The Experts below are selected from a list of 5826 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Atalay Atasu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Extended Producer Responsibility for Durable Products
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Vishal Agrawal, Atalay AtasuAbstract:Problem definition: We study how extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation implementations for durable products should differ from those for nondurable products. Academic/practical relevan...
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design implications of extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Management Science, 2019Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under...
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valuable e waste implications for extended Producer Responsibility
IISE Transactions, 2019Co-Authors: Gokce Esenduran, Atalay Atasu, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based product take-back regulation holds OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) of electronics responsible for the collection and recovery (e.g., recycling) ...
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design incentives under collective extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for Producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of Producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these Producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where Producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures Producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of Producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...
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Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
Environmentally Responsible Supply Chains, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:Take-back legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) holds Producers responsible for proper end-of-life treatment of their products. In addition to diverting waste products from landfills, EPR legislation has the potential advantage of incentivizing eco-design of products. However, evidence suggests that product design outcomes of EPR legislation can be significantly influenced by its implementation. In this chapter, we survey the research on this topic, focusing on design impacts associated with several key operational considerations in supply chains. We show that intended design incentives under EPR legislation may be weakened, muted, or even negated as a result of operational factors such as design trade-off, market competition, and recycling resource sharing. Accordingly, we develop insights as to how the design potential of EPR legislation may be realized.
Luk N. Van Wassenhove - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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valuable e waste implications for extended Producer Responsibility
IISE Transactions, 2019Co-Authors: Gokce Esenduran, Atalay Atasu, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based product take-back regulation holds OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) of electronics responsible for the collection and recovery (e.g., recycling) ...
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Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy
California Management Review, 2018Co-Authors: Nathan Kunz, Kieren Mayers, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations require that Producers organize and pay for treatment and recycling of waste arising from their products at end of life. EPR has been effective in...
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What Roles for Which Stakeholders under Extended Producer Responsibility
Review of European Comparative & International Environmental Law, 2014Co-Authors: Harri Kalimo, Atalay Atasu, Reid Lifset, Chris Van Rossem, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:This article analyzes extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), two decades after the concept emerged. It concentrates on the scope of the Producers' Responsibility vis-a-vis other stakeholders in the context of EPR for waste electronics. It argues that in order for a core aspect of EPR – the creation of design incentives – to function properly the responsibilities need to be shared between the Producers and other stakeholders, and that the allocation of responsibilities needs to be both more rigorous and more nuanced than is presently the case. The article structures the discussion on, and presents solutions to, the proper allocation of responsibilities by creating a framework that distinguishes between issues relating to the core premises of EPR, those that are a function of the multilevel system of governance in which EPR is pursued, and those that are of a practical nature, cutting across jurisdictional levels.
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implementing individual Producer Responsibility for waste electrical and electronic equipment through improved financing
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2013Co-Authors: Kieren Mayers, Reid Lifset, Karl Bodenhoefer, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:(EPR) industrial ecology Producer Responsibility organizations (PROs) recycling Summary Under the European Union (EU) Waste Electrical and Electronics Equipment (WEEE) Directive, Producers are responsible for financing the recycling of their products at end of life. A key intention of such extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide economic incentives for Producers to develop products that are easier to treat and recycle at end of life. Recent research has shown, however, that the implementation of EPR for WEEE has so far failed in this respect. Current WEEE systems calculate their prices according to simple mass-based allocation of costs to Producers, based on broad collection categories containing a mixture of dif- ferent product types and brands. This article outlines two alternative approaches, which instead calculate charges for products sold by Producers by classifying them according to their eventual end-of-life treatment requirements and cost. Worked examples indicate that these methods provide both effective and efficient frameworks for financing WEEE, poten- tially delivering financial incentives to Producers substantial enough to affect their potential profitability and, as a likely consequence, the decisions relating to the design of their prod- ucts. In particular they fulfill three important criteria required by the WEEE Directive: they can financially reward improved design, allocate costs of historic waste proportionately (on the basis of tonnes of new products sold), and provide sufficient financial guarantees against future waste costs and liabilities. They are also relatively practical for implementa- tion because they are based solely on cost allocation and financing. Further research and investigation would be worthwhile to test and verify this approach using real-world data and under various scenarios.
