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Robert N Stavins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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linkage of greenhouse gas emissions trading systems learning from experience
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N StavinsAbstract:The last ten years have seen the growth of linkages between many of the world's cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases (GHGs), both directly between systems, and indirectly via connections to credit systems such as the Clean Development Mechanism. If nations have tried to act in their own self-interest, this proliferation of linkages implies that for many nations, the expected benefits of linkage outweighed expected costs. In this paper, we draw on the past decade of experience with carbon markets to test a series of hypotheses about why systems have demonstrated this revealed preference for linking. Linkage is a multi-faceted Policy decision that can be used by political jurisdictions to achieve a variety of objectives, and we find evidence that many economic, political, and strategic factors--ranging from geographic proximity to integrity of emissions reductions--influence the decision to link. We also identify some potentially important effects of linkage, such as loss of control over domestic carbon policies, which do not appear to have deterred real-world decisions to link. These findings have implications for the future role that decentralized linkages may play in International Climate Policy architecture. The Kyoto Protocol has entered what is probably its final commitment period, covering only a small fraction of global GHG emissions. Under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, negotiators may now gravitate toward a hybrid system, combining top-down elements for establishing targets with bottom-up elements of pledge-and-review tied to national policies and actions. The incentives for linking these national policies are likely to continue to produce direct connections among regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems. The growing network of decentralized, direct linkages among these systems may turn out to be a key part of a future hybrid Climate Policy architecture.
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post durban Climate Policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N StavinsAbstract:AbstractThe outcome of the December 2011 United Nations Climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an International Climate Policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad International participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential Climate polig architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases, because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban International Climate Policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in a longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future Climate agreement.Table of ContentsI. Introduction 405II. Theory of Linkage 407A. Types of Linkage 4071. Direct linkage 4072. Indirect linkages 408B. Implications of Linking 4081. Cost effectiveness 4092. Distribution of Policy impacts 4093. National control 4104. Incentives for setting caps 410III. Characteristics of Existing and Proposed Linkages 411A. Linkage Among Existing Trading Systems 4111. Emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 4112. Clean Development Mechanism 4123. Joint Implementation 4144. European Union Emissions Trading System 4155. Norwegian Emissions Trading Scheme 4176. Swiss C02 Act 4187. New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 4188. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 420B. Possible Linkage Among Future Trading Systems 4221. Australia's Clean Energy Act of 2011 4222. California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 4233. Quebec's cap-and-trade system 4244. China's emissions trading system pilots 4245. South Korea's cap-and-trade system 4256. Mexico's cap-and-trade system 4257. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 425IV. The Durban Platform and Its Implications for Linkage 426A. The UNFCCC, the Berlin Mandate, and the Kyoto Protocol 426B. A New Approach Requiring Participation of All Parties 427V. Linkage as a Climate Policy Architecture 428A. Near-Term Role …
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three key elements of a post 2012 International Climate Policy architecture
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2012Co-Authors: Sheila M Olmstead, Robert N StavinsAbstract:AbstractThis article describes three essential elements of an effective post-2012 International Climate Policy architecture: a framework to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are...
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post durban Climate Policy architecture based on linkage of cap and trade systems
Climate Change and Sustainable Development, 2012Co-Authors: Matthew Ranson, Robert N StavinsAbstract:The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations Climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an International Climate Policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad International participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential Climate Policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban International Climate Policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future Climate agreement.
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three key elements of post 2012 International Climate Policy architecture
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Sheila M Olmstead, Robert N StavinsAbstract:We describe three essential elements of an effective post-2012 International global Climate Policy architecture: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based Policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate International equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global Climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Richard S J Tol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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International Climate Policy and regional welfare weights
Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Daiju Narita, Richard S J Tol, David AnthoffAbstract:We derive a global social welfare function that is consistent with the burden sharing in the Kyoto Protocol and in one proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty. The Kyoto Protocol favored the EU, while the EU post-Kyoto proposal puts more weight on the wellbeing of other OECD countries at the expense of EU residents. Ignoring income differences, the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty favors developing countries. However, if income differences are taken into account, the EU proposal is not at all generous to developing countries.
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International Climate Policy and regional welfare weights
Research Papers in Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Daiju Narita, Richard S J Tol, David AnthoffAbstract:We impute a global social welfare function that is consistent with the burden sharing in the Kyoto Protocol and in two proposals for a post-Kyoto treaty. The Kyoto Protocol favored the EU. The Frankel proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty continues the favorable treatment of the EU, while the EU proposal puts more weight on the wellbeing of other OECD countries at the expense of its own residents. Ignoring income differences, the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty favors developing countries. However, if income differences are taken into account, the EU proposal is not at all generous to developing countries.
