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William G. Howell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Presidential Power in War
Annual Review of Political Science, 2011Co-Authors: William G. HowellAbstract:This review critically evaluates the largely consensual view that wars naturally and reflexively augment Presidential Power. After summarizing the key arguments advanced by presidency scholars in the aftermath of World War II, this article canvasses the existing empirical basis for their claims and the theoretical microfoundations upon which they are offered. Both appear wanting. Few systematic studies yield unambiguous evidence that the adjoining branches of government reliably support elements of the president's domestic or foreign policy agendas during war that they otherwise would oppose. And no one, to date, has offered a clear theory explaining why either Congress or the courts would behave in this way. The article therefore calls for continued empirical research on the causal effects of war on Presidential Power, and for renewed investments in theories that might account for the ways in which war figures into congressional and judicial voting.
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Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis
The Journal of Politics, 2008Co-Authors: Brandice Canes-wrone, William G. Howell, David LewisAbstract:An enduring and controversial debate centers on whether there exist “two presidencies,” that is, whether presidents exercise fundamentally greater influence over foreign than domestic affairs. This paper makes two contributions to understanding this issue and, by extension, Presidential Power more generally. First, we distill an institutional logic that both supports the two presidencies thesis and implies that Congress has incentives to delegate foreign policy Powers to the president. Accordingly, the logic suggests that empirical analysis should incorporate these incentives. Our second contribution, then, is to test for the existence of two presidencies in a domain that Congress cannot delegate, budgetary appropriations, and a domain that explicitly incorporates delegation, agency creation. Consistent with expectations, we find presidents exercise considerably greater influence over foreign policy.
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the Presidential Power of unilateral action
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article we highlight a formal basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of Presidential Power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president’s formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. We argue that the president’s Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory—data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified. A few observations about politics are so widely accepted that virtually all political scientists have committed them to memory. One of these is Richard Neustadt’s (1960) famous dictum, “Presidential Power is the Power to persuade,” which expresses, in shorthand form, his view that the Powers of the modern American presidency are rooted in the personal qualities of the individual occupying the office—in his skills, his temperament, and his experience. This notion of the personal presidency dominated the field for decades, but its influence is on the decline. The main reason is that it seems increasingly out of sync with the facts. The personal presidency became a popular theoretical notion just as the American presidency was experiencing tremendous growth c
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The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action
Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article we highlight a formal basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of Presidential Power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president`s formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. We argue that the president`s Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers - and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory - data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified.
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Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article, the authors explore a basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point but that has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. The purpose of the article is to outline a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. The authors argue that the president's Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. The authors also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them.
Christopher S. Kelley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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To Be (Unitarian) or Not to Be (Unitarian): Presidential Power in the George W. Bush Administration
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Christopher S. KelleyAbstract:President George W. Bush pushed the envelope on Presidential Power while defending many controversial actions in the name of the unitary executive theory of Presidential Power. This left many in the public, including those in Congress, with the mistaken belief that 1) the theory originated there and 2) that its behavior is actually condoned by the theory itself. This paper seeks to dispel that opinion in the following ways: First, I will examine the theory’s core values, where it originated, and how it evolved to negate the opinion that it is a 21st century phenomena; Second, I will compare that actions of the Bush administration, particularly in its use of the Presidential signing statement, to determine whether their was congruence or conflict; and third, I will look at whether the theory had been so damaged that it did not make it out of the Bush administration by examining, briefly, the actions of the Obama administration, and in particular how it has used the signing statement. I make the following conclusions: First, the Bush administration’s behavior violated the tenets of the unitary executive theory and his actions were admonished by many of its adherents, and second, so far the Obama administration has behaved consistent with the values of the theory, which was embraced by Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton, though there are some troubling signs in its use of the signing statement.
