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Edward Guntrip - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • International Investment law, hybrid authority and jurisdiction
    The Oxford Handbook of Jurisdiction in International Law, 2019
    Co-Authors: Edward Guntrip
    Abstract:

    This chapter discusses the extent to which contemporary approaches to jurisdiction can be applied to hybrid exercises of state and non-state authority in International Investment law. Relying on theories of relative authority and transnational law, it demonstrates that jurisdiction needs to be reformulated to capture exercises of hybrid authority in International law. If jurisdiction cannot address hybrid authority, it will continue to overlook significant exercises of authority within International Investment law. Based on how hybrid authority functions in International Investment law, the chapter then highlights that the role of the state in International law has altered from being a welfare state to a competition state. Yet, the jurisdictional framework has not adapted to the altered function of the state. Hence, despite the common use of hybrid authority in International Investment law, it cannot be accommodated within the jurisdictional framework.

  • International Investment law in an isolationist world: a human rights perspective
    2017
    Co-Authors: Edward Guntrip
    Abstract:

    Political events in 2016 marked a fundamental shift in the world order. The scale of the shift has precipitated claims that the world has entered into a new International order characterised by isolationist policies. This article addresses the validity of these claims with regards to International Investment law. The article adopts a human rights perspective to argue that isolationist State conduct in International Investment law can often be justified as an exercise of the right to economic self-determination. As the right to self-determination has been invoked in debates regarding International Investment law since the 1960s and 1970s, it is suggested that some isolationist State practice is merely the latest manifestation of on-going policy tensions within the International Investment law regime.

  • SELF-DETERMINATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT Investment: REIMAGINING SOVEREIGNTY IN International Investment LAW
    International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2016
    Co-Authors: Edward Guntrip
    Abstract:

    International Investment law can be criticized for its understanding of sovereignty. Informed by the works of Koskenniemi, this article re-imagines ‘sovereignty’ based on a host state population exercising its right to economic self-determination. Recent transparency initiatives in International Investment law support this conceptualization of sovereignty. Further, the stance taken aligns with the continuous evolution of the International Investment law regime. The establishment of a different perspective on sovereignty in International Investment law highlights the need for an alternative understanding of this term if International Investment law is to achieve widespread approval.

Stephan W Schill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Oxford Scholarship Online - International Investment Law and Community Interests
    Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018
    Co-Authors: Stephan W Schill, Vladislav Djanic
    Abstract:

    In contemporary discourse, International Investment law and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) are often perceived as threats to community interests in one-sidedly protecting foreign investors and undermining public policies that are to the benefit of the local population and the International community. The chapter promotes a different perspective. First, it argues that International Investment law properly construed can be conceptualized as protecting community interests, because it is part of the legal infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the global economy under a rule of law framework. Aimed at supporting economic growth, this helps further economic and noneconomic community interests, including sustainable development. Second, the chapter argues that International Investment law and ISDS do not turn a blind eye to the conflicts that can arise between economic and noneconomic community interests, such as environmental protection or human rights. Instead, International Investment law and ISDS have numerous mechanisms at their disposal for alleviating tensions with noneconomic community interests.

  • International Investment Law and History
    2018
    Co-Authors: Stephan W Schill, Christian J. Tams, Rainer Hofmann
    Abstract:

    Historiographical approaches in International Investment law scholarship are becoming ever more important. This insightful book combines perspectives from a range of expert International law scholars who explore ways in which using a broad variety of methods in historical research can lead to a better understanding of International Investment law.

  • International Investment Law and the Global Financial Architecture - International Investment Law and the Global Financial Architecture
    2017
    Co-Authors: Christian J. Tams, Stephan W Schill, Rainer Hofmann
    Abstract:

    This book addresses how International Investment law interacts with the (re-)regulation of financial and capital markets, in particular in the sovereign debt and banking sectors. It considers where the line should be drawn between legitimate regulation and undue interference with investor rights and, equally importantly, who draws it.

  • In Defense of International Investment Law
    European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016, 2016
    Co-Authors: Stephan W Schill
    Abstract:

    The present article responds to the critical perspective Kate Miles offers on International Investment law in her article “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence, and Future Directions”, published in this Yearbook. While sharing several concerns Miles identifies, and supporting present reform efforts to make the system more transparent, increase possibilities of involvement for third parties, and ensure policy space, this article presents a generally positive perspective on the foundations of International Investment law. It argues that the present system has to be seen as a mechanism to subject International Investment relations to the International rule of law, with investor-state arbitration providing a form of access to justice to foreign investors in cases where domestic courts are not sufficiently well-placed to effectively control government action and enforce Investment treaty obligations. The system, in other words, vindicates fundamental values of a just world order under law. Furthermore, the article argues that Miles paints a misleading picture of the power arbitrators exercise in the interpretation and application of Investment treaties. Rather than developing the system to the detriment of public interests, arbitrators are subject to numerous mechanisms of state control; moreover, they regularly apply interpretative techniques that are respectful of public interests. Finally, the article discusses the cases Kate Miles presents as pathologies of the system and argues that they are not encroachments on governments’ policy space, but involve legitimate disputes that are appropriate for resolution in an International forum

