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Simplice A. Asongu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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fighting software Piracy some global conditional policy instruments
Journal of Business Ethics, 2018Co-Authors: Simplice A. Asongu, Pritam Singh, Sara Le RouxAbstract:This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software Piracy in the conditional distributions of software Piracy. Our paper examines software Piracy in 99 countries over the period 1994–2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software Piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against Piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with the increasing levels of software Piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software Piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software Piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software Piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software Piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software Piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software Piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with the increasing software Piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software Piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software Piracy. Moreover, the relationships between policy instruments and software Piracy display various patterns: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with the increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software Piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study.
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Fighting Software Piracy in Africa: How Do Legal Origins and IPRs Protection Channels Matter?
Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 2015Co-Authors: Simplice A. AsonguAbstract:In the current efforts toward harmonizing intellectual property rights (IPRs) regimes in the African continent, this paper provides answers to four key questions relevant in the policy decision-making processes. After empirically examining the questions, the following findings are established. (1) In comparison to common law countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant autonomous rate of software Piracy; consistent with the “law and property rights” theory. (2) But for IPRs laws, the other intellectual property (IP) protection channels (World Intellectual Property Organization treaties, main IP law, and multilateral treaties) reduce the incidence of software Piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law countries appear to mitigate software Piracy more than in common law countries. (4) Formal institutions are instrumental in the fight against software Piracy through IPRs protection channels.
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fighting software Piracy which governance tools matter in africa
2012Co-Authors: Antonio Rodriguez Andres, Simplice A. AsonguAbstract:This article integrates previously missing components of government quality into the governance-Piracy nexus in exploring governance mechanisms by which global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are effectively transmitted from international to the national level in the battle against Piracy. It assesses the best governance tools in the fight against Piracy and upholding of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). The instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in tackling Piracy through good governance mechanisms is also examined. Findings demonstrate that: (1) while all governance tools under consideration significantly decrease the incidence of Piracy, corruption-control is the most effective weapon; (2) but for voice and accountability, political stability and democracy, IPR laws (treaties) are instrumental in tackling Piracy through government quality dynamics of rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, and press freedom. Hence, the need for a policy approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement an integrated system of both IPRs and corollary good governance policies. Moreover, our findings support the relevance of good governance measures in developing countries wishing to complement their emerging IPR regimes.
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software Piracy inequality and the poor evidence from africa
2012Co-Authors: Simplice A. AsonguAbstract:Purpose – Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to economic and human developments amid growing emphasis on IPRs (with recent advances in ICTs) and good governance. In the first empirical study on the incidence of Piracy on inequality in Africa, we examine how a plethora of factors (IPRs laws, education & ICTs and government quality) are instrumental in the Piracy-inequality nexus. Design/methodology/approach – Two-Stage-Least Squares estimation approaches are applied in which Piracy is instrumented with IPRs regimes (treaties), education & ICTs and government quality dynamics. Findings – The main finding suggests that, software Piracy is good for the poor as it has a positive income-redistributive effect; consistent with economic and cultural considerations from recent literature. ICTs & education (dissemination of knowledge) are instrumental in this positive redistributive effect, while good governance mitigates inequality beyond the Piracy channel. Practical implications – As a policy implication, in the adoption IPRs, sampled countries should take account of the role less stringent IPRs regimes play on income-redistribution through software Piracy. Collateral benefits include among others, the cheap dissemination of knowledge through ICTs which African countries badly need in their quest to become ‘knowledge economies’. A caveat however is that, too much Piracy may decrease incentives to innovate. Hence, the need to adopt tighter IPRs regimes in tandem with increasing income-equality. Originality/value – It is the first empirical assessment of the incidence of Piracy on inequality in Africa: a continent with stubbornly high poverty and inequality rates.
