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Derek E H Olmstead - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Measuring Market Power and the Efficiency of Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market: An Energy-Only Market Design Measuring Market Power and the Efficiency of Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market: An Energy-Only Market Design
    2020
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    Abstract We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 14% -19% above the competitive benchmark. This reflects 2.35% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behavior changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. However, the rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. We demonstrate that the energy Market profits in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run performance measures. JEL: D44, L13, L50, L94, Q4

  • measuring Market power and the efficiency of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market an energy only Market design
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 6.7%–19% above the competitive benchmark, with an average of 13%. This reflects 2.1% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behaviour changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. The rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. However, we demonstrate that the energy Market profits in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run Electricity Market performance measures.

  • measuring Market power and the efficiency of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market an energy only Market design
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 14%-19% above the competitive benchmark. This reflects 2.35% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behavior changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. However, the rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. We demonstrate that the energy Market pro ts in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run performance measures.

David P Brown - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Measuring Market Power and the Efficiency of Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market: An Energy-Only Market Design Measuring Market Power and the Efficiency of Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market: An Energy-Only Market Design
    2020
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    Abstract We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 14% -19% above the competitive benchmark. This reflects 2.35% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behavior changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. However, the rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. We demonstrate that the energy Market profits in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run performance measures. JEL: D44, L13, L50, L94, Q4

  • carbon pricing with an output subsidy under imperfect competition the case of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market
    Resource and Energy Economics, 2018
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Andrew Eckert, Heather Eckert
    Abstract:

    Abstract In this paper, we examine the use of carbon pricing and an output-based subsidy in a Market with imperfect competition. We consider a carbon pricing policy in Alberta's Electricity Market as a case study. This policy consists of two phases. In the first phase, the carbon price is increased with the output subsidy being based on a fraction of facility-level emission intensity. In the second phase, the output subsidy is altered to be uniform across assets and based on the emissions intensity of an efficient natural gas asset. Using a model of oligopoly competition, we simulate the short-run impacts of the two phases on Electricity prices, emissions, and unit and firm-level profitability. We find that the mechanisms by which Electricity prices and emissions change in response to carbon pricing differ depending on whether the Market is perfectly competitive or oligopolistic. We demonstrate that by differentiating the effective carbon price across technologies, changing the basis of the output subsidy has substantially larger price and emissions effects than increasing the carbon price for all generators. The estimated effects of carbon pricing vary as the firms’ generation portfolios change.

  • measuring Market power and the efficiency of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market an energy only Market design
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 6.7%–19% above the competitive benchmark, with an average of 13%. This reflects 2.1% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behaviour changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. The rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. However, we demonstrate that the energy Market profits in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run Electricity Market performance measures.

  • carbon pricing with an output subsidy under imperfect competition the case of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market
    Research Papers in Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Andrew Eckert, Heather Eckert
    Abstract:

    In this paper, we examine the use of carbon pricing and an output-based subsidy in a Market with imperfect competition. We consider a carbon pricing policy in Alberta's Electricity Market as a case study. This policy consists of two phases. In the first phase, the carbon price is doubled with the output subsidy being based on a fraction of facility-level emission intensity. In the second phase, the carbon price will remain constant, while the output subsidy is altered to be uniform across assets and based on the emissions intensity of an efficient natural gas asset. Using a model of oligopoly competition, we simulate the short-run impacts of the two phases on Electricity prices, emissions, and unit and firm-level profitability. We find that the mechanisms by which Electricity prices and emissions change in response to carbon pricing differ depending on whether the Market is perfectly competitive or oligopolistic. We demonstrate that regardless of Market structure, changing the basis of the output subsidy has substantially larger effects than a doubling of the carbon price. The estimated effects of carbon pricing vary as the firms' generation portfolios change.

  • measuring Market power and the efficiency of alberta s Restructured Electricity Market an energy only Market design
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: David P Brown, Derek E H Olmstead
    Abstract:

    We measure the degree of Market power execution and inefficiencies in Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market. Using hourly wholesale Market data from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms exercise substantial Market power in the highest demand hours with limited excess production capacity. The degree of Market power execution in all other hours is low. Market inefficiencies are larger in the high demand hours and elevate production costs by 14%-19% above the competitive benchmark. This reflects 2.35% of the average Market price across all hours. A recent regulatory policy clarifies that certain types of unilateral Market power execution is permitted in Alberta. We find evidence that suggests that strategic behavior changed after this announcement. Market power execution increased. We illustrate that the observed earnings are often sufficient to promote investment in natural gas based technologies. However, the rents from Market power execution can exceed the estimated capacity costs for certain generation technologies. We demonstrate that the energy Market pro ts in the presence of no Market power execution are generally insufficient to promote investment in new generation capacity. This stresses the importance of considering both short-run and long-run performance measures.