  • International Investment Law and Development: Friends or Foes?
    2015
    Co-Authors: Stephan W Schill, Christian J. Tams, Rainer Hofmann
    Abstract:

    Although there is broad consensus that Investment, including foreign Investment, can have a positive impact on economic development, the relationship between International Investment law and International development law has long been a history of ignorance and mistrust. The literature and jurisprudence on International Investment law until recently has largely treated the law of International development in passing. Many works on International development law, in turn, pay no more than lip-service to Investment protection. Critics have even seen Investment law as an obstacle to sustainable development. Serving as an introduction to the book International Investment Law and Development: Bridging the Gap, the present paper maps out the conceptual relations between International Investment law and development and discusses how the existing gap can be bridged through a more comprehensive and integrated vision on Investment and development.

Robert Basedow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Business Lobbying in International Investment Policy-Making in Europe
    Lobbying in the European Union, 2018
    Co-Authors: Robert Basedow
    Abstract:

    Does European business lobby in International Investment policy and notably for the conclusion of International Investment agreements? The chapter argues that business is little involved in this policy domain due to limited perceived welfare effects. Theories of public choice and bureaucratic politics may better account for policy outcomes. The chapter verifies these hypotheses in case studies of International Investment policy-making in Germany and the European Union. Finally, the chapter raises the question of whether the exceptional, vocal involvement of European business in the debates on Investment regulation under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) might be the result of policy-maker influence on the business community. The findings imply that policy-makers may be freer in reforming their approach to International Investment policy and International Investment agreements than assumed.

  • A legal history of the EU's International Investment policy
    The journal of world investment and trade, 2016
    Co-Authors: Robert Basedow
    Abstract:

    The article traces the evolution of the legal competences of the European Union (EU) in International Investment regulation from the Spaak Report (1956) to the Lisbon Treaty (2009). It focuses on the question why and how the EU gradually acquired legal competences in this key domain of global economic governance. The analysis suggests that Commission entrepreneurship and spill-overs from other EU policies were the most important factors fuelling the extension of the EU’s legal competences. The Member States, on the other hand, sought to prevent a competence transfer. European business – arguably the main stakeholder – was mostly uninterested or divided regarding the EU’s role in International Investment policy. The findings have implications for our perception of business lobbying in International Investment policy and potentially for the legal interpretation and delimitation of the EU’s new competences.

  • The European Union’s new International Investment policy: product of Commission entrepreneurship or business lobbying?
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2016
    Co-Authors: Robert Basedow
    Abstract:

    The article seeks to explain the emergence of the European Union (EU)’s International Investment policy since the 1980s. The article develops two competing explanations. It evaluates whether the Commission acted as policy entrepreneur to consolidate the EU’s role in International Investment policy or whether European business lobbied for the ‘brusselization’ of International Investment policy making to ensure access to ambitious state-of-the-art International Investment agreements. The article traces the EU’s involvement in International Investment policy through history. It examines policy-making instances, which shaped the EU’s de facto competences in International Investment negotiations and its legal competences under European law. It finds that Commission entrepreneurship promoted the EU’s involvement in International Investment negotiations and ultimately ensured due to the procedural particularities of the Convention on the Future of Europe the extension of the EU’s legal competences. European business and the Member States did not promote the emergence of the EU’s International Investment policy.

  • Business lobbying and International Investment agreements The bureaucratic politics behind the International Investment regime
    2014
    Co-Authors: Robert Basedow
    Abstract:

    Does business lobby for International Investment agreements? Although most research endorses the assumption that business is the main stakeholder of the International Investment regime, hardly any study has evaluated the role of business in shaping this key domain of global economic governance. The paper uses basic quantitative and qualitative methods in order to shed light on the significance of business lobbying behind the conclusion of IIAs. It finds that apart from Investment liberalisation business takes little interest in International Investment regulation. The findings of this paper suggest that the International Investment regime is primarily the result of bureaucratic politics, which has implications for policy-makers and future research. Does business lobby for International Investment agreements? Most observers are inclined to believe that business lobbying is a key driver behind the conclusion of International Investment agreements (IIAs). IIAs are depicted as regulatory subsidy of states given to business. The Investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment and provisions of IIAs should unlock profitable Investment opportunities, lower risk premiums of Investment projects and ultimately increase profits. The paper, however, argues that business is surprisingly little interested in IIAs. Business is known to lobby over Investment liberalisation 1 but seems hardly interested in post-establishment treatment and protection provisions. The paper draws on methodological triangulation in order to underscore this argument. In a first part, it evaluates whether the content of some 485 IIAs concluded by selected OECD countries since 1980 has been converging or diverging over time. It finds that the content of the examined IIAs has been diverging, which challenges the assumption that IIAs are expression and manifestation of strong regulatory competition and underlying business lobbying. In a second part, the paper draws on 50 semi-structured interviews with business representatives, national and International policy-makers in order to explain the lack of interest of business in International Investment policy. The findings of this paper suggest that the International Investment regime is a state- rather than business-driven regime. It ties into a nascent but growing literature, which critically evaluates the political and economic benefits of IIAs and notably bilateral Investment treaties (BITs). 1. The state of research The role of business lobbying in the proliferation of IIAs has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. A sizeable number of econometric studies evaluates the question whether IIAs and BITs actually affect the volume and direction of International Investment flows. Overall, their findings are ambivalent. Some studies suggest that IIAs have little to no impact, while others conclude that IIAs

