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Maria R. Ruiz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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b f skinner s radical Behaviorism historical misconstructions and grounds for feminist reconstructions
Behavior and Social Issues, 1995Co-Authors: Maria R. RuizAbstract:Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated thorough feminist revisions most notably in psychoanalytic and developmental theory. Although Behaviorism has attracted strong objections from feminist critics, claims of its antithetical positioning vis-A¥-vis feminist theory construction have practically remained unchallenged. A preliminary step in formulating grounds for a synthesis is to clarify the multiple meanings of Behaviorism. Specifically, the fusion of Watson’ s methodological Behaviorism and Skinner’ s radical Behaviorism in the literature must be disentangled in order to address the latter’ s potential as a conceptual framework for constructing feminist theory. Key conceptual features of radical Behaviorism that suggest its potential as a vehicle for building a feminist epistemology include: radical Behaviorism’ s contextualistic world view, its interpretation of agency, its treatment of private experience and self knowledge, and its understanding of the pivotal functions of the verbal community.
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b f skinner s radical Behaviorism historical misconstructions and grounds for feminist reconstructions
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 1995Co-Authors: Maria R. RuizAbstract:Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated feminist revisions, most notably in psychoanalytic and developmental theory. Although Behaviorism has attracted strong obje...
J Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Methodological Behaviorism from the standpoint of a radical behaviorist
The Behavior Analyst, 2013Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Methodological Behaviorism is the name for a prescriptive orientation to psychological science. Its first and original feature is that the terms and concepts deployed in psychological theories and explanations should be based on observable stimuli and behavior. I argue that the interpretation of the phrase “based on” has changed over the years because of the influence of operationism. Its second feature, which developed after the first and is prominent in contemporary psychology, is that research should emphasize formal testing of a theory that involves mediating theoretical entities from an nonbehavioral dimension according to the hypothetico-deductive method. I argue that for contemporary methodological Behaviorism, explanations of the behavior of both participants and scientists appeal to the mediating entities as mental causes, if only indirectly. In contrast to methodological Behaviorism is the radical Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner. Unlike methodological Behaviorism, radical Behaviorism conceives of verbal behavior in terms of an operant process that involves antecedent circumstances and reinforcing consequences, rather than in terms of a nonbehavioral process that involves reference and symbolism. In addition, radical Behaviorism recognizes private behavioral events and subscribes to research and explanatory practices that do not include testing hypotheses about supposed mediating entities from another dimension. I conclude that methodological Behaviorism is actually closer to mentalism than to Skinner’s radical Behaviorism.
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Three Views of Behaviorism
Psychological Record, 2013Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Three views of Behaviorism are examined in an effort to clarify its meaning. The views are composites of what readers might hear or read in the professional literature of psychology. View 1 is un-self-consciously critical of Behaviorism and might represent the view taken by a contemporary cognitive psychologist. View 2 appears to support Behaviorism but actually represents only a methodological Behaviorism and an epistemological dualism. View 3 represents a radical, thoroughgoing Behaviorism. The radical Behaviorism of View 3 regards any differences between Views 1 and 2 as superficial—both are mediational and mentalistic and therefore objectionable. In contrast to Views 1 and 2, radical Behaviorism emphasizes the functional analysis of verbal behavior, which leads to a thoroughgoing, behavioral conception of knowledge and explanatory practices in psychology.
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a review of baum s review of conceptual foundations of radical Behaviorism
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2011Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical Behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological Behaviorism inherent in Baum's position needs to be resolved.
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methodological Behaviorism as a radical behaviorist views it
Behavior and Philosophy (Online), 2011Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Methodological Behaviorism is a stance on verbal processes and the meaning of "psychological" terms and concepts that are deployed in theories and explanations of behavior. According to this stance, all such terms and concepts should be based on observable stimuli and behavior. Over the years, psychologists have interpreted the phrase "based on" in at least three different ways. One interpretation was that psychologists should remain formally silent on causal mental terms, and not speak at all about unobservables. A second interpretation allowed psychologists to appeal indirectly to mediating mental terms, provided the psychologists could logically connect the terms to observables through operational definitions, where those definitions were exhaustive. A third interpretation again allowed psychologists to appeal indirectly to mediating mental terms, provided the psychologists could logically connect the terms to observables through operational definitions. This time, however, the definitions need be only partial instead of exhaustive. We argue the interpretations lead to an incomplete psychology, if not also an institutionalized mentalism, because they fail to recognize private behavioral events. None of the interpretations are consistent with the radical Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner.
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some historical and conceptual background to the development of b f skinner s radical Behaviorism part 3
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:The present article is the third in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner's radical Behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article is the intellectual context of a paper on operationism Skinner published in 1945, in which he first used the term "radical Behaviorism" in print. Overall, Skinner's radical Behaviorism was a thoroughgoing Behaviorism that provided a naturalistic account of the full range of human functioning, including the influence on both verbal and nonverbal behavior of phenomena identified as "subjective".
Arthur W. Staats - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the psychological Behaviorism theory of pain and the placebo its principles and results of research application
Advances in Psychosomatic Medicine, 2006Co-Authors: Peter S Staats, Hamid Hekmat, Arthur W. StaatsAbstract:The psychological Behaviorism theory of pain unifies biological, behavioral, and cognitive-behavioral theories of pain and facilitates development of a common vocabulary for pain research across dis
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behavior and personality psychological Behaviorism
1996Co-Authors: Arthur W. StaatsAbstract:In this capstone work, Arthur Staats synthesises more than four decades of research, theory, and study into a new generation of behaviourism that offers insights and future directions for researchers, professionals, and students. Staats's unified theory of psychological behaviourism builds on current theories in child development, personality, psychological measurement, and abnormal behaviour. His theoretical model provides new ways to consider human behaviour as a whole that will have implications for research, theory, and practice.
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Psychological Behaviorism and Behaviorizing Psychology
The Behavior Analyst, 1994Co-Authors: Arthur W. StaatsAbstract:Paradigmatic or psychological Behaviorism (PB), in a four-decade history of development, has been shaped by its goal, the establishment of a Behaviorism that can also serve as the approach in psychology (Watson’s original goal). In the process, PB has become a new generation of Behaviorism with abundant heuristic avenues for development in theory, philosophy, methodology, and research. Psychology has resources, purview and problem areas, and nascent developments of many kinds, gathered in chaotic diversity, needing unification (and other things) that cognitivism cannot provide. Behaviorism can, within PB’s multilevel framework for connecting and advancing both psychology and Behaviorism.
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rule governed behavior unifying radical and paradigmatic Behaviorism
The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 1991Co-Authors: Leonard G Burns, Arthur W. StaatsAbstract:Commonalities and differences between Skinner’s analysis of verbal behavior and the paradigmatic Behaviorism (PB) approach are described as a means of introducing the latter to behavior analysis. The focus is on treating the topic of rule-governed behavior—a topic of current interest in behavior analysis in addressing the challenge of cognitive psychology—within the PB framework. Dealing behaviorally with traditional psychology interests is considered important in PB, and this article aims to advance toward that goal. PB has presented a framework that deals with not only the behavioral description of language but also with language function as well as language acquisition. This includes a treatment of the manner in which verbal stimuli generally can control motor behavior. This framework includes analyses in addition to those present in the behavior analytic framework, along with empirical developments, and these can be used to enhance a behavioral understanding of important parts of verbal behavior and the effects of verbal stimuli on behavior, including rule-governed phenomena. Our purpose is to use the particular topic of rule-governed behavior to argue that a more explicit interaction between radical and paradigmatic Behaviorism would advance Behaviorism and also enable it to have a stronger impact upon psychology and the scientific community.
John O. Cooper - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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radical Behaviorism a productive and needed philosophy for education
Journal of Behavioral Education, 1992Co-Authors: William L. Heward, John O. CooperAbstract:Radical Behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical Behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing Behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical Behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical Behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical Behaviorism. In particular, we define radical Behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the “intolerance” exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.
John C. Malone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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when a clear strong voice was needed a retrospective review of watson s 1924 1930 Behaviorism
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2014Co-Authors: John C. Malone, Andres GarciapenagosAbstract:Despite the attention given John B. Watson during the century since he introduced Behaviorism, thereremain questions about what he really contributed. He is still appropriately criticized for his arrogant self-promotion and especially for his perceived emphasis on a simple S-R reflexology. However, we argue thattheformerwasnecessaryatthetimeandthatcriticismofWatsononthesecondcountonlydivertsattentionfrom the genuine contributions that he did make. In support of these contentions we examine severalaspects of his contributions that warrant clarification, namely, his promotion of applied comparativepsychology, his views on the nature of mind, his originality, criticism from and respect afforded bycontemporaries,hisrelationtorecentinterestin“theembodimentofmind,”histreatmentofthinking,andhisappreciationofFreud’swork.WeorganizeourdiscussionaroundspecificchaptersofthetwoeditionsofBehaviorism, but in support of our arguments we include publications of Watson that are less well known.Those works develop some important points that are only briefly treated in both editions of Behaviorism.Key words: John B. Watson, Behaviorism, history, mind, embodiment, thinking, Freud, psychoanalysis
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Did John B. Watson Really “Found” Behaviorism?
The Behavior Analyst, 2014Co-Authors: John C. MaloneAbstract:Developments culminating in the nineteenth century, along with the predictable collapse of introspective psychology, meant that the rise of behavioral psychology was inevitable. In 1913, John B. Watson was an established scientist with impeccable credentials who acted as a strong and combative promoter of a natural science approach to psychology when just such an advocate was needed. He never claimed to have founded “behavior psychology” and, despite the acclaim and criticism attending his portrayal as the original behaviorist, he was more an exemplar of a movement than a founder. Many influential writers had already characterized psychology, including so-called mental activity, as behavior, offered many applications, and rejected metaphysical dualism. Among others, William Carpenter, Alexander Bain, and (early) Sigmund Freud held views compatible with twentieth-century Behaviorism. Thus, though Watson was the first to argue specifically for psychology as a natural science, Behaviorism in both theory and practice had clear roots long before 1913. If Behaviorism really needs a “founder,” Edward Thorndike might seem more deserving, because of his great influence and promotion of an objective psychology, but he was not a true behaviorist for several important reasons. Watson deserves the fame he has received, since he first made a strong case for a natural science (behaviorist) approach and, importantly, he made people pay attention to it.
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pragmatism and radical Behaviorism a response to leigland
Behavior and Philosophy, 2004Co-Authors: John C. MaloneAbstract:Leigland notes that the relation between radical Behaviorism and pragmatism is complex and cites Richard Rorty as an exemplar of pragmatism. But Rorty promotes a bizarre version of pragmatism, not to be associated with radical Behaviorism or with pragmatism as Peirce conceived it. Rorty is a monist and a brilliant writer, but he dismisses religion and science in favor of a humanistic ontology that is based on "imaginative literature." Skinner would never agree with such a position, and those who would understand pragmatism are advised to read Peirce, not Rorty. I was happy to see Leigland's comment on my Quine memorial piece (Malone, 2001) because I knew that he wouldn't say anything with which I would violently disagree. I have meant to compliment him on his excellent chapter in a recent edited volume (Leigland, 1997) in which he characterized modern Behaviorism—both methodological and radical—in a masterly fashion. Our review of that book appeared recently (Malone, Armento, & Epps, 2003). Leigland correctly notes that the relation between pragmatism and radical Behaviorism is complex, and I believe that this is because there is no one version of either. When I think of pragmatism I think of Charles Peirce, period, and when I think of radical Behaviorism it is my idealized image of Skinner's rendition, exemplified in 1964 and maybe in 1974, but seldom elsewhere. Most important, when I think of pragmatism I never, ever think of the twisted and humanist version promoted by Richard Rorty! I will consider Leigland's points one by one, clarifying my position where necessary. First, Leigland points out that Skinner's scientific views never amounted to physical reductionism—of course; I never thought so. I just said that Skinner believed in a physical world existing beyond our experience of it—which he did and we all do. But we don't often think about metaphysical questions regarding a transcendent reality. Second, we can't know that world, in any reasonable sense of the word "know," so it remains a metaphysical belief. As Leigland says, we can't step into a "God's-eye view of the world, in and of itself." I agree, and Skinner surely would have agreed.
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radical Behaviorism and the rest of psychology a review precis of skinner s about Behaviorism
2001Co-Authors: John C. Malone, Natalie M. CruchonAbstract:Radical Behaviorism is fundamentally different from traditional psychology, so it is not surprising that it has been widely misunderstood. It offers an alternative to the traditional treatments of mind that avoids some of the insoluble problems raised by those views. B. F. Skinner attempted many times to describe this alternative with limited success, partially attributable to the opacity of his prose and the excessiveness of his proposed applications. We offer annotated excerpts from one of his books dedicated to this end in an effort to show how his approach deals with topics usually viewed as "cognitive psychology." While modern radical Behaviorism has progressed beyond Skinner's
