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Clark B Lombardi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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constitutional provisions making sharia a or the chief Source of legislation where did they come from what do they mean do they matter
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Clark B LombardiAbstract:The constitutions of many Arab countries provide that Islamic Law ("shari'a") is a "Source" of national Law. Indeed, some make shari'a norms "a chief Source," of state Law. Other stronger provisions even declare them to be "the chief Source" or "the only Source" of legislation. There has been surprisingly little historical scholarship about these clauses, either in Arabic or in Western languages. There has also been almost no systematic comparative scholarship looking at the way that these clauses have been interpreted in different countries. In both Western scholarship and in popular Arab discourse one finds considerable confusion about where these clauses came from and about the implications of a country adopting them. In particular there is confusion about when a "Source" clause will be interpreted to prohibit the state from enacting Laws inconsistent with shari'a. This article provides a comprehensive history of the origins of these clauses in Syria and their spread to the Gulf States, Egypt and beyond. It also provides a comparative survey of their interpretation in Arab courts. It demonstrates that when they were first adopted, these clauses were understood to be ambiguous. Furthermore, for some time, the courts in different countries developed different interpretations of them. Weak provisions declaring shari'a "a Source" or "a chief Source" of Law were understood in some countries to permit the state to enact legislation inconsistent with shari'a, but were understood in others to prohibit such legislation. Stronger clauses making shari'a "the chief Source" were also interpreted in conflicting ways. Over time, however, interpretation of SSL language evolved and converged. Constitutional courts seem increasingly to agree that weak SSL clauses do not require governmental respect for shari'a while strong ones do. At the same time, courts in countries with strong SSL clauses have developed some surprising views about what sorts of Law are consistent with shari'a. Most notably, courts in Egypt have insisted that Islamic values overlap significantly with liberal values and thus strong SSL clauses require the state to respect the liberal rule of Law. The history of SSL clauses to date thus reminds us that interpretations of Arab constitutions, no less than "Western" ones, constantly evolve and, at times, they grow in surprising ways. One should thus be cautious about evaluating Arab Spring constitutions or about predicting the impact that certain types of constitutional language will have going forward. Language that does not today seem to require governmental respect for shari'a may, in time, be reread to require this. At the same time, a society's understanding of shari'a is likely to be contested and over time to evolve. Liberals can only hope that if constitutions are interpreted to require respect for shari'a, social understandings of shari'a will develop in a way that harmonizes Islamic and democratic values.
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constitutional provisions making sharia a or the chief Source of legislation where did they come from what do they mean do they matter
American University of International Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: Clark B LombardiAbstract:Since 1950, a large number of Arab countries have enacted constitutions containing provisions that declare Islamic norms to be a Source of legislation. The wording of these provisions varies in subtle but significant ways. Arab constitutions use different terms to describe the Islamic norms that serve as a Source of Law. Some refer to "fiqh," others to "sharia," and still others to "the principles of sharia." Furthermore, these constitutions characterize the role of Islamic norms differently. Most clauses describe Islamic norms either as "a chief Source of legislation" (masdarun raisiun li'l tashri') or as "the chief Source of legislation" (al-masdar al-raisi li'ltashri'), 1 although a few use slightly different formulations.2 Many constitutions drafted or amended in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 are likely to include such sharia-as-Source-oflegislation ("SSL") provisions.Where did SSL provisions come from, and what do they accomplish? Today, most academics and policy makers seem to accept that the impact of an SSL provision will depend on its wording. Provisions making Islamic norms "a chief Source" of legislation have never been understood to require that state legislation be consistent with sharia norms; conversely, constitutions making sharia norms "the chief Source" or "the only Source" of legislation have always been understood to create such a requirement.3 The distinction is important, they believe, because a constitution that requires legislation to respect Islamic Law is inconsistent with liberal values. Working from these assumptions, the U.S. government in 2004 worked hard to prevent the government of occupied Iraq from drafting a constitution that made Islam "the chief Source" of legislation.4 More recently, media accounts of constitutional deliberations in Arab countries have followed closely the debates about whether to make Islamic norms "the chief Source of legislation." These accounts have implicitly assumed that the role of Islam in the legal system will be determined largely by the outcomes of these debates.5This article will examine the history of SSL clauses in the Arab world. It will discuss how such clauses came to be included in Arab constitutions in the first place and how different clauses have been interpreted over