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Frank Schimmelfennig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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europeanisation before and after accession Conditionality legacies and compliance
Europe-Asia Studies, 2010Co-Authors: Arista Maria Cirtautas, Frank SchimmelfennigAbstract:This introductory essay reviews the literature on historical legacies in the post-communist area and relates it to the study of enlargement and Europeanisation. The authors develop a framework for the special section, specify various ways in which historical legacies can be conceived of affecting Conditionality and compliance, give an overview of the contributions and summarise the findings.
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eu political accession Conditionality after the 2004 enlargement consistency and effectiveness
Journal of European Public Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Frank SchimmelfennigAbstract:Has the EU's political accession Conditionality changed after the enlargement of 2004 against the backdrop of apparent 'enlargement fatigue' and domestic obstacles in the remaining non-member countries? Based on an empirical analysis of non-member eligibility and EU discrimination, this article concludes that EU enlargement policy has remained consistently linked to compliance with basic democratic norms in the target countries. The recent drawbacks in the negotiations of the EU with Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey have been caused by issues of national identity related to legacies of ethnic conflict that are likely to create high political costs to the target governments. As a result, whereas consistency has remained high, effectiveness is reduced. The findings confirm the continuing relevance of the external incentives model of EU Conditionality after the recent enlargement.
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eu democracy promotion in the european neighbourhood political Conditionality economic development and transnational exchange
European Union Politics, 2008Co-Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Hanno ScholtzAbstract:How effective and relevant is European Union political Conditionality for the promotion of democracy in third countries? This article reports the results of a panel study of 36 countries of the East European and Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU for the years 1988—2004. The analysis shows robust and strong effects of EU political Conditionality on democracy in the neighbouring countries if the EU offers a membership perspective in return for political reform. Absent the offer of membership, however, EU incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change. The analysis controls for economic development and transnational exchanges as two alternative potential causes of democratization. Although economic and geographical factors have an impact on democratization in the European neighbourhood as well, EU political Conditionality remains a significant influence.
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candidate countries and Conditionality
2008Co-Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:Originally, research on “Europeanization” was concerned almost exclusively with domestic change in EU member states. In light of the developments of European integration in the past decade, however, this exclusive research focus no longer appears appropriate. In the aftermath of the crisis and downfall of communism, most Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have declared the “return to Europe” to be their key foreign policy goal. This “return to Europe” included the pursuit of closer institutional ties with the EU, such as trade and association agreements, and cumulated in the accession of eight CEECs in 2004 (as well as Cyprus and Malta). Bulgaria and Romania are on schedule to follow in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey started accession negotiations in 2005. The remaining countries of the (Western) Balkans that are covered by the Stabilization and Association process launched in 1999 also possess a general membership perspective.
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governance by Conditionality eu rule transfer to the candidate countries of central and eastern europe
Journal of European Public Policy, 2004Co-Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:In the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU Conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of Conditionality: democratic Conditionality and acquis Conditionality.
Gwendolyn Sasse - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the politics of eu Conditionality the norm of minority protection during and beyond eu accession
Journal of European Public Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Gwendolyn SasseAbstract:The norm of minority protection is often singled out as a prime example of the political impact of European Union (EU) Conditionality on the ethnically diverse states of Central and Eastern Europe. The EU's ‘minority condition’ is best understood as a political and social construct rooted in European security concerns. As such, it has had very ‘real’ effects, both intended and unintended, and direct and indirect. This article extends the study of EU Conditionality by including the post-accession period, and by concentrating on the politics surrounding Conditionality. As the cases of Latvia and Estonia demonstrate, high-intensity EU involvement during the accession process did generate a rationalist momentum for legislative change, and formal compliance gave rise to a perception of behavioural change. However, socialization effects can point in the opposite direction of the rationalist momentum that informs formal legal change and thereby ‘lock in’ deeper structural problems and contradictory behavioural t...
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the european neighbourhood policy Conditionality revisited for the eu s eastern neighbours
Europe-Asia Studies, 2008Co-Authors: Gwendolyn SasseAbstract:Abstract The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is modelled on the institutional and procedural experience of the EU's eastward enlargement, although it explicitly excludes a membership perspective. It thus aims to define an alternative incentive for domestic reform in neighbouring countries, referred to as ‘a stake in the internal market’. This article suggests that the ENP amounts to a form of ‘Conditionality-lite’ for non-candidate countries. Within the ENP the key defining elements of Conditionality—clear incentive and enforcement structures—are vague for both the EU and its neighbouring countries. Thus, the ENP is conceptually and empirically weak when measured against a simple, rationalist Conditionality model. In line with the alternative understanding of Conditionality as a process rather than a clear-cut variable, the main function of the ENP is twofold: it provides an external reference point which domestic political actors in the ENP countries can choose to utilise when it fits their agenda (b...
