The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Hilary Williamson Hoynes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Earned Income Tax Credit
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2019Co-Authors: Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:In this article, I review the most prominent provision of the federal income Tax code that targets low-income Tax filers, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as well as the structurally similar Ch...
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Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Infant Health
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Douglas L. Miller, David SimonAbstract:This paper evaluates the health impact of a central piece in the U.S. safety net for families with children: the Earned Income Tax Credit. Using Tax-reform induced variation in the federal EITC, we examine the impact of the Credit on infant health outcomes. We find that increased EITC income reduces the incidence of low birth weight and increases mean birth weight. For single low education (
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redistribution and Tax expenditures the earned income Tax Credit
National Tax Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefi ts by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the effi ciency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters.
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Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit
2008Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms (expansions and contractions) to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. Targeting the EITC to lower-income families by raising the phase-out rate generates a welfare loss for single mothers, primarily because of the disincentive to enter the labor market and not the traditional hours-of-work distortion.
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redistribution and Tax expenditures the earned income Tax Credit
NBER Chapters, 2008Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Nada Eissa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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redistribution and Tax expenditures the earned income Tax Credit
National Tax Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefi ts by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the effi ciency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters.
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Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit
2008Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms (expansions and contractions) to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. Targeting the EITC to lower-income families by raising the phase-out rate generates a welfare loss for single mothers, primarily because of the disincentive to enter the labor market and not the traditional hours-of-work distortion.
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redistribution and Tax expenditures the earned income Tax Credit
NBER Chapters, 2008Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Hilary Williamson HoynesAbstract:This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to Taxes are important. We use Tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the Credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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labor supply response to the earned income Tax Credit
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Nada Eissa, Jeffrey B LiebmanAbstract:This paper examines the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), which included an expansion of the earned income Tax Credit, on the labor force participation and hours of work of single women with children. We identify the impact of TRA86 by comparing the change in labor supply of single women with children to the change for single women without children. We find that between 1984–1986 and 1988–1990, single women with children increased their relative labor force participation by up to 2.8 percentage points. We observe no change in the relative hours worked by single women with children who were already in the labor force.
Naomi Mccay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Rise and Fall of the UK’s First Tax Credit: The Working Families Tax Credit 1998–2000
Social Policy and Administration, 2001Co-Authors: Eithne Mclaughlin, Janet M. Trewsdale, Naomi MccayAbstract:The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), introduced in 1998/9, was regarded as the most important and easily the most redistributive measure introduced by the New Labour administration elected in 1997. WFTC is, however, scheduled to end, and to be replaced by another Tax Credit in 2003. This paper reviews the birth, brief life and “death” of WFTC in the period 1998–2000 and examines the structure of eligibility for WFTC in one UK region.
Edward Kahn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the production Tax Credit for wind turbine powerplants is an ineffective incentive
Energy Policy, 1996Co-Authors: Edward KahnAbstract:Abstract The US Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 created a production Tax Credit of 1.5¢/kWh available for 10 years to promote certain renewable energy technologies, including wind turbines. This paper argues that the impact of the wind turbine production Tax Credit will be minimal. The argument depends entirely on the nature of the project finance structure used by the private power industry for wind turbine development. We show that Tax Credits can only be absorbed by equity investors if there is a large fraction of equity in the project capital structure. This raises the financing cost of wind turbine projects compared to conventional power technology, which relies on a large fraction of low cost debt. If the Tax Credit were paid as a cash subsidy, the capital structure could be shifted to low cost debt and financing costs could be significantly reduced.
David R. Just - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the welfare economics of a biofuel Tax Credit and the interaction effects with price contingent farm subsidies
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, David R. JustAbstract:A framework is developed to analyze the effects of a biofuel consumer Tax exemption and the interaction effects with a price contingent farm subsidy. Ethanol prices rise above the gasoline price by the amount of the Tax Credit. Corn farmers gain directly while gasoline consumers only gain from any reduction in world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production. Domestic oil producers lose. Historically, the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the gasoline price. Hence, part of the Tax Credit is redundant and represents “rectangular” deadweight costs that dwarf triangular deadweight cost measures of traditional farm subsidies. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
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water in the u s ethanol Tax Credit and mandate implications for rectangular deadweight costs and the corn oil price relationship
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, David R. JustAbstract:Abstract The relationship between ethanol, corn and oil prices are analyzed under two alternative situations, depending on whether or not consumers purchase ethanol on the basis of its contribution to mileage. In all cases, market prices of ethanol can be above or below the consumer price paid for ethanol. With a Tax Credit, we determine several key parameters affecting the price relationships between corn, ethanol and gasoline, including the relative value of the fuel Tax and Tax Credit, and the value of corn returned to the market in the form of by-products. The outcome is further complicated if the mandates are binding or if price contingent corn production subsidies like deficiency payments are available. Empirical analysis of historical U.S. price relationships assesses the validity of the alternative models and the extent to which each policy impacted the market. The implicit subsidy of the Tax Credit and mandates is often higher than the observed corn price itself. We discuss several reasons for this including how corn production subsidies cause the corn price to fall below that which would occur if there was no ethanol policy. Therefore, without corn production subsidies in the past, no ethanol production would have occurred, even with a Tax Credit or a mandate. Furthermore, corn producers do not benefit at all from ethanol policies when the deficiency payment program is operational and very little from the Tax Credit when the mandate is binding. We extend de Gorter and Just’s concept of “water” in the Tax Credit to include the premium due to a binding mandate. The resulting rectangular deadweight costs are estimated for the past 25 years and are found to dwarf standard triangular deadweight cost measures of traditional farm subsidies. Those who emphasize the benefits of ethanol policy in reducing Tax costs of farm programs ignore new deadweight costs created by ethanol policy including an increase in the deadweight costs of the farm subsidy program. Furthermore, farm subsidies increase both the Tax costs of the Tax Credit and the deadweight costs due to ethanol policy. Our theoretical framework provides a foundation for future research on biofuel policies while the empirical analysis gives a perspective on the relative importance of several key parameters determining the effects of past U.S. ethanol policy.
