The Experts below are selected from a list of 17670 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Martin Dribe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
ses differences in marital Fertility widened during the Fertility Transition evidence from global micro level population data
SN Social Sciences, 2021Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:The decline in human Fertility during the demographic Transition is one of the most profound changes to human living conditions. To gain a better understanding of this Transition we investigate the association between socioeconomic status (SES) and marital Fertility in different Fertility regimes in a global and historical perspective. We use data for a large number women in 91 different countries for the period 1703–2018 (N = 116,612,473). In the pre-Transitional Fertility regime the highest SES group had somewhat lower marital Fertility than other groups both in terms of children ever born (CEB) and number of surviving children under 5 (CWR). Over the course of the Fertility Transition, as measured by the different Fertility regimes, these rather small initial SES differentials in marital Fertility widened, both for CEB and CWR. There was no indication of a convergence in marital Fertility by SES in the later stages of the Transition. Our results imply a universally negative association between SES and marital Fertility and that the Fertility differentials widened during the Fertility Transition.
-
socio economic status and Fertility decline insights from historical Transitions in europe and north america
Population Studies-a Journal of Demography, 2017Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Marco Breschi, Alain Gagnon, Danielle Gauvreau, Heidi A Hanson, Thomas N Maloney, Stanislao Mazzoni, Joseph Molitoris, Lucia Pozzi, Ken R SmithAbstract:The timings of historical Fertility Transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and Fertility during the Fertility Transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital Fertility and related these to common theories on Fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high Fertility among the upper classes in pre-Transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their Fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their Fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in Fertility varied significantly between populations.
-
the impact of socio economic status on net Fertility during the historical Fertility decline a comparative analysis of canada iceland sweden norway and the usa
Population Studies-a Journal of Demography, 2014Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, David J Hacker, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:We used micro-level data from the censuses of 1900 to investigate the impact of socio-economic status on net Fertility during the Fertility Transition in five Northern American and European countries (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the USA). The study is therefore unlike most previous research on the historical Fertility Transition, which used aggregate data to examine economic correlates of demographic behaviour at regional or national levels. Our data included information on number of children by age, occupation of the mother and father, place of residence, and household context. The results show highly similar patterns across countries, with the elite and upper middle classes having considerably lower net Fertility early in the Transition. These patterns remain after controlling for a range of individual and community-level Fertility determinants and geographical unobserved heterogeneity.
-
the historical Fertility Transition at the micro level southern sweden 1815 1939
Demographic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Tommy Bengtsson, Martin DribeAbstract:AbstractBACKGROUNDWe know a great deal about the historical Fertility Transition at the macro level. The dominating focus on the macro level in previous research on the Fertility Transition means, however, that to a large extent we lack knowledge about details of the decline and empirical tests of the leading explanatory frameworks.OBJECTIVEOur aim is to explore socioeconomic Fertility differentials in an industrializing community, to gain insight about the details and discuss possible mechanisms. The study starts well before industrialization and finishes at the end of the Transition.METHODWe use longitudinal individual-level data from the Scanian Economic-Demographic Database, which contains demographic as well as socioeconomic information, including occupation, landholding, and income. In the analysis we use hazard regressions with shared frailty at the family level.RESULTSThe Transition involved not only parity-specific stopping but also spacing. While the upper social strata had higher Fertility prior to the Transition, they started to control their Fertility earlier, by the 1880s, and also more consistently. Farmers, the middle class, and skilled workers followed in the decades after, and unskilled workers with some additional delay.CONCLUSIONSThese findings are partly inconsistent with several of the major explanations in the literature, such as mortality decline, increased female labor force participation, and a quantity-quality