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Gustavo Collantes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the california zero emission vehicle mandate a study of the Policy Process 1990 2004
University of California Davis. Institute of Transportation Studies. Research report, 2006Co-Authors: Gustavo CollantesAbstract:This dissertation research is concerned with the study of the Policy Process over the Zero-Emission Vehicle mandate, from its conception, through its inception, and the biennial reviews, until 2004. The study is structured as three core chapters. The first chapter studies the origin of the ZEV mandate, trying to understand the conditions that favored and the factors that resulted in its implementation. The Multiple Streams theoretical framework is used to guide the study. The second chapter presents an empirical study of the Policy Process during the biennial reviews. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to frame the study in this chapter theoretically, it aims at understanding the dynamics of Policy change and coalition stability, and identifying the Policy dimensions that dominated the debate over time. The third chapter presents a theoretical study of the strategic Policy behavior of the main actors in the Policy Process. A game-theoretical model is developed of an environmental regulator (California Air Resources Board - CARB) that needs to set emission standards in the presence of multiple industry players (automakers), who in turn need to decide on their level of compliance in the presence of a competitor. The model presented improves over previous published work in the subject. The model of strategic behavior indiacates that the competitiveness of the auto industry tends to preclude collusion. The regulator may use this industry competitiveness to its advantage and achieve higher social benefits.
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The California Zero-Emission Vehicle Mandate: A Study of the Policy Process, 1990-2004 - eScholarship
2006Co-Authors: Gustavo CollantesAbstract:The Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, one of the most daring environmental policies related to transportation, was implemented in September, 1990, by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). It originally required that, starting in 1998, 2% of the in-state new light duty vehicle sales of major automakers had no emissions of criteria pollutants.The required ZEV percentage would be increased to 5% in 2001 and to 10% in 2003. CARB organized biennial reviews of the programs, to elicit stakeholder participation and monitor evolution of the program. Through this review schedule, the program underwent several revisions resulting from intense Policy debates. This dissertation research is concerned with the study of the Policy Process over the ZEV mandate, from its conception, through its inception, and the biennial reviews, until 2004. The study is structured as three core chapters. The first chapter studies the origin of the ZEV mandate, trying to understand the conditions that favored and the factors that resulted in its implementation. To guide the study in this chapter, I use the Multiple Streams theoretical framework. The second chapter presents an empirical study of the Policy Process during the biennial reviews. This study aims at understanding the dynamics of Policy change and coalition stability, identifying the Policy dimensions that dominated the debate over time. I use the Advocacy Coalition Framework to frame the study in this chapter theoretically. The third core chapter presents a theoretical study of the strategic Policy behavior of the main actors in the Policy Process. I develop a game-theoretical model of an environmental regulator (CARB) that needs to set emission standards in the presence of multiple industry players (automakers), who in turn need to decide on their level of compliance in the presence of a competitor. The model presented improves over previous published work in the subject. The results of these studies yield numerous conclusions with both theoretical and practical implications. I find that Multiple Streams is useful to understand the origin of the ZEV mandate, while I identify and/or confirm arguments by other scholars about significant limitations in the framework. Through the analysis of the public testimonies given by stakeholders at the biennial reviews, I identify the Policy areas of major concern at different points in time along the Policy Process. I also identify the Policy positions of each stakeholder and obtain estimates of the groups of stakeholders with similar Policy beliefs (belief coalitions.) I find that these belief coalitions show some stability over time, though less than what was found by previous studies. One of the major conclusions from the model of strategic behavior is that the competitiveness of the auto industry tends to preclude collusion. The regulator may use this industry competitiveness to its advantage and achieve higher social benefits.
