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Mark E. Warren - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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beyond the self legislation model of democracy james bohman s approach to Democratic Theory
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2018Co-Authors: Mark E. WarrenAbstract:James Bohman’s work involves a paradigm shift in how we conceive democracy in complex, pluralized, globalized contexts comprised of multiple, overlapping constituencies that often have broad extension in space and time. He breaks with theories that view democracy as comprised of a bounded demos legislating for itself, and which conceptualize democracy as ways of organizing territorial, state-organized political entities. Elements of a progressive Democratic Theory that travels across borders should be built out of three ideas: (a) a nonutopianism that pays close attention to the “circumstances of politics”; (b) institutions that enable nondomination, which helps to push conflict resolution toward the Democratic media of deliberation, bargaining, compromise, and voting; and (c) reflexive institutions that enable the deliberative generation, revision, and renewal of collective procedures and decisions, and which organize the creativity, intelligence, and energy of individuals.
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a problem based approach to Democratic Theory
American Political Science Review, 2017Co-Authors: Mark E. WarrenAbstract:Over the last few decades, Democratic Theory has grown dramatically in its power and sophistication, fueled by debates among models of democracy. But these debates are increasingly unproductive. Model-based strategies encourage theorists to overgeneralize the place and functions of ideal typical features of democracy, such as deliberation or elections. Here I sketch an alternative strategy based on the question: What kinds of problems does a political system need to solve to count as “Democratic”? I suggest three general kinds: it should empower inclusions, form collective agendas and wills, and have capacities to make collective decisions. We can view common practices such as voting and deliberating as means for addressing these problems, and theorize institutional mixes of practices that would maximize a political system's Democratic problem-solving capacities. The resulting theories will be both normatively robust and sufficiently fine-grained to frame Democratic problems, possibilities, and deficits in complex polities.
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governance driven democratization
Critical Policy Studies, 2009Co-Authors: Mark E. WarrenAbstract:While Democratic reforms of electoral institutions continue, their capacities for deepening democracy are limited by the large, pluralized, complex, and territorial political units through which they work. Much of the institutional innovation in democracy has shifted elsewhere – into ‘governance’, the development and administration of public policy. The Democratic potentials of governance reside in the potentially responsive linkages between what governments do and what citizens receive. From the perspective of Democratic Theory, however, this ‘governance driven-democratization’ is a frontier. Concepts inherited from participatory Democratic Theory such as citizen engagement and direct democracy obscure more than they reveal. Most of the new experiments engage a relatively few citizens. Many involve only self-selected stakeholders and activists, and so by-pass broader public interests, or generate new forms of exclusion. In this paper, I specify the concept and domains of governance-driven democratization...
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The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory
Annual Review of Political Science, 2008Co-Authors: Nadia Urbinati, Mark E. WarrenAbstract:Democratic theorists have paid increasing attention to problems of political representation over the past two decades. Interest is driven by (a) a political landscape within which electoral representation now competes with new and informal kinds of representation; (b) interest in the fairness of electoral representation, particularly for minorities and women; (c) a renewed focus on political judgment within Democratic Theory; and (d) a new appreciation that participation and representation are complementary forms of citizenship. We review recent innovations within Democratic Theory, focusing especially on problems of fairness, constituency definition, deliberative political judgment, and new, nonelectoral forms of representation.