the years. It will demonstrate that Arab understandings of these clauses have evolved over time. If we focus on the way in which SSL clauses have recently been interpreted and applied, the conventional wisdom of many Western academics, policy makers, and journalists is partly correct. In some ways, however, it may need to be revised.Part I will provide background necessary to understand why Arabs, starting in the 1950s, began to adopt provisions describing sharia as a "Source" of legislation. Parts II and III will survey all the Arab countries that adopted SSL provisions from 1950 to the start of the Arab Spring-discussing countries in the order that they adopted a clause. For each country, this article will look at the circumstances under which the country decided to adopt its SSL provision and why that country chose to phrase the SSL clause in the way that it did. It will then briefly explore how courts in these countries have to date interpreted and applied the national SSL provision. Part IV will explore the conclusions that we can draw from the history of SSL clauses.Part IV begins by arguing that, if we focus on the way in which SSL clauses are interpreted today, the conventional wisdom about their meaning needs to be refined. When they first appeared, SSL clauses, no matter how they were worded, were thought to be ambiguous about whether the state can legislate in a way that violates sharia principles. After decades of debate about the meaning of these clauses, Arabs have taken a large step toward the positions described above. Provisions stating that Islamic Law is the chief Source of legislation are generally understood today to mean that states are constitutionally barred from enacting un-Islamic legislation. …
Judith Schonsteiner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en el tribunal constitucional chileno el minimo comun denominador international human rights Law in the chilean constitutional court the least common denominator
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Judith SchonsteinerAbstract:Spanish Abstract: La investigacion que se presenta en este articulo revela datos ineditos empiricos sobre el uso del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos por el Tribunal Constitucional de Chile. Identifica, mediante un analisis de votos de mayoria y de minoria, distintas maneras de uso, a saber, re- chazo sistematico, no uso sistematico, cita sistematica, y cita selectiva, por parte de los distintos ministros. Se muestra que solamente algunos ministros consideran el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos como fuente de derecho. Posterior a la presentacion de los datos empiricos, busca posibles razones que expliquen las diferencias, basado en un analisis de sentencias, entrevistas con ministros, y evidencia empirica adicional. English Abstract: This paper analyses new empirical quantitative and qualitative data on the use of international human rights Law (IHRL) by the Chilean Constitutional Court. Revising majority and minority votes gathered in a database of all decisions (n=243) between 2008 and 2013 that contain references to IHRL, it classifies justices' positions on IHRL into four modes of use, i.e., systematic rejection, systematic absence of citations, systematic application, and a cherry-picking approach which cites IHRL only in relation to some topics. The paper additionally shows that only very few justices actually consider IHRL as a Source of Law. Others consider isolated quotes as allegedly persuasive obiter dicta, without even considering whether the norm is applicable to Chile. After presenting the empirical quantitative data, the article develops several hypotheses on the reasons for the cherry-picking approach, as it is the legally least convincing one due to its lack of consistency.
Galván, Ezequiel Rodrigo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A reparação das vítimas na jurisprudência do Tribunal Penal Internacional
2020Co-Authors: Galván, Ezequiel RodrigoAbstract:El trabajo aborda la reparación en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Penal Internacional que -a partir del Estatuto de Roma- dispuso el reconocimiento de las víctimas y su reparación en el marco de una instancia internacional encargada de juzgar responsabilidad individual por los “crímenes más graves de transcendencia internacional”. Concluye el autor que la víctima y su dignidad se presenta como un actor y elemento de sentido transversal a todo el sistema derivado del Estatuto de Roma, el cual recupera al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos como una fuente de derecho, así como la jurisprudencia de sus tribunales internacionales como una interpretación de ese derecho que integra al Estatuto. La recepción expresa de estándares de la Corte Interamericana y de la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, además de aprovechar el camino recorrido por estos tribunales internacionales, incorpora a la Corte Penal Internacional en el diálogo de estas instancias jurisdiccionales y la construcción del corpus iuris de los derechos humanos a partir de concepción común de la preeminencia de la dignidad de la persona.The work deals with reparation in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, which -based on the Rome Statute- provided for the recognition of victims and their reparation within the framework of an international body in charge of judging individual responsibility for the “most serious crimes of international transcendence”. The author concludes that the victim and his dignity is presented as an actor and element of meaning transversal to the entire system derived from the Rome Statute, which recovers international human rights Law as a Source of Law, as well as the jurisprudence of its international tribunals as an interpretation of that right that integrates the Statute. The express reception of standards of