trade-off, but consistent with an innovation process where new ideas and attitudes about family limitation spread from the elite to other social groups.COMMENTSFurther studies are required to empirically test the innovation-diffusion theory.1. IntroductionOne of the major demographic changes during the past 200 years has been the emergence of the two-child norm as part of the creation of the modern family. In most parts of Western Europe this process started in the late nineteenth century and was completed by the 1930s. In Sweden marital Fertility started to decline around 1880, and after about 50 years, total Fertility had declined to below two children per woman (Hofsten and Lundstrom 1976). Since then completed Fertility has remained quite stable at around two births per woman, despite large variations in birth rates, giving empirical support for the two-child ideal of modern families.We know a great deal about the historical Fertility Transition at the macro level. It was fairly simultaneous in Western Europe, France excluded, starting in the late nineteenth century, and earlier in urban areas than in rural. At the micro level we also know a great deal about Fertility before the Transition, but less on the Transition itself, and even less integrating the pre-Transitional period with the Transition. We therefore still lack a fundamental understanding of the whole process of Fertility decline (cf. Guinnane 2011). There has been much theorizing and generalization of empirical evidence around the Fertility Transition with a number of influential explanatory frameworks emerging. In most cases, however, the empirical support is rather weak. Examples include the quantity-quality trade-off, the cost-of-time hypotheses, and the innovation-diffusion hypothesis, as well as mortality decline as the main trigger of Fertility decline. Sometimes the hypothesis in itself has been used to explain other outcomes, as in the case of the quantity-quality trade-off, which has been viewed as instrumental in the Transition from preindustrial economic stagnation to modern economic growth (see Galor 2011).The aim of this paper is to look at Fertility patterns by socioeconomic status before and during the Fertility Transition in order to gain new insights into the explanations of the Transition. Rather than performing direct tests of different hypotheses about the Transition, for which we lack sufficient data, we will discuss likely socioeconomic patterns that could be derived from the standard explanations, and put these to an empirical test using high-quality individual level data with information on socioeconomic status derived from occupation and land holding. …
-
social class and net Fertility before during and after the demographic Transition a micro level analysis of sweden 1880 1970
Demographic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:AbstractBACKGROUNDAlthough demographers have long been interested in studying the historical Fertility Transition, there is still a lack of knowledge about disaggregated patterns. Identifying these patterns could help us to better understand the mechanisms behind the Transition.OBJECTIVEThe aim of this paper is to explore social class differentials in Fertility before, during, and after the Fertility decline, in order to test hypotheses regarding a reversal of class differences during the Transition.METHODWe use micro-level census data for Sweden 1880, 1890, 1900, 1960, and 1970 with individual-level information on occupation, which is used to measure class. Poisson regressions with parish-level fixed effects enable us to carefully control spatial heterogeneity in measuring class differences in net Fertility (child-woman ratios).RESULTSThe relative differences were about as large in the early phases of the Transition as they were in the 1960s. The Fertility levels of the high-Fertility classes were about 40% higher than those of the low-Fertility classes. In the early phases of the decline, the upper and middle classes had much lower net Fertility than lower skilled workers, who had the highest Fertility levels. However, there was no clear gradient from the highest to the lowest socioeconomic status. Instead, it appears that the upper and middle classes had low Fertility levels, while the Fertility levels of the remaining groups were unchanged, and therefore remained relatively high. In the 1960s, members of the middle class had the lowest Fertility levels, while farmers and rural laborers had the highest Fertility levels.CONCLUSIONSThe results only partly confirm the assumption that there was a reversal in class differences in the demographic Transition. Class was found to be important, but the pattern was not characterized by a simple gradient. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity was shown to explain about half of the observed differences between classes. The observed pattern suggests that the Fertility Transition can be attributed to both innovation-diffusion and the adjustment to new socioeconomic conditions.