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Catherine Galko Campbell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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defense of rawls s Political Conception of the person
2014Co-Authors: Catherine Galko CampbellAbstract:In Chap. 7, I refute normative objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of the person. I argue that, as with the metaphysical objections to the original position, some of the normative objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of the person fail simply because they are based on a misunderstanding. I argue that the other normative objections are unsuccessful because they rely on a false dichotomy between the individual and the Political. These objections, I argue, fail to undermine Rawls’s Political Conception of the person because social factors can help persons develop their identities without the government taking an active role in ensuring that persons engage in social activities. Rawls grants that social factors partially constitute individuals’ identities. Indeed, it is his view that persons will engage in the social activities that help them to constitute their identities and develop full moral autonomy without the government ensuring that they do so.
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objections to rawls s Political Conception of persons
2014Co-Authors: Catherine Galko CampbellAbstract:Rawls intends his Political Conception of persons to pick out the features of persons that are important from the point of view of Political theorizing. For Rawls, the features that are important are those that characterize persons as having the rights and capacities required to participate in Political life. This chapter explains two kinds of criticisms of Rawls’s Political Conception of the person. First, critics claim that Rawls has failed to identify the features of persons that are Politically-relevant. Second, independently of whether Rawls has correctly identified the features that are Politically-relevant, critics argue that Rawls’s characterization of the features is problematic. I call these objections that are grounded in an alternative Conception of Political identity “normative objections.” According to the Conception of Political identity grounding these objections, one of the most important facts about persons from a Political point of view is that they are socially constituted. Critics argue that this fact makes it the case that the government should be arranged in such a way as to foster a Political climate that promotes the proper development of its citizens, and that the government should do so, inter alia, by adopting policies that take the fact persons’ identities are partially constituted by their social circumstances to be both fundamental and valuable. The chapter explains and clarifies these objections, and explains why these critics think their Conception of Political identity is preferable to Rawls’s.
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Defense of Rawls’s Political Conception of the Person
Persons Identity and Political Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Catherine Galko CampbellAbstract:In Chap. 7, I refute normative objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of the person. I argue that, as with the metaphysical objections to the original position, some of the normative objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of the person fail simply because they are based on a misunderstanding. I argue that the other normative objections are unsuccessful because they rely on a false dichotomy between the individual and the Political. These objections, I argue, fail to undermine Rawls’s Political Conception of the person because social factors can help persons develop their identities without the government taking an active role in ensuring that persons engage in social activities. Rawls grants that social factors partially constitute individuals’ identities. Indeed, it is his view that persons will engage in the social activities that help them to constitute their identities and develop full moral autonomy without the government ensuring that they do so.
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Objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of Persons
Persons Identity and Political Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Catherine Galko CampbellAbstract:Rawls intends his Political Conception of persons to pick out the features of persons that are important from the point of view of Political theorizing. For Rawls, the features that are important are those that characterize persons as having the rights and capacities required to participate in Political life. This chapter explains two kinds of criticisms of Rawls’s Political Conception of the person. First, critics claim that Rawls has failed to identify the features of persons that are Politically-relevant. Second, independently of whether Rawls has correctly identified the features that are Politically-relevant, critics argue that Rawls’s characterization of the features is problematic. I call these objections that are grounded in an alternative Conception of Political identity “normative objections.” According to the Conception of Political identity grounding these objections, one of the most important facts about persons from a Political point of view is that they are socially constituted. Critics argue that this fact makes it the case that the government should be arranged in such a way as to foster a Political climate that promotes the proper development of its citizens, and that the government should do so, inter alia, by adopting policies that take the fact persons’ identities are partially constituted by their social circumstances to be both fundamental and valuable. The chapter explains and clarifies these objections, and explains why these critics think their Conception of Political identity is preferable to Rawls’s.