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The Unitary, or Unilateral Executive? Presidential Power in the Bush Administration
American Review of Politics, 2008Co-Authors: Christopher S. KelleyAbstract:The Bush administration came to office in 2001 determined to return Powers to the president lost largely as a result of Watergate. Key to returning those Powers is the unitary executive theory of Presidential Power—a constitutional theory of Power developed by conservatives in the Reagan administration meant to offer the president offensive and defensive opportunities when working with an external environment that is polarized and hostile towards the executive branch. While the theory has been a part of each administration from Reagan through Bush II, it is the Bush II administration that has received the majority of the attention for its aggressive defense of a number of controversial actions by relying on the theory. Among those actions has been the use (or abuse) of the Presidential bill signing statement. It is my purpose to argue that the administration has not behaved as a Unitarian but as something else entirely, leaving the Powers of the office perhaps in worse shape than they found it.
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Assessing Presidential Power: Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies
American Politics Research, 2008Co-Authors: Christopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. MarshallAbstract:Presidents have a wide array of strategies to influence legislation. One area that has seen less emphasis in the literature is the executive's unilateral ability to issue signing statements and their role in shaping policy. We develop a spatial model illustrating how the president's bargaining Power with Congress can be expanded when the veto threat is coordinated with signing statements. The analysis suggests that signing statements, although underappreciated, may potentially be a valuable Presidential tool in the veto bargaining process. The analysis also shows that veto threats are a key factor explaining the president's use of the constitutional signing statement. We infer that veto threats and signing statements are linked together as part of a larger coordinated strategy to exert Presidential Power in the legislative realm.
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The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2008Co-Authors: Christopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. MarshallAbstract:The Presidential bill signing statement is one of many devices that contemporary presidents have developed for use against a recalcitrant Congress, joining with the executive order, memoranda, proclamations, pocket vetoes, and primary unilateral policy devices, to name but a few (Barilleaux 1989; Cooper 2002; Mayer 2001; Spitzer 2006). In late 2005 and then in 2006, the signing statement moved from relative obscurity to cause celebre. The reason it became a public spectacle is multifaceted. First, in December 2005, President George W. Bush used the signing statement to renege on a deal he had made with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) to keep torture off the list of interrogation techniques as part of the global war on terrorism. Throughout the fall of 2005, the administration applied enormous political pressure to persuade Senator McCain to back away from his "no torture" position. When it failed, President Bush invited Senator McCain, along with Senator John Warner (R-VA), to a White House photo op and a formal signing ceremony, at which President Bush proclaimed, "[T]he Administration is committed to treating all detainees held by the United States in a manner consistent with our Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations, which reflect the values we hold dear" (Bush 2005a). However, in President Bush's signing statement to the bill, (1) he set off a public firestorm after he wrote, The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial Power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks. (Bush 2005b) Also in December 2005, the Bush administration released numerous documents regarding Judge Samuel Alito's time in the Reagan administration's Justice Department. Alito, at the time preparing for his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, had worked in the Reagan Justice Department in the mid-1980s, in part to develop the signing statement as a useful device to protect the prerogatives of the presidency, as well as to advance policy preferences throughout the executive branch agencies (Alito 1986). And finally, in April 2006, Charlie Savage, a reporter for the Boston Globe, wrote an article claiming that President Bush had used the signing statement to challenge "more than 750 laws" since taking office, a number that exceeded all previous presidents combined (Savage 2006). What ensued were numerous editorials condemning the practice, along with congressional hearings, testimony, and legislation designed to blunt the effects of the signing statement and a chorus of critics who issued reports demanding that the practice stop. Yet despite all the recent attention, there has been little scholarly research tying the use of the signing statement to the larger picture of Presidential Power (Cooper 2002, 2005 are important exceptions). This essay investigates how the signing statement is used to influence the policy process when the normal methods break down, particularly in this modern period of divided government characterized by high levels of partisanship inside Congress and inside the electorate. The empirical analysis seeks to understand the factors that explain why the president uses signing statements on some laws and not others. In broader terms, the investigation of signing statements sheds light on how two distinct views of Power--Neustadt's personal presidency and unilateralism--can be viewed as complementary, rather than competing approaches. The investigation utilizes a mixture of methods and evidence to assess the role of Presidential signing statements in understanding Presidential Power. …
Bryan W. Marshall - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Assessing Presidential Power: Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies
American Politics Research, 2008Co-Authors: Christopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. MarshallAbstract:Presidents have a wide array of strategies to influence legislation. One area that has seen less emphasis in the literature is the executive's unilateral ability to issue signing statements and their role in shaping policy. We develop a spatial model illustrating how the president's bargaining Power with Congress can be expanded when the veto threat is coordinated with signing statements. The analysis suggests that signing statements, although underappreciated, may potentially be a valuable Presidential tool in the veto bargaining process. The analysis also shows that veto threats are a key factor explaining the president's use of the constitutional signing statement. We infer that veto threats and signing statements are linked together as part of a larger coordinated strategy to exert Presidential Power in the legislative realm.