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harmonizing iprs on software Piracy empirics of trajectories in africa
MPRA Paper, 2012Co-Authors: Simplice A. AsonguAbstract:In the current efforts of harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide, this paper explores software Piracy trajectories and dynamics in Africa. Using a battery of estimation techniques that ignore as well as integrate short-run disturbances in time-dynamic fashion, we answer the big questions policy makers are most likely to ask before harmonizing IPRs regimes in the battle against software Piracy. Three main findings are established. (1) African countries with low software Piracy rates are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates; implying despite existing divergent IPRs systems, convergence in Piracy rate could be a genuine standard-setting platform. (2) Legal origins do not play a very significant role in the convergence process. (3) A genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against Piracy is most likely between a horizon of 4 to 8 years. In other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified horizon will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and locality.
Ivan P. L. Png - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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on the reliability of software Piracy statistics
2010Co-Authors: Ivan P. L. PngAbstract:Despite tremendous debate and policy interest in software Piracy, statistics compiled by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) have generally been accepted at face value by policy makers and scholars. However, the accuracy of BSA statistics has not been independently verified. Based on a review of the BSA methodology and empirical analysis, I conclude the following. A change in the BSA consultant and methodology around 2002-03 had systematic effects on published Piracy rates. First, the trend rate of decrease of Piracy rates fell from 2.0% points per year to 1.1% points per year. Second, Piracy rates apparently became more sensitive to changes in income. Third, Piracy rates depended on projections of software usage based on per capita incomes in the respective countries, and were subject to a bias that was greater for higher-income countries.
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on the reliability of software Piracy statistics
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2010Co-Authors: Ivan P. L. PngAbstract:Based on a review of the methodology and empirical analysis of software Piracy statistics compiled by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), I conclude that a change in the BSA consultant and methodology around 2002-03 had systematic effects on published Piracy rates. The trend rate of decrease of Piracy rates fell from 2.0% points per year to 1.1% points per year. Among countries for which the BSA's Piracy statistics depended on a projection of software usage, the trend decrease in the Piracy rate was under-estimated and the sensitivity of Piracy to changes in income was over-estimated. Any government pronouncement or action, and academic study using the BSA software Piracy statistics should take account of changes in the BSA consultant and methodology.
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Piracy and the legitimate demand for recorded music
Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, 2003Co-Authors: Kai Lung Hui, Ivan P. L. PngAbstract:Publishers of computer software and music claimed losses of over $17.6 billion to Piracy in 2002. Theoretically, however, Piracy may raise legitimate demand through positive demand-side externalities, sampling, and sharing. Accordingly, the actual impact of Piracy on the legitimate demand is an empirical issue. Addressing this issue in the context of recorded music, we develop and test hypotheses from theoretical models of Piracy on international data for music CDs over the period 1994-98. Empirically, we find that the demand for music CDs decreased with Piracy, suggesting that "theft" outweighed the "positive" effects of Piracy. However, the impact of Piracy on CD sales was considerably less than estimated by industry. We estimated that, in 1998, actual losses amounted to about 6.6% of sales, or 42% of industry estimates. But, we found evidence that publishers would have raised prices in the absence of Piracy, suggesting that the actual revenue loss would have been higher.
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Piracy and the legitimate demand for recorded music
Social Science Research Network, 2002Co-Authors: Kai Lung Hui, Ivan P. L. PngAbstract:Publishers of computer software and music claimed losses of nearly $16 billion to Piracy in 1999. Theoretically, however, Piracy may raise legitimate demand through positive demand-side externalities, sampling, and sharing. Accordingly, the actual impact of Piracy on the legitimate demand is an empirical issue. Addressing this issue in the context of recorded music, we develop and test hypotheses from theoretical models of end-user and re-seller Piracy on international panel data for music CDs. Empirically, we find that the demand for music CDs decreased with Piracy, suggesting that "theft" outweighed the "positive" effects of Piracy. However, the impact of Piracy on CD sales was considerably smaller than industry estimates. Further, we estimated that, accounting for both demand losses and price adjustments, the industry lost no more than 6.6% of revenue to Piracy.