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The California Zero-Emission Vehicle Mandate: A Study of the Policy Process, 1990-2004
2006Co-Authors: Gustavo CollantesAbstract:The Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, one of the most daring environmental policies related to transportation, was implemented in September, 1990, by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). It originally required that, starting in 1998, 2% of the in-state new light duty vehicle sales of major automakers had no emissions of criteria pollutants.The required ZEV percentage would be increased to 5% in 2001 and to 10% in 2003. CARB organized biennial reviews of the programs, to elicit stakeholder participation and monitor evolution of the program. Through this review schedule, the program underwent several revisions resulting from intense Policy debates. This dissertation research is concerned with the study of the Policy Process over the ZEV mandate, from its conception, through its inception, and the biennial reviews, until 2004. The study is structured as three core chapters. The first chapter studies the origin of the ZEV mandate, trying to understand the conditions that favored and the factors that resulted in its implementation. To guide the study in this chapter, I use the Multiple Streams theoretical framework. The second chapter presents an empirical study of the Policy Process during the biennial reviews. This study aims at understanding the dynamics of Policy change and coalition stability, identifying the Policy dimensions that dominated the debate over time. I use the Advocacy Coalition Framework to frame the study in this chapter theoretically. The third core chapter presents a theoretical study of the strategic Policy behavior of the main actors in the Policy Process. I develop a game-theoretical model of an environmental regulator (CARB) that needs to set emission standards in the presence of multiple industry players (automakers), who in turn need to decide on their level of compliance in the presence of a competitor. The model presented improves over previous published work in the subject. The results of these studies yield numerous conclusions with both theoretical and practical implications. I find that Multiple Streams is useful to understand the origin of the ZEV mandate, while I identify and/or confirm arguments by other scholars about significant limitations in the framework. Through the analysis of the public testimonies given by stakeholders at the biennial reviews, I identify the Policy areas of major concern at different points in time along the Policy Process. I also identify the Policy positions of each stakeholder and obtain estimates of the groups of stakeholders with similar Policy beliefs (belief coalitions.) I find that these belief coalitions show some stability over time, though less than what was found by previous studies. One of the major conclusions from the model of strategic behavior is that the competitiveness of the auto industry tends to preclude collusion. The regulator may use this industry competitiveness to its advantage and achieve higher social benefits.
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the california zero emission vehicle mandate a study of the Policy Process 1990 2004
University of California Transportation Center, 2006Co-Authors: Gustavo CollantesAbstract:Author(s): Collantes, Gustavo O | Abstract: The Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, one of the most daring environmental policies related to transportation, was implemented in September, 1990, by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). It originally required that, starting in 1998, 2% of the in-state new light duty vehicle sales of major automakers had no emissions of criteria pollutants. The required ZEV percentage would be increased to 5% in 2001 and to 10% in 2003. CARB organized biennial reviews of the programs, to elicit stakeholder participation and monitor the evolution of the program. Through this review schedule, the program underwent several revisions resulting from intense Policy debates.This dissertation research is concerned with the study of the Policy Process over the ZEV mandate, from its conception, through its inception, and the biennial reviews, until 2004. The study is structured as three core chapters. The first chapter studies the origin of the ZEV mandate, trying to understand the conditions that favored and the factors that resulted in its implementation. To guide the study in this chapter, I use the Multiple Streams theoretical framework. The second chapter presents an empirical study of the Policy Process during the biennial reviews. This study aims at understanding the dynamics of Policy change and coalition stability, identifying the Policy dimensions that dominated the debate over time. I use the Advocacy Coalition Framework to frame the study in this chapter theoretically. The third core chapter presents a theoretical study of the strategic Policy behavior of the main actors in the Policy Process. I develop a game-theoretical model of an environmental regulator (CARB) that needs to set emission standards in the presence of multiple industry players (automakers), who in turn need to decide on their level of compliance in the presence of a competitor. The model presented improves over previous published work in the subject.The results of these studies yield numerous conclusions with both theoretical and practical implications. I find that Multiple Streams is useful to understand the origin of the ZEV mandate, while I identify and/or confirm arguments by other scholars about significant limitations in the framework. Through the analysis of the public testimonies given by stakeholders at the biennial reviews, I identify the Policy areas of major concern at different points in time along the Policy Process. I also identify the Policy positions of each stakeholder and obtain estimates of the groups of stakeholders with similar Policy beliefs (belief coalitions.) I find that these belief coalitions show some stability over time, though less than what was found by previous studies. One of the major conclusions from the model of strategic behavior is that the competitiveness of the auto industry tends to preclude collusion. The regulator may use this industry competitiveness to its advantage and achieve higher social benefits.