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The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2008Co-Authors: Christopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. MarshallAbstract:The Presidential bill signing statement is one of many devices that contemporary presidents have developed for use against a recalcitrant Congress, joining with the executive order, memoranda, proclamations, pocket vetoes, and primary unilateral policy devices, to name but a few (Barilleaux 1989; Cooper 2002; Mayer 2001; Spitzer 2006). In late 2005 and then in 2006, the signing statement moved from relative obscurity to cause celebre. The reason it became a public spectacle is multifaceted. First, in December 2005, President George W. Bush used the signing statement to renege on a deal he had made with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) to keep torture off the list of interrogation techniques as part of the global war on terrorism. Throughout the fall of 2005, the administration applied enormous political pressure to persuade Senator McCain to back away from his "no torture" position. When it failed, President Bush invited Senator McCain, along with Senator John Warner (R-VA), to a White House photo op and a formal signing ceremony, at which President Bush proclaimed, "[T]he Administration is committed to treating all detainees held by the United States in a manner consistent with our Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations, which reflect the values we hold dear" (Bush 2005a). However, in President Bush's signing statement to the bill, (1) he set off a public firestorm after he wrote, The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial Power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks. (Bush 2005b) Also in December 2005, the Bush administration released numerous documents regarding Judge Samuel Alito's time in the Reagan administration's Justice Department. Alito, at the time preparing for his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, had worked in the Reagan Justice Department in the mid-1980s, in part to develop the signing statement as a useful device to protect the prerogatives of the presidency, as well as to advance policy preferences throughout the executive branch agencies (Alito 1986). And finally, in April 2006, Charlie Savage, a reporter for the Boston Globe, wrote an article claiming that President Bush had used the signing statement to challenge "more than 750 laws" since taking office, a number that exceeded all previous presidents combined (Savage 2006). What ensued were numerous editorials condemning the practice, along with congressional hearings, testimony, and legislation designed to blunt the effects of the signing statement and a chorus of critics who issued reports demanding that the practice stop. Yet despite all the recent attention, there has been little scholarly research tying the use of the signing statement to the larger picture of Presidential Power (Cooper 2002, 2005 are important exceptions). This essay investigates how the signing statement is used to influence the policy process when the normal methods break down, particularly in this modern period of divided government characterized by high levels of partisanship inside Congress and inside the electorate. The empirical analysis seeks to understand the factors that explain why the president uses signing statements on some laws and not others. In broader terms, the investigation of signing statements sheds light on how two distinct views of Power--Neustadt's personal presidency and unilateralism--can be viewed as complementary, rather than competing approaches. The investigation utilizes a mixture of methods and evidence to assess the role of Presidential signing statements in understanding Presidential Power. …
Terry M Moe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Presidential Power of unilateral action
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article we highlight a formal basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of Presidential Power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president’s formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. We argue that the president’s Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory—data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified. A few observations about politics are so widely accepted that virtually all political scientists have committed them to memory. One of these is Richard Neustadt’s (1960) famous dictum, “Presidential Power is the Power to persuade,” which expresses, in shorthand form, his view that the Powers of the modern American presidency are rooted in the personal qualities of the individual occupying the office—in his skills, his temperament, and his experience. This notion of the personal presidency dominated the field for decades, but its influence is on the decline. The main reason is that it seems increasingly out of sync with the facts. The personal presidency became a popular theoretical notion just as the American presidency was experiencing tremendous growth c
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The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action
Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article we highlight a formal basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of Presidential Power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president`s formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. We argue that the president`s Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers - and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory - data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified.
