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James J. Gross - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Maladaptive Behavior in Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Role of Emotion Experience and Emotion Regulation
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 2015Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Ihno A. Lee, Jennifer M. Phillips, Antonio Y. Hardan, James J. GrossAbstract:Maladaptive behavior is common in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, the factors that give rise to maladaptive behavior in this context are not well understood. The present study examined the role of Emotion Experience and Emotion regulation in maladaptive behavior in individuals with ASD and typically developing (TD) participants. Thirty-one individuals with ASD and 28 TD participants and their parents completed questionnaires assessing Emotion Experience, regulation, and maladaptive behavior. Compared to TD participants, individuals with ASD used cognitive reappraisal less frequently, which was associated with increased negative Emotion Experience, which in turn was related to greater levels of maladaptive behavior. By decreasing negative Emotions, treatments targeting adaptive Emotion regulation may therefore reduce maladaptive behaviors in individuals with ASD.
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the eyes have it the role of attention in cognitive reappraisal of social stimuli
Emotion, 2014Co-Authors: Valeria Manera, Ihno A. Lee, Andrea Christiane Samson, Corinna Pehrs, James J. GrossAbstract:Cognitive reappraisal (CR) is a commonly used Emotion-regulation strategy that has been shown to influence affective, cognitive, and social outcomes. Although progress has been made in elucidating the mechanisms underlying CR, the role of attention remains unclear. In the present study, we investigated the role of attention in CR by tracking participants’ gazes during the presentation of videos depicting people in negative moods. Participants were asked to attend naturally or to use reappraisal to increase or decrease their Emotions while viewing the videos. After each video, they rated their negative Emotion Experience. Results showed that participants spent more time looking at the Emotional regions in the target’s face (eyes and mouth) when asked to up-regulate their Emotions, compared with when they simply attended to the videos. The reverse pattern was found for down-regulation of Emotions. In addition, the effects of cognitive reappraisal on negative Emotion Experience were mediated by the time spent looking at the Emotional regions, with a stronger effect for the down-regulation instruction. Finally, direct effects of regulation instruction on negative Emotion were observed even when controlling for time spent viewing Emotional regions, which suggests that attention and CR are distinct components that uniquely influence negative Emotions. These results complement and extend previous findings on the role of attention in CR, and highlight the importance of taking attentional mechanisms into account when designing CR training.
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Emotion regulation in asperger s syndrome and high functioning autism
Emotion, 2012Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Oswald Huber, James J. GrossAbstract:It is generally thought that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals’ Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to problems with Emotion regulation. To assess Emotional functioning in AS/HFA, 27 AS/HFA adults (16 women) and 27 age-, gender-, and education-matched typically developing (TD) participants completed a battery of measures of Emotion Experience, labeling, and regulation. With respect to Emotion Experience, individuals with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative Emotions, but similar levels of positive Emotions, compared with TD individuals. With respect to Emotion labeling, individuals with AS/HFA had greater difficulties identifying and describing their Emotions, with approximately two-thirds exceeding the cutoff for alexithymia. With respect to Emotion regulation, individuals with AS/HFA used reappraisal less frequently than TD individuals and reported lower levels of reappraisal self-efficacy. Although AS/HFA individuals used suppression more frequently than TD individuals, no difference in suppression self-efficacy was found. It is important to note that these differences in Emotion regulation were evident even when controlling for Emotion Experience and labeling. Implications of these deficits are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.
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BRIEF REPORT Emotion Regulation in Asperger's Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism
2012Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Oswald Huber, James J. GrossAbstract:It is generally thought that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals’ Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to problems with Emotion regulation. To assess Emotional functioning in AS/HFA, 27 AS/HFA adults (16 women) and 27 age-, gender-, and education-matched typically developing (TD) participants completed a battery of measures of Emotion Experience, labeling, and regulation. With respect to Emotion Experience, individuals with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative Emotions, but similar levels of positive Emotions, compared with TD individuals. With respect to Emotion labeling, individuals with AS/HFA had greater difficulties identifying and describing their Emotions, with approximately two-thirds exceeding the cutoff for alexithymia. With respect to Emotion regulation, individuals with AS/HFA used reappraisal less frequently than TD individuals and reported lower levels of reappraisal self-efficacy. Although AS/HFA individuals used suppression more frequently than TD individuals, no difference in suppression self-efficacy was found. It is important to note that these differences in Emotion regulation were evident even when controlling for Emotion Experience and labeling. Implications of these deficits are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.