Charles Edward Snare - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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windows of opportunity when and how can the Policy analyst influence the Policymaker during the Policy Process
Review of Policy Research, 1995Co-Authors: Charles Edward SnareAbstract:Building on a variety of conceptualizations about the Policymaker, the Policy analyst, and the Policy Process, this essay seeks to understand how these three aspects mesh together. Consequently, this paper attempts to examine four questions that are germane to the analysis of Policy: What roles can the Policy analyst playq What are the personality types of Policymakersq What is the role of the Policymaker's personality in the Policy Processq What are the windows of opportunity for the Policy analyst in one's attempt to influence the Policymaker during the Policy Processq This paper argues that the Policy analyst has the opportunity to influence Policymakers at various stages of the Policy Process. However, the influence strategies that are effective are different depending upon the type of Policymaker. This understanding is vital if a Policy analyst desires to have an impact. Furthermore, the role the analyst performs has a significant impact on the how and the extent to which the analyst may have leverage. Copyright 1995 by The Policy Studies Organization.
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windows of opportunity when and how can the Policy analyst influence the Policymaker during the Policy Process
Review of Policy Research, 1995Co-Authors: Charles Edward SnareAbstract:Building on a variety of conceptualizations about the Policymaker, the Policy analyst, and the Policy Process, this essay seeks to understand how these three aspects mesh together. Consequently, this paper attempts to examine four questions that are germane to the analysis of Policy: What roles can the Policy analyst play? What are the personality types of Policymakers? What is the role of the Policymaker's personality in the Policy Process? What are the windows of opportunity for the Policy analyst in one's attempt to influence the Policymaker during the Policy Process? This paper argues that the Policy analyst has the opportunity to influence Policymakers at various stages of the Policy Process. However, the influence strategies that are effective are different depending upon the type of Policymaker. This understanding is vital if a Policy analyst desires to have an impact. Furthermore, the role the analyst performs has a significant impact on the how and the extent to which the analyst may have leverage.
Govinda Paudel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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community forestry and the threat of recentralization in nepal contesting the bureaucratic hegemony in Policy Process
Society & Natural Resources, 2013Co-Authors: Ramesh Sunam, Naya Sharma Paudel, Govinda PaudelAbstract:Nepal's community forestry program has been touted as a successful case in decentralized forest management. However, the government of Nepal has often constrained the autonomy of local communities as an apparent attempt to reverse decentralization. This article identifies the mechanisms through which decentralized reforms and growing deliberative culture of Policy Process are attenuated. To this end, we analyze an amendment proposal of the government to revise the Forest Act 1993—a widely recognized legislation for democratic decentralization—with the tacit aim of re-equipping the government forestry staff with substantial power. This article shows that the government often monopolizes the Policy Process and obstructs community forestry, while failing to address its own governance deficits. While acknowledging the importance of an antagonistic form of resistance, we emphasize the combination of alliance-led resistance and research-informed deliberation as an effective strategy to contest inappropriate pol...
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community forestry and the threat of recentralization in nepal contesting the bureaucratic hegemony in Policy Process
Society & Natural Resources, 2013Co-Authors: Ramesh Sunam, Naya Sharma Paudel, Govinda PaudelAbstract:Nepal’s community forestry program has been touted as a successful case in decentralized forest management. However, the government of Nepal has often constrained the autonomy of local communities as an apparent attempt to reverse decentralization. This article identifies the mechanisms through which decentralized reforms and growing deliberative culture of Policy Process are attenuated. To this end, we analyze an amendment proposal of the government to revise the Forest Act 1993 — a widely recognized legislation for democratic decentralization — with the tacit aim of re-equipping the government forestry staff with substantial power. This article shows that the government often monopolizes the Policy Process and obstructs community forestry, while failing to address its own governance deficits. While acknowledging the importance of an antagonistic form of resistance, we emphasize the combination of alliance-led resistance and research-informed deliberation as an effective strategy to contest inappropriate Policy decisions and promote a deliberative culture.