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ocean carbon sinks and International Climate Policy
Energy Policy, 2006Co-Authors: Katrin Rehdanz, Richard S J Tol, Patrick WetzelAbstract:Terrestrial vegetation sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol as offsets for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, but ocean sinks have escaped attention. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as were the terrestrial sinks at the time of negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. It is not unlikely that certain countries will advocate the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks to reduce their emission reduction obligations in post-2012 negotiations. We use a simple model of the International market for carbon dioxide emissions to evaluate who would gain or loose from allowing for ocean carbon sinks. Our analysis is restricted to information on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone of a country. We use information on the actual carbon flux and derive the human-induced uptake for the period from 1990 onwards. Like the carbon sequestration of business as usual forest management activities, natural ocean carbon sequestration applies at zero costs. The total amount of anthropogenic ocean carbon sequestration is large, also in the exclusive economic zones. As a consequence, it substantially alters the costs of emission reduction for most countries. Countries such as Australia, Denmark, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would gain substantially, and a large number of countries would benefit too. Current net exporters of carbon permits, particularly Russia, would gain less and oppose the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks.
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ocean carbon sinks and International Climate Policy
Research Papers in Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Katrin Rehdanz, Richard S J Tol, Patrick WetzelAbstract:Terrestrial sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol as offsets for carbon sequestration, but ocean sinks have escaped attention. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as were the terrestrial sinks at the time of negotiation. It is not unlikely that certain countries will advocate the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks to reduce their emission reduction obligations. We use a simple model of the International market for carbon dioxide emissions to evaluate who would gain or loose from allowing for ocean carbon sinks. Our analysis is restricted to information on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone of a country. Like the carbon sequestration of business as usual forest management activities, natural ocean carbon sequestration applies at zero costs. The total amount of anthropogenic ocean carbon sequestration is large, also in the exclusive economic zones. As a consequence, it substantially alters the costs of emission reduction for most countries. Countries such as Australia, Denmark, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would gain substantially, and a large number of countries would benefit too. Current net exporters of carbon permits, particularly Russia, would gain less and oppose the inclusion of carbon sinks.
Joseph E Aldy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the paris agreement
Nature Climate Change, 2016Co-Authors: Joseph E Aldy, William A Pizer, Massimo Tavoni, Lara Aleluia Reis, Keigo Akimoto, Geoffrey J BlanfordAbstract:The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition toward an International Climate Policy architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years. An important Policy task will be to assess and compare these contributions. We use four integrated assessment models to produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 2⠰C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders’ Climate goals. Countries’ marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination. Marginal costs rise almost proportionally with income, but full Policy costs reveal more complex regional patterns due to terms of trade effects.
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alternative metrics for comparing domestic Climate change mitigation efforts and the emerging International Climate Policy architecture
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2016Co-Authors: Joseph E Aldy, William A PizerAbstract:The availability of practical mechanisms for comparing domestic efforts aimed at mitigating global Climate change is important for the stability, equity, and efficiency of International Climate agreements. We examine a variety of metrics that could be used to compare countries’ Climate change mitigation efforts and illustrate their potential application to large developed and developing countries. Because there is no single, comprehensive, measurable metric that could be applied to all countries, we suggest using a set of indicators to characterize and compare mitigation effort, akin to using a set of economic statistics to indicate the health of the macroeconomy. Given the iterative pledge-and-review approach that is emerging in the current Climate change negotiations, participation, commitment, and compliance could be enhanced if this set of indicators is able to show that all parties are doing their "fair share," both prospectively and retrospectively. The latter, in particular, highlights the need for a well-functioning Policy surveillance regime. (JEL: Q54, Q58, F55)
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alternative metrics for comparing domestic Climate change mitigation efforts and the emerging International Climate Policy architecture
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2016Co-Authors: Joseph E Aldy, William A PizerAbstract:The availability of practical mechansims for comparing domestic efforts aimed at mitigating global Climate change are important for the stability, equity, and efficiency of International Climate agreements. We examine a variety of metrics that could be used to compare countries’ Climate change mitigation efforts and illustrate their potential application to large developed and developing countries. Because there is no single comprehensive, measurable metric that could be applied to all countries, we suggest using a set of indicators to characterize and compare mitigation effort, akin to using a set of economic statistics to indicate the health of the macroeconomy. Given the iterative pledge and review approach that is emerging in the current Climate change negotiations, participation, commitment, and compliance could be enhanced if this set of indicators is able to show that all parties are doing their “fair share,” both prospectively and retrospectively. The latter, in particular, highlights the need for a wellfunctioning Policy surveillance regime. JEL Codes: Q54, Q58, F55
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The crucial role of Policy surveillance in International Climate Policy
Climatic Change, 2014Co-Authors: Joseph E AldyAbstract:An extensive literature shows that information-creating mechanisms enhance the transparency of and can support participation and compliance in International agreements. This paper draws from game theory, International relations, and legal scholarship to make the case for how transparency through Policy surveillance can facilitate more effective International Climate change Policy architecture. I draw lessons from Policy surveillance in multilateral economic, environmental, and national security contexts to inform a critical evaluation of the historic practice of monitoring and reporting under the global Climate regime. This assessment focuses on how surveillance produces evidence to inform Policy design, enables comparisons of mitigation effort, and illustrates the adequacy of the global effort in Climate agreements. I also describe how the institution of Policy surveillance can facilitate a variety of Climate Policy architectures. This evaluation of Policy surveillance suggests that transparency is necessary for global Climate Policy architecture.