Shivendu Shivendu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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managing Piracy pricing and sampling strategies for digital experience goods in vertically segmented markets
Information Systems Research, 2005Co-Authors: Ramnath K Chellappa, Shivendu ShivenduAbstract:Digital goods lend themselves to versioning but also suffer from Piracy losses. This paper develops a pricing model for digital experience goods in a segmented market and explores the optimality of sampling as a Piracy-mitigating strategy. Consumers are aware of the true fit of an experience good to their tastes only after consumption, and as Piracy offers an additional (albeit illegal) consumption opportunity, traditional segmentation findings from economics and sampling recommendations from marketing, need to be revisited. We develop a two-stage model of Piracy for a market where consumers are heterogeneous in their marginal valuation for quality and their moral costs. In our model, some consumers pirate the product in the first stage allowing them to update their fit-perception that may result in re-evaluation of their buying/pirating decision in the second stage. We recommend distinct pricing and sampling strategies for underestimated and overestimated products and suggest that any potential benefits of Piracy can be internalized through product sampling. Two counterintuitive results stand out. First, Piracy losses are more severe for products that do not live up to their hype rather than for those that have been undervalued in the market, thus requiring a greater deterrence investment for the former, and second, unlike physical goods where sampling is always beneficial for underestimated products, sampling for digital goods is optimal only under narrowly defined circumstances due to the price boundaries created by both Piracy and segmentation.
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managing Piracy pricing and sampling strategies for digital experience goods in vertically segmented markets
2003Co-Authors: Ramnath K Chellappa, Shivendu ShivenduAbstract:This paper models the pricing of digital experience goods such as online video in a vertically segmented market under threat of Piracy. By definition consumers know the true fit of an experience good only after they have consumed it and Piracy offers an illegal consumption method. We develop a two-stage model of Piracy where some consumers pirate in the first stage thus updating their perception of a product's fit while deciding to keep the pirated copy or buy a legitimate one in the second stage. Our results show that the effect of Piracy can be mitigated by suitable pricing strategies and some externality benefits of Piracy can be internalized through product sampling. Counter to intuition, we show that losses due to Piracy are more severe for products that don't live up to their hype rather than for products that tend to be valued in the market, thus requiring a greater investment in deterrence for the former. Further, our analysis points out that sampling strategies are optimal only under narrowly defined conditions for vertically segmented digital experience products, unlike physical goods where sampling is always beneficial when valued attributes have been underestimated by consumers.
George E. Higgins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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criminological theory in the digital age the case of social learning theory and digital Piracy
Journal of Criminal Justice, 2010Co-Authors: Robert G Morris, George E. HigginsAbstract:To date, few studies had attempted to extend existing theories of crime to technology driven crimes, such as digital Piracy. To address this gap in the literature, this study explored the ability of Akers' social learning theory in explaining the likelihood of engaging in digital Piracy. Also explored was the extent to which the social learning process mediated the impact of several noteworthy correlates of digital Piracy among college students attending different universities (n = 585), relying on a structural equation modeling (SEM) framework. The findings were modestly supportive of social learning theory as it may apply to digital Piracy. The findings are discussed in the context of extending existing theories of crime to account for contemporary technology driven crimes, such as digital Piracy. Policy implications and direction for future research are discussed.
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music Piracy and neutralization a preliminary trajectory analysis from short term longitudinal data
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2008Co-Authors: George E. Higgins, Scott E Wolfe, Catherine D MarcumAbstract:Digital Piracy is an emerging criminal behavior. Little empirical research has been produced that examines the role of neutralization and performance of this behavior. Using short-term longitudinal data from college students, the present study examines the trajectories of digital Piracy and the role of neutralization. The findings from this study show that trajectories of digital Piracy may be tied to neutralization toward digital Piracy. Criminal justice policies may be developed from this study.