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Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1999Co-Authors: Terry M Moe, William G. HowellAbstract:In this article, the authors explore a basis for Presidential Power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point but that has become so pivotal to Presidential leadership that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. The purpose of the article is to outline a theory of this aspect of Presidential Power. The authors argue that the president's Powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. The authors also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own Powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them.
David Levine - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a time for Presidential Power war time and the constrained executive
Michigan Law Review, 2013Co-Authors: David LevineAbstract:A TIME FOR Presidential Power? WAR TIME AND THE CONSTRAINED EXECUTIVE WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES. By Mary L. Dudziak. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. 136. $24.95.INTRODUCTIONBetween 2002 and 2008 I served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force. Though I had been deployed overseas several times, my primary place of duty was in the United States. When I landed at Baghdad International Airport in June 2006, however, several things immediately changed for me as a result of military regulations. I had to carry my sidearm and dog tags at all times. I could not eat anywhere other than a U.S. military installation. I could not drink alcohol. My pay was a bit higher. Personally, I was more vigilant, more aware of my surroundings. In other words, I was at war.Indeed, the U.S. government claimed wartime Powers because thousands of others like me-members of the U.S. military-were stationed in Iraq: the United States deployed large numbers of troops to provisional bases on foreign soil, those troops used lethal force, and they detained individuals without trial for using force in return. And while there was a reasonably clear beginning point for the exercise of these Powers-found in an Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF") rather than a formal declaration of war1-from the vantage point of June 2006, it was unclear whether or when this authority would cease. There was no enemy that could surrender or sign a peace treaty, or give some other sign that "war" had ended; the forces that the United States was fighting-variously, Sunni tribesmen, Shia militias, and foreign extremists-had changed significantly since the 2003 invasion and would even change during my yearlong deployment. Although, as an officer in the U.S. military, it was very clear for me when I was at war and when I was not, the temporal bounds of this "wartime" were actually quite murky for the U.S. government. That murkiness increased significantly when considering not only the war in Iraq but also the "Global War on Terror" writ large.Professor Mary L. Dudziak's important new book War Time2 confronts the murkiness between wartime and peacetime, investigating its history, present reality, and implications. Although the boundaries of the War on Terror are commonly perceived as shifting and uncertain, especially compared to relatively defined wars such as World War II, Dudziak argues that the murky boundaries of war are not a new phenomenon and highlights the corrosive effects that such uncertainty can have on the rule of law. She argues that this uncertainty will accelerate as the United States engages in increasingly amorphous armed conflicts. She likewise predicts that political leaders-particularly executive branch officials-will try to take advantage of wartime's uncertain boundaries while using the terminology of a more certain past.Dudziak contends that the increasing invocation of wartime as an argument for increased executive Power runs counter to the conception of the United States as a nation of laws. She suggests that we need to understand the flawed rationale behind such invocations to effectively combat them. Part I of this Notice summarizes Dudziak's work, tracing the development of the modern concept of "wartime" from World War II to the present day. Parts II and III evaluate Dudziak's arguments in light of two of the most extraordinary Powers that a state may claim in wartime-the Power to detain and the Power to project force. Part II argues that, for all of Dudziak's concerns about the diminishing barriers between peacetime and wartime, there still exist some hard limits on the Power that the executive may claim, as evidenced by U.S. detention policies in Iraq. But while some limits may still apply, Part III also finds truth in Dudziak's premise that wartime's boundaries are eroding, using the recent U.S. intervention in Libya as an example. Part III also examines the limits to Dudziak's paradigm, under which wartime necessarily equals government Power, against the backdrop of a president who has expanded his Power by conspicuously avoiding "wartime. …