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Ziva Kunda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can dissonance Theory do it all
    Psychological Inquiry, 1992
    Co-Authors: Ziva Kunda
    Abstract:

    I share the enthusiasm with which Aronson welcomes the reemergence of the concept of motivation and the renewed efforts to combine motivation and cognition in Social Psychological Theory and research. I also share Aronson's desire for a unified Theory that will account for the plethora of classic and novel motivational phenomena under a single theoretical umbrella. But I am not convinced that dissonance Theory as articulated by Festinger (1957) or as reformulated by Aronson (1968) is capable of providing this umbrella. It is true that, with enough ingenuity, any case in which motives have been shown to affect reasoning may be reformulated as resulting from an inconsistency between two cognitions, as argued recently by Berkowitz and Devine (1989). But the value of such reformulations is questionable. This is because it has been demonstrated and argued by several theorists, including Aronson, that the mere inconsistency between two beliefs does not suffice to produce the motivational state termed dissonance and its resulting attitude change. Rather, dissonance motivation appears to be aroused by the implications of such inconsistency for the self. For example, under the induced-compliance paradigm, people are led to engage in counterattitudinal behaviors that they would normally avoid and subsequently shift their attitudes toward greater consistency with these behaviors. In this case, the implications to the self that people are concerned about are that they will appear to be fools for having performed the counterattitudinal behaviors. Consistent with this view, Cooper and Fazio (1984) showed that in the induced-compliance paradigm, counterattitudinal behaviors are followed by attitude change only when conditions that could lead to the attribution of the behavior to one's foolishness are present-that is, when the subjects believe they have chosen freely to engage in behaviors with foreseeable negative consequences. In research described in the target article, Aronson argues that Cooper and Fazio's (1984) conditions for the arousal of dissonance motivation are overly restrictive. It is not required that the counterattitudinal behavior will have negative consequences because dissonance motivation does not result only from inconsistency with the belief "I am not a fool," a belief that is brought into play in the induced-compliance paradigm only if negative consequences are expected. Dissonance motivation may also result from inconsistency with the belief "I am not a hypocrite," which is likely to be triggered under different kinds of circumstances. In keeping with dissonance tradition, Aronson argues that the inconsistency between the beliefs "I am not a fool (or a hypocrite)" and "I have done something foolish (or hypocritical)" is the driving force behind the subsequent attitude change. Steele (1988), however showed that attitude change in the induced-compliance paradigm is driven by the motivation to avoid being a fool triggered by this inconsistency rather than by the inconsistency per se. This is because when subjects are provided with other avenues for convincing themselves that they are not fools-for example, when they are reminded of other valued aspects of their selves-they do not engage in attitude change despite the ongoing persistence of that inconsistency. It seems, therefore, that we will advance our understanding of motivational phenomena more by searching for the goals aroused in various situations than by searching for inconsistencies among beliefs. Aronson does recognize the importance of goals in producing dissonance effects. Indeed, he argues that all such effects may be viewed as resulting from having performed behaviors that challenge one of three goals: the desires to be stable, competent, and good. Although this view of the range of dissonance Theory is broader than the highly restrictive one put forth by Cooper and Fazio (1984), it remains much too restrictive to account for the full range of motivational effects on reasoning that have been documented to date. It is overly restrictive in two senses. First, many other goals may affect reasoning as well. These include broad goals, such as the goals of being happy, being healthy, having free choice, or having control, as well as goals specific to given situations, such as minimizing effort at a given task, viewing a future blind date positively, or viewing a future competitor negatively. Second, Aronson's view is overly restrictive in that it assumes that dissonance-provoking goals capable of affecting reasoning are triggered only by the performance of behaviors that challenge them. But goals may be aroused through other avenues as well. For example, the desire to see a competitor fail, which can affect evaluations of the competitor, may be aroused by the mere existence of the competitor, and the desire to possess health-related genes, which can affect evaluations of relevant research, may be aroused upon hearing of their existence. In a recent article (Kunda, 1990), I reviewed evidence showing that reasoning may be affected by a wide range of goals, and I proposed mechanisms that could account for all such effects. Goals, or motives, were conceptualized very broadly to include any wish, desire, or preference for the outcome of a reasoning task, regardless of how these were aroused. I suggested that people motivated to arrive at particular conclusions attempt to construct seemingly objective justifications for these conclusions that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They arrive at their desired conclusions only if they succeed in justifying them. But the process of justification construction is biased by people's goalsthey selectively access those memories, beliefs, and inferential rules capable of justifying their desired conclusions and creatively combine accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that lend support to their desired conclusions. These notions of goal-directed memory search and belief construction are capable of accounting for all the research carried out in the dissonance tradition, as well as for research conducted within other paradigms that seem excluded from Aronson's reformulated dissonance Theory. An example of a paradigm involving motivated reasoning that seems excluded from Aronson's Theory is provided by research on the effects of outcome dependency. Research in this paradigm has shown that when people believe that their own future outcomes depend on the behavior of others, they

John F Dovidio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • intergroup relations and health disparities a Social Psychological perspective
    Health Psychology, 2013
    Co-Authors: Brenda Major, Wendy Berry Mendes, John F Dovidio
    Abstract:

    Objective: This article considers how the Social psychology of intergroup processes helps to explain the presence and persistence of health disparities between members of Socially advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Method: Social Psychological Theory and research on intergroup relations, including prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, stigma, prejudice concerns, Social identity threat, and the dynamics of intergroup interactions, is reviewed and applied to understand group disparities in health and health care. Potential directions for future research are considered. Results: Key features of group relations and dynamics, including Social categorization, Social hierarchy, and the structural positions of groups along dimensions of perceived warmth and competence, influence how members of high status groups perceive, feel about, and behave toward members of low status groups, how members of low status groups construe and cope with their situation, and how members of high and low status groups interact with each other. These intergroup processes, in turn, contribute to health disparities by leading to differential exposure to and experiences of chronic and acute stress, different health behaviors, and different quality of health care experienced by members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Within each of these pathways, Social Psychological Theory and research identifies mediating mechanisms, moderating factors, and individual differences that can affect health. Conclusions: A Social Psychological perspective illuminates the intergroup, interpersonal, and intrapersonal processes by which structural circumstances which differ between groups for historical, political, and economic reasons can lead to group differences in health.