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digital Piracy self control theory and rational choice an examination of the role of value
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2007Co-Authors: George E. HigginsAbstract:To date, several researchers have shown that attitudes, low self-control, social learning theory and deterrence theory to explain digital Piracy. However, no study examined whether rational choice theory mediated the link between low self-control and digital Piracy. Further, no study in digital Piracy or criminological literature had considered the role of value in such an examination. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to contribute to the literature by examining the links between low self-control, rational choice, value, and digital Piracy. This study built on the mediating model presented by Piquero and Tibbetts (1996). That is, this study assumed that rational choice theory mediated the link between low self-control and digital Piracy. Further, this study assumed that some situational factors would mediate the effect of other situational factors
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digital Piracy assessing the contributions of an integrated self control theory and social learning theory using structural equation modeling
Criminal Justice Studies, 2006Co-Authors: George E. Higgins, Brian D Fell, Abby L WilsonAbstract:Digital Piracy is an emerging white‐collar crime that requires empirical investigation. Using a nonrandom sample of 392 university undergraduates, the present study examined how self‐control theory and social learning theory come together to explain digital Piracy. The findings revealed that low self‐control and social learning theory could come together in different ways to explain digital Piracy. That is, out of five models examined, the findings revealed that social learning theory partially mediated the effect that self‐control had on digital Piracy. Implications of these findings are also discussed.
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can low self-control help with the understanding of the software Piracy problem?
Deviant Behavior, 2004Co-Authors: George E. HigginsAbstract:ABSTRACT Computer crime—specifically, software Piracy—is growing, and no research in criminology examines whether low self-control can help us understand the behavior. This study examines the link that Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) idea of low self-control has with software Piracy. Using a nonrandom sample of college students and measures of low self-control, software pirating peers, software pirating attitudes, and moral beliefs toward software Piracy, the findings show that low self-control has a link with software Piracy. This finding expands the scope of self-control theory and provides an understanding of why the behavior occurs.
Ramnath K Chellappa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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managing Piracy pricing and sampling strategies for digital experience goods in vertically segmented markets
Information Systems Research, 2005Co-Authors: Ramnath K Chellappa, Shivendu ShivenduAbstract:Digital goods lend themselves to versioning but also suffer from Piracy losses. This paper develops a pricing model for digital experience goods in a segmented market and explores the optimality of sampling as a Piracy-mitigating strategy. Consumers are aware of the true fit of an experience good to their tastes only after consumption, and as Piracy offers an additional (albeit illegal) consumption opportunity, traditional segmentation findings from economics and sampling recommendations from marketing, need to be revisited. We develop a two-stage model of Piracy for a market where consumers are heterogeneous in their marginal valuation for quality and their moral costs. In our model, some consumers pirate the product in the first stage allowing them to update their fit-perception that may result in re-evaluation of their buying/pirating decision in the second stage. We recommend distinct pricing and sampling strategies for underestimated and overestimated products and suggest that any potential benefits of Piracy can be internalized through product sampling. Two counterintuitive results stand out. First, Piracy losses are more severe for products that do not live up to their hype rather than for those that have been undervalued in the market, thus requiring a greater deterrence investment for the former, and second, unlike physical goods where sampling is always beneficial for underestimated products, sampling for digital goods is optimal only under narrowly defined circumstances due to the price boundaries created by both Piracy and segmentation.
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managing Piracy pricing and sampling strategies for digital experience goods in vertically segmented markets
2003Co-Authors: Ramnath K Chellappa, Shivendu ShivenduAbstract:This paper models the pricing of digital experience goods such as online video in a vertically segmented market under threat of Piracy. By definition consumers know the true fit of an experience good only after they have consumed it and Piracy offers an illegal consumption method. We develop a two-stage model of Piracy where some consumers pirate in the first stage thus updating their perception of a product's fit while deciding to keep the pirated copy or buy a legitimate one in the second stage. Our results show that the effect of Piracy can be mitigated by suitable pricing strategies and some externality benefits of Piracy can be internalized through product sampling. Counter to intuition, we show that losses due to Piracy are more severe for products that don't live up to their hype rather than for products that tend to be valued in the market, thus requiring a greater investment in deterrence for the former. Further, our analysis points out that sampling strategies are optimal only under narrowly defined conditions for vertically segmented digital experience products, unlike physical goods where sampling is always beneficial when valued attributes have been underestimated by consumers.
