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Andrew Flavelle Martin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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consequences for broken political promises lawyer politicians and the rules of Professional Conduct
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Andrew Flavelle MartinAbstract:Politicians sometimes break their promises. Canadian law is clear that the only recourse is for voters at the ballot box. However, politicians who happen to be lawyers are ostensibly governed by the rules of Professional Conduct. Under these rules, certain promises, termed undertakings, are special. Courts and law societies will enforce these promises and/or impose consequences for their breach against practicing lawyers. This article considers how the rule on undertakings should apply to political promises made by lawyer-politicians. The article begins with a brief summary of the rules of Professional Conduct as they apply to lawyer-politicians and to lawyers’ undertakings. The article then turns to the case law on broken political promises. Finally, the article argues that the rule of Professional Conduct on undertakings should apply to lawyer-politicians’ promises in limited circumstances, and specifically when these promises take pseudo-legal form such as signed contracts and pledges.
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legal ethics versus political practices the application of the rules of Professional Conduct to lawyer politicians
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Andrew Flavelle MartinAbstract:Canadian legal ethics has paid little attention to how the rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers apply to lawyer-politicians – that is, politicians who happen to be lawyers. This article addresses this issue with reference to what Canadian case law and commentary do exist, supplemented by more plentiful American materials. It proposes a distinction between Conduct that is politically expedient and Conduct in which lawyer-politicians’ duties as lawyers come into apparent conflict with their duties of office. Canadian case law reveals three conflicting approaches to this latter category: that the duties of a lawyer prevail, that the duties of a politician prevail, and that the two sets of duties must be balanced in the circumstances. The article then considers the legal barriers and policy considerations that may limit law societies’ discipline of lawyer-politicians. It ends by considering potential approaches and solutions, concluding that law societies should regulate lawyer-politicians’ Conduct but should balance the Professional obligations of those lawyers against their responsibilities as holders of public office. It also emphasizes that lawyer-politicians who do not want to be held to this standard should surrender their law licenses.
George M Cohen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the state of lawyer knowledge under the model rules of Professional Conduct
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: George M CohenAbstract:The actual knowledge standard pervades the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and applies to lawyers in all areas of practice, whether transactional, litigation, or criminal. Yet the state of lawyers’ ethical “knowledge” is poor. The Model Rules and the authorities interpreting them do an inadequate job of defining knowledge; of explaining or justifying the use of the knowledge standard in the rules; and of relating the knowledge requirement to, and reconciling it with, other ethical and legal requirements. Drafters of ethics codes are apparently unwilling to do anything about this problem, because lawyers often view the knowledge standard as an important means of limiting lawyer responsibility. The knowledge standard may not provide as much protection as lawyers think, however.I argue in this Article that given the importance of the actual knowledge standard, the Model Rule drafters need to provide better guidance to lawyers about the meaning of, and reasons for, the knowledge under the Model Rules. First, the Model Rules should expressly incorporate recklessness, or willful blindness, into the definition of “knowledge” or its comment. Second, the rules and comments should make clear that the knowledge requirement does not negate or limit any duty to investigate or communicate that otherwise exists in the ethics rules or other law, and that the deliberate breach of these duties can be evidence of willful blindness and therefore knowledge. Finally, the drafters should further clarify where a duty to investigate or communicate otherwise exists in comments to rules including a knowledge requirement.