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Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls’s Conception of the Person
Persons Identity and Political Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Catherine Galko CampbellAbstract:In this chapter, I clarify the debate between Rawls and his communitarian critics. I discuss Charles Taylor’s account of the liberal/communitarian debate. I explain in detail Michael Sandel’s argument that Rawls’s commitment to the priority of the right over the good commits him to a Conception of persons as “unencumbered selves.” Sandel argues that Rawls is committed to a Kantian Conception of persons, which is a kind of “abstract individualism.” This Conception of persons, Sandel and Taylor argue, makes trouble for Rawls because it is inconsistent with the fact that persons are “socially constituted.” These arguments, however, fail fully to explain the Conception of persons as “socially constituted.” Because Sandel and Taylor do not clearly spell out their objections, this chapter clarifies these arguments. It sets out Sandel’s metaphysical objections explicitly. It also clarifies the “normative objections,” which are supposed to undermine the justificatory role played by Rawls’s Political Conception of the person. Clarifying these objections reveals the real point of contention between communitarians and Rawls. I suggest that what is at issue is not really Rawls’s Political Conception of the person, but whether or not the state should promote a good and how to understand the good that the state should promote.
Paul Billingham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can my religion influence my Conception of justice Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2017Co-Authors: Paul BillinghamAbstract:In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal Political Conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of Political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ Political Conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their Political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of Political Conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian Political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.
Guido Palazzo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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toward a Political Conception of corporate responsibility business and society seen from a habermasian perspective
Academy of Management Review, 2007Co-Authors: Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido PalazzoAbstract:We review two important schools within business and society research, which we label positivist and post-positivist corporate social responsibility (CSR). The former is criticized because of its instrumentalism and normative vacuity, and the latter because of its relativism, foundationalism, and utopianism. We propose a new approach, based on J?rgen Habermas's theory of democracy, and define the new role of the business firm as a Political actor in a globalizing society.
Aaron Maltais - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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global warming and the cosmopolitan Political Conception of justice
Environmental Politics, 2008Co-Authors: Aaron MaltaisAbstract:Within the literature in green Political theory on global environmental threats one can often find dissatisfaction with liberal theories of justice. This is true even though liberal cosmopolitans regularly point to global environmental problems as one reason for expanding the scope of justice beyond the territorial limits of the state. One of the causes for scepticism towards liberal approaches is that many of the most notable anti-cosmopolitan theories are also advanced by liberals. In this paper, I first explain why one of the strongest expressions of liberal anti-cosmopolitanism cannot simply be dismissed because it may fail to support desired environmental ends. The Political Conception of justice represents one of the most important challenges to cosmopolitanism generally and is thus a serious challenge to viewing global environmental problems in terms of cosmopolitan justice. Second, I will show through the case of anthropogenic global warming that the Political Conception of justice under current c...
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global warming and our natural duties of justice a cosmopolitan Political Conception of justice
2008Co-Authors: Aaron MaltaisAbstract:Compelling research in international relations and international Political economy on global warming suggests that one part of any meaningful effort to radically reverse current trends of increasin ...
Steinar Bøyum - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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rawls s notion of the Political Conception as educator
European Journal of Political Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Steinar BøyumAbstract:This paper explores John Rawls’s strangely neglected notion, the Political Conception as educator, which captures how the public Political culture can educate citizens. The aim is to elucidate both the idea itself and above all its function in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. After first surveying its main content and some historical parallels, the main body of the paper explores why Rawls places so much trust in the educative effect of institutions and, apparently, so little in schools. Along the way we shall discuss the relation between Political liberalism and republicanism, the border disagreement between Political Conception and comprehensive doctrine, Mackie’s distinction between wide and narrow morality and the importance of trust in Rawls’s view of society.
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Rawls’s notion of the Political Conception as educator:
European Journal of Political Theory, 2012Co-Authors: Steinar BøyumAbstract:This paper explores John Rawls’s strangely neglected notion, the Political Conception as educator, which captures how the public Political culture can educate citizens. The aim is to elucidate both the idea itself and above all its function in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. After first surveying its main content and some historical parallels, the main body of the paper explores why Rawls places so much trust in the educative effect of institutions and, apparently, so little in schools. Along the way we shall discuss the relation between Political liberalism and republicanism, the border disagreement between Political Conception and comprehensive doctrine, Mackie’s distinction between wide and narrow morality and the importance of trust in Rawls’s view of society.