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individual differences in cognitive reappraisal experiential and physiological responses to an anger provocation
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 2007Co-Authors: Iris B Mauss, Crystal L Cook, Jennifer Y J Cheng, James J. GrossAbstract:Effective Emotion regulation is widely seen as vital for healthy adaptation. There remains considerable uncertainty, however, as to what constitutes effective Emotion regulation. One promising Emotion regulation strategy is cognitive reappraisal, which involves reframing Emotional events so as to decrease their Emotional impact. This strategy is useful because it seems to enable individuals to down-regulate negative feelings without the physiological costs that are associated with other forms of Emotion regulation. It remains unknown, however, whether individual differences in the use of reappraisal are associated with experiential and physiological responses to anger-inducing situations. To examine this question, individuals either high or low in reappraisal were made angry in the laboratory while Emotion Experience and cardiovascular responses were assessed. Results indicated that compared to low reappraisers, high reappraisers had a more adaptive profile of Emotion Experience and cardiovascular responding. Specifically, across baseline and provocation periods, high reappraisers reported less anger, less negative Emotion, and more positive Emotion, showed greater cardiac output and ventricular contractility, and lesser total peripheral resistance. These findings suggest that reappraisers are successful at down-regulating negative Emotions, even in the context of a potent negative Emotion such as anger.
Andrea Christiane Samson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Maladaptive Behavior in Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Role of Emotion Experience and Emotion Regulation
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 2015Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Ihno A. Lee, Jennifer M. Phillips, Antonio Y. Hardan, James J. GrossAbstract:Maladaptive behavior is common in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, the factors that give rise to maladaptive behavior in this context are not well understood. The present study examined the role of Emotion Experience and Emotion regulation in maladaptive behavior in individuals with ASD and typically developing (TD) participants. Thirty-one individuals with ASD and 28 TD participants and their parents completed questionnaires assessing Emotion Experience, regulation, and maladaptive behavior. Compared to TD participants, individuals with ASD used cognitive reappraisal less frequently, which was associated with increased negative Emotion Experience, which in turn was related to greater levels of maladaptive behavior. By decreasing negative Emotions, treatments targeting adaptive Emotion regulation may therefore reduce maladaptive behaviors in individuals with ASD.
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the eyes have it the role of attention in cognitive reappraisal of social stimuli
Emotion, 2014Co-Authors: Valeria Manera, Ihno A. Lee, Andrea Christiane Samson, Corinna Pehrs, James J. GrossAbstract:Cognitive reappraisal (CR) is a commonly used Emotion-regulation strategy that has been shown to influence affective, cognitive, and social outcomes. Although progress has been made in elucidating the mechanisms underlying CR, the role of attention remains unclear. In the present study, we investigated the role of attention in CR by tracking participants’ gazes during the presentation of videos depicting people in negative moods. Participants were asked to attend naturally or to use reappraisal to increase or decrease their Emotions while viewing the videos. After each video, they rated their negative Emotion Experience. Results showed that participants spent more time looking at the Emotional regions in the target’s face (eyes and mouth) when asked to up-regulate their Emotions, compared with when they simply attended to the videos. The reverse pattern was found for down-regulation of Emotions. In addition, the effects of cognitive reappraisal on negative Emotion Experience were mediated by the time spent looking at the Emotional regions, with a stronger effect for the down-regulation instruction. Finally, direct effects of regulation instruction on negative Emotion were observed even when controlling for time spent viewing Emotional regions, which suggests that attention and CR are distinct components that uniquely influence negative Emotions. These results complement and extend previous findings on the role of attention in CR, and highlight the importance of taking attentional mechanisms into account when designing CR training.
