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Zoe Robinson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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What is a "Religious Institution"?
Boston College Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Zoe RobinsonAbstract:INTRODUCTIONWhat Religious Institutions have constitutional rights? This question has become increasingly important. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court held that Religious Institutions have an absolute constitutional right to fire ministers regard for employment discrimination laws.1 Undergirding the holding was, Chief Justice John Roberts stated, the general principle that the text of the Constitution gives "special solicitude" to the rights of Religious organizations.2 With this statement, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor fundamentally changed the framework of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, all litigants could pursue one or both of two claims under the Religion Clauses: that the government had burdened their Religious liberty in violation of the Free Exercise Clause; and/or that the government had violated the Establishment Clause.3 What Hosanna-Tabor has added is an additional doctrinal path for litigants to follow. Unlike the generally applicable Religion Clauses, however, this new cause of action is exclusive and applicable only to "Religious Institutions."4Commentators have waged war over the legitimacy of the Court's new Religious Institutionalism.5 The idea that Religious Institutions are unique for First Amendment purposes, claims one prominent scholar, is antithetical to the ideals of neutrality and equality that the Religion Clauses were intended to enshrine.6 However, while scholars focus on the normative validity of the Court's new Institutional right, the doctrinal contours remain largely unaddressed.7 And of all of the potential doctrinal issues raised by the Court's new Religious Institutionalism, one stands out as critically important: the threshold question of who, or what, is a "Religious Institution."8 Answering this question is crucial because it determines what Institutions have the unique and rare absolute constitutional protection over a whole host of activities.9Myriad Institutions have wasted no time in vying for the "Religious Institution" designation.10 Religiously-owned businesses, Religious lobby groups, Religious universities, and Religious schools have all filed claims with the lower federal courts claiming to be First Amendment Religious Institutions.11 These Institutions are claiming that they are constitutionally protected from adhering to, for example, Title VII discrimination laws,12 the Obama Administration's health insurance mandate requiring employers to provide contraception,13 workers compensation laws,14 and basic common law rules like negligence and contract.15The lower courts are struggling to figure out how to determine which of these Institutions are "Religious Institutions" for the purposes of the new First Amendment right.16 Lacking any guidance or coherent theory as to how to sin- gle out this newly specialized constitutional group among a sea of organizations that increasingly claim to be Religious, courts are vacillating between identifying First Amendment Religious Institutions based on who they are, what they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to-without any clear theoretical justification for their choices.17Given the importance of this threshold question, it is surprising that there has yet to be any serious attempt to define a "Religious Institution" for First Amendment purposes. This Article fills this gap by presenting the first scholarly attempt to offer a set of guidelines for courts to identify a First Amendment Religious Institution. It proceeds from the perspective of First Amendment exceptionalism-that only a certain subset of groups claiming to be Religious in nature will qualify as a constitutional Religious Institution. The Article argues that the most pragmatic and definable way to sort first-order Religious Institutions-i.e., those groups that should be classified as rights holders-from second-order Religious Institutions-i. …
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what is a Religious Institution
Boston College Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Zoe RobinsonAbstract:INTRODUCTIONWhat Religious Institutions have constitutional rights? This question has become increasingly important. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court held that Religious Institutions have an absolute constitutional right to fire ministers regard for employment discrimination laws.1 Undergirding the holding was, Chief Justice John Roberts stated, the general principle that the text of the Constitution gives "special solicitude" to the rights of Religious organizations.2 With this statement, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor fundamentally changed the framework of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, all litigants could pursue one or both of two claims under the Religion Clauses: that the government had burdened their Religious liberty in violation of the Free Exercise Clause; and/or that the government had violated the Establishment Clause.3 What Hosanna-Tabor has added is an additional doctrinal path for litigants to follow. Unlike the generally applicable Religion Clauses, however, this new cause of action is exclusive and applicable only to "Religious Institutions."4Commentators have waged war over the legitimacy of the Court's new Religious Institutionalism.5 The idea that Religious Institutions are unique for First Amendment purposes, claims one prominent scholar, is antithetical to the ideals of neutrality and equality that the Religion Clauses were intended to enshrine.6 