(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1. IntroductionThe decline of Fertility in the demographic Transition has been a major theme in historical demography for some time. Much of the literature focusing on the demographic aspects of the decline has sought to chart the process without actually explaining it. Other studies have offered explanations for the decline mainly at the macro level, identifying either innovation or adjustment processes as the main causal agents. Scholars have shown less interest in examining disaggregated patterns using micro-level analyses.One of the main issues that arises in discussions of the Fertility decline is the extent to which Fertility levels differ according to socioeconomic status, and how these differences evolved over the Fertility Transition. Most demographers appear to agree that having higher social status was associated with having higher Fertility prior to the Transition, but that this situation reversed during the Transition, or even before it occurred (Livi-Bacci 1986; Skirbekk 2008). While it is therefore often assumed that higher social groups were forerunners in the decline (Haines 1992; Livi-Bacci 1986), the question of whether the change happened because new incentives were affecting the elite groups first (adjustment), or if it came about as a result of a diffusion of new ideas first adopted in these high-status groups (innovation), remains unresolved (see Haines 1992).As some of the differences in Fertility levels between socioeconomic groups may have also been related to spatial differences in socioeconomic structure, rather than to social status as such (Garrett et al. 2001); it is essential that researchers control for the spatial aspect when analyzing socioeconomic stratification and Fertility in national populations (see also Szreter 1996). …
Ian M Timaeus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
pathways to low Fertility 50 years of limitation curtailment and postponement of childbearing
Demography, 2020Co-Authors: Ian M Timaeus, Tom A MoultrieAbstract:Abstract This study applies survival analysis to the birth histories from 317 national surveys to model pathways to low Fertility in 83 less-developed countries between 1965 and 2014. It presents period measures of parity progression, the length of birth intervals and total Fertility that have been standardized fully for age, parity, and interval duration. It also examines parity-specific trends in the proportion of women who want no more children. Outside sub-Saharan Africa, Fertility Transition was dominated by parity-specific family size limitation. As the Transition progressed, women also began to postpone their next birth for lengthy periods in many countries. During the first half of the Fertility Transition in much of sub-Saharan Africa and in some other countries, however, women stopped childbearing without targeting particular family sizes. Moreover, birth intervals in sub-Saharan Africa have been lengthening since the onset of the Transition. Birth control is not restricted to a dichotomy between limitation and spacing. Other reasons for curtailing childbearing and postponing having another birth also shape countries’ pathways through Fertility Transition.
-
birth intervals postponement and Fertility decline in africa a new type of Transition
Population Studies-a Journal of Demography, 2012Co-Authors: Tom A Moultrie, Takudzwa S Sayi, Ian M TimaeusAbstract:We investigated birth-interval dynamics in 24 African countries using data from 76 Demographic and Health Surveys conducted since 1986. Controlling for selection bias in the birth-history data using the Brass-Juarez method and regression models produced almost identical results. Birth intervals have lengthened in every country examined. This analysis uncovered a distinctive and previously undocumented pattern of childbearing that is prevalent across sub-Saharan Africa. After allowing for time trends in birth-interval length, the lengthening of birth intervals in almost every country varies little by women's age or parity. Moreover, in several countries, birth intervals are now too long to be explicable by birth spacing contingent on the age of women's youngest child. Rather, women are postponing births for other reasons. These findings offer empirical support for the idea that the Fertility Transition in sub-Saharan Africa is following a different pattern from that observed elsewhere.
-
the south african Fertility decline evidence from two censuses and a demographic and health survey
Population Studies-a Journal of Demography, 2003Co-Authors: Tom A Moultrie, Ian M TimaeusAbstract:Inadequate data and apartheid policies have meant that, until recently, most demographers have not had the opportunity to investigate the level of, and trend in, the Fertility of South African women. The 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey provide the first widely available and nationally representative demographic data on South Africa since 1970. Using these data, this paper describes the South African Fertility decline from 1955 to 1996. Having identified and adjusted for several errors in the 1996 Census data, the paper argues that total Fertility at that time was 3.2 children per woman nationally, and 3.5 children per woman for African South Africans. These levels are lower than in any other sub-Saharan African country. We show also that Fertility in South Africa has been falling since the 1960s. Thus, Fertility Transition predates the establishment of a family planning programme in the country in 1974.
