The Experts below are selected from a list of 303 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ralph Ossa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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profits in the new trade approach to trade Negotiations
The American Economic Review, 2012Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:Ever since Johnson’s ( 1954) seminal work initiated the formal analysis of trade Negotiations, the terms-of-trade theory has been the dominant paradigm of the field. As is well known, it holds that trade Negotiations serve to internalize termsof-trade externalities resulting from countries’ noncooperative tariff choices. Its standard formulation is due to Bagwell and Staiger ( 1999), who show that it can not only explain the purpose of trade Negotiations but also rationalize many features of the GATT/ WTO’s institutional design. For all its merits, this standard theory has two significant limitations. First, it predicts that trade Negotiations should revolve solely around the issue of terms-of-trade manipulation, which seems implausible to many observers of GATT/WTO Negotiations. Second, it is based on conventional neoclassical trade models, which are difficult to calibrate convincingly so that little is known about its quantitative implications for important variables such as the gains from GATT/WTO Negotiations. In this article, I present a variant of my analysis in Ossa (2011a) which aims to overcome these limitations. The main idea is to depart from the conventional neoclassical trade model and instead build on a Krugman (1980) “new trade” model. The key difference from Ossa (2011a) is that I now rule out free entry, which turns the production relocation effects into profit shifting effects. Such profit shifting effects are intuitively appealing, since they allow for a view of trade Negotiations in which producer interests play a prominent role. I keep the analysis deliberately simple to highlight the novel elements of my approach. Specifically, I shut off all terms-of-trade effects and allow trade policy to operate only at the most aggregate level so that a single tariff is
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a new trade theory of gatt WTO Negotiations
Journal of Political Economy, 2011Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations based on Krugman's "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO Negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO Negotiations.
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a new trade theory of gatt WTO Negotiations
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations based on the Krugman (1980) "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO Negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO Negotiations.
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a new trade theory of gatt WTO Negotiations
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I develop a novel theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations. This theory provides new answers to two prominent questions in the trade policy literature: first, what is the purpose of trade Negotiations? And second, what is the role played by the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination? Relative to the standard terms-of-trade theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations, my theory makes two main contributions: first, it builds on a ‘new trade’ model rather than the neoclassical trade model and therefore sheds new light on GATT/WTO Negotiations between similar countries. Second, it relies on a production relocation externality rather than the terms-of-trade externality and therefore demonstrates that the terms-of-trade externality is not the only trade policy externality which can be internalized in GATT/WTO Negotiations.
Brett G Williams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the falconer draft text for the doha round WTO Negotiations on agriculture a ha porth of tar to save the vessel from sinking or just a dab of paint on an irreparably broken hull
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Brett G WilliamsAbstract:This article reviews the July 2007 draft text released by the Chair of the WTO negotiating group on agricultural trade. The purpose of the article is to review the proposed feasible outcome in the context of the reform of the application of the GATT to agriculture that was begun in the Uruguay Round. The paper notes that the proposed outcome deviates significantly from fundamental principles of the GATT. The resulting rules would still discriminate against Members with a comparative advantage in agriculture, largely as a result of the exclusion of the most protected products from liberalization. The outcome would largely fail to serve the GATT function of guiding members away from the most inefficient policy instruments, largely as a result of the overemphasis on domestic support rather than market access. The outcome would fail to assist Developing Members to overcome their own protectionist pressure because of the way that the outcome would accord a right to special and differential treatment to members who are in fact able to fully participate in the multilateral system as contemplated in the 1979 Enabling Clause. The paper reviews each aspect of the draft text: tariff reductions, the exclusions for sensitive products and special products, the special safeguard mechanisms, the export subsidy rules, the reductions in aggregate measure of support, de minimis, Blue box support and adjustments to the green box. The paper argues that this outcome will enable the most protectionist Members to resist liberalization. The paper argues that the main reason for the unsatisfactory outcome which the Chairman has put forward as politically feasible is that Developing Members have focussed more on creating exceptions for themselves than on trying to reinforce the integrity of the rules. The paper concludes by expressing the concern that perhaps the deviations from the guiding principles of reciprocity, ranking of policy instruments and non-discrimination are reaching the point at which it will be impossible for the system to harness the interests of exporters to arrive at politically sustainable economic welfare enhancing deals perhaps we are already there and not even this very imperfect deal is possible.
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the falconer draft text for the doha round WTO Negotiations on agriculture a ha porth of tar to save the vessel from sinking or just a dab of paint on an irreparably broken hull
University of New South Wales law journal, 2007Co-Authors: Brett G WilliamsAbstract:On 17 July 2007, the Chair of the World Trade Organization ('WTO') negotiating Committee on Agriculture released the draft Falconer text as a suggestion of a politically feasible outcome to the Doha Round agriculture Negotiations. Although much of it is not drafted as a legal instrument, it represents the first real suggestion of a final outcome since the Harbinson text of February 2003. The purpose of this article is not just to summarise the Falconer text. The purpose is to set out how the proposed outcome would fit into the context of the overall framework of rules under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ('WTO Agreement'), and to assess how it would fit into the continuing reform of agricultural trade that began with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and which may end with the same General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') rules applying to all sectors of trade.