Steven Greene - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Social identity Theory and party identification
    Social Science Quarterly, 2004
    Co-Authors: Steven Greene
    Abstract:

    Objective. Given that the group aspect of party identification forms a central, yet largely unexplored element of American partisanship, Social identity Theory presents a compelling Social-Psychological Theory of group belonging through which to reinterpret the contemporary understanding of partisanship. Methods. Using a mail survey of 302 randomly selected Franklin County, Ohio residents, levels of Social identification with the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and political independents are measured using the Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale. Scores on the IDPG are used to predict attitudes toward parties and the consistency of partisan behavior. Results. Levels of partisan Social identity proved to be significant predictors of political party ratings, ideology, and party activities, even when taking traditional measures of partisan strength into account. Conclusions. Social identity is a fundamental aspect of partisanship, which, when measured, can lead to superior prediction and understanding of related political attitudes and behaviors.

  • Social identity Theory and party identification
    Social Science Quarterly, 2004
    Co-Authors: Steven Greene
    Abstract:

    Given that the group aspect of party identification forms a central, yet largely unexplored element of American partisanship, Social identity Theory presents a compelling Social-Psychological Theory of group belonging through which to reinterpret the contemporary understanding of partisanship. Copyright (c) 2004 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

  • the Social Psychological measurement of partisanship
    Political Behavior, 2002
    Co-Authors: Steven Greene
    Abstract:

    This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of the Social-Psychological Theory behind the concept of partisanship and addresses how well contemporary measures, especially the ubiquitous NES/Michigan measure, accord with contemporary theories of measurement, attitudes, and group identification. A number of shortcomings with the NES measure are discovered and more recent, Psychologically informed measures that address these shortcomings are explored. After a brief empirical demonstration of the utility of these newer measures, recommendations are made for using new Theory and new measures to improve our understanding of the role of partisanship in influencing political behavior.

Michael K Cummings - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • patterns of cognitive dissonance reducing beliefs among smokers a longitudinal analysis from the international tobacco control itc four country survey
    Tobacco Control, 2013
    Co-Authors: Omid Fotuhi, Geoffrey T Fong, Mark P Zanna, Ron Borland, Huahie Yong, Michael K Cummings
    Abstract:

    Objective The purpose of this paper is to assess whether smokers adjust their beliefs in a pattern that is consistent with Cognitive Dissonance Theory. This is accomplished by examining the longitudinal pattern of belief change among smokers as their smoking behaviours change. Methods A telephone survey was conducted of nationally representative samples of adult smokers from Canada, the USA, the UK and Australia from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Survey. Smokers were followed across three waves (October 2002 to December 2004), during which they were asked to report on their smoking-related beliefs and their quitting behaviour. Findings Smokers with no history of quitting across the three waves exhibited the highest levels of rationalisations for smoking. When smokers quit smoking, they reported having fewer rationalisations for smoking compared with when they had previously been smoking. However, among those who attempted to quit but then relapsed, there was once again a renewed tendency to rationalise their smoking. This rebound in the use of rationalisations was higher for functional beliefs than for risk-minimising beliefs, as predicted by Social Psychological Theory. Conclusions Smokers are motivated to rationalise their behaviour through the endorsement of more positive beliefs about smoking, and these beliefs change systematically with changes in smoking status. More work is needed to determine if this cognitive dissonance-reducing function has an inhibiting effect on any subsequent intentions to quit.

Bryan Jennifer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Effects of a brief interpersonal conflict cognitive reappraisal intervention on improvements in access to emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms in college students
    Digital Archive, 2020
    Co-Authors: Rodriguez, Lindsey M., Lee Katherine, Onufrak Jamie, Dell Jaclyn, Quist Michelle, Drake, Hunter P., Bryan Jennifer
    Abstract:

    Objective: Research has demonstrated relative success with brief interventions that utilize Social Psychological Theory to target the root cause of unwanted behaviours. Given the intersections among anxious attachment, depression, and emotion dysregulation, the current research utilises an interpersonal conflict cognitive reappraisal intervention to evaluate improvements in depressive symptoms. We also evaluated mediation via improvements in emotion regulation and moderation by attachment anxiety. Design: Undergraduates (N = 260) completed a baseline assessment and were randomised to one of four writing conditions: An interpersonal conflict from (a) their own perspective; (b) the other party’s perspective; or (c) a neutral, third-party perspective (primary experimental condition) or about their day (control condition). They also completed a follow-up survey online two weeks later. Main outcome measures included limited access to emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms. Results: Consistent with hypotheses, compared to control, participants who adopted the perspective of neutral third party reported improvements in access to emotion regulation strategies. There was also a significant indirect effect on depressive symptoms through changes in strategies. Finally, improving strategies led to a reduction in depressive symptoms, especially for those higher in attachment anxiety. Conclusion: We present promising emerging results for a single-session, conflict-focused, brief cognitive reappraisal intervention on changes in emotion regulation and depressive symptoms