Ranjit Roy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Automatic Generation Control of Two-area Interconnected Hydro-Hydro Restructured Power
    2015
    Co-Authors: Preghnesh Bhatt, S. P. Ghoshal, Ranjit Roy
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Non-minimum phase characteristic of hydro turbine shows an opposite initial power surge in the event of frequency disturbance, thus possesses widely different characteristic than thermal generating unit. This paper presents Automatic Generation Control (AGC) of an interconnected two-area multiple-units hydro-hydro power system in Restructured Electricity Market. The step load perturbation to such a system results in heavy frequency oscillations and the system is unable to regain its stable state as the positive real parts of some eigenvalue pairs confirm the inherent dynamically unstable characteristic of the system. To stabilize the frequency oscillations, impacts of Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES) placed at terminal of area and Thyristor Controlled Phase Shifter (TCPS) located in series with tie-line have been investigated. Two cases such as (a) SMES-SMES coordination and (b) TCPS-SMES coordination are evaluated to compare their effectiveness to suppress the frequency oscillations. The parameters of TCPS, SMES and integral gains of AGC loop are optimized through craziness-based particle swarm optimization algorithm in order to have the optimal transient response of the system under different PoolCo and bilateral transaction in Restructured Electricity Market

  • Automatic Generation Control of Two-area Interconnected Hydro-Hydro Restructured Power System with TCPS and SMES
    2013
    Co-Authors: Preghnesh Bhatt, S. P. Ghoshal, Ranjit Roy
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Non-minimum phase characteristic of hydro turbine shows an opposite initial power surge in the event of frequency disturbance, thus possesses widely different characteristic than thermal generating unit. This paper presents Automatic Generation Control (AGC) of an interconnected two-area multiple-units hydro-hydro power system in Restructured Electricity Market. The step load perturbation to such a system results in heavy frequency oscillations and the system is unable to regain its stable state as the positive real parts of some eigenvalue pairs confirm the inherent dynamically unstable characteristic of the system. To stabilize the frequency oscillations, impacts of Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES) placed at terminal of area and Thyristor Controlled Phase Shifter (TCPS) located in series with tie-line have been investigated. Two cases such as (a) SMES-SMES coordination and (b) TCPS-SMES coordination are evaluated to compare their effectiveness to suppress the frequency oscillations. The parameters of TCPS, SMES and integral gains of AGC loop are optimized through crazinessbased particle swarm optimization algorithm in order to have the optimal transient response of the system under different PoolCo and bilateral transaction in Restructured Electricity Market

Siano Pierluigi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Co-optimized bidding strategy of an integrated wind-thermal-photovoltaic system in deregulated Electricity Market under uncertainties
    'Elsevier BV', 2020
    Co-Authors: Khaloie Hooman, Siano Pierluigi, Abdollahi Amir, Shafie-khah Miadreza, Nojavan Sayyad, Anvari-moghaddam Amjad, Catalao J. P. S.
    Abstract:

    Clean Energy sources, such as wind and solar, have become an inseparable part of today's power grids. However, the intermittent nature of these sources has become the greatest challenge for their owners, which makes the bidding in the Restructured Electricity Market more challenging. Hence, the main goal of this paper is to propose a novel multi-objective bidding strategy framework for a wind-thermal-photovoltaic system in the deregulated Electricity Market for the first time. Contrary to the existing bidding models, in the proposed model, two objective functions are taken into account that the first one copes with profit maximization while the second objective function concerns with emission minimization of thermal units. The proposed multi-objective optimization problem is solved using the weighted sum approach. The uncertainties associated with Electricity Market prices and the output power of renewable energy sources are characterized by a set of scenarios. Ultimately, in order to select the best-compromised solution among the obtained Pareto optimal solutions, two diverse approaches are applied. The proposed bidding strategy problem is being formulated and examined in various modes of joint and disjoint operation of dispatchable and non-dispatchable energy sources. Simulation results illustrate that not only the integrated participation of these resources increases the producer's expected profit, but also decreases the amount of the produced pollution by the thermal units.© 2019 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial–NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY–NC–ND 4.0) license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

  • Design of a risk-averse decision making tool for smart distribution network operators under severe uncertainties: An IGDT-inspired augment ε-constraint based multi-objective approach
    'Elsevier BV', 2016
    Co-Authors: Mazidi Mohammadreza, Monsef Hassan, Siano Pierluigi
    Abstract:

    In the context of Restructured Electricity Market and smart grid, uncertainties including renewable generation, load demand, and Electricity price would significantly affect the technical and financial aspects of smart distribution networks. This paper presents a risk-averse decision making tool to help distribution network operator (DNO) in short-term operational activities. The objective is to optimize hourly sale prices offered to the customers, transactions (purchase/sale) with the wholesale Market, commitment of distributed generation, dispatch of energy storage systems, and planning of interruptible loads in a way that a target profit for the risk-averse DNO is guaranteed. A bi-level information gap decision theory (IGDT) inspired problem is developed to hedge the DNO against risk imposed by the information gap between the forecasted and actual uncertain variables. The bi-level problem is recast into its equivalent single level problem driven by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions. Since the uncertain variables compete with each other to maximize their enveloped-bounds, the augmented ε-constraint method is used to solve the proposed IGDT-inspired multi-objective optimization problem. A Monte Carlo simulation based after-the-fact analysis is conducted to verify the robust performance of the operational decisions. The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed model are evaluated on the 33-bus and the 118-bus modified test networks

M Sydulu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • optimal spot pricing in Electricity Market with inelastic load using constrained bat algorithm
    International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2014
    Co-Authors: M Murali, Sailaja M Kumari, M Sydulu
    Abstract:

    Abstract In Restructured Electricity Markets, an effective transmission pricing is required to address transmission issues and to generate correct economic signals. These prices depend on generator bids, load levels and transmission network constraints. A congestion charge is incurred when the system is constrained due to physical limitations. Spot pricing or Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) or Nodal pricing is a popular method in Restructured power Markets to address these issues. This paper presents a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) based spot pricing approach in single auction model with fuel cost minimization as objective function. This is solved with a heuristic technique called Bat algorithm and the results are compared with Linear Programming (LP) and Genetic algorithm (GA) approaches in a constrained pool based Restructured Electricity Market. The developed models have been tested on IEEE 14 bus system, New England 39 bus system and 75 bus Indian practical power system. Different cases such as without loss, concentrated loss and distributed loss are considered for this problem. Two types of generator bids i.e., fixed bids and linear bids are considered for generators. Load is assumed to be inelastic. Generator profit, ISO profit and Social surplus during congestion have been computed in all the cases. In most of the cases studied, Bat algorithm is proven to be better than LP and GA algorithms for fuel cost minimization and social welfare (Social surplus) improvement.

  • estimation of locational marginal price in a Restructured Electricity Market with different loss cases using seed genetic algorithm
    Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, 2014
    Co-Authors: M Murali, Sailaja M Kumari, M Sydulu
    Abstract:

    In Restructured Electricity Markets, an effective transmission pricing is required to address transmission issues and to generate correct economic signals. These prices depend on generator bids, load levels and transmission network constraints. A congestion charge is incurred when the system is constrained due to physical limitations. Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a popular method in Restructured power Markets to address these issues. Seed genetic algorithms performs powerful global searches and is a well-proven optimization algorithm. This paper combines a seed Genetic Algorithm approach with DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) to estimate LMP at all buses while minimizing the net system generation costs or fuel cost in a constrained pool-based Restructured Electricity Market. Various cases like LMP without loss, concentrated loss and distributed loss have been attempted. Both fixed bids and linear bids are considered for generators. Load is assumed to be inelastic. The developed models have been tested on IEEE 14 bus, New England 39 bus and 75 bus Indian Power systems. Comparison is made between linear programming-based DCOPF using Power World Simulator and the developed GA approach for all cases of fuel cost. In all the cases studied, GA approach is found to estimate better LMP and minimum fuel cost. ISO profits during congestion have also been evaluated in all cases. In this paper the proposed distributed loss model is stated to be the feasible operation compared with concentrated loss model.

  • transmission fixed cost allocation using game theory in multilateral transactions of Restructured Electricity Market
    International Review of Electrical Engineering-iree, 2013
    Co-Authors: M Murali, Sailaja M Kumari, P Sridivya, M Sydulu
    Abstract:

    In deregulated Electricity Markets there is a strong need for effective allocation of fixed costs to Market participants. The conventional usage based methods currently employed in Market scenario may fail to send right economic signals. Hence in this paper, cooperative game theory is applied for power system fixed cost allocation. Increasing competition in the energy Market can help maximize customers’ payoffs. This can be achieved by applying game theory. In this regard, two solution methodologies such as Nucleolus and Shapley value are adopted in a Multi-lateral Market. Both the methods have their pros and cons, while it can be inferred that Shapley value is a more preferable method when the solution is in the core of the game. In this paper, these methods are applied in case of IEEE 14 bus, New England 39 bus and Indian 75 bus power system and the results obtained are compared with the conventional usage based methods