David Mcnamee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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sovereign and state a Democratic Theory of sovereign immunity
Texas Law Review, 2015Co-Authors: Corey Brettschneider, David McnameeAbstract:Sovereign immunity is an old idea, rooted in monarchy: the king cannot be sued without consent in his own courts. The American Constitution, by contrast, is committed to popular sovereignty and Democratic self-rule. It is hardly surprising, then, that sovereign immunity doctrine comes riddled with confusion when awkwardly transplanted to a Democratic context. But scholars have so far overlooked a cure for these confusions-to revisit the fundamental question of sovereignty in a democracy. In this Article, we aim to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the Constitution's core commitment to democracy. On our view, a state is rightly immune from suit when it acts as the Democratic sovereign. This includes the authority to make what we will call "sovereign mistakes." For a plaintiff to raid the treasury to pay for losses stemming from public policy decisions, even in error, vitiates the sovereign power of the purse. But a necessary condition for Democratic legitimacy is that the sovereign must respect citizens' fundamental constitutional rights. And so when the state violates these rights, it no longer acts as the Democratic sovereign, and it does not enjoy immunity from suit. The mantle of Democratic sovereignty passes to the citizen-plaintiff instead. Part I considers and rejects the all-or-nothing approaches to sovereign immunity doctrine that dominate the literature. Part II then develops our Democratic alternative. Parts III and IV apply this Democratic principle of sovereign immunity to breathe new life into the doctrine-providing a normative justification for immunity where it lies while also carving out its limits.IntroductionFew areas of doctrine have sown as much confusion over the past two centuries as the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.1 And today it appears to occupy a kind of twilight zone in constitutional Theory. Its defenders, who tend towards conservative originalism, invoke a broad principle of sovereign dignity that finds no home in the constitutional text.2 Its liberal detractors, who favor expansive interpretations of rights and powers under the Constitution, instead call for a narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment in isolation.3 We argue that much of this confusion stems from a failure to appreciate the theoretical question at the core of the doctrine: how can we reconcile it with democracy?What does it mean to say that the sovereign is immune from suit in a system of popular sovereignty? The answer to this question cannot rest in some excursion to the doctrine's historical and monarchical roots. But neither can it be wholesale rejection of the doctrine-a system of popular sovereignty is not a system that lacks sovereignty altogether. To solve this apparent morass, we offer a Democratic account of sovereignty, one that both registers the importance of collective decision making and respects the fundamental rights of citizens. We therefore tie the seemingly confused doctrine of sovereign immunity to the more generalized Democratic ambitions of the Constitution as a whole. We begin with the fundamental question at the heart of sovereign immunity: when may citizens sue a Democratic state? Consider the following cases:* A prison guard sexually assaults an inmate, who then sues the federal government as his employer.4* A state college bookstore receives preferential transfers from a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy, and the court-appointed trustee sues to recover them to distribute them fairly.5* A federal statute requires states to negotiate with Native American tribes over the operation of gaming facilities.6 One tribe sues the State of Florida for breach of this duty, seeking to compel negotiations.7* After finding a pattern of racial segregation, a federal court orders the Governor of Michigan to fund remedial education programs as part of the desegregation decree.8These cases trace just a few of the many wrinkles in the law of sovereign immunity. …
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sovereign and state a Democratic Theory of sovereign immunity
2014Co-Authors: Corey Brettschneider, David McnameeAbstract:Sovereign immunity is an old idea, rooted in monarchy: the king cannot be sued without consent in his own courts. The American Constitution, by contrast, is committed to popular sovereignty and Democratic self-rule. It is hardly surprising, then, that sovereign immunity doctrine comes riddled with confusion when awkwardly transplanted to a Democratic context. But scholars have so far overlooked a cure for these confusions — to revisit the fundamental question of sovereignty in a democracy. In this paper, we aim to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the Constitution’s core commitment to democracy. On our view, a state is rightly immune from suit when it acts as the Democratic sovereign. This includes the authority to make what we will call “sovereign mistakes.” For a plaintiff to raid the treasury to pay for losses stemming from public policy decisions, even in error, vitiates the sovereign power of the purse. But a necessary condition for Democratic legitimacy is that the sovereign must respect citizens’ fundamental constitutional rights. And so when the state violates these rights, it no longer acts as the Democratic sovereign, and it does not enjoy immunity from suit. The mantle of Democratic sovereignty passes to the citizen-plaintiff, instead. Part I considers and rejects the all-or-nothing approaches to sovereign immunity doctrine that dominate the literature. Part II then develops our Democratic alternative. Parts III and IV apply this Democratic principle of sovereign immunity to breathe new life into the doctrine — providing a normative justification for immunity where it lies while also carving out its limits.
Fabio Wolkenstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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agents of popular sovereignty
Political Theory, 2019Co-Authors: Fabio WolkensteinAbstract:Popular sovereignty requires that citizens perceive themselves as being able to act and implement decisions, and that they are de facto causally connected to mechanisms of decision making. I argue that the two most common understandings of the exercise of popular sovereignty—which center on direct decision making by the people as a whole and the indirect exercise of Democratic agency by elected representatives, respectively—are inadequate in this respect, and go on to suggest a complementary account that stresses the central role of internally Democratic and participatory political parties in actualising popular sovereignty, drawing on the Democratic Theory of Hans Kelsen.
Dennis F Thompson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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deliberative Democratic Theory and empirical political science
Annual Review of Political Science, 2008Co-Authors: Dennis F ThompsonAbstract:Although empirical studies of deliberative democracy have proliferated in the past decade, too few have addressed the questions that are most significant in the normative theories. At the same time, many theorists have tended too easily to dismiss the empirical findings. More recently, some theorists and empiricists have been paying more attention to each other's work. Nevertheless, neither is likely to produce the more comprehensive understanding of deliberative democracy we need unless both develop a clearer conception of the elements of deliberation, the conflicts among those elements, and the structural relationships in deliberative systems.