Bjorn Alpermann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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studying the chinese Policy Process in the era of top level design the contribution of political steering theory
Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2019Co-Authors: Gunter Schubert, Bjorn AlpermannAbstract:Making sense of the Chinese Policy Process has been one of the most challenging endeavors for China scholars since the beginning of ‘reform and opening up’. Although a great deal of empirical knowledge has been gathered over the years on Policy-making and implementation in many different fields, theorizing on the Chinese Policy Process has mostly been concerned with individual Policy instruments or various modes of Policy-making so far instead of looking at how these are interconnected. In this article, we propose ‘political steering theory’ as an integrative theoretical framework to fill in this gap. Originating from Policy research conducted by German social scientists starting in the 1970s, we consider ‘political steering theory’ to be the most appropriate approach to the Chinese case, particularly in the current era of ‘top-level design’ led by Xi Jinping. We demonstrate how China recently recalibrated its political steering approach and propose new directions for research into the Chinese Policy Process under the current administration.
Geoffrey M Lorenz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Coalition portfolios and interest group influence over the Policy Process
Interest Groups & Advocacy, 2013Co-Authors: Michael T Heaney, Geoffrey M LorenzAbstract:An interest group coalition exists whenever two or more interest groups collaborate in advocating their public Policy agendas. Working together in coalition is one of the most common tactics that interest groups use to advance their interests in the Policy Process. The extant literature on coalitions emphasizes interest group decisions to participate or not in one coalition, or their strategy toward coalitions in general, but gives insufficient attention to interest group participation in multiple coalitions. To rectify this deficit, this article examines the implications of groups’ participation in multiple coalitions for their ability to influence the Policy Process. In order to account for interest group involvement in multiple coalitions, we introduce the concept of the coalition portfolio , which is the set of all coalitions within a given area of public Policy in which an interest group participates at a particular point in time . The portfolio concept recognizes that interest groups may have a wide variety of coalition strategies depending on the mix of coalitions that they join. Variations in the structure of these portfolios matter both to interest groups and to Policymakers. Moreover, coalition portfolios evolve over time as coalitions form and dissolve, and as political conditions adjust over the course of the Policy Process. We develop and test hypotheses that the change in the composition of coalition portfolios increases the influence of interest groups over public Policy when: (i) the number of coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger; (ii) the average size of the coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger or smaller; and (iii) a group’s portfolio improves its position within the overall network of coalitions. Network position is measured based on the betweenness of interest groups in coalition networks, which gives higher scores to groups that lie on the shortest paths between other groups. We test these hypotheses while accounting for other explanations for interest group influence, including: (i) the group’s position in communication networks; (ii) the group’s number of registered lobbyists working on Medicare; (iii) whether or not the group has a Political Action Committee; (iv) the extent to which a group’s lobbying contacts lean toward one political party; (v) whether or not the group endorsed the legislation in question; (vi) the organization’s age in years; and (vii) whether the group is a citizens advocacy organization, a business advocacy organization or some other organizational type. We evaluate these hypotheses using a study of 115 interest groups involved in the enactment and implementation of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. This legislation established an outpatient prescription drug benefit in Medicare – a government health insurance program for the elderly and disabled in the United States – and made other significant changes to the program. We conducted personal interviews with representatives of 102 of these groups. We analyzed data resulting from these interviews using negative binomial and ordinary least squares regression models. The results support Hypothesis (iii); groups gain influence over the Policy Process when their coalition portfolios increase the extent to which they are situated between other groups in the coalition network. However, interest groups are limited in the extent to which they can create portfolios that have desirable levels of betweenness because network position is also a function of membership decisions made by all other groups in the network. These results provide insight into how the composition of coalition portfolios affects the ability of interest groups to exert influence over the Policy Process. This analysis is most directly applicable to Policy debates over complex pieces of legislation.