Neil Cummins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
marital Fertility and wealth during the Fertility Transition rural france 1750 1850
The Economic History Review, 2013Co-Authors: Neil CumminsAbstract:It has been long established that the demographic Transition began in eighteenth-century France, yet there is no consensus on exactly why Fertility declined. This analysis links Fertility life histories to wealth at death data for four rural villages in France, 1750–1850. For the first time, the wealth–Fertility relationship during the onset of the French Fertility decline can be analysed. Where Fertility is declining, wealth is a powerful predictor of smaller family size. This article argues that Fertility decline in France was a result of changing levels of economic inequality, associated with the 1789 Revolution. In cross-section, the data support this hypothesis: where Fertility is declining, economic inequality is lower than where Fertility is high.
-
marital Fertility and wealth during the Fertility Transition rural france
2012Co-Authors: Neil CumminsAbstract:It has been long established that the demographic Transition began in eighteenthcentury France, yet there is no consensus on exactly why Fertility declined. This analysis links Fertility life histories to wealth at death data for four rural villages in France, 1750–1850. For the first time, the wealth–Fertility relationship during the onset of the French Fertility decline can be analysed. Where Fertility is declining, wealth is a powerful predictor of smaller family size. This article argues that Fertility decline in France was a result of changing levels of economic inequality, associated with the 1789 Revolution. In cross-section, the data support this hypothesis: where Fertility is declining, economic inequality is lower than where Fertility is high. T hree great events, the industrial revolution, the French Revolution, and the silent revolution of the demographic Transition, were critical in shaping the modern world. All three emerged in eighteenth-century Europe. Britain was the pioneer of industrialization; France was the pioneer of conscious Fertility control. Is there a connection between these revolutions? The root causes of the Fertility Transition are poorly understood.We still cannot explain why Fertility fell in eighteenth-century France; just as we cannot explain why it fell over a century later in the rest of Europe. Economic explanations for the European Fertility Transition, such as demographic Transition theory, micro economic theory, and more recently unified growth theory, have treated the early French Fertility decline as noise, the extreme tail end of a normal distribution.
-
marital Fertility and wealth in Transition era france 1750 1850
2009Co-Authors: Neil CumminsAbstract:The spectacularly early decline of French Fertility is one of the great puzzles of economic history. There are no convincing explanations for why France entered a Fertility Transition over a century before anywhere else in the world. This analysis links highly detailed individual level Fertility life histories to wealth at death data for four rural villages in Transition-era France, 1750-1850. The results show that it was the richest groups who reduced their family size first and that they used spacing strategies to achieve this. In cross section, measures of the environment for social mobility are strongly associated with the Fertility decline. The evidence presented here demonstrates that socioeconomic status mattered during the early French Fertility decline. This study is a first step towards re-establishing the French experience as paramount in our understanding of Europe's demographic Transition.
-
why did Fertility decline an analysis of the individual level economics correlates of the nineteenth century Fertility Transition in england and france
2009Co-Authors: Neil CumminsAbstract:The Fertility Transition in nineteenth century Europe is one of economic history’s greatest puzzles. There is no consensus in the literature on the causes of this ‘Fertility revolution’. Following a critical review of the empirical and theoretical literature, this thesis re-examines the economic correlates of the Fertility decline through the analysis of two new datasets from England and France. For the first time, the relationship between wealth and Fertility can be studied over the period of the Fertility Transition. Clear patterns are discovered, namely a strong positive relationship pre-Transition which switches to a strongly negative relationship during the onset of the Transition. Family limitation is initiated by the richest segments of society. I then introduce a simple model which links Fertility and social mobility to levels of economic inequality. I argue that parents are motivated by relative status concerns and the Fertility Transition is a response to changes in the environment for social mobility, where increased mobility becomes obtainable through Fertility limitation. This hypothesis is tested with the new micro data in England and France. Fertility decline is strongly associated with decreased levels of inequality and increased levels of social mobility. The analysis finds strong support for the role of changes in inequality and the environment for social mobility as central factors in our understandings of Europe’s Fertility Transition.