However, while scholars focus on the normative validity of the Court's new Institutional right, the doctrinal contours remain largely unaddressed.7 And of all of the potential doctrinal issues raised by the Court's new Religious Institutionalism, one stands out as critically important: the threshold question of who, or what, is a "Religious Institution."8 Answering this question is crucial because it determines what Institutions have the unique and rare absolute constitutional protection over a whole host of activities.9Myriad Institutions have wasted no time in vying for the "Religious Institution" designation.10 Religiously-owned businesses, Religious lobby groups, Religious universities, and Religious schools have all filed claims with the lower federal courts claiming to be First Amendment Religious Institutions.11 These Institutions are claiming that they are constitutionally protected from adhering to, for example, Title VII discrimination laws,12 the Obama Administration's health insurance mandate requiring employers to provide contraception,13 workers compensation laws,14 and basic common law rules like negligence and contract.15The lower courts are struggling to figure out how to determine which of these Institutions are "Religious Institutions" for the purposes of the new First Amendment right.16 Lacking any guidance or coherent theory as to how to sin- gle out this newly specialized constitutional group among a sea of organizations that increasingly claim to be Religious, courts are vacillating between identifying First Amendment Religious Institutions based on who they are, what they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to-without any clear theoretical justification for their choices.17Given the importance of this threshold question, it is surprising that there has yet to be any serious attempt to define a "Religious Institution" for First Amendment purposes. This Article fills this gap by presenting the first scholarly attempt to offer a set of guidelines for courts to identify a First Amendment Religious Institution. It proceeds from the perspective of First Amendment exceptionalism-that only a certain subset of groups claiming to be Religious in nature will qualify as a constitutional Religious Institution. The Article argues that the most pragmatic and definable way to sort first-order Religious Institutions-i.e., those groups that should be classified as rights holders-from second-order Religious Institutions-i. …
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What is a 'Religious Institution'?
2013Co-Authors: Zoe RobinsonAbstract:Change in the First Amendment landscape tends towards the incremental, but the Supreme Court’s opinion two terms ago in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC — holding that Religious Institutions enjoy a range of First Amendment protections that do not extend to other individuals or organizations — is better understood as a jurisprudential earthquake. The suddenness and scale of the shift helps to explain the turmoil that has ensued in the lower courts and law journals. And yet, it could be that the biggest aftershock has yet to be felt. The Court left open the most important functional question that exists in scenarios where there will be constitutional winners and losers: what, or who, is a 'Religious Institution' for First Amendment purposes?The lower federal courts have begun to grapple with the question, but no satisfactory approach exists. Drawing on the historical sources and values animating Hosanna-Tabor and its Religion Clause predecessors, this Article provides a workable framework for distinguishing between those Institutions that fall within the scope of the Religious Institutions category and those that do not. The framework proposed here proceeds from a purposive analysis that turns on which Institutions will most often and most effectively use the newly identified and exclusive protections to benefit society as a whole. To this end, the framework favors Institutions that have as their purpose (1) protection of individual conscience; (2) protection of group rights; and (3) provision of desirable societal structures.
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what is a Religious Institution
2013Co-Authors: Zoe RobinsonAbstract:Change in the First Amendment landscape tends towards the incremental, but the Supreme Court’s opinion two terms ago in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC — holding that Religious Institutions enjoy a range of First Amendment protections that do not extend to other individuals or organizations — is better understood as a jurisprudential earthquake. The suddenness and scale of the shift helps to explain the turmoil that has ensued in the lower courts and law journals. And yet, it could be that the biggest aftershock has yet to be felt. The Court left open the most important functional question that exists in scenarios where there will be constitutional winners and losers: what, or who, is a 'Religious Institution' for First Amendment purposes?The lower federal courts have begun to grapple with the question, but no satisfactory approach exists. Drawing on the historical sources and values animating Hosanna-Tabor and its Religion Clause predecessors, this Article provides a workable framework for distinguishing between those Institutions that fall within the scope of the Religious Institutions category and those that do not. The framework proposed here proceeds from a purposive analysis that turns on which Institutions will most often and most effectively use the newly identified and exclusive protections to benefit society as a whole. To this end, the framework favors Institutions that have as their purpose (1) protection of individual conscience; (2) protection of group rights; and (3) provision of desirable societal structures.