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the state of lawyer knowledge under the model rules of Professional Conduct
American University Business Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: George M CohenAbstract:IntroductionThe state of lawyers' ethical "knowledge" is poor. By that, I mean that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the authorities interpreting it do a poor job of defining "knowledge"; of explaining or justifying the use of the knowledge standard in the rules; and of relating the knowledge requirement to, and reconciling it with, other ethical and legal requirements. As a result, many lawyers have less "knowledge" of their ethical and legal obligations than they ought to have. Moreover, lawyers who understand the knowledge problem, such as drafters of ethics codes, are apparently unwilling to do anything about it. The reason is that lawyers often view the knowledge standard as an important means of limiting lawyer responsibility. That view, however, is misleading.The terms "knowingly," "known," and "knows" appear in almost every category of ethical rules: those dealing with the lawyer-client relationship,1 the lawyer's role as advocate and duties to the court,2 the lawyer's obligations to third parties,3 the lawyer's responsibilities within law firms,4 the lawyer's duties concerning public service,5 and the lawyer's obligations to the profession.6 The Terminology section of the Model Rules defines these terms to mean "actual knowledge of the fact in question," arid then adds: "A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."7 There is no comment explaining this definition.The problem starts with the meaning of this definition. Its two sentences are in some tension. If actual knowledge may be inferred from circumstances, a lawyer can violate an ethical rule requiring "knowledge" even if the lawyer does not "actually know." A common resolution is that the two sentences establish an objective rather than a subjective standard of proof for actual knowledge.8 Thus, as a practical matter, the rules allow a disciplinary authority to prove actual knowledge by circumstantial evidence, rather than solely by a lawyer's admission of knowledge as part of the disciplinary proceeding, or by the testimony of some third party to whom the lawyer had earlier stated his or her intentions.9 Moreover, an objective standard of knowledge means that a lawyer cannot disprove knowledge simply by sincerely contending that the lawyer did not believe10 that some fact was true or that some legal rule existed or would be interpreted in a certain way. This explanation does not completely eliminate the tension. The question remains: what circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find actual knowledge? Put another way, what does the actual knowledge standard intend to exclude?The most accepted answer is that the actual knowledge standard aims to exclude a duty to inquire. In particular, the Terminology section defines "reasonably should know," which appears in a number of ethics rules,11 as denoting "that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question."12 The distinction between an actual knowledge standard, which includes no duty of inquiry, and a reasonably should know standard, which includes such a duty, raises a number of questions. First, does the knowledge standard include recklessness or willful blindness, which lies between "know" and "reasonably should know?" Second, how does the knowledge standard apply if a lawyer otherwise has a legal or ethical duty to inquire and fails to satisfy it? Third, how does the knowledge requirement interact with rules of imputation?13I will argue in this Article that the Model Rules should be revised to answer these three related questions and thereby provide clearer guidance to lawyers. First, the Model Rules should expressly incorporate recklessness into the definition of "knowledge" or at least should expressly incorporate this standard whenever a duty to inquire or a duty to communicate otherwise exists under the rules or other law. Second, one way to show recklessness or willful blindness is through a deliberate breach of an otherwise existing duty to inquire. …
Omar Haredeye - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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overview the rules of Professional Conduct and their application to the legal profession online and off
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Omar Haredeye, Bob TarantinoAbstract:This article was presented in a modified format at the Law Society of Upper Canada’s Ethical Considerations in an Age of Technology Continuing Professional Development program on October 7, 2011 and November 21, 2011. Reproduced with permission of the publisher from Internet and E-Commerce Law in Canada, Vol. 12, No. 11, March 2012.This article seeks to provide a formal analysis of the ethical obligations applicable to the activities of lawyers carried out online, with particular reference to “social media.” While an exhaustive review of the Rules of Professional Conduct is beyond the scope of this article, an examination of the Rules indicates that the rules listed within are the most relevant to the issue canvassed in this article.
Emily Rubin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Professional Conduct and misConduct
Handbook of Clinical Neurology, 2013Co-Authors: Emily RubinAbstract:Standards of Conduct in any profession reflect the shared values of that profession and define behaviors by its members that are considered either mandatory or proscribed. This chapter will provide an overview of several of the primary aspects of Professional Conduct and misConduct by physicians, with an emphasis on the neurologist where appropriate. It will start with an overview of the foundations of the physician-patient relationship, then cover topics including initiation of the physician-patient relationship, communication, therapeutic privilege, disclosure of medical errors, empathy and Professional boundaries, barriers to care and termination of the physician-patient relationship, conflicts of interest, self-care, deception of third parties, reporting impaired colleagues, and expert testimony.
Roberto Carlos Dos Santos Pacheco - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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peer review in education promoting collaboration written expression critical thinking and Professional responsibility
Education and Information Technologies, 2003Co-Authors: Vinicius Medina Kern, Luciana Martins Saraiva, Roberto Carlos Dos Santos PachecoAbstract:This article discusses the application of the peer review process as a pedagogical instrument for the promotion of written expression, collaborative work, critical thinking, and Professional responsibility among Informatics and Engineering majors. The approach is introduced with a motivation, followed by a discussion about common principles of current learning paradigms and the peer review process. This work is being Conducted in Brazil, where we intend to promote a learning paradigm shift through the application of peer review in education. A framework for this application is outlined, together with an account of results from experiences and a discussion about the skills that this approach exercises, especially with regard to widely accepted curricula and codes of ethics and Professional Conduct. Further research and development efforts are conjectured.