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Enablers and barriers for Producer Responsibility in the electrical and electronic equipment sector
2012 Electronics Goes Green 2012+, 2012Co-Authors: Maria Besiou, Luk N. Van Wassenhove, Ian Williams, Francis Ongondo, Tony Curran, Clementine O'connor, Mona Man-yu Yang, Johannes Dietrich, Max Marwede, Maitane GalloAbstract:ZeroWIN (Towards Zero Waste in Industrial Networks - www.zerowin.eu) is a five year project funded by the EC under the 7th Framework Programme. Amongst others, ZeroWIN examines how Producers' Responsibility can be applied in the electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and photovoltaic sectors. Discussion about extending Producers' Responsibility for environmental impacts of their products to the entire product life cycle began in the 1990s. Since then, many environmental regulations focusing on treatment of end-of-life products have incorporated the concept of Producer Responsibility. This paper identifies and critically discusses global implementation of Producer Responsibility in the photovoltaic and EEE industrial sectors. Characteristics of current systems and markets preventing or facilitating its implementation are discussed.
Garth T. Hickle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Moving beyond the “patchwork:” a review of strategies to promote consistency for extended Producer Responsibility policy in the U.S.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 2014Co-Authors: Garth T. HickleAbstract:Abstract Product-oriented environmental policy with an emphasis on extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) (frequently referred to as product stewardship in the U.S.) is being applied in the United States for an increasingly broad scope of products including waste electronics and household hazardous wastes such as paint and mercury-containing lamps. However, due to the lack of a unified federal response, these efforts are driven by state-level policies and regulations. This state-led approach is frequently characterized as resulting in a “patchwork” of disparate regulations. Historically, two strategies are often suggested as offering a remedy for this situation; 1) federal legislation and 2) model state legislation. However, another policy strategy has emerged in the U.S., that of an overall EPR policy framework, which creates a clear process for selecting and designating products and articulates the roles and responsibilities for the various players along the product chain. This article provides an analysis of the experiences and prospects for each of the three strategies to serve as a policy vehicle for greater consistency of EPR regulations throughout the U.S. In part motivated by global extended Producer Responsibility policy approaches, particularly in the Canadian Provinces, efforts are now underway to investigate a similar comprehensive regulatory approach to be implemented by individual states in the U.S. The article examines the “framework” model that is envisioned in the U.S. and outlines the recommend components of this policy concept. Finally, the article provides a comparison with other jurisdictions, most notably, British Columbia, which has implemented a broad extended Producer Responsibility policy.
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Comparative Analysis of Extended Producer Responsibility Policy in the United States and Canada
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2013Co-Authors: Garth T. HickleAbstract:This article analyzes the policy choices and programmatic elements of extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as implemented in the United States and Canada. The article traces the historical development of EPR in each country and defines common features of EPR in each nation. The U.S. states and the Canadian provinces have assumed the primary role, rather than the federal governments, for enacting Producer Responsibility requirements in their respective countries. However, the paths taken demonstrate several fundamental differences, including the prevalence of individual versus collective Responsibility and the financing mechanisms implemented for EPR. Given the deepening experience with EPR and the breadth of its application to a widening array of products in the United States, the Canadian model for EPR is starting to receive more examination from policy makers in the United States, indicating that the policy and programmatic differences between the two nations may eventually be narrowing. The comparative policy analysis is illustrated through the lens of EPR regulatory efforts for waste electronics, with particular profiles of the programs in the State of Minnesota and Province of Ontario. Both approaches broadly reflect many of the policy considerations and governance and programmatic themes that dominate EPR programs in each country. Finally, the article offers recommendations for collaborative work between the United States and Canada to explore consistency between programs and other complementary strategies to support Producer Responsibility activities.
