The Experts below are selected from a list of 1716 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Robert N. Stavins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the design of environmental markets what have we learned from experience with cap and trade
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Richard Schmalensee, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:This article reviews the design of environmental markets for pollution control over the past 30 years, and identifies key market-design lessons for future applications. The focus is on a subset of the cap-and-trade systems that have been implemented, planned, or proposed around the world. Three criteria led us to the selection of systems for review. First, among the broader class of Tradable Permit systems, our focus is exclusively on cap-and-trade mechanisms, thereby excluding emission-reduction-credit or offset programmes. Second, among cap-and-trade mechanisms, we examine only those that target pollution abatement, and so we do not include applications to natural resource management, such as individual transferable quota systems used to regulate fisheries. Third, we focus on the most prominent applications—those that are particularly important environmentally, economically, or both.
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post durban climate policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:AbstractThe outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate polig architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases, because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in a longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.Table of ContentsI. Introduction 405II. Theory of Linkage 407A. Types of Linkage 4071. Direct linkage 4072. Indirect linkages 408B. Implications of Linking 4081. Cost effectiveness 4092. Distribution of policy impacts 4093. National control 4104. Incentives for setting caps 410III. Characteristics of Existing and Proposed Linkages 411A. Linkage Among Existing Trading Systems 4111. Emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 4112. Clean Development Mechanism 4123. Joint Implementation 4144. European Union Emissions Trading System 4155. Norwegian Emissions Trading Scheme 4176. Swiss C02 Act 4187. New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 4188. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 420B. Possible Linkage Among Future Trading Systems 4221. Australia's Clean Energy Act of 2011 4222. California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 4233. Quebec's cap-and-trade system 4244. China's emissions trading system pilots 4245. South Korea's cap-and-trade system 4256. Mexico's cap-and-trade system 4257. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 425IV. The Durban Platform and Its Implications for Linkage 426A. The UNFCCC, the Berlin Mandate, and the Kyoto Protocol 426B. A New Approach Requiring Participation of All Parties 427V. Linkage as a Climate Policy Architecture 428A. Near-Term Role …
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post durban climate policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Climate Change and Sustainable Development, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.
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Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems
2012Co-Authors: Robert N. Stavins, Matthew RansonAbstract:The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provide an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces costs of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirectly linked regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, bottom-up architecture of direct links among systems
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linking Tradable Permit systems a key element of emerging international climate policy architecture
Ecology Law Quarterly, 2009Co-Authors: Judson Jaffe, Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:This Article analyzes the role that linkage between emission trading systems could play in a future international climate policy architecture. Cap-and-trade systems, regional, national, and international in scope, are emerging as a preferred instrument for addressing global climate change throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism— an emission-reduction-credit system—has also developed a significant constituency. Because links between Tradable Permit systems can reduce
Matthew Ranson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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post durban climate policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:AbstractThe outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate polig architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases, because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in a longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.Table of ContentsI. Introduction 405II. Theory of Linkage 407A. Types of Linkage 4071. Direct linkage 4072. Indirect linkages 408B. Implications of Linking 4081. Cost effectiveness 4092. Distribution of policy impacts 4093. National control 4104. Incentives for setting caps 410III. Characteristics of Existing and Proposed Linkages 411A. Linkage Among Existing Trading Systems 4111. Emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 4112. Clean Development Mechanism 4123. Joint Implementation 4144. European Union Emissions Trading System 4155. Norwegian Emissions Trading Scheme 4176. Swiss C02 Act 4187. New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 4188. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 420B. Possible Linkage Among Future Trading Systems 4221. Australia's Clean Energy Act of 2011 4222. California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 4233. Quebec's cap-and-trade system 4244. China's emissions trading system pilots 4245. South Korea's cap-and-trade system 4256. Mexico's cap-and-trade system 4257. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 425IV. The Durban Platform and Its Implications for Linkage 426A. The UNFCCC, the Berlin Mandate, and the Kyoto Protocol 426B. A New Approach Requiring Participation of All Parties 427V. Linkage as a Climate Policy Architecture 428A. Near-Term Role …
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post durban climate policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Climate Change and Sustainable Development, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.