Sara C. Bronin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses
Yale Law & Policy Review, 2006Co-Authors: Sara C. BroninAbstract:Religious Institutions have long offered their congregants services that go beyond worship. From access to schools or community halls to services as basic as parking, Religious Institutions necessarily use their land and resources for more than just Religious observance. But particularly in the last two decades, they have begun expanding far beyond their traditional offerings to a wider and more diverse array of "auxiliary uses" non-worship uses that are affiliated with a Religious Institution. Religious Institutions now run insurance agencies, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and transportation companies.1 They manage retail stores that sell Religiously themed merchandise,2 incorporate popular franchises like Starbucks3 and McDonald's,4 finance recording studios,5 and operate credit unions and banks.6 The nation's second-largest church (with 30,000 congregants) has even begun developing
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Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses
2005Co-Authors: Sara C. BroninAbstract:Religious Institutions have long offered their congregants services that go beyond worship. Particularly in the last two decades, they have begun expanding far beyond their traditional offerings to a wider and more diverse array of "auxiliary uses" - non-worship uses that are affiliated with a Religious Institution. (One type of large Religious Institution, the megachurch, is fast gaining members by offering schools, community centers, dining facilities, even movie theaters and gymnasiums.) Government has long granted special protections to the worship uses of Religious Institutions. A recent federal law - the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) - has nationalized how land use regulations apply to Religious Institutions. However, as this article argues, RLUIPA does not adequately address the problem of auxiliary uses. To avoid constitutional challenges to RLUIPA, Congress must rework RLUIPA to differentiate between those auxiliary uses that are substantially-related to a Religious Institution's mission and those that are not.
Serge Vaucelle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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christian patriotism and physical education in pre revolutionary france the royal military school in soreze in the eighteenth century
International Journal of The History of Sport, 2019Co-Authors: Serge Vaucelle, John McclellandAbstract:The Ecole Royale Militaire of Soreze (Royal Military School) was located in the French province of Languedoc. On the eve of the 1789 Revolution it was still a Religious Institution run by the Bened...
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Teaching the Body and Pedagogical Renewal in Prerevolutionary France (Royal Military School of Soreze, 1759-1854)
Les Cahiers de Framespa : Nouveaux champs de l'histoire sociale, 2018Co-Authors: Serge VaucelleAbstract:The Ecole Royale Militaire of Soreze (Royal Military School) was housed in the French province of Languedoc. On the eve of the 1789 Revolution it was still a Religious Institution run by the Benedictine monks, known for having broken with certain traditional models. The establishment offered special forms of instruction, stressing certain scientific and literary disciplines and also physical education (fencing, dancing, horse riding and equestrianism). Pupils’ best results were also recorded in swimming. At the end of every school year, all the results were confirmed by public examinations, labelled Exercices publics. By analyzing this unusual set of data – the Cahiers d’exercices – we can reconstruct the evolution of the school’s programs over a period of more than a century. The goal of the present study is to bring to light the incalculable richness of Sorèze’s programs, by distinguishing the elements already present in the military training of the period from the pedagogical innovations that were introduced, and the special place that was reserved for physical exercise. It will thus be possible to understand the total coherence of the scholarly program that this Catholic Institution developed in pre-Revolutionary France.
Mark D. Rosen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of Overlapping Spheres
University of Illinois Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Mark D. RosenAbstract:Individual Religious liberty enjoys strong legal protections supported by an underlying contemporary consensus in the United States. This legal and cultural consensus took root after a wave of individuals’ complaints of government interference with their ability to practice their religion’s dictates. But the current claims of Religious interference have been increasingly asserted on behalf of an array of Religiously affiliated Institutions. Unlike previous claims, there is no normative consensus as to what, if any protections, these myriad Institutions should receive. This uncertainty can be seen in the federal government’s chaotic responses—from recent Supreme Court case law to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate. Scholars have staked out two opposing positions. One group has argued that churches and affiliated Religious Institutions should be entitled to legal autonomy. A second camp has argued that the state is the singular source of legal authority in modern politics and that all authority and status of a church is entirely derivative of its members’ rights of voluntary association and conscience. This article proposes a third framework to determine the appropriate relationship between Religious Institutions and the state, what it dubs the Religious Institution Principle. Drawing on John Rawls, this framework rejects both the view that Religious Institutions are jurisdictionally independent of the modern state, and that Religious Institutions’ status is derivative of its members’ rights of association and conscience. Instead, the Article argues that Religious Institutions cannot be reduced to the individuals who compose them, but instead that the protections they deserve may be “greater than the sum of the parts” of their constituent members. The Religious Institution Principle provides a principled approach