David Vanzetti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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impact of tariff reductions in nama and agriculture WTO Negotiations on gcc common external tariffs
2010 Conference (54th) February 10-12 2010 Adelaide Australia, 2010Co-Authors: David Vanzetti, Ralf PetersAbstract:The Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) have a common external tariff that is unusually low with the exception of selected products such as alcohol and tobacco. As exporters of oil and gas and importers of agricultural products, the GCC is interested in the impacts of tariffs reductions in these products following the eventual completion of the Doha round. Of particular interest are four sectors (raw materials, gas-related goods, fisheries and chemicals), in which it is hoped tariffs will be eliminated. This will improve market access for the GCC countries, but it may also increase the competition depending on the initial bilateral tariffs. In agriculture, rising import prices driven by policy changes occurring elsewhere will increase import costs in the GCC countries. Potential gains and losses are identified using a bilateral trade model.
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now what searching for a solution to the WTO industrial tariff Negotiations
2006Co-Authors: Santiago Fernandez De Cordoba, David VanzettiAbstract:The WTO Negotiations on non-agricultural market access (NAMA) could lead to significant gains for developing countries in exports, employment and economic efficiency. An analysis of various scenarios shows potential global annual welfare gains ranging from $70 billion to $110 billion. However, the generally modest overall results conceal important changes in trade and output in individual sectors. Some countries will achieve important gains in key sectors, but in other countries some sectors will face important adjustments, including significant loss of employment and output. Estimated losses in tariff revenue could have a strong negative impact on government revenues for a number of countries.
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trick or treat development opportunities and challenges in the WTO Negotiations on industrial tariffs
The World Economy, 2005Co-Authors: Santiago Fernandez De Cordoba, Sam Laird, David VanzettiAbstract:Negotiations on industrial tariffs in the current WTO work programme have turned out to be surprisingly difficult. On the one hand, developing countries, particularly in Africa, are concerned about the potential negative effect on their industrial development of developed country efforts to push them into deep cuts in applied tariffs: after the disillusion of the Uruguay Round, promises of welfare gains seem unconvincing. On the other hand, a number of the more complex formula proposals for tariff-cutting make it difficult for participants to evaluate what they have to do compared with what they hope to receive. The developing countries may achieve greater exports and welfare gains from the more ambitious proposals, but computations show that these also imply greater imports, lower tariff revenues, some labour market adjustments and reduced output in some politically sensitive sectors. Some way of assisting the developing countries in coping with these adjustments is required to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the Negotiations.
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shifting sands searching for a compromise in the WTO Negotiations on agriculture
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Ralf Peters, David VanzettiAbstract:The WTO Negotiations on agricultural trade policy remain deadlocked following the failure of the multilateral talks at Cancun. This study considers various options involved in the discussions, focusing on the 'Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture' (an annex of the revised draft Cancun Ministerial Text) and the positions of key players involved and the joint EC-US proposal. In order to quantify the economic effects of these proposals, the study uses a computable global trade model to analyse trade policy issues, and to assist in the preparation and evaluation of negotiating positions.
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shifting sands searching for a compromise in the WTO Negotiations on agriculture
Research Papers in Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Ralf Peters, David VanzettiAbstract:The WTO Negotiations on agriculture remain deadlocked after four years of discussion, and efforts to find a solution at Cancun failed. Analysis shows that the recent draft Cancun text offers more flexibility than earlier proposals, and such flexibility most likely implies a lower level of ambition overall. However, developing countries are less able to take advantage of this flexibility and their bound tariffs will be reduced to levels at or below applied rates. The reduction in levels of intervention and the expiry of the Peace Clause make it more likely that there will be greater resort in the future to safeguards and countervailing measures. Analysis of the various proposals using the UNCTAD/FAO Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) shows that most of the benefits from liberalization accrue to developed countries, which currently have the highest levels of intervention. The group of developing countries, which include both exporters and importers of agricultural products, gain from liberalization, but those gains are small and unevenly distributed. In fact, net-food importing developing countries tend to lose because of higher world prices. Within developing countries, producers tend to gain from higher world prices at the expense of consumers. Since negotiating positions suggest that governments attach a higher weight to producer than consumer benefits, a possible solution to the impasse lies in switching support in developed countries from border measures to less-trade-distorting measures such as direct income support. Providing compensation to current beneficiaries of European Union support in ACP countries for the erosion of preferences may also assist in the search for a compromise.