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Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems
2012Co-Authors: Robert N. Stavins, Matthew RansonAbstract:The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provide an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent Tradable Permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces costs of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirectly linked regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, bottom-up architecture of direct links among systems
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linking Tradable Permit systems a key element of emerging international climate policy architecture
Ecology Law Quarterly, 2009Co-Authors: Judson Jaffe, Matthew Ranson, Robert N. StavinsAbstract:This Article analyzes the role that linkage between emission trading systems could play in a future international climate policy architecture. Cap-and-trade systems, regional, national, and international in scope, are emerging as a preferred instrument for addressing global climate change throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism— an emission-reduction-credit system—has also developed a significant constituency. Because links between Tradable Permit systems can reduce
Martin Drechsler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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software data and modelling news ecotrade a multi player network game of a Tradable Permit market for biodiversity credits
Environmental Modelling and Software, 2010Co-Authors: Florian Hartig, Martin Horn, Martin DrechslerAbstract:EcoTRADE is a multi-player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, which may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
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ecotrade a multi player network game of a Tradable Permit market for biodiversity credits
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2008Co-Authors: Florian Hartig, Martin Horn, Martin DrechslerAbstract:EcoTRADE is a multi player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, which may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and also as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
Peter J. Wilcoxen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 16, Number 2—Spring 2002—Pages 107–129 The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy
2013Co-Authors: Warwick J. Mckibbin, Peter J. WilcoxenAbstract:Many policy problems have frustratingly long histories of inefficient regulation that can be difficult or impossible to reverse, even where large efficiency gains might be had from doing so. Climate change is an exception, however, because little real action has been undertaken to date. It presents an unusual opportunity for an efficient economic policy to be employed right from the beginning. However, the opportunity could easily be lost. Ongoing negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far produced the Kyoto Protocol, a deeply flawed agreement that manages to be both economically inefficient and politically impractical. In this article, we examine the key economic characteristics of climate change and argue that economic theory provides good guidance on the design of an efficient and politically realistic policy. Because climate change involves vast uncertainties and has potentially enormous distributional effects, neither of the standard market-based environmental policy instruments is a viable approach: a Tradable Permit system would be inefficient, and an emissions tax would be politically unrealistic. However, a hybrid policy, combining the best features of the two, would be an efficient and practical approach. We then compare our hybrid proposal to the Kyoto Protocol and argue that it overcomes the Protocol’s shortcomings
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the role of economics in climate change policy
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002Co-Authors: Warwick J. Mckibbin, Peter J. WilcoxenAbstract:Many policy problems have frustratingly long histories of inefficient regulation that can be difficult or impossible to reverse, even where large efficiency gains might be had from doing so. Climate change is an exception, however, because little real action has been undertaken to date. It presents an unusual opportunity for an efficient economic policy to be employed right from the beginning. However, the opportunity could easily be lost. Ongoing negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far produced the Kyoto Protocol, a deeply flawed agreement that manages to be both economically inefficient and politically impractical. In this article, we examine the key economic characteristics of climate change and argue that economic theory provides good guidance on the design of an efficient and politically realistic policy. Because climate change involves vast uncertainties and has potentially enormous distributional effects, neither of the standard market-based environmental policy instruments is a viable approach: a Tradable Permit system would be inefficient, and an emissions tax would be politically unrealistic. However, a hybrid policy, combining the best features of the two, would be an efficient and practical approach. We then compare our hybrid proposal to the Kyoto Protocol and argue that it overcomes the Protocol’s shortcomings.
Florian Hartig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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software data and modelling news ecotrade a multi player network game of a Tradable Permit market for biodiversity credits
Environmental Modelling and Software, 2010Co-Authors: Florian Hartig, Martin Horn, Martin DrechslerAbstract:EcoTRADE is a multi-player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, which may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
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ecotrade a multi player network game of a Tradable Permit market for biodiversity credits
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2008Co-Authors: Florian Hartig, Martin Horn, Martin DrechslerAbstract:EcoTRADE is a multi player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, which may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and also as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