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Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of Overlapping Spheres
2013Co-Authors: Mark D. RosenAbstract:Alongside the contemporary consensus favoring strong protections for individual Religious liberty, controversial new claims on behalf of Religiously affiliated Institutions have been asserted with increasing frequency. They raise difficult questions. For example, are churches entitled to a “ministerial exception” exempting them from federal anti-discrimination laws when hiring and firing ministers? Must Catholic hospitals be exempted from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate,” which requires that employers provide their employees health insurance that includes contraceptive devices, because use of contraceptives is contrary to Catholic tenets?To date, scholars have staked out two diametrically opposed approaches. One group argues that churches have inherent autonomy, and a corresponding jurisdictional independence of the state, vis-a-vis matters within the church’s domain. A second argues that churches are voluntary associations that accordingly enjoy no protections beyond their members’ constitutional and statutory rights. The first group favors the ministerial exception and exemptions from the contraception mandate, whereas the second group opposes them.This Article critiques both approaches, and provides an alternative framework derived from John Rawls’s monumental works on political theory. What this Article calls the “Religious Institution Principle” provides a basis for determining what qualifies as a Religious Institution, as it explains why Religious Institutions are not reducible to their members, and why they are meaningfully different from most, possibly all, other associations. But Religious Institutions do not have any inherent autonomy. Not all religions are entitled to the Religious Institution Principle’s protections, and the principle does not provide anything approaching full immunity from state regulation for the religions falling within its coverage.In essence, whereas the first scholarly approach treats state and church as separate juridical spheres, and the second approach eliminates the distinct sphere of religion by folding churches into their individual members, this Article conceptualizes government and Religious Institutions as overlapping spheres.The Religious Institution Principle’s derivation reveals why it is fair, and why it plausibly can be thought to be acceptable to both Religious and non-Religious citizens. The principle generates a robust normative framework for evaluating Religious Institutions’ claims, which the Article applies to a wide array of difficult questions, including the polygamy decision in Reynolds v. United States, sexual abuse lawsuits against clergy, the ministerial exception, the contraception mandate, and the church autonomy cases.
Jennie-leigh Mclamb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Keeping Religious Institutions Secure
2015Co-Authors: Jennie-leigh MclambAbstract:Keeping Religious Institutions Secure explores the unique vulnerabilities that churches, synagogues, and mosques face in regards to security, making them attractive to criminals who see them as easy targets. The text illustrates why all places of worship should think about security and the types of breaches that can drive people away. The book focuses on the most frequent security concerns experienced by houses of worship, including embezzlement, vandalism, assault, hate crime, and in rare cases, an active shooter-and how to help prevent them from occurring. Beginning with an overview of the basic security concepts and principles that can enhance the security of any Religious facility, it then delves deeply into the particular security concerns of houses of worship, including the use of volunteers, protecting Religious leaders, ensuring safety for children and teens, interacting with local law enforcement, handling the media, and much more. Covers security best practices that are adaptable to any type of Religious Institution. Addresses the key security measures-physical, electronic, environmental, and procedural-for protecting people and facilities. Includes guidance on identifying threats and vulnerabilities and instituting countermeasures for deterring crime and violence. Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Examining Typical Crimes Chapter 3: Understanding Basic Security Principles Chapter 4: Evaluating Risk Chapter 5: Utilizing the Total Environment Chapter 6: Choosing Physical Security Measures Chapter 7: Developing Policies and Procedures Chapter 8: Identifying and Handling At-Risk People Chapter 9: Reacting to an Event in Progress Chapter 10: Responding to an Active Shooter Chapter 11: Recovering from an Incident Chapter 12: Handling the Media Chapter 13: Recognizing Intangible Assets and Liability Concerns Chapter 14: Increasing Security Awareness Chapter 15: Implementing and Training Chapter 16: Keeping the Principal Safe Chapter 17: Assessing the Need for Less-Lethal Weapons and Firearms Chapter 18: Establishing Security Partnerships Chapter 19: Protecting Children and Youth Chapter 20: Conclusion and Summary
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4 – Evaluating Risk
Keeping Religious Institutions Secure, 2015Co-Authors: Jennie-leigh MclambAbstract:This chapter outlines the steps a Religious Institution must take to properly evaluate their facility. An effective security system cannot be designed without understanding the threats, risks, vulnerabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of the organization. The steps of a risk assessment are the following: facility characterization, security survey, asset identification and consequence of loss, identification of vulnerabilities or weaknesses, threat identification and ranking, countermeasure identification, and cost-benefit analysis. The Religious Institution should consolidate the information learned from each step into a report that provides a clear picture of the facility’s security posture.
