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Lorand Bartels - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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binding Tariff Preferences for developing countries under article ii gatt
Journal of International Economic Law, 2010Co-Authors: Lorand Bartels, Christian HaberliAbstract:Tariff Preferences, which are authorized under the WTO Enabling Clause and autonomous waivers, are often withdrawn on dubious grounds and without due process. This reduces much of their potential value, because traders and investors lack the predictability and security necessary to make long-term business decisions based on the market access opportunities that these Preferences provide. Some developing countries have responded to this by concluding regional trade agreements (RTAs) under Article XXIV of the GATT, despite the sometimes heavy price of reciprocity. In this article, we offer an alternative. We make two practical proposals to provide the maximum possible security and predictability for both preference beneficiaries and donors. First, we argue that, contrary to what is often assumed, it is perfectly possible to bind Tariff Preferences under existing WTO rules. Second, based upon an examination of the current state of the law, we propose that any withdrawals of products and countries from Tariff preference programs, whether by way of temporary safeguards or definitive 'graduation', should be based on objective and legally secure criteria. These criteria should also be scheduled as qualifications to bound Preferences under Article II of the GATT. These reforms are possible without any change to existing WTO rules. Oxford University Press 2010, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
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bringing predictability and security to developing countries Tariff Preferences
2010Co-Authors: Lorand Bartels, Christian HaberliAbstract:While most economists criticise the GSP for a number of (good) reasons, all preference donors and receivers profess their commitment to what they consider as a tool for developing countries ‘to secure a share in the growth of world trade’. The political support given by both receivers and donors to Preferences as an economic development tool means that they will remain part of the landscape of international trade regulation for the foreseeable future.Under the WTO Enabling Clause, such Preferences are allowed if they are generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory. However, Tariff Preferences are also often withdrawn on dubious grounds and without due process. This reduces much of their potential value, because traders and investors lack the predictability and security necessary to make long term business decisions based on the market access opportunities that these Preferences provide. Indeed, the lack of predictability and security of unilateral Tariff preference schemes has been one of the reasons that some developing countries have concluded regional trade agreements (RTAs) under Article XXIV GATT, despite the sometimes heavy price of reciprocity.In this paper we offer an alternative. Based on a legal examination of Tariff preference schemes and their limitations (coverage, graduation, safeguards, and conditionality), we make three practical proposals to provide better security and predictability for both preference beneficiaries and donors:1. a binding of GSP schemes under Article II GATT (negotiated under Article XXVIII GATT)2. as an alternative, a dispute settlement regime specifically targeted at unbound Preferences, and3. legally secure rules on limitations to GSP programs, including transparent and objective graduation criteria, which may be bound or unbound.Contrary to what is often assumed, this paper demonstrates that it is perfectly possible to bind Tariff Preferences and graduation criteria under existing WTO rules. All it takes is sufficient political will.Presented at the SIEL 2010 Conference in Barcelona.
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The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+ Arrangement
Journal of International Economic Law, 2007Co-Authors: Lorand BartelsAbstract:In EC Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body held that the WTO Enabling Clause permitted developed countries to grant better Tariff treatment to some developing countries than to others, subject to certain conditions. It held further that these conditions were not met by the EU's so-called 'drugs arrangement', a system of additional Preferences (normally duty free treatment) for certain countries which the EU had determined were in need of special Tariff Preferences, thanks to their involvement in combating the production and trafficking of narcotics. In response to this ruling, when the EU renewed its GSP programme in 2005, it replaced its drugs arrangement and two similar, though less generous, labour and environment arrangements with a new arrangement popularly known as the 'GSP+ arrangement'. Under this arrangement, additional Tariff Preferences (normally duty free treatment), were made available to developing countries committing to ratify and implement a list of human rights and good governance conventions. According to the EU, the GSP+ arrangement complies with the Appellate Body's interpretation of the Enabling Clause. This article argues that it does not. This is primarily because of the substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, which do not meet the Appellate Body's criteria for differential Tariff treatment of developing countries. Second, it is because the EU's requirement that would-be beneficiaries must have applied by a certain date, replicates the problem of the 'closed list' of beneficiaries that was fatal to the earlier incarnation of the EU's GSP program. The article concludes with some suggestions for designing a GSP+ arrangement more likely to meet the Appellate Body's conditions than the EU's present arrangement. , Oxford University Press.