Corey Brettschneider - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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sovereign and state a Democratic Theory of sovereign immunity
Texas Law Review, 2015Co-Authors: Corey Brettschneider, David McnameeAbstract:Sovereign immunity is an old idea, rooted in monarchy: the king cannot be sued without consent in his own courts. The American Constitution, by contrast, is committed to popular sovereignty and Democratic self-rule. It is hardly surprising, then, that sovereign immunity doctrine comes riddled with confusion when awkwardly transplanted to a Democratic context. But scholars have so far overlooked a cure for these confusions-to revisit the fundamental question of sovereignty in a democracy. In this Article, we aim to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the Constitution's core commitment to democracy. On our view, a state is rightly immune from suit when it acts as the Democratic sovereign. This includes the authority to make what we will call "sovereign mistakes." For a plaintiff to raid the treasury to pay for losses stemming from public policy decisions, even in error, vitiates the sovereign power of the purse. But a necessary condition for Democratic legitimacy is that the sovereign must respect citizens' fundamental constitutional rights. And so when the state violates these rights, it no longer acts as the Democratic sovereign, and it does not enjoy immunity from suit. The mantle of Democratic sovereignty passes to the citizen-plaintiff instead. Part I considers and rejects the all-or-nothing approaches to sovereign immunity doctrine that dominate the literature. Part II then develops our Democratic alternative. Parts III and IV apply this Democratic principle of sovereign immunity to breathe new life into the doctrine-providing a normative justification for immunity where it lies while also carving out its limits.IntroductionFew areas of doctrine have sown as much confusion over the past two centuries as the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.1 And today it appears to occupy a kind of twilight zone in constitutional Theory. Its defenders, who tend towards conservative originalism, invoke a broad principle of sovereign dignity that finds no home in the constitutional text.2 Its liberal detractors, who favor expansive interpretations of rights and powers under the Constitution, instead call for a narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment in isolation.3 We argue that much of this confusion stems from a failure to appreciate the theoretical question at the core of the doctrine: how can we reconcile it with democracy?What does it mean to say that the sovereign is immune from suit in a system of popular sovereignty? The answer to this question cannot rest in some excursion to the doctrine's historical and monarchical roots. But neither can it be wholesale rejection of the doctrine-a system of popular sovereignty is not a system that lacks sovereignty altogether. To solve this apparent morass, we offer a Democratic account of sovereignty, one that both registers the importance of collective decision making and respects the fundamental rights of citizens. We therefore tie the seemingly confused doctrine of sovereign immunity to the more generalized Democratic ambitions of the Constitution as a whole. We begin with the fundamental question at the heart of sovereign immunity: when may citizens sue a Democratic state? Consider the following cases:* A prison guard sexually assaults an inmate, who then sues the federal government as his employer.4* A state college bookstore receives preferential transfers from a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy, and the court-appointed trustee sues to recover them to distribute them fairly.5* A federal statute requires states to negotiate with Native American tribes over the operation of gaming facilities.6 One tribe sues the State of Florida for breach of this duty, seeking to compel negotiations.7* After finding a pattern of racial segregation, a federal court orders the Governor of Michigan to fund remedial education programs as part of the desegregation decree.8These cases trace just a few of the many wrinkles in the law of sovereign immunity. …
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sovereign and state a Democratic Theory of sovereign immunity
2014Co-Authors: Corey Brettschneider, David McnameeAbstract:Sovereign immunity is an old idea, rooted in monarchy: the king cannot be sued without consent in his own courts. The American Constitution, by contrast, is committed to popular sovereignty and Democratic self-rule. It is hardly surprising, then, that sovereign immunity doctrine comes riddled with confusion when awkwardly transplanted to a Democratic context. But scholars have so far overlooked a cure for these confusions — to revisit the fundamental question of sovereignty in a democracy. In this paper, we aim to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the Constitution’s core commitment to democracy. On our view, a state is rightly immune from suit when it acts as the Democratic sovereign. This includes the authority to make what we will call “sovereign mistakes.” For a plaintiff to raid the treasury to pay for losses stemming from public policy decisions, even in error, vitiates the sovereign power of the purse. But a necessary condition for Democratic legitimacy is that the sovereign must respect citizens’ fundamental constitutional rights. And so when the state violates these rights, it no longer acts as the Democratic sovereign, and it does not enjoy immunity from suit. The mantle of Democratic sovereignty passes to the citizen-plaintiff, instead. Part I considers and rejects the all-or-nothing approaches to sovereign immunity doctrine that dominate the literature. Part II then develops our Democratic alternative. Parts III and IV apply this Democratic principle of sovereign immunity to breathe new life into the doctrine — providing a normative justification for immunity where it lies while also carving out its limits.