Valentina Vadi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law
    The Oxford Handbook of International Cultural Heritage Law, 2020
    Co-Authors: Valentina Vadi
    Abstract:

    This chapter evaluates whether the existing legal framework adequately protect cultural heritage vis-à-vis the economic interests of foreign investors. It aims to address this question by examining recent arbitrations and proposing three principal legal tools to foster a better balance between economic and cultural interests in International Investment law and arbitration. This recent jurisprudence highlights that arbitral tribunals are increasingly providing consideration to cultural concerns. Yet, the interplay between the protection of cultural heritage and the promotion of foreign direct Investment in International Investment law and arbitration continues to pose two main problems: one ontological, concerning the essence of International Investment law and International law more generally; and one epistemological, concerning the mandate of arbitral tribunals. The chapter then considers three principal avenues that can facilitate a better balance between the public and private interests in International Investment law: a ‘treaty-driven approach’; a ‘judicially driven approach’; and counterclaims.

  • Jus Cogens in International Investment Law and Arbitration
    Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2016
    Co-Authors: Valentina Vadi
    Abstract:

    Despite growing reference to jus cogens in the jurisprudence of International courts and scholarly writings, the concept remains vague. What is jus cogens? Why does it matter? What are its effects? These questions remain unsettled, and the time is ripe for further in-depth investigation. This chapter aims at addressing this set of questions, focusing on the role of jus cogens in International Investment law and arbitration. Jus cogens has played an important role in the evolution of International Investment law, and illuminating the trajectory of this concept is important for the future of the field. In fact, not only can the study contribute to further clarifying the concept of jus cogens but it can also reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the International Investment law system. These developments can be significant for International Investment lawyers, International law scholars and other interested audiences

  • Public Health in International Investment Law and Arbitration
    2012
    Co-Authors: Valentina Vadi
    Abstract:

    Introduction Part 1: Foreign Direct Investments and Public Health: Defining and Connecting the Two Fields 1. International Investment Law 2. Public Health in Contemporary International Law and Policy 3. The Interplay between Public Health and Foreign Direct Investments Part 2: The Interplay of Foreign Investment and Public Health in Practice 4. Access to Medicines and International Investment Law: Pharmaceutical Patents as Investments 5. Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law 6. The Environmental Health Spillovers of Foreign Direct Investment in International Investment Law Part 3: Reconciling Public Health with Investor Rights in International Investment Law 7. Reconciling Public Health with Investors' Rights in International Investment Law: Substantive Aspects 8. Conclusions

Emily J. Blanchard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Trade taxes and International Investment
    Canadian Journal of Economics Revue canadienne d'économique, 2009
    Co-Authors: Emily J. Blanchard
    Abstract:

    This paper demonstrates that International Investment disturbs the conventionally understood equivalence between import tariffs and export taxes. Fundamentally, remittances to foreigners introduce an additional pecuniary channel between countries so that two-good Lerner Symmetry generally will not hold. Moreover, because tariffs subsidize investors in the local import competing sector while export taxes can extract rent from foreign investors in the export sector, the pattern of International Investment will influence government preferences over trade policy instruments as well as levels. Notably, trade tax symmetry is restored by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on International remittances.

  • Trade Imbalances, International Investment, and a Limitation of Lerner's Symmetry Theorem
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
    Co-Authors: Emily J. Blanchard
    Abstract:

    This paper sounds a caution to International trade economists, demonstrating that the equilibrium trade imbalances implied by most models of International Investment disturb the symmetry between import tariffs and export taxes found by Lerner (1936). When trade is unbalanced, Lerner's equivalence result holds only when (i) trade tax revenue is redistributed among consumers, (ii) neither the import tariff nor the export tax would be prohibitive, and (iii) the value of trade imbalance at world prices is invariant to instrument choice. The last condition implies that Lerner symmetry generally will not obtain in many otherwise standard trade models with International Investment, since remittances to foreign investors - a source of permanent trade imbalances- typically depend on both relative and absolute local prices, and thus on the government's choice of trade tax instrument. Endogenizing trade policy only exacerbates the asymmetry, since International Investment influences government preferences over trade policy instruments as well as levels. Notably, Lerner symmetry can be resurrected by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on International Investment returns. Future work therefore should either reinstate Lerner symmetry by adopting Investment taxes, or at very the least, acknowledge the trade tax asymmetry inherent to models with International Investment.