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comparability of effort in International Climate Policy architecture
Research Papers in Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Joseph E Aldy, William A PizerAbstract:The comparability of domestic actions to mitigate global Climate change has important implications for the stability, equity, and efficiency of International Climate agreements. We examine a variety of metrics that could be used to evaluate countries' Climate change mitigation effort and illustrate their potential application for large developed and developing countries. We also explain how transparent measures of the comparability of effort can contribute to the design of International and domestic Climate change Policy along several dimensions. For example, such measures can facilitate participation and compliance in an agreement if they can illustrate that all parties are doing their "fair share." Second, these measures can inform the bilateral linking of domestic cap-and-trade programs in a manner akin to how nations negotiate the lowering of trade barriers more generally in trade Policy. Third, assessments of the comparability of effort can affect whether to implement and, if necessary, the stringency of unilateral border measures (e.g., a border tax). Finally, such assessments demonstrate the need for a well-functioning Policy surveillance regime.
Timmons J Roberts - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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postface fragmentation failing trust and enduring tensions over what counts as Climate finance
International Environmental Agreements-politics Law and Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Timmons J Roberts, Romain WeikmansAbstract:The Paris Agreement commits nations in Article 2(1) to “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and Climate-resilient development.” However there is an absence of Internationally agreed accounting rules that would permit overall assessments of progress to this goal and any meaningful comparisons of performance between countries. This is true also for the quantitative Copenhagen/Cancun promise by developed nations to jointly mobilize US$100 billion by 2020. Our goal is to provoke discussion about the depth of the problems this lack of a functional definition and accounting system have created and perpetuated. We do so by describing the fragmented system of national reporting of Climate finance and how the OECD’s Rio Marker system is serving neither contributors nor recipients. More than a trust issue between developed and developing countries, we argue that the lack of modalities to account for Climate finance also considerably impedes the effective functioning of the bottom-up approach that now prevails under the UNFCCC. The deadline to propose "modalities of accounting Climate finance" by 2018 is a crucial window in which to address this chronic issue in International Climate Policy.
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difficulties in accounting for private finance in International Climate Policy
Climate Policy, 2013Co-Authors: Martin Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa, Timmons J RobertsAbstract:It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to Climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public Climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private Climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for 'private finance' given the commitment of industrialized countries - enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements - to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private Climate finance flows with Climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private Climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27-123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of 'private Climate finance' are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, Policy makers will first have to clearly define 'private Climate finance' and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in International Climate agreements.
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difficulties in accounting for private finance in International Climate Policy
Climate Policy, 2013Co-Authors: Martin Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa, Timmons J RobertsAbstract:It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to Climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public Climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private Climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private Climate finance flows with Climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private Climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by indus...
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adaptation and International Climate Policy
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2013Co-Authors: Mizan R Khan, Timmons J RobertsAbstract:Because of the failure of the world to agree an adequate regime to limit greenhouse gas emissions to a safe level, adaptation to Climate change has risen rapidly in UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations since 2007. We closely review the development of policies, institutions, and financing of adaptation in International agreements from 1992 to the present. We conclude that the way the treaty has been built—first as a mitigation regime with adaptation added on only later—has led to some profound problems for marrying the goals of economic development and building Climate resilient societies. Particularly there are two problematic areas. First, following mitigation approaches, technical solutions are often the focus in adaptation projects, when social, political, and cultural problems lie at the roots of vulnerability and should be addressed directly. Second, early requirements that external funding would only come if the adaptation effort was clearly ‘additional’ to what would have been done without a changing Climate have been extremely pernicious. By attempting to divide a development project from the ‘additional’ costs of adapting to Climate change, the global Policy has shaped adaptation efforts at the local level. To understand how we ended up with such quirky definitions of what counts as adaptation, we need to review the history of adaptation in the negotiated regimes. Finally, we trace the incomplete negotiations over who will pay for adaptation in developing countries, whether that funding will come as grants or loans, as private investment or public funds, and what say recipient countries will have. WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:171–189. doi: 10.1002/wcc.212 The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Sheila M Olmstead - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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three key elements of a post 2012 International Climate Policy architecture
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2012Co-Authors: Sheila M Olmstead, Robert N StavinsAbstract:AbstractThis article describes three essential elements of an effective post-2012 International Climate Policy architecture: a framework to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are...
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three key elements of post 2012 International Climate Policy architecture
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Sheila M Olmstead, Robert N StavinsAbstract:We describe three essential elements of an effective post-2012 International global Climate Policy architecture: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based Policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate International equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global Climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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an expanded three part architecture for post 2012 International Climate Policy
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Sheila M Olmstead, Robert N StavinsAbstract:We describe the major features of a post-2012 International global Climate Policy architecture with three essential elements: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based Policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate International equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global Climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.