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Emotion regulation in asperger s syndrome and high functioning autism
Emotion, 2012Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Oswald Huber, James J. GrossAbstract:It is generally thought that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals’ Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to problems with Emotion regulation. To assess Emotional functioning in AS/HFA, 27 AS/HFA adults (16 women) and 27 age-, gender-, and education-matched typically developing (TD) participants completed a battery of measures of Emotion Experience, labeling, and regulation. With respect to Emotion Experience, individuals with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative Emotions, but similar levels of positive Emotions, compared with TD individuals. With respect to Emotion labeling, individuals with AS/HFA had greater difficulties identifying and describing their Emotions, with approximately two-thirds exceeding the cutoff for alexithymia. With respect to Emotion regulation, individuals with AS/HFA used reappraisal less frequently than TD individuals and reported lower levels of reappraisal self-efficacy. Although AS/HFA individuals used suppression more frequently than TD individuals, no difference in suppression self-efficacy was found. It is important to note that these differences in Emotion regulation were evident even when controlling for Emotion Experience and labeling. Implications of these deficits are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.
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BRIEF REPORT Emotion Regulation in Asperger's Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism
2012Co-Authors: Andrea Christiane Samson, Oswald Huber, James J. GrossAbstract:It is generally thought that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals’ Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to problems with Emotion regulation. To assess Emotional functioning in AS/HFA, 27 AS/HFA adults (16 women) and 27 age-, gender-, and education-matched typically developing (TD) participants completed a battery of measures of Emotion Experience, labeling, and regulation. With respect to Emotion Experience, individuals with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative Emotions, but similar levels of positive Emotions, compared with TD individuals. With respect to Emotion labeling, individuals with AS/HFA had greater difficulties identifying and describing their Emotions, with approximately two-thirds exceeding the cutoff for alexithymia. With respect to Emotion regulation, individuals with AS/HFA used reappraisal less frequently than TD individuals and reported lower levels of reappraisal self-efficacy. Although AS/HFA individuals used suppression more frequently than TD individuals, no difference in suppression self-efficacy was found. It is important to note that these differences in Emotion regulation were evident even when controlling for Emotion Experience and labeling. Implications of these deficits are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.
Douglas S. Mennin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Association Between Complexity of Emotion Experience and Behavioral Adaptation:
Emotion Review, 2019Co-Authors: Mia Skytte O'toole, Megan E. Renna, Emma Elkjær, Mai Bjørnskov Mikkelsen, Douglas S. MenninAbstract:This article systematically reviews studies investigating the effect of three operationalizations of complexity in Emotion Experience (i.e., differentiation, covariation, and variability) on situat...
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real world Emotion an Experience sampling approach to Emotion Experience and regulation in bipolar i disorder
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2013Co-Authors: June Gruber, Aleksandr Kogan, Douglas S. Mennin, Greg MurrayAbstract:Laboratory studies suggest that bipolar disorder is characterized by Emotion dysregulation, yet Emotion disturbance has not been systematically described using more ecologically valid methods. Using an Experience-sampling approach, we therefore sought to investigate positive and negative Emotionality, Emotion regulation strategies, and functioning among remitted individuals with bipolar I disorder (BD; n = 31) compared with both healthy controls (CTL; n = 32) and remitted individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD; n = 21). Hierarchical linear modeling analyses of self-report data spanning a 6-day consecutive period revealed that the BD group aligned with the CTL group in reporting greater positive Emotionality than the MDD group, but aligned with the MDD group in reporting greater negative Emotionality than the CTL group. Furthermore, the BD and MDD groups reported greater general use of Emotion regulation strategies than the CTL group. These findings suggest that BD is characterized by amplified Emotionality as well as increased efforts to regulate Emotions in everyday life. Discussion focuses on implications for BD, as well as identification of unique (disorder-specific) and shared (transdiagnostic) features of Emotion disturbance.
Ann M. Kring - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Toward an understanding of anticipatory pleasure deficits in schizophrenia: Memory, prospection, and Emotion Experience.
