland Peace Process
British Politics, 2013Co-Authors: Paul DixonAbstract:The former Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chief of Staff and key negotiator on the Province, Jonathan Powell, have admitted that they used deception to advance the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. This article argues that the Labour government misled the people of Northern Ireland about the implications of the Good Friday Agreement to secure a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum on the deal. During the referendum campaign British Prime Minister was prominent among those arguing that there would be decommissioning before either paramilitary prisoners were released or Sinn Fein sat in government. Legislation to release paramilitary prisoners without prior decommissioning was introduced into Parliament just 2 weeks after the referendum. In December 1999 Sinn Fein entered government without IRA decommissioning. Tony Blair later acknowledged that the ‘political skills’ that were initially useful in pushing the Peace Process forward became counterproductive and undermined the moderate powersharing settlement that the GFA was intended to deliver. Powersharing between the hardline parties in 2007 was the fortuitous, if less desirable, outcome.
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guns first talks later neoconservatives and the northern ireland Peace Process
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2011Co-Authors: Paul DixonAbstract:The Northern Ireland Peace Process emerged from ‘behind the scenes’ when contacts between the British government and Sinn Fein were revealed in November 1993. On 31st August 1994, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared a ceasefire and in April 1998 the Good Friday Agreement achieved a power-sharing accommodation based on the moderate political parties. By 2003, the hardline Democratic Unionist Party was electorally dominant among unionists and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, among nationalists. Remarkably, in May 2007, the ‘hardline’ parties agreed to share power. The Northern Ireland Peace Process appears to represent an apparently successful case of two democratic governments—the British and Irish—negotiating with ‘the enemy’ to achieve a power-sharing accommodation. This success has led to various actors with competing political agendas claiming to have discovered ‘the lessons’ of Northern Ireland for other areas in conflict. The Labour government's ‘Orthodox’ interpretation suggests that i...
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political skills or lying and manipulation the choreography of the northern ireland Peace Process
Political Studies, 2002Co-Authors: Paul DixonAbstract:The ‘real war’ and ‘propaganda war’ fought over Northern Ireland for thirty years polarised party and public opinion. The key dilemma faced by politicians during the recent Peace Process has been how to wind down the ‘war’ and win sufficient party and public support for an accommodation between unionists and nationalists which falls so far short of previous expectations. Scripts telling contrasting stories have been prepared to convince rival republican and unionist audiences to support the Peace Process. In addition, the pro-Agreement parties have attempted to shift opinion towards accommodation through a range of political skills and choreography. Key competing parties and governments have sometimes co-operated back stage while front stage they have on occasion ‘play acted’ conflict between each other. The political skills, or lying and manipulation, by which the Peace Process has been driven forward have been uncovered creating public distrust in the political Process. Realists see such political decep...
Niall O Dochartaigh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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together in the middle back channel negotiation in the irish Peace Process
Journal of Peace Research, 2011Co-Authors: Niall O DochartaighAbstract:This article examines the development of cooperative relationships in back-channel communication and their impact on intraparty negotiation. It draws on extensive newly available evidence on back-channel communication in the Irish Peace Process to expand the range of detailed case studies on a topic which is shrouded in secrecy and resistant to academic inquiry. The article analyses the operation of a secret back channel that linked the Irish Republican Army to the British government over a period of 20 years, drawing on unique material from the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, and a range of other primary sources. The article finds that interaction through this back channel increased predictability and laid a foundation of extremely limited trust by providing information and increasing mutual understanding. Strong cooperative relationships developed at the intersection between the two sides, based to a great extent on strong interpersonal relationships and continuity in personnel. This ...
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together in the middle back channel negotiation in the irish Peace Process
Journal of Peace Research, 2011Co-Authors: Niall O DochartaighAbstract:This article examines the development of cooperative relationships in back-channel communication and their impact on intraparty negotiation. It draws on extensive newly available evidence on back-channel communication in the Irish Peace Process to expand the range of detailed case studies on a topic which is shrouded in secrecy and resistant to academic inquiry. The article analyses the operation of a secret back channel that linked the Irish Republican Army to the British government over a period of 20 years, drawing on unique material from the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, and a range of other primary sources. The article finds that interaction through this back channel increased predictability and laid a foundation of extremely limited trust by providing information and increasing mutual understanding. Strong cooperative relationships developed at the intersection between the two sides, based to a great extent on strong interpersonal relationships and continuity in personnel. This in turn produced direct pressure for changes in the position of parties as negotiators acted as advocates of movement in intraparty negotiations. The article finds that this back channel was characterized by a short chain, the direct involvement of principals and the establishment of a single primary channel of communication and that these features combined with secrecy to generate the distinctive cooperative dynamics identified in this article. It concludes that the potential for the development of cooperative relationships is particularly strong in back-channel negotiation for two reasons; first, the joint project of secrecy creates an ongoing shared task that builds trust and mutual understanding regardless of progress in the negotiations. Secondly, as a shared project based on the explicit aim of bypassing spoilers, the Process creates structural pressures for cooperation to manage internal opponents on both sides, pressures intensified by the secrecy of the Process.
Landon E Hancock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the northern irish Peace Process from top to bottom
International Studies Review, 2008Co-Authors: Landon E HancockAbstract:Like the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Peace Process has the distinction of being one of the longest-running Processes both in the time required to reach an agreement and in the time required for implementation of that agreement. This article analyzes the Peace Process from the perspectives of elite negotiations to community relations and in between in order to determine how each of these Peace Processes within the overall Peace Process contributed its longevity and overall success. The distinction that Peace is made from the top-down is contrasted with the notion that it cannot succeed without social preparation through bottom-up, or middle-out initiatives; concluding with analysis of frameworks that attempt to capture the entirety of the Peace Process and what its success means for the study of the Northern Irish Peace Process and Peace Processes in general.