Luyi Gui - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Recycling Infrastructure Development under Extended Producer Responsibility in Developing Economies
Production and Operations Management, 2020Co-Authors: Luyi GuiAbstract:To tackle the severe pollution caused by electronic waste (e‐waste), several developing countries have introduced e‐waste legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). A major challenge to implement EPR in developing countries is the lack of formal recycling infrastructure. In this paper, we study if a collective form of EPR implementation where Producers may jointly invest in recycling facilities can promote their incentives to do so. We develop a Nash bargaining model that captures the decision dynamics underlying joint recycling facility investment. We show that despite its advantage in reducing Producers’ fixed investment costs, joint investment in the collective system may lead to a worse recycling infrastructure development outcome than independent investment in an individual system. This can particularly happen when the collective system involves products whose recycling costs are highly differentiated. We further show that cost sharing based on the principle of Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) may undermine the recycling infrastructure development outcome in the collective system compared to simple proportional cost sharing rules. In practice, it is generally believed that IPR leads to better design incentives than proportional cost sharing rules. Accordingly, our result indicates that there exists a tradeoff between these two cost sharing rules, and promoting recycling infrastructure development via collective systems may come at the expense of design incentives and vice versa.
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design incentives under collective extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for Producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of Producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these Producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where Producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures Producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of Producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...
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Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
Environmentally Responsible Supply Chains, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:Take-back legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) holds Producers responsible for proper end-of-life treatment of their products. In addition to diverting waste products from landfills, EPR legislation has the potential advantage of incentivizing eco-design of products. However, evidence suggests that product design outcomes of EPR legislation can be significantly influenced by its implementation. In this chapter, we survey the research on this topic, focusing on design impacts associated with several key operational considerations in supply chains. We show that intended design incentives under EPR legislation may be weakened, muted, or even negated as a result of operational factors such as design trade-off, market competition, and recycling resource sharing. Accordingly, we develop insights as to how the design potential of EPR legislation may be realized.
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efficient implementation of collective extended Producer Responsibility legislation
Management Science, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds Producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple Producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to Producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different Producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain Producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some Producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and Producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that...
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Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2013Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:The goal of this article is to contribute to the understanding of how the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, stakeholder perspectives and prevailing conditions (economic, geographic, etc.) in the implementation locality shape extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) “on the ground.” We provide an in‐depth examination of the implementation dimension of EPR in a specific case study by examining concrete activities at the operational front of the collection and recycling system, and probing the varying stakeholder preferences that have driven a specific system to its status quo. To this end, we conduct a detailed case study of the Washington State EPR implementation for electronic waste. We provide an overview of various stakeholder perspectives and their implications for the attainment of EPR policy objectives in practice. These findings shed light on the intrinsic complexity of EPR implementation. We conclude with recommendations on how to achieve effective and efficient EPR implementation, including improving design incentives, incorporating reuse and refurbishing, expanding product scope, managing downstream material flows, and promoting operational efficiency via fair cost allocation design.
Kieren Mayers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy
California Management Review, 2018Co-Authors: Nathan Kunz, Kieren Mayers, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations require that Producers organize and pay for treatment and recycling of waste arising from their products at end of life. EPR has been effective in...
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implementing individual Producer Responsibility for waste electrical and electronic equipment through improved financing
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2013Co-Authors: Kieren Mayers, Reid Lifset, Karl Bodenhoefer, Luk N. Van WassenhoveAbstract:(EPR) industrial ecology Producer Responsibility organizations (PROs) recycling Summary Under the European Union (EU) Waste Electrical and Electronics Equipment (WEEE) Directive, Producers are responsible for financing the recycling of their products at end of life. A key intention of such extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide economic incentives for Producers to develop products that are easier to treat and recycle at end of life. Recent research has shown, however, that the implementation of EPR for WEEE has so far failed in this respect. Current WEEE systems calculate their prices according to simple mass-based allocation of costs to Producers, based on broad collection categories containing a mixture of dif- ferent product types and brands. This article outlines two alternative approaches, which instead calculate charges for products sold by Producers by classifying them according to their eventual end-of-life treatment requirements and cost. Worked examples indicate that these methods provide both effective and efficient frameworks for financing WEEE, poten- tially delivering financial incentives to Producers substantial enough to affect their potential profitability and, as a likely consequence, the decisions relating to the design of their prod- ucts. In particular they fulfill three important criteria required by the WEEE Directive: they can financially reward improved design, allocate costs of historic waste proportionately (on the basis of tonnes of new products sold), and provide sufficient financial guarantees against future waste costs and liabilities. They are also relatively practical for implementa- tion because they are based solely on cost allocation and financing. Further research and investigation would be worthwhile to test and verify this approach using real-world data and under various scenarios.