the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights, in addition to taking advantage of the path traveled by these international tribunals, incorporates the International Criminal Court in the dialogue of these jurisdictional instances and the construction of the corpus iuris of human rights based on a common conception of the pre-eminence of the dignity of the person.O trabalho aborda a reparação na jurisprudência do Tribunal Penal Internacional que – a partir do Estatuto de Roma - ordenou o reconhecimento das vítimas e sua reparação no âmbito de uma instância internacional responsável de julgar responsabilidade individual pelos “crimes mais graves de transcendência internacional”. O autor conclui que a vítima e sua dignidade são apresentadas como ator e elemento de significado transversal a todo o sistema derivado do Estatuto de Roma, que recupera o direito internacional dos direitos humanos como fonte de direito, assim como a jurisprudência de seus tribunais internacionais como uma interpretação desse direito que integra o Estatuto. A recepção expressa dos padrões da Corte Interamericana e da Corte Européia de Direitos Humanos, além de aproveitar o caminho adotado por essas cortes internacionais, incorpora a Corte Penal Internacional no diálogo dessas instâncias jurisdicionais e na construção do corpus iuris dos direitos humanos com base em uma concepção comum da preeminência da dignidade da pessoa.Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociale
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A reparação das vítimas na jurisprudência do Tribunal Penal Internacional
'Universidad Nacional de La Plata', 2019Co-Authors: Galván, Ezequiel RodrigoAbstract:The work deals with reparation in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, which -based on the Rome Statute- provided for the recognition of victims and their reparation within the framework of an international body in charge of judging individual responsibility for the “most serious crimes of international transcendence”. The author concludes that the victim and his dignity is presented as an actor and element of meaning transversal to the entire system derived from the Rome Statute, which recovers international human rights Law as a Source of Law, as well as the jurisprudence of its international tribunals as an interpretation of that right that integrates the Statute. The express reception of standards of the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights, in addition to taking advantage of the path traveled by these international tribunals, incorporates the International Criminal Court in the dialogue of these jurisdictional instances and the construction of the corpus iuris of human rights based on a common conception of the pre-eminence of the dignity of the person.El trabajo aborda la reparación en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Penal Internacional que -a partir del Estatuto de Roma- dispuso el reconocimiento de las víctimas y su reparación en el marco de una instancia internacional encargada de juzgar responsabilidad individual por los “crímenes más graves de transcendencia internacional”. Concluye el autor que la víctima y su dignidad se presenta como un actor y elemento de sentido transversal a todo el sistema derivado del Estatuto de Roma, el cual recupera al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos como una fuente de derecho, así como la jurisprudencia de sus tribunales internacionales como una interpretación de ese derecho que integra al Estatuto. La recepción expresa de estándares de la Corte Interamericana y de la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, además de aprovechar el camino recorrido por estos tribunales internacionales, incorpora a la Corte Penal Internacional en el diálogo de estas instancias jurisdiccionales y la construcción del corpus iuris de los derechos humanos a partir de concepción común de la preeminencia de la dignidad de la persona.
García López, Luisa Fernanda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Ideal democrático?: Do ativismo judicial à constitucionalização do direito
'Universidad Sergio Arboleda', 2020Co-Authors: García López, Luisa FernandaAbstract:La constitucionalización del derecho en Colombia obedece a una participación activa del juez, en particular del juez constitucional. El precedente judicial fuente del derecho es una muestra de la inclusión del juez en el escenario constitucional como garante de la democracia y del derecho. El ideal democrático incluye irreversiblemente al juez constitucional y sus interpretaciones. La sobreinterpretación del derecho responde a una interpretación amplia de la Constitución y a la construcción de normas que en algo contribuyen a llenar las lagunas del derecho. Con ello, el neoconstitucionalismo, es constitucionalizar el ordenamiento jurídico.The constitutionalization of Law in Colombia is due to an active participation of the judge, in particular, of the constitutional judge. The judicial precedent Source of Law is an example of the inclusion of the judge on the constitutional stage as guarantor of democracy and Law. The democratic ideal irreversibly includes the constitutional judge and his interpretations. The overinterpretation of Law answers to a broad interpretation of the Constitution and to a building of norms that contribute something to fill the gaps in the Law. Thus neoconstitutionalism is constitutionalizing the juridical order
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El juez y el precedente: hacia una reinterpretación de la separación de poderes
'Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana', 2020Co-Authors: García López, Luisa FernandaAbstract:The role of the judge during the Roman Republic was decisive and thenabolished and relegated to the “mouth of the Law” with the French Revolution. For his part, the judge in the common scheme, he is creator of Law and its role is determinant in the American legal system. The Colombian legal reality has been marked by a leading role of constitutional jurisprudence in the area of fundamental rights and public policies. To that extent, the separation of powers in Colombia is due to a figure that has developed since 1991. The classical conception of the separation of powers or balance of powers has been reinterpreting; a new version involves the judge and the precedent. Jurisprudence as a Source of Law in the time of the Roman Republic, its absolute rejection in the French Revolution and its reinterpretation in the 20th century, are evidence of the inclusion of the judge on the constitutional stage as the guarantor of democracy and of a living right. Undeniably the political role as a creator of Law by the constitutional judge, define and interpret the content of the Constitution. Therefore, the current democracy responds to a reinterpretation of the separation of powers and the inclusion of the judge on the legal stage. To that extent, the scope of the judicial activism responds to an interpretive activity and creation of judges under the name of precedent. In Colombia, this activism through the Acción de tutela, has generated great achievements at the level of recognition of fundamental rights and primacy of agile and effective legal mechanisms, but more than anything else, it reflects the shortcomings of a legal system that does not respond to the needs of the society. What are the limits of a Constitutional Court that has revolutionized the Colombian legal universe? Certainly article 241 of the COP, which implies not exercise functions of other powers, not “become legislator, replace the Government in the policy direction or decide the causes of ordinary jurisdiction”. However, as its main functions are, exercise control over constitutionality of Laws and the defense of fundamental rights, it is difficult to set limits to the constitutional courts. It is necessary to the image of the common Law to create the jurisprudential corpus and a series of precise parameters that generate harmony, from the resolution of cases fill the gaps and above all to create legal certainty. El papel del juez durante la República Romana fue determinante y luegoabolido y relegado a la “boca de la ley” con la Revolución Francesa. Porsu parte, en el esquema anglosajón el juez es creador de derecho y su papeles determinante en el ordenamiento jurídico norteamericano. La realidadjurídica colombiana se ha visto marcada por un rol protagónico de lajurisprudencia constitucional en materia de derechos fundamentales y depolíticas públicas. En esa medida, la separación de poderes en Colombiaobedece a una figura que ha evolucionando desde 1991. La concepciónclásica de separación de poderes, o de balance de poderes se ha venidoreinterpretando; una nueva versión involucra al juez y el precedente.La jurisprudencia como fuente del derecho en la época de la RepúblicaRomana, su absoluto rechazo en la Revolución Francesa y su reinterpretaciónen el siglo XX, dan muestra de la inclusión del juez en el escenarioconstitucional como garante de la democracia y del derecho viviente. Esinnegable el papel político y creador del derecho por parte del juez Constitucional,ya que definir e interpretar el contenido de la Constitución es unacto de creación del derecho. Por lo tanto, la democracia actual respondea una reinterpretación de la separación de poderes y la inclusión del juezen el escenario jurídico. En esa medida, el alcance del activismo judicialresponde a una actividad interpretativa y de creación de los jueces bajola denominación de precedente. En Colombia, ese activismo a través dela acción de tutela, ha generado grandes logros a nivel de reconocimientode derechos fundamentales y de primacía de mecanismos jurídicos ágilesy eficaces, pero más que nada refleja las carencias de un sistema jurídicoque no responde a las necesidades de la sociedad.¿Cuáles son los límites de una Corte Constitucional que ha revolucionadoel universo jurídico colombiano? El artículo 241 de la Constitución Política,le impide ejercer funciones propias de otros poderes, pues no debe“convertirse en legislador, sustituir al gobierno en la dirección políticao decidir las causas propias de la jurisdicción ordinaria”1. No obstante,como sus funciones principales son ejercer el control de constitucionalidadde las leyes y la defensa de los derechos fundamentales, es difícilfijar los límites a la justicia constitucional. Es necesario, partiendo delcommon Law, ir creando el corpus jurisprudencial y una serie de parámetrosprecisos que a partir de la resolución de casos generen armonía,llenen los vacíos y ante todo forjen seguridad jurídica
Kristine Eck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Law of the land communal conflict and legal authority
Journal of Peace Research, 2014Co-Authors: Kristine EckAbstract:Common notions about the Source of communal land conflict in Africa have long explained it as growing out of conditions of environmental scarcity. This article argues instead that the institutional structure of the legal system is central to understanding which countries are prone to experience communal land conflict. When competing cus- tomary and modern jurisdictions coexist in countries inhabited by mixed identity groups, the conflicting Sources of legal authority lead to insecurity about which Source of Law will prevail. Because the Source of Law is contested, con- flict parties cannot trust the legal system to predictably adjudicate disputes, which encourages the use of extrajudicial vigilante measures. Using new data on communal violence in West Africa, this argument is examined for the period 1990-2009. The results show that in countries where competing jurisdictions exist, communal land conflict is 200- 350% more likely. These findings suggest that researchers should consider the role of legal institutions and processes in relation to social unrest and collective violence.