Journal of abnormal psychology, 2016Co-Authors: Janelle M. Painter, Ann M. KringAbstract:Anticipatory pleasure deficits have been observed in people with schizophrenia. Less is known about the extent to which interrelated processes that comprise anticipatory pleasure, including memory, prospection, and Emotion Experience are disrupted. We asked people with (n = 32) and without (n = 29) schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder to provide memory and prospection narratives in response to specific cues. Half of the prospections followed a memory task, and half followed a control task. People with schizophrenia generated memories similar in content and Experience as controls even as they described them less clearly. However, people with schizophrenia were less likely to explicitly reference the past in their prospections, and their prospections were less detailed and richly Experienced than controls, regardless of the task completed before prospection. People with schizophrenia reported similar levels of positive Emotion (current and predicted) in positive prospections that followed the memory task, but less positive Emotion than controls in positive prospections that followed the control task. Taken together, these results suggest that people with schizophrenia Experience difficulties drawing from past Experiences and generating detailed prospections. However, asking people with schizophrenia to recall and describe memories prior to prospection may increase the likelihood of drawing from the past in prospections, and may help boost current and predicted pleasure.
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diminished Emotion expressivity but not Experience in men and women with schizophrenia
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2014Co-Authors: Jasmine Mote, Barbara K Stuart, Ann M. KringAbstract:One of the most well-replicated findings in schizophrenia over the past 20 years is that people with this disorder do not outwardly express Emotions even when they report experiencing the same amount of Emotion as people without schizophrenia (e.g., Kring & Moran, 2008). Where differences are observed in reported Experience between people with and without schizophrenia, they tend to be in reported arousal (e.g., Tremeau et al., 2009) or incongruent Emotion Experience (e.g., more negative Emotion reported for positive and neutral stimuli; Cohen & Minor, 2010). Unfortunately, nearly all of these studies have been done exclusively with men; we know next to nothing about Emotional responding in women with schizophrenia. How few studies have included women? Only 20 out of 61 non-overlapping studies across three meta-analyses of Emotion Experience in schizophrenia (Cohen & Minor, 2010; Llerena, Strauss, & Cohen, 2012; Yan et al., 2012) included at least 40% women. Of these studies, only five examined sex differences and found no significant sex differences (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Habel, Krasenbrink, Bowi, Ott, & Schneider, 2006; Hudry, Saoud, d’Amato, Dalery, & Royet, 2002; Schneider et al., 1995; Volz, Hamm, Kirsch, & Rey, 2003). With respect to expressivity, only three studies have examined sex differences in schizophrenia. Two studies did not find sex differences (Davison, Frith, Harrison-Read, & Johnson, 1996; Simons, Ellgring, Beck-Dossler, Gaebel, & Wolwer, 2010). However, Davison et al. (1996) did not include a healthy comparison group and included twice as many men as women; Simons et al. (2010) included nearly twice as many men as women and did not assess Emotional expressions. Tremeau et al. (2005) found that women with schizophrenia exhibited more facial movements when recalling an Emotional event than did men, but did not assess Emotion expressions. None of these studies assessed Emotion Experience. Thus, no study has examined sex differences, Emotion expressions, and self-reported Emotion Experience in schizophrenia. Understanding Emotional responding in women with schizophrenia is important for many reasons. First, women with schizophrenia differ from men on many aspects of the disorder, including a later age of onset, less pernicious course of illness, and less severe negative symptoms (e.g., Leung & Chue, 2000). Perhaps one reason why women with schizophrenia show a less severe illness course is because they do not show this same disconnect between Emotion Experience and expressivity. On the other hand, men and women may differ in negative symptoms in aggregate, but may not differ on all aspects of these symptoms. Negative symptoms are related to worse functional outcome in schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2004), and understanding whether there are sex differences in Emotional responding, which is central to the expression and motivation/pleasure domain of negative symptoms, is essential for the assessment and treatment of all people with schizophrenia. Second, including equal numbers of men and women with schizophrenia better represents the prevalence of the disorder, which is roughly the same for men and women (McGrath, Saha, Chant, & Welham, 2008). Third, we can determine whether the disconnect between expression and Experience reflects something about schizophrenia, or something about sex. Indeed, multitudes of studies with healthy people find that women are more expressive than men (for reviews see Brody & Hall, 2008; Kret & De Gelder, 2012). Women smile more than men, a finding that persists after accounting for factors such as culture and age (LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003). This sex difference holds across different methods, including self-report (e.g., Hess et al., 2000; Simon & Nath, 2004), observer ratings in laboratory settings (e.g., Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2007; Kring & Gordon, 1998) and naturalistic contexts (e.g., Campos et al., 2013), and EMG corrugator and zygomatic response (e.g., Huang & Hu, 2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). By contrast, results on sex differences in reported Experience are mixed (Brody & Hall, 2008; Hyde, 2014; Stevens & Hamann, 2012). Some studies find that women report more intense Emotion Experience than men (e.g., Huang & Hu, 2009), while others do not find sex differences (e.g., Kemp, Silberstein, Armstrong, & Nathan, 2004; Kring & Gordon, 1998). The mixed findings likely reflect the variety of methods (e.g., ecological momentary assessment; self-report trait questionnaires; adjective checklists following evocative stimuli) and definitions of Emotion Experience (e.g., responses to stimuli; retrospective reports across days). Taken together, these findings suggest two competing hypotheses about Emotion expression and Experience in women with schizophrenia. First, based on prior studies showing that men with schizophrenia differ in expression but not Experience compared to men without schizophrenia, we can hypothesize that women with schizophrenia will show the same pattern. That is, compared to women without schizophrenia, women with schizophrenia will be less expressive but will not differ in reported Experience. Second, based on prior studies showing that healthy women are more expressive than men, we can hypothesize that women with schizophrenia will be more expressive than men with schizophrenia yet will not differ in reported Experience. To test these hypotheses, we examined Emotion expression and Experience in men and women with schizophrenia. Women without schizophrenia were chosen as the control group to examine whether women with schizophrenia would more closely resemble men with schizophrenia (competing hypothesis one) or healthy women (competing hypothesis two). We did not include a male control group as this was not directly relevant to these hypotheses, and several prior studies have demonstrated that men with schizophrenia differ from men without schizophrenia.
John Lambie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The demanding world of Emotion: A Gestalt approach to Emotion Experience
New Ideas in Psychology, 2020Co-Authors: John LambieAbstract:Abstract Psychology is biased towards thinking of Emotions as feelings rather than as an Experiences of the world. But they are both. World-focused Emotion Experiences (WFEE) are how the world appears or is consciously perceived in one's Emotion Experience. For example, when happy the world may seem welcoming, or when sad the world may seem barren of possibilities. What explains these Experiences? This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Lewin, I propose an “Emotional demand model” of WFEE. The Emotional demand character of objects (e.g. bear-to-be-run-from) is distinguished from their expressive character (e.g. angry bear). It is a mistake to think of Emotion faces only as expressions—they are also demands. This distinction explains some anomalous findings in infancy and autism research. The model highlights another tool for recognizing our own Emotions: noticing when we feel “demanded of” by the world, with implications for Emotion regulation.
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Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge:
Emotion Review, 2009Co-Authors: John LambieAbstract:This article examines the role of Emotion Experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between Emotion Experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that Emotion Experiences contribute to rational action only if one is appropriately aware of them (because only then does one have the capacity to inhibit one's Emotional reactions). Furthermore, it is argued that awareness of Emotion increases self-knowledge because it is a source of information about our biases.
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How many selves in Emotion Experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)
Psychological Review, 2004Co-Authors: Anthony J. Marcel, John LambieAbstract:T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (Dalgleish, T. & Power, M.J., 2004. Psychological Review, 111(3), pp.812-19) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article (Lambie, J.A. & Marcel, A.J., 2002. Psychological Review, 109(2), pp.219-259) implicitly presents a unitary view of self in Emotion Experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.
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Intentional avoidance and social understanding in repressors and nonrepressors: Two functions for Emotion Experience?
Consciousness & Emotion, 2003Co-Authors: John Lambie, Kevin L. BakerAbstract:Two putative functions of Emotion Experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety Experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an Emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative Emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using Emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety Experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety Experience.
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Consciousness and the varieties of Emotion Experience : a theoretical framework
Psychological review, 2002Co-Authors: John Lambie, Anthony J. MarcelAbstract:Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of Emotion Experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that Emotion Experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of Emotion Experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing Emotion Experience. They classify the nature and content of Emotion Experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" Emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.