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Producer Responsibility Organizations Development and Operations
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2013Co-Authors: Kieren Mayers, Scott ButlerAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations are now in effect in 27 European Union member states and are applicable to up to 100 million tonnes of waste packaging, batteries, automobiles, and electrical and electronic products annually. This article investigates the implementation of EPR through a case study of European Recycling Platform (ERP) UK Ltd., the UK arm of one of the largest Producer Responsibility organizations (PROs) in Europe, recycling more than 1.5 million tonnes of waste electrical and electronic equipment to date. Previous research is extremely limited on the detailed operations of PROs. This case is presented as an example illustrating typical operational challenges PROs face in implementing EPR, such as how PROs gain an understanding of the waste management infrastructure and legislation in each country, collect sufficient volumes of waste using cost‐effective arrangements, and maintain uninterrupted collection, treatment, and recycling services. The case study provides new insights and context on the practical implementation of EPR regulations relevant for both policy makers and researchers.
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Individual Producer Responsibility: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE Directive
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Atalay Atasu, Reid Lifset, Jason Linnell, Jonathan Perry, Viktor Sundberg, Kieren Mayers, Mark Dempsey, Luk N. Van Wassenhove, Chris Van Rossem, Jeremy GregoryAbstract:This report documents the interim findings of the INSEAD IPR Network in relation to investigating practical solutions enabling implementation of Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) for the WEEE Directive. The INSEAD IPR Network is a partnership of Producers, academics and technical specialists from across the world working to identify, explore and develop practical solutions to IPR. The network is a project co-ordinated by the International graduate business school, INSEAD. Members and authors of this report are listed in Appendix 1. Article 8.2 of the European WEEE (Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment) Directive establishes individual Producer Responsibility for the recycling of products put on the market after 13 August 2005. Making each Producer responsible for financing the end-of-life costs of their own products is intended to enable end-of-life costs to be fed back to each individual Producer. By modifications to the product design, the Producer can directly influence the end of life cost. Without Individual Producer Responsibility these incentives for design improvements are lost. This report demonstrates that there are already a range of approaches to Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) that have been implemented across the world; many of which attempt to account to a greater or lesser degree for the products and brands of each Producer. Oekopol (2007) already noted the development of such approaches, in contrast to the more prevalent collective market-share based implementations (Collective Producer Responsibility – or CPR). In their recent report to the European Commission, Oekopol stated: ‘The alternatives are, in light of on-going efforts of Producers, highly feasible.’
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Meeting the 'Producer Responsibility' Challenge The Management of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment in the UK
1999Co-Authors: Kieren MayersAbstract:Since the late 1980s, various governments have been moving towards a new marketbased approach to waste management known as ‘Producer Responsibility’. Through this approach, Producers of electrical and electronic equipment will be made responsible for the end-of-life waste management costs of their products. Focusing on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment (E E), this paper examines the environmental rationale behind this new approach to waste management, and discusses its political evolution and development across Europe. Cases for the most effective and workable approaches are argued, and the scope and implications of future legislation in the UK is summarised. It is concluded that Producer Responsibility will be effective only if legislation is deployed such that well-defined price mechanisms result in the appropriate level of environmental improvement. This will be achieved in the U K only if Producers become more proactive in collaborating with each other, and with policy-makers, in proposing a suitable way forward.