Timothy W Guinnane - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the historical Fertility Transition a guide for economists
Journal of Economic Literature, 2011Co-Authors: Timothy W GuinnaneAbstract:The historical Fertility Transition is the process by which much of Europe and North America went from high to low Fertility in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This transformation is central to recent accounts of long-run economic growth. Prior to the Transition, women bore as many as eight children each, and the elasticity of Fertility with respect to incomes was positive. Today, many women have no children at all, and the elasticity of Fertility with respect to incomes is zero or even negative. This paper discusses the large literature on the historical Fertility Transition, focusing on what we do and do not know about the process. I stress some possible misunderstandings of the demographic literature, and discuss an agenda for future work. ( JEL I12, J13, N30)
-
the historical Fertility Transition a guide for economists
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Timothy W GuinnaneAbstract:The historical Fertility Transition is the process by which much of Europe and North America went from high to low Fertility in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This transformation is central to recent accounts of long-run economic growth. Prior to the Transition, women bore as many as eight children each, and the elasticity of Fertility with respect to incomes was positive. Today, many women have no children at all, and the elasticity of Fertility with respect to incomes is zero or even negative. This paper discusses the large literature on the historical Fertility Transition, focusing on what we do and do not know about the process. I stress some possible misunderstandings of the demographic literature, and discuss an agenda for future work.
-
regions and time in the european Fertility Transition problems in the princeton project s statistical methodology
The Economic History Review, 2007Co-Authors: John C Brown, Timothy W GuinnaneAbstract:Much empirical social-science research, including work in economic and demographic history, has relied on the analysis of published information on administrative districts. One famous example of this type of research, the Princeton Project on the Decline of Fertility in Europe (EFP), was carried out at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research in the 1960s and 1970s. This project aimed to characterize the decline of Fertility that took place in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The project’s summary statements argued that social and economic forces played little role in bringing about the Fertility Transition. A central feature of the EFP argument is a series of statistical exercises which purport to show that changes in economic and social conditions exerted little influence on Fertility. Two recent articles on Germany for this period have used similar data and methods to draw different conclusions. We show that the difference reflects problems in the Princeton project’s statistical methods. Those problems affect, potentially, virtually all quantitative research of this type. Our findings suggest cautious re-thinking of conclusions based on this type of evidence, starting with the EFP.
Francesco Scalone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
ses differences in marital Fertility widened during the Fertility Transition evidence from global micro level population data
SN Social Sciences, 2021Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:The decline in human Fertility during the demographic Transition is one of the most profound changes to human living conditions. To gain a better understanding of this Transition we investigate the association between socioeconomic status (SES) and marital Fertility in different Fertility regimes in a global and historical perspective. We use data for a large number women in 91 different countries for the period 1703–2018 (N = 116,612,473). In the pre-Transitional Fertility regime the highest SES group had somewhat lower marital Fertility than other groups both in terms of children ever born (CEB) and number of surviving children under 5 (CWR). Over the course of the Fertility Transition, as measured by the different Fertility regimes, these rather small initial SES differentials in marital Fertility widened, both for CEB and CWR. There was no indication of a convergence in marital Fertility by SES in the later stages of the Transition. Our results imply a universally negative association between SES and marital Fertility and that the Fertility differentials widened during the Fertility Transition.
-
the impact of socio economic status on net Fertility during the historical Fertility decline a comparative analysis of canada iceland sweden norway and the usa
Population Studies-a Journal of Demography, 2014Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, David J Hacker, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:We used micro-level data from the censuses of 1900 to investigate the impact of socio-economic status on net Fertility during the Fertility Transition in five Northern American and European countries (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the USA). The study is therefore unlike most previous research on the historical Fertility Transition, which used aggregate data to examine economic correlates of demographic behaviour at regional or national levels. Our data included information on number of children by age, occupation of the mother and father, place of residence, and household context. The results show highly similar patterns across countries, with the elite and upper middle classes having considerably lower net Fertility early in the Transition. These patterns remain after controlling for a range of individual and community-level Fertility determinants and geographical unobserved heterogeneity.