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The WTO legality of the EU's GSP+ arrangement
Journal of International Economic Law, 2007Co-Authors: Lorand BartelsAbstract:In EC-Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body held that the WTO Enabling Clause permitted developed countries to grant better Tariff treatment to some developing countries than to others, subject to certain conditions. It held further that these conditions were not met by the EU's so-called 'drugs arrangement', a system of additional Preferences (normally duty free treatment) for certain countries which the EU had determined were in need of special Tariff Preferences, thanks to their involvement in combating the production and trafficking of narcotics. In response to this ruling, when the EU renewed its GSP programme in 2005, it replaced its drugs arrangement and two similar, though less generous, labour and environment arrangements with a new arrangement popularly known as the 'GSP+ arrangement'. Under this arrangement, additional Tariff Preferences (normally duty free treatment), were made available to developing countries committing to ratify and implement a list of human rights and good governance conventions. According to the EU, the GSP+ arrangement complies with the Appellate Body's interpretation of the Enabling Clause. This article argues that is does not. This is primarily because of the substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, which do not meet the Appellate Body's criteria for differential Tariff treatment of developing countries. Second, it is because the EU's requirement that would-be beneficiaries must have applied by a certain date, replicates the problem of the `closed list' of beneficiaries that was fatal to the earlier incarnation of the EU's GSP program. The article concludes with some suggestions for designing a GSP+ arrangement more likely to meet the Appellate Body's conditions than the EU's present arrangement. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press
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the wto appellate body report in ec conditions for the granting of Tariff Preferences to developing countries wt ds246 ab r and its implications for conditionality in gsp programs
2005Co-Authors: Lorand BartelsAbstract:All developed countries and a number of developing countries operate a so-called GSP programs under which they grant Tariff Preferences lower than the WTO most-favoured-nation rate to goods from developing countries. The EC and the US are unique in that they have for many years subjected such Preferences to a variety of political and other non-trade criteria, including implementation of international labour rights. In EC-GSP the WTO Appellate Body made a significant ruling on the legitimacy of such conditions, but the full implications of this ruling are yet to be worked out. This article interprets the ruling, with a view to determining the legality under WTO law of the US and EC practice of granting GSP trade benefits on a conditional basis.
Peri Silva - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Market Access for Sale: Latin America’s Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences - Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences
Policy Research Working Papers, 2010Co-Authors: Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri SilvaAbstract:This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the Tariff Preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and Tariff Preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for Tariff Preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant Tariff Preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.
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The Role of Importers and Exporters in the Determination of the U.S. Tariff Preferences Granted to Latin America - The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. Tariff Preferences granted to Latin America
Journal of Development Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Peri SilvaAbstract:This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by Tariff Preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.
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the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s Tariff Preferences granted to latin america
Journal of Development Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Peri SilvaAbstract:This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by Tariff Preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.
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market access for sale latin america s lobbying for us Tariff Preferences
2004Co-Authors: Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri SilvaAbstract:This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the Tariff Preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and Tariff Preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for Tariff Preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant Tariff Preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.