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eu Conditionality and minority rights translating the copenhagen criterion into policy
2005Co-Authors: Gwendolyn SasseAbstract:Human and minorities map an area in which the EU's external relations have pushed for a (partial) rethinking of the EU's internal values, objectives and policies. While minority issues have been at the forefront of the enlargement rhetoric and are often singled out as a prime example of the EU's positive stabilising impact in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the EU has in fact promoted norms which lack a basis in EU law and do not directly translate into the acquis communautaire. The analysis of EU Conditionality presented in this paper will proceed in two steps. Firstly, the EU's minority criterion will be 'unpacked' both in terms of its inherent dilemmas and the way in which the EU translated it into an institutional process. Secondly, this paper locates the EU's minority criterion in the domestic political context of three accession countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania) in order to establish the balance between internal and external incentives for policy change and the effectiveness of EU Conditionality. The empirical evidence suggests that, on balance, international actors and a vaguely defined European norm framed the debates and perceptions and affected the timing and nature of specific pieces of legislation, while the domestic political constellations and pressures ultimately had a more significant effect on the institutional and policy outcomes.
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Conditionality and compliance in the eu s eastward enlargement regional policy and the reform of sub national government
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2004Co-Authors: James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, Claire GordonAbstract:Studies of EU Conditionality assume one basic premise: that it exists and works because there is a power asymmetry which enables the Commission to impose the adoption of the acquis on the CEECs as a precondition of their entry to the Union. Thus this literature posits that there are clear causal relationships in the use of Conditionality to ensure policy or institutional outcomes. Existing studies of enlargement Conditionality analyse its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization. This article, however, takes a policy-tracking approach to analyse how Conditionality was actually put into operation in policy-making and institution-building in the fields of regional policy and regionalization in the CEECs. The research draws on interviews conducted with officials in the Commission and in CEEC delegations in Brussels to illustrate the views of key actors, and to examine the interactions between the Commission and the candidate countries. By studying the policy process, the article demonstrates the fluid nature of Conditionality, the inconsistencies in its application by the Commission over time, and the weakness of a clear-cut causal relationship between Conditionality and outcome in this policy area. By charting the changes in the Commission's approach over time, and illustrating the diverse responses of the CEECs, this study confirms the need for a more nuanced approach to the concept of EU Conditionality, and argues for a logic of differentiation in the study of its impact on the CEECs.
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europeanization and regionalization in the eu s enlargement to central and eastern europe the myth of Conditionality
2004Co-Authors: James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, Claire GordonAbstract:Introduction The Logic of Enlargement Conditionality and Europeanization Communist Legacies and Regionalization The Commission, Conditionality and Regional Policy Monitoring Conditionality and Compliance Transition, Enlargement and Regionalization: A Comparison of Hungary and Poland Elites and the Capacity for Europeanization Conclusion Bibliography Statistical Appendix
Axel Dreher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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politics and imf Conditionality
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Janegbert Sturm, James Raymond VreelandAbstract:Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their Conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF Conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council and analyze a newly available dataset on the level of Conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992 to 2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer Conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.
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imf Conditionality theory and evidence
Public Choice, 2009Co-Authors: Axel DreherAbstract:This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on Conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of Fund resources. The paper presents theoretical arguments in favour of Conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of Conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of Conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.
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imf and economic growth the effects of programs loans and compliance with Conditionality
World Development, 2006Co-Authors: Axel DreherAbstract:Summary In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them being advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its Conditionality. This paper tries to separate those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970–2000, it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is also evidence that compliance with Conditionality mitigates this negative effect, while the overall impact, however, remains negative. IMF loans have no robust statistically significant impact.
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imf and economic growth the effects of programs loans and compliance with Conditionality
International Finance, 2005Co-Authors: Axel DreherAbstract:In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its Conditionality. This paper tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is only weak evidence that compliance with Conditionality mitigates this negative effect. IMF loans have no statistically significant impact.
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a public choice perspective of imf and world bank lending and Conditionality
Public Choice, 2004Co-Authors: Axel DreherAbstract:The paper explains IMF and World Bank lending and Conditionality stressing changes in relative bargaining power of different stakeholders over time. It applies public choice theory to explain the interests of the institutions' member states, its borrowers and staffs as well as private actors attaching their money to the IFIs' programs. Using panel data for 43 countries between 1987--99 it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seems to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity and ``bad'' policies.
Ulrich Sedelmeier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is europeanisation through Conditionality sustainable lock in of institutional change after eu accession
West European Politics, 2012Co-Authors: Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:Is the impact of EU accession Conditionality sustainable after target states achieve EU membership? Although accession changes the incentive structure for compliance, this article suggests that a lock-in of pre-accession institutional changes can contribute to their persistence even after the EU's sanctioning power weakens. A case study of gender equality institutions in five new member states suggests that a combination of government partisan preferences and veto players explains whether such lock-in occurs. If institutional change no longer fits government preferences, the key condition is the presence of veto players who can lock in institutional change. Rather than impairing Europeanisation, as the literature often assumes, domestic veto players can thus foster it. However, the case study also finds that veto players can lock in non-compliance too if Conditionality was unsuccessful, and it appears easier to reverse earlier institutional change than to redress the lack of it.