-
social class and net Fertility before during and after the demographic Transition a micro level analysis of sweden 1880 1970
Demographic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:AbstractBACKGROUNDAlthough demographers have long been interested in studying the historical Fertility Transition, there is still a lack of knowledge about disaggregated patterns. Identifying these patterns could help us to better understand the mechanisms behind the Transition.OBJECTIVEThe aim of this paper is to explore social class differentials in Fertility before, during, and after the Fertility decline, in order to test hypotheses regarding a reversal of class differences during the Transition.METHODWe use micro-level census data for Sweden 1880, 1890, 1900, 1960, and 1970 with individual-level information on occupation, which is used to measure class. Poisson regressions with parish-level fixed effects enable us to carefully control spatial heterogeneity in measuring class differences in net Fertility (child-woman ratios).RESULTSThe relative differences were about as large in the early phases of the Transition as they were in the 1960s. The Fertility levels of the high-Fertility classes were about 40% higher than those of the low-Fertility classes. In the early phases of the decline, the upper and middle classes had much lower net Fertility than lower skilled workers, who had the highest Fertility levels. However, there was no clear gradient from the highest to the lowest socioeconomic status. Instead, it appears that the upper and middle classes had low Fertility levels, while the Fertility levels of the remaining groups were unchanged, and therefore remained relatively high. In the 1960s, members of the middle class had the lowest Fertility levels, while farmers and rural laborers had the highest Fertility levels.CONCLUSIONSThe results only partly confirm the assumption that there was a reversal in class differences in the demographic Transition. Class was found to be important, but the pattern was not characterized by a simple gradient. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity was shown to explain about half of the observed differences between classes. The observed pattern suggests that the Fertility Transition can be attributed to both innovation-diffusion and the adjustment to new socioeconomic conditions.(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1. IntroductionThe decline of Fertility in the demographic Transition has been a major theme in historical demography for some time. Much of the literature focusing on the demographic aspects of the decline has sought to chart the process without actually explaining it. Other studies have offered explanations for the decline mainly at the macro level, identifying either innovation or adjustment processes as the main causal agents. Scholars have shown less interest in examining disaggregated patterns using micro-level analyses.One of the main issues that arises in discussions of the Fertility decline is the extent to which Fertility levels differ according to socioeconomic status, and how these differences evolved over the Fertility Transition. Most demographers appear to agree that having higher social status was associated with having higher Fertility prior to the Transition, but that this situation reversed during the Transition, or even before it occurred (Livi-Bacci 1986; Skirbekk 2008). While it is therefore often assumed that higher social groups were forerunners in the decline (Haines 1992; Livi-Bacci 1986), the question of whether the change happened because new incentives were affecting the elite groups first (adjustment), or if it came about as a result of a diffusion of new ideas first adopted in these high-status groups (innovation), remains unresolved (see Haines 1992).As some of the differences in Fertility levels between socioeconomic groups may have also been related to spatial differences in socioeconomic structure, rather than to social status as such (Garrett et al. 2001); it is essential that researchers control for the spatial aspect when analyzing socioeconomic stratification and Fertility in national populations (see also Szreter 1996). …
-
detecting deliberate Fertility control in pre Transitional populations evidence from six german villages 1766 1863
European Journal of Population-revue Europeenne De Demographie, 2010Co-Authors: Martin Dribe, Francesco ScaloneAbstract:This article deals with the possible existence of deliberate Fertility control before the Fertility Transition. The timing of the Fertility response to economic stress, as measured by fluctuations in grain prices, is used as a measure of deliberate, but non-parity specific, control. Birth histories from six German villages (1766–1863), including information on occupation of the husband, are used together with community-wide grain price series in a micro-level event-history analysis. The results show a negative Fertility response to grain prices both in the year immediately following the price change, and with a 1-year lag. The response was also highly different between socioeconomic groups, with the most pronounced effects among the unskilled laborers. Moreover, the response in this group was very rapid, already present 3–6 months after the price change. As all involuntary Fertility responses to economic hardship (e.g., malnutrition, spousal separation, and spontaneous abortion) come with a considerable time lag, the existence of such a rapid response among the lower social groups suggests that individual agency (deliberate control) was an important aspect of reproductive behavior also before the Fertility Transition.