Mathias Paukert - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Gestaltung von Tarifen für kommunikationsfähige Messsysteme im Verbund mit zeitvariablen Stromtarifen
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 2013Co-Authors: Torsten J. Gerpott, Mathias PaukertAbstract:ZusammenfassungAuch in Deutschland kommen kommunikationsfähige Messsysteme (KMS oder „Smart Meter“) für Strom im Verbund mit zeitlichen Differenzierungen von kWh-Arbeitspreisen zunehmend bei privaten Haushaltskunden zum Einsatz. Dennoch liegen bislang kaum Erkenntnisse zu Präferenzen dieser Kunden im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung von KMS-Tarifelementen und von zeitvariablen Stromverbrauchspreisen vor. In der vorliegenden Studie werden derartige Präferenzen in einer Online-Befragung von 754 deutschsprachigen Erwachsenen mittels der Conjoint-Analyse-Methode ermittelt. Als KMS-Tarifelemente werden Bereitstellungs- und Monatsgebühren betrachtet. Als Merkmale zeitvariabler Strompreise werden die Zahl der Zeit-/Tarifblöcke, die maximale Spreizung von Arbeitspreisen in verschiedenen Zeitfenstern sowie die Vorhersag-/Änderbarkeit von Arbeitspreisen berücksichtigt. Die meisten Befragten beurteilten den Nutzen von mehrdimensionalen KMS- und Verbrauchstarifelementen hauptsächlich anhand der KMS-Tarifmerkmale. Mit einer Vorlaufzeit von mindestens einem Tag dynamisch anpassbare Arbeitspreise werden fast durchweg als nutzenmindernd erlebt. Zwischen den Tarifpräferenzen einerseits und sozio-demographischen und Strombezugsmerkmalen von Kunden sowie deren subjektiven KMS-Erwartungen/Beurteilungen andererseits bestehen nur vereinzelt signifikante Zusammenhänge. Die Bereitschaft, KMS-Bereitstellungs- und -Monatsgebühren hinzunehmen, sowie deutlich von undifferenzierten Strompreisen abweichende Varianten zeitvariabler Tarife nachzufragen, dürfte mit Einsatzerfahrungen von KMS und zeitvariablen Stromtarifen zunehmen. Aus den Befunden werden Schlussfolgerungen für Energielieferanten, die KMS-basierte zeitvariable Tarife bei Haushaltskunden in Deutschland vermarkten wollen, und für die wissenschaftliche Forschung abgleitet.AbstractIn Germany too, communication-capable electricity metering systems (CMS) together with time-based differentiation of kWh-rates for energy consumption are increasingly proliferated among household customers. Nevertheless, empirical evidence with respect to Preferences of members of this customer group for the design of CMS Tariff elements and of time-variant electricity consumption rates is still scarce. The present study captures such Preferences by means of conjoint analysis of data obtained in an online survey of 754 German-speaking adults. Examined CMS Tariff elements are a one-off installation fee and monthly recurring use charges. The studied characteristics of time-based rates are the number of time/Tariff blocks, the maximum spread between kWh-rates for different time windows and the adaptability/predictability of kWh-rates. Most respondents judged multidimensional CMS and electricity consumption Tariff offerings mainly in light of the CMS Tariff characteristics. The vast majority of the participants perceived kWh-rates, which may change with a minimum lead time of one day as reducing the benefit of CMS and consumption Tariff bundles. Tariff Preferences on the one hand were only rarely significantly related to customers’ socio-demographic and electricity procurement characteristics as well as their CMS-related expectations/assessments on the other. The willingness to accept CMS-related one-off installation and recurring service charges as well as the propensity to opt for time-dependent electricity consumption Tariff variants differing clearly from non-differentiated electricity price schemes appear to be positively affected by customers’ practical application experience with CMS and time-variant electricity consumption rates. Conclusions are drawn for energy suppliers seeking to propagate CMS-based time-variant Tariffs among household customers in Germany and for future scholarly research.
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Gestaltung von Tarifen für kommunikationsfähige Messsysteme im Verbund mit zeitvariablen Stromtarifen
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 2013Co-Authors: Torsten J. Gerpott, Mathias PaukertAbstract:Auch in Deutschland kommen kommunikationsfähige Messsysteme (KMS oder „Smart Meter“) für Strom im Verbund mit zeitlichen Differenzierungen von kWh-Arbeitspreisen zunehmend bei privaten Haushaltskunden zum Einsatz. Dennoch liegen bislang kaum Erkenntnisse zu Präferenzen dieser Kunden im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung von KMS-Tarifelementen und von zeitvariablen Stromverbrauchspreisen vor. In der vorliegenden Studie werden derartige Präferenzen in einer Online-Befragung von 754 deutschsprachigen Erwachsenen mittels der Conjoint-Analyse-Methode ermittelt. Als KMS-Tarifelemente werden Bereitstellungs- und Monatsgebühren betrachtet. Als Merkmale zeitvariabler Strompreise werden die Zahl der Zeit-/Tarifblöcke, die maximale Spreizung von Arbeitspreisen in verschiedenen Zeitfenstern sowie die Vorhersag-/Änderbarkeit von Arbeitspreisen berücksichtigt. Die meisten Befragten beurteilten den Nutzen von mehrdimensionalen KMS- und Verbrauchstarifelementen hauptsächlich anhand der KMS-Tarifmerkmale. Mit einer Vorlaufzeit von mindestens einem Tag dynamisch anpassbare Arbeitspreise werden fast durchweg als nutzenmindernd erlebt. Zwischen den Tarifpräferenzen einerseits und sozio-demographischen und Strombezugsmerkmalen von Kunden sowie deren subjektiven KMS-Erwartungen/Beurteilungen andererseits bestehen nur vereinzelt signifikante Zusammenhänge. Die Bereitschaft, KMS-Bereitstellungs- und -Monatsgebühren hinzunehmen, sowie deutlich von undifferenzierten Strompreisen abweichende Varianten zeitvariabler Tarife nachzufragen, dürfte mit