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after Conditionality post accession compliance with eu law in east central europe
Journal of European Public Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:The European Union's pre-accession Conditionality was very effective in prompting the alignment of the post-communist candidate countries with EU law. As the conditional membership incentive was the main factor driving alignment, the changing incentive structure after accession suggests that – ceteris paribus – post-accession compliance with EU law will deteriorate. Data on infringements of EU law allow us a first insight into whether this negative scenario has materialized. The data suggest that, far from constituting an ‘eastern problem’, virtually all of the new member states outperformed virtually all of the old members during the first four years of membership. To explain this unexpectedly good performance, further research should focus on two factors, both related to the experience of pre-accession Conditionality: a greater susceptibility of the new member states to shaming and an institutional investment in legislative capacity.
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candidate countries and Conditionality
2008Co-Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:Originally, research on “Europeanization” was concerned almost exclusively with domestic change in EU member states. In light of the developments of European integration in the past decade, however, this exclusive research focus no longer appears appropriate. In the aftermath of the crisis and downfall of communism, most Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have declared the “return to Europe” to be their key foreign policy goal. This “return to Europe” included the pursuit of closer institutional ties with the EU, such as trade and association agreements, and cumulated in the accession of eight CEECs in 2004 (as well as Cyprus and Malta). Bulgaria and Romania are on schedule to follow in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey started accession negotiations in 2005. The remaining countries of the (Western) Balkans that are covered by the Stabilization and Association process launched in 1999 also possess a general membership perspective.
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governance by Conditionality eu rule transfer to the candidate countries of central and eastern europe
Journal of European Public Policy, 2004Co-Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich SedelmeierAbstract:In the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU Conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of Conditionality: democratic Conditionality and acquis Conditionality.
Geoffrey Pridham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the eu s political Conditionality and post accession tendencies comparisons from slovakia and latvia
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008Co-Authors: Geoffrey PridhamAbstract:The EU's political Conditionality during the 2004 enlargement process recorded significant progress but imperfect implementation. But what has happened since post-Communist countries joined the EU three years ago now that the leverage of Brussels has ceased? This article develops an analytical approach to answer this question and applies it to the two cases of Slovakia and Latvia during the first three years of membership, showing some further progress with Conditionality matters but also a rather mixed picture. Altogether, there is no common pattern whereby conditionalty loses momention and becomes unscrambled even though the drive behind enlargement has been the crucial force driving Conditionality policy.
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change and continuity in the european union s political Conditionality aims approach and priorities
Democratization, 2007Co-Authors: Geoffrey PridhamAbstract:The EU's political Conditionality has acquired increasing importance with successive enlargements; this also goes for the period since 2004 compared with that before. The focus here is on change and continuity in Conditionality policy with respect to its aims, approach, and priorities. The article presents and applies a three-dimensional analysis concerning the challenge to, the process of, and the management of that policy. Given the need for assessing it in a broad and dynamic context, the discussion revolves around three relationships: between Conditionality and post-communist democratization; between Conditionality and the enlargement process; and between Conditionality and the EU itself in terms of institutional responsibility for enlargement and Conditionality matters. This explains how the policy since 2004 has been driven by four factors: more difficult democratization cases from the West Balkans; lessons from the earlier 2004 enlargement involving East–Central Europe; the policy outlook of Commis...
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the european union s democratic Conditionality and domestic politics in slovakia the me iar and dzurinda governments compared
Europe-Asia Studies, 2002Co-Authors: Geoffrey PridhamAbstract:THE PROCESS OF MONITORING CANDIDATE COUNTRIES for EU membership has in the past decade become much stricter than ever before, compared with previous enlargements, in terms not only of the scope but also the specificity of Conditionality demands. This is evident with respect to both economic and political conditions, but it is the latter which is particularly visible and which has a wider significance for European integration. For the EU has moved resolutely down the path of high as well as low politics and, thereby, into areas traditionally regarded as internal to states. This is demonstrated most recently by the debate, and also controversy, over a formal commitment on human rights. It is also clear that the EU has moved beyond conditions of formal democracy to those pertaining to substantive democracy or qualitative conditions such as the role of political parties and political participation, the independence of the media and an active civil society as well as human and minority rights.' While there has been a general growth of Conditionality on the part of international organisations (IOs) in the 1990s, the EU has been at the forefront in pushing both the political and economic versions of this. Some other IOs have been advocates of particular aspects of substantive democracy, like the Council of Europe (COE) over human rights and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) over minority rights as well as fair and free elections, while others, like NATO, have remained committed to more formal requirements (in its case, civilian control over the military and the existence of a constitutional state). The EU, however, has developed an ever more extensive portfolio of Conditionality demands and increasingly so in recent years. It has elaborated on and added to the original Copenhagen criteria set out in 1993.2 The reasons for this trend are several-the end of the Cold War and hence of the predominance of security concerns over democracy promotion; the EU's own political dynamic in a federalising direction; and, in particular, the awareness in Brussels of the various problems of accommodating so many still unconsolidated new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with their communist legacies.