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Howard Sankey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability
2018Co-Authors: Howard SankeyAbstract:Part 1 Relativism: five varieties of cognitive Relativism. Part 2 Incommensurability: Kuhn's changing concept of incommensurability (appendix - incommensurability and the indeterminacy of translation Kuhn's ontological Relativism taxonomic incommensurability. Part 3 Untranslatability: in defense of untranslatability (appendix - translation and languagehood) incommensurability, translation and understanding. Part 4 Rationality: the problem of rational theory choice judgement and rational theory choice. Part 5 Naturalism: rationality, Relativism and methodological pluralism normative naturalism and the challenge of Relativism Popper's metamethodological conventionalism and the turn to naturalism.
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Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism
Social Epistemology, 2015Co-Authors: Howard SankeyAbstract:This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic Relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic Relativism, according to which epistemic Relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic Relativism. Such Relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic Relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the criterion proposed by Roderick Chisholm, which is based on epistemological particularism. After sketching Chisholm’s approach, a response to epistemic Relativism is presented which combines Chisholm’s particularism with epistemic naturalism and reliabilism. A number of objections to the position are then considered. The paper ends with remarks about the relationship between particularism and the naturalistic response proposed to epistemic Relativism.
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Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2014Co-Authors: Howard SankeyAbstract:In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic Relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic Relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to Relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response to epistemic Relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to Relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to Relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world.
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Scepticism, Relativism and the argument from the criterion
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2012Co-Authors: Howard SankeyAbstract:Abstract This article explores the relationship between epistemic Relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic Relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic Relativism is characterized as Relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive Relativism, such as truth Relativism, conceptual Relativism and ontological Relativism. An argument from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion to epistemic Relativism is presented, and is contrasted with three other arguments for epistemic Relativism. It is argued that the argument from the criterion is the most fundamental argument for epistemic Relativism. Finally, it is noted how the argument of the present paper fits with the author’s previous suggestion that a particularist response to the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be combined with a naturalistic view of epistemic warrant to meet the challenge of epistemic Relativism.
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Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion
Erkenntnis, 2009Co-Authors: Howard SankeyAbstract:This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic Relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and Relativism, an argument in support of epistemic Relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms. It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms.
Cassandra L Pinnick - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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feminist epistemology implications for philosophy of science
Philosophy of Science, 1994Co-Authors: Cassandra L PinnickAbstract:This article examines the best contemporary arguments for a feminist epistemology of scientific knowledge as found in recent works by S. Harding. I argue that no feminist epistemology of science is worthy of the name, because such an epistemology fails to escape well-known vicissitudes of epistemic Relativism. But feminist epistemology merits attention from philosophers of science because it is part of a larger relativist turn in the social sciences and humanities that now aims to extend its critique to science, and Harding's "standpoint feminism" is the best-developed case. She attempts to make new use of discredited philosophical ideas concerning underdetermination, Planck's Hypothesis, and the role of counterfactuals in historical studies of science.
Lynne M Healy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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universalism and cultural Relativism in social work ethics
International Social Work, 2007Co-Authors: Lynne M HealyAbstract:EnglishGiven globalization and increasing multiculturalism, growing numbers of social workers face the challenges of respecting culture while upholding professional ethics. This article examines the perspectives of universalism and cultural Relativism as applied to ethical decision-making in social work. A moderately universalist stance is recommended for social work, as valuing both diversity and human rights.FrenchFace a la mondialisation et a l'augmentation du multiculturalisme, un nombre croissant de travailleurs sociaux font face a des defis dans un contexte qui demande de tenir compte a la fois du respect culturel et de l'ethique professionnelle. Cet article examine l'application de prises de decisions ethiques dans des perspectives universalistes et de Relativisme culturel en travail social. Une position universaliste moderee est recommandee pour le travail social, valorisant a la fois la diversite culturelle et les droits humains.SpanishDada la globalizacion y el multiculturalismo creciente, los t...
Keith J Holyoak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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exposure to moral Relativism compromises moral behavior
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2013Co-Authors: Tage S Rai, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Abstract Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral Relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that Relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral Relativism compared to moral absolutism.
Isidora Stojanovic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Metaethical Relativism
2017Co-Authors: Isidora StojanovicAbstract:Although Relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5 th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as "relativist" would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even "expressivist" in light of the distinctions currenty drawn in philosophy of language and semantics. In this chapter, we distinguish two construals of Relativism, developed in sections 2 and 3 respectively: the "metaphysical" construal, based on the idea that there is no single, absolute, universal morality, and the "semantic" construal, based on the idea that the truth value of moral claims is relative to a set of moral standards, or moral practices, or some other suitable parameter. Section 1 introduces the core relativist ideas in an informal way, and warns against possible misinterpretations.
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Talking about Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments and Relative Truth
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2007Co-Authors: Isidora StojanovicAbstract:In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn (2005), according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter (in addition to a possible world parameter) rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence containing a taste predicate, and given any assignment of values to the relevant parameters, the two accounts predict the same truth value and are, in that sense, equivalent. I also look at possible reasons for preferring one account over the other. The phenomenon of “faultless disagreement” (cf. Kölbel (2002)) is often believed to be one such reason. I argue, against Kölbel and Lasersohn, that disagreement is never faultless: either the two parties genuinely disagree, hence if the one is right then the other is wrong, or the two parties are both right, but their apparent disagreement boils down to a misunderstanding. What is more, even if there were faultless disagreement, I argue that Relativism would fail to account for it. The upshot of my paper, then, is to show that there is not much disagreement between a contextualist account that models the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, and a relativist account that models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. The choice between the two accounts, at least when talking about taste, is thus, to a large extent, a matter of taste.