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The economics of the U.S. ethanol import tariff with a blend mandate and Tax Credit.
Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 2008Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, David R. JustAbstract:U.S. import tariffs on ethanol are designed to offset a Tax Credit that benefits U.S. and foreign producers alike. The Tax Credit is an ethanol consumption subsidy but ethanol market prices increase by almost the full amount of the Credit as the impact on world oil prices is small. Therefore, removing the tariff has a small impact on U.S. ethanol prices but increases the world price by almost the full tariff. Eliminating both the tariff and Tax Credit has the exact opposite effect: U.S. prices decline by almost the tariff (equal to the Tax Credit) while world prices remain essentially unchanged. With a mandate instead, an import tariff equal to the initial premium will necessarily result in a further increase in domestic ethanol prices as the resulting decline in imports requires more domestic supply to fulfill the mandate. This moderates the world price depressing effects of the tariff. For a given import tariff and price premium of ethanol over gasoline, exporters like Brazil therefore prefer mandates over Tax Credits but ideally only a mandate and no Tax Credit or tariff.
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The Economics of U.S. Ethanol Import Tariffs with a Consumption Mandate and Tax Credit
2007Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, David R. JustAbstract:This paper analyzes the impact of an ethanol import tariff in conjunction with a consumption mandate and Tax Credit. A Tax Credit alone acts as a subsidy to ethanol producers, equally benefiting exporters like Brazil. If an import tariff is imposed to offset the Tax Credit, world prices of ethanol decline by less than the tariff (unless oil prices are unaffected). Eliminating the tariff with a Tax Credit in place results in a significant gain to exporters like Brazil but eliminating the Tax Credit too reduces the initial benefits to Brazil of the tariff reduction substantially. The results change however if there is “water” in the Tax Credit. Then exporters benefit much more with the elimination of both the tariff and Tax Credit compared to a situation of both policies in place. If only a mandate was in place, exporters like Brazil again benefit as much as domestic ethanol producers do. Eliminating the tariff with a mandate results in an increase in domestic ethanol prices (even if oil prices do not change) because more domestic supply is required to maintain the mandate. The tariff therefore has a smaller negative impact on world ethanol prices with a mandate compared to a Tax Credit. A Tax Credit with a binding mandate is a subsidy to fuel consumers and only indirectly benefits ethanol producers if ethanol prices increase due to increased demand for ethanol with the increase in fuel consumption). Therefore, eliminating the Tax Credit with a binding mandate has little effect on market prices of ethanol – domestic and foreign producers alike benefit very little with a Tax Credit in this situation. Brazil would much prefer the elimination of the Tax Credit and the so-called offsetting import tariff when a mandate is binding. Hence, the protective effects of an import tariff are not additive with either a Tax Credit or the price premium due to a mandate.
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the law of unintended consequences how the u s biofuel Tax Credit with a mandate subsidizes oil consumption and has no impact on ethanol consumption
2007Co-Authors: Harry De Gorter, David R. JustAbstract:With a mandate, U.S. policy of ethanol Tax Credits designed to reduce oil consumption does the exact opposite. A Tax Credit is a direct gasoline consumption subsidy with no effect on the ethanol price and therefore does not help either corn or ethanol producers. To understand this, consider first the effects of each policy alone (a mandate and a Tax Credit). Although market prices for ethanol increase under each policy, consumer fuel prices always decline with a Tax Credit and increase with a mandate except when gasoline supply is less elastic than ethanol supply. To achieve a given ethanol price, the gasoline price is always higher with a mandate compared to a Tax Credit. A Tax Credit alone is an ethanol consumption subsidy but most of the benefits go to ethanol producers because ethanol is typically a small share of total fuel consumption. Fuel consumers benefit indirectly to the extent gasoline prices decline with increased ethanol production. With a Tax Credit or mandate, gasoline consumption declines but more so with a mandate (for a given ethanol price and production level). However, a Tax Credit with a binding mandate always generates an increase in gasoline consumption, the extent to which depends on the type of mandate. If it is a blend mandate (as in most countries outside the United States), the Tax Credit acts as a fuel consumption subsidy. Ethanol producers only gain indirectly with the increased ethanol demand resulting from the increase in total fuel consumption. Most of the market effects are due to the mandate with the Tax Credit only exacerbating the ethanol price increase and causing an increase in the gasoline price but a decrease in the consumer fuel price. For a consumption mandate (as in the United States), the Tax Credit is even worse as it acts as a gasoline consumption subsidy. Market prices of ethanol do not change, even as the price paid by consumers for gasoline declines (while gasoline market prices rise). A Tax Credit is therefore a pure waste as it involves huge Taxpayer costs while increasing greenhouse gas emissions, local pollution and traffic congestion, while at the same time providing no benefit to either corn or ethanol producers (or in promoting rural development) and fails to reduce the Tax costs of farm subsidy programs but generates an increase in the oil price and hence wealth in Middle East countries. These social costs are huge because the new mandate calls for 36 bil. gallons by 2022, to cost over $28 bil. a year in Taxpayer monies alone. Even if the mandate is not binding initially, the elimination of the Tax Credit will cause the mandate to bind or the mandate can be increased so our results still hold.
