The Experts below are selected from a list of 4584 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Stefan Voigt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Constitutional Economics a primer
2020Co-Authors: Stefan VoigtAbstract:Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in Constitutional Economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact Constitutional rules have on political economy.
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empirical Constitutional Economics onward and upward
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011Co-Authors: Stefan VoigtAbstract:Abstract Empirical Constitutional Economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. Rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. It calls for recognizing additional Constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables. Its major emphasis is, however, on calling for the next logical step in this field, namely to endogenize constitutions.
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empirical Constitutional Economics onward and upward
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Stefan VoigtAbstract:Empirical Constitutional Economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. The next logical step in this field is to endogenize constitutions. Thus, rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. In particular, it calls for recognizing additional Constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables.
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positive Constitutional Economics ii a survey of recent developments
Public Choice, 2011Co-Authors: Stefan VoigtAbstract:Analysis of the economic effects of Constitutional rules has made substantial progress over the last decade. This survey provides an overview of this rapidly growing research area and also discusses a number of methodological issues and identifies underresearched areas. It argues that the next logical step of positive Constitutional Economics is to endogenize Constitutional rules.
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explaining Constitutional change a positive Economics approach
1999Co-Authors: Stefan VoigtAbstract:A new reserch programme emerges - Constitutional Economics two competing approaches to Constitutional Economics - a comparison of Buchanan and Hayek the possibility of positive Constitutional Economics positive Constitutional Economics - a survey breaking with the notion of social contract - constitutions as based on spontaneously arisen institutions bargaining for Constitutional change - towards an economic theory of Constitutional change implicit Constitutional change - changing the meaning of the constitution without changing the text of the document Constitutional competition - foreign factors causing constitional change? outlook - connecting positive Constitutional Economics with the theory of economic policy.
Thomas J Dilorenzo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is voluntary government possible a critique of Constitutional Economics
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as Constitutional Economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by Constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
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Constitutional Economics and the calculus of consent
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock are widely credited with creating the Public Choice School. Its main elements include Constitutional political economy, an analysis of different voting-rights regimes, and the insight that human beings do not suddenly sprout angel’s wings when they become government bureaucrats (hence, there is government failure as well as market failure). The latter is devoted to an investigation of the premises upon which a legitimate government is predicated, and to an understanding of human and property rights in a Constitutional democratic order. In this paper, public choice Constitutional Economics shall be subjected to critique.
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is voluntary government possible a critique of Constitutional Economics
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 2000Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:A social contract theory of government can be used to place a stamp of approval on all, or most, of the actions of the existing government (for example, Rousseau). Thus, the theory of the divine right of kings began as a check on government, as an order to the King to stay within divinely-commanded laws; it was transformed, by the State, into a divine stamp of approval for anything the King might decide to do. (Murray Rothbard) According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as Constitutional Economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by Constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
Viktor J. Vanberg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evolving Preferences and Welfare Economics: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 2014Co-Authors: Viktor J. VanbergAbstract:The theoretical consistency and practical applicability of traditional welfare Economics has long been subject to controversy. More recently the challenge has been added from evolutionary approaches that the individual preferences on which the welfare calculus is based are themselves subject to change. The purpose of the present paper is twofold. It takes, firstly, a closer look at the discussion on the need and feasibility of an evolutionary welfare Economics that accommodates evolving preferences. The particular focus is on proposals advanced by three authors, Carl Christian von Weizsacker, Ulrich Witt and Robert Sugden. And it seeks, secondly, to show that the paradigm of Constitutional Economics can deal with the evolving-preferences-issue in a more coherent and consistent way than approaches that remain within the mind-frame of welfare Economics.
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The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: a Constitutional Economics perspective
Constitutional Political Economy, 2010Co-Authors: Viktor J. VanbergAbstract:The ‘science-as-market’ analogy has been used in support of the notion that in science just as in markets competition works as an effective instrument for reconciling the self-interested ambitions of individual agents with the social function that science and markets are supposed to serve. This paper examines the analogy from a Constitutional Economics perspective, drawing attention to the role that the rules of the constitution of the ‘game of science’ as well as the ‘market game’ play in conditioning the ways in which competition works in the two realms.
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Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons
Constitutional Political Economy, 1997Co-Authors: Viktor J. VanbergAbstract:The paper relates John. R. Commons‘ view on the roleof human design in institutional evolution to the views thathave been advanced on this matter by F. A. Hayek, in German ordo-liberalism,and in Constitutional political economy. It is argued that Commons‘concept of ’’purposeful selection‘‘ points in the direction ofa theoretical perspective that consistently integrates the notionsof institutional evolution and Constitutional design.
Walter E Block - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is voluntary government possible a critique of Constitutional Economics
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as Constitutional Economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by Constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
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Constitutional Economics and the calculus of consent
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock are widely credited with creating the Public Choice School. Its main elements include Constitutional political economy, an analysis of different voting-rights regimes, and the insight that human beings do not suddenly sprout angel’s wings when they become government bureaucrats (hence, there is government failure as well as market failure). The latter is devoted to an investigation of the premises upon which a legitimate government is predicated, and to an understanding of human and property rights in a Constitutional democratic order. In this paper, public choice Constitutional Economics shall be subjected to critique.
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is voluntary government possible a critique of Constitutional Economics
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 2000Co-Authors: Walter E Block, Thomas J DilorenzoAbstract:A social contract theory of government can be used to place a stamp of approval on all, or most, of the actions of the existing government (for example, Rousseau). Thus, the theory of the divine right of kings began as a check on government, as an order to the King to stay within divinely-commanded laws; it was transformed, by the State, into a divine stamp of approval for anything the King might decide to do. (Murray Rothbard) According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as Constitutional Economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by Constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
Daniel J Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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money as meta rule buchanan s Constitutional Economics as a foundation for monetary stability
Public Choice, 2018Co-Authors: Peter J Boettke, Alexander William Salter, Daniel J SmithAbstract:This paper explores James Buchanan’s contributions to monetary Economics and argues these contributions form the foundation of a robust monetary Economics paradigm. While often not recognized for his contributions to monetary Economics, Buchanan’s scholarship offers important insights for current debates, especially the renewed interest in narrow banking in the wake of the financial crisis. We argue that the post-2007 crisis milieu creates a unique opportunity to recognize, as Buchanan did, the vital role that money plays in the market as the ‘grammar of commerce.’ That recognition makes the need for more fundamental reform of our monetary regimes at the Constitutional level more apparent, making Buchanan’s work on monetary constitutions more relevant than ever before. We then discuss how adopting Buchanan’s monetary framework can improve both monetary scholarship and institutions.
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money as meta rule buchanan s Constitutional Economics as a foundation for monetary stability
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Peter J Boettke, Alexander William Salter, Daniel J SmithAbstract:This paper explores James Buchanan’s contributions to monetary Economics and argues these contributions form the foundation of a robust monetary Economics paradigm. While often not recognized for his contributions to monetary Economics, Buchanan’s scholarship offers important insights for current debates. We argue that the post-2007 crisis milieu creates a unique opportunity to recognize, as Buchanan did, the vital role that money plays in the market as the ‘grammar of commerce.’ That recognition makes the need for more fundamental reform of our monetary regimes at the Constitutional level more apparent, making Buchanan’s work on monetary constitutions more relevant than ever before.