Trine Vig Jensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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tariff preferences WTO Negotiations and the ldcs the case of the everything but arms initiative
The World Economy, 2005Co-Authors: Wusheng Yu, Trine Vig JensenAbstract:By assessing the impact of the recently adopted 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) initiative of the EU on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and by showing how further multilateral trade liberalisations erode the EBA preferences and impact the LDCs, this paper attempts to uncover the LDCs' difficult positions in the WTO trade Negotiations. Due to its limited product coverage and previous preferences granted by the EU, welfare impacts of the EBA on the LDCs are shown to be small and the bulk of these gains are associated with the 'sensitive' products that are subject to gradual liberalisations. Moreover, these small gains are likely to disappear if the EU conducts trade policy reforms in fulfilling its WTO obligations, resulting in an actually worse-off situation for the LDCs. Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liberalisation scenario reinforces the above results that the LDCs may well lose due to preference erosion and higher world market prices. It concludes that other development assistance measures from developed countries should be made available to the LDCs to ease their dependency on trade preferences and to foster their supply capacities. The LDCs themselves should attempt to integrate the duty and quota-free market access status contained in the EBA into a binding WTO agreement to secure a stable trading environment. But more importantly, in order to solve the difficulties at the root these countries should actively engage in reforming their own trade policies. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.
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tariff preferences WTO Negotiations and the ldcs the case of the everything but arms initiative
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Trine Vig JensenAbstract:By assessing the impact of the recently adopted 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) initiative of the EU on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and by showing how further multilateral trade liberalisations erode the EBA preferences and impact the LDCs, this paper attempts to uncover the LDCs' difficult positions in the WTO trade Negotiations. Due to its limited product coverage and previous preferences granted by the EU, welfare impacts of the EBA on the LDCs are shown to be small and the bulk of these gains are associated with the 'sensitive' products that are subject to gradual liberalisations. Moreover, these small gains are likely to disappear if the EU conducts trade policy reforms in fulfilling its WTO obligations, resulting in an actually worse-off situation for the LDCs. Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liberalisation scenario reinforces the above results that the LDCs may well lose due to preference erosion and higher world market prices. It concludes that other development assistance measures from developed countries should be made available to the LDCs to ease their dependency on trade preferences and to foster their supply capacities. The LDCs themselves should attempt to integrate the duty and quota-free market access status contained in the EBA into a binding WTO agreement to secure a stable trading environment. But more importantly, in order to solve the difficulties at the root these countries should actively engage in reforming their own trade policies.
Bernard Hoekman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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liberalizing trade in services lessons from regional and WTO Negotiations
2013Co-Authors: Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya MattooAbstract:Liberalization of trade and investment in services through trade agreements has progressed less than trade in goods. We review the limited progress achieved to date in the WTO and major regional agreements on services and possible explanations why trade agreements have not been more effective at integrating the services markets of participating countries. We argue that the prospects for both services liberalization and welfare-enhancing regulatory reform in the context of trade agreements can be enhanced through mechanisms that enhance transparency, dialogue and cooperation between regulators, trade officials and stakeholders.
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developing countries and a new round of WTO Negotiations
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Thomas W Hertel, Bernard Hoekman, Will MartinAbstract:This article summarizes some of the results and findings emerging from an ongoing World Bank research and capacity-building project that focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiating agenda from a developing country perspective. Recent research suggests that the potential gains from further multilateral liberalization of trade remain very large. The payoffs associated with attempts to introduce substantive disciplines in the WTO on domestic regulatory regimes are much less certain. This suggests that the focus of current and future Negotiations should be primarily on the bread and butter of the multilateral trading system-the progressive liberalization of barriers to trade in goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis. In addition, priority should be given to ensuring that rules are consistent with the development needs of poorer countries and to helping developing countries implement WTO obligations.
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the political economy of services trade liberalization a case for international regulatory cooperation
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2007Co-Authors: Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, Andre SapirAbstract:Little progress has been made since the creation of the WTO in expanding and deepening the coverage of services liberalization commitments. This paper identifies and discusses five hypotheses that may explain the absence of dynamism: (i) technological changes allow ever more services to be traded cross-border unaffected by policy; (ii) strong incentives to pursue liberalization on an autonomous basis (unilaterally); (iii) perceptions that bilateral or regional cooperation are a good substitute for the WTO; (iv) standard political economy factors such as adjustment costs and resistance by incumbents to erosion of rents; and (v) concerns that the WTO will affect the ability of regulators to enforce national norms. We argue that all of these explanations play a role, and that some of these factors significantly impede the scope for reciprocal exchanges of ‘concessions’—the engine of WTO Negotiations.
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agricultural tariffs or subsidies which are more important for developing economies
The World Bank Economic Review, 2004Co-Authors: Bernard Hoekman, Francis Ng, Marcelo OlarreagaAbstract:This article assesses the impact of the world price-depressing effect of agricultural subsidies and border protection in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries on developing economies' exports, imports, and welfare. Developing economy exporters are likely to benefit from reductions in such subsidies and trade barriers, whereas net importers may lose as world prices rise. A simple partial equilibrium model of global trade in commodities that benefit from domestic support or export subsidies is developed to estimate the relevant elasticities. Simulation results suggest that a 50 percent reduction in border protection will have a much larger positive impact on developing economies' exports and welfare than a 50 percent reduction in agricultural subsidies. Although there is significant