Einsatzerfahrungen von KMS und zeitvariablen Stromtarifen zunehmen. Aus den Befunden werden Schlussfolgerungen für Energielieferanten, die KMS-basierte zeitvariable Tarife bei Haushaltskunden in Deutschland vermarkten wollen, und für die wissenschaftliche Forschung abgleitet. In Germany too, communication-capable electricity metering systems (CMS) together with time-based differentiation of kWh-rates for energy consumption are increasingly proliferated among household customers. Nevertheless, empirical evidence with respect to Preferences of members of this customer group for the design of CMS Tariff elements and of time-variant electricity consumption rates is still scarce. The present study captures such Preferences by means of conjoint analysis of data obtained in an online survey of 754 German-speaking adults. Examined CMS Tariff elements are a one-off installation fee and monthly recurring use charges. The studied characteristics of time-based rates are the number of time/Tariff blocks, the maximum spread between kWh-rates for different time windows and the adaptability/predictability of kWh-rates. Most respondents judged multidimensional CMS and electricity consumption Tariff offerings mainly in light of the CMS Tariff characteristics. The vast majority of the participants perceived kWh-rates, which may change with a minimum lead time of one day as reducing the benefit of CMS and consumption Tariff bundles. Tariff Preferences on the one hand were only rarely significantly related to customers’ socio-demographic and electricity procurement characteristics as well as their CMS-related expectations/assessments on the other. The willingness to accept CMS-related one-off installation and recurring service charges as well as the propensity to opt for time-dependent electricity consumption Tariff variants differing clearly from non-differentiated electricity price schemes appear to be positively affected by customers’ practical application experience with CMS and time-variant electricity consumption rates. Conclusions are drawn for energy suppliers seeking to propagate CMS-based time-variant Tariffs among household customers in Germany and for future scholarly research.
Trine Vig Jensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tariff Preferences wto negotiations and the ldcs the case of the everything but arms initiative
The World Economy, 2005Co-Authors: Wusheng Yu, Trine Vig JensenAbstract:By assessing the impact of the recently adopted 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) initiative of the EU on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and by showing how further multilateral trade liberalisations erode the EBA Preferences and impact the LDCs, this paper attempts to uncover the LDCs' difficult positions in the WTO trade negotiations. Due to its limited product coverage and previous Preferences granted by the EU, welfare impacts of the EBA on the LDCs are shown to be small and the bulk of these gains are associated with the 'sensitive' products that are subject to gradual liberalisations. Moreover, these small gains are likely to disappear if the EU conducts trade policy reforms in fulfilling its WTO obligations, resulting in an actually worse-off situation for the LDCs. Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liberalisation scenario reinforces the above results that the LDCs may well lose due to preference erosion and higher world market prices. It concludes that other development assistance measures from developed countries should be made available to the LDCs to ease their dependency on trade Preferences and to foster their supply capacities. The LDCs themselves should attempt to integrate the duty and quota-free market access status contained in the EBA into a binding WTO agreement to secure a stable trading environment. But more importantly, in order to solve the difficulties at the root these countries should actively engage in reforming their own trade policies. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.
Alan O Sykes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)
World Trade Review, 2015Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Alan O SykesAbstract:The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade Preferences for developing countries. The idea for such Preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement†in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination violates the most-favored nation (MFN) obligation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. I, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential Tariff schemes had to await a GATT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. The waiver was to expire after 10 years, but the authority for Preferences was extended by the GATT Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the “Enabling Clause,†and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.
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european communities conditions for the granting of Tariff Preferences to developing countries wt ds246 ab r
World Trade Review, 2006Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Alan O SykesAbstract:The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade Preferences for developing countries. The idea for such Preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement†in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination violates the most-favored nation (MFN) obligation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. I, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential Tariff schemes had to await a GATT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. The waiver was to expire after 10 years, but the authority for Preferences was extended by the GATT Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the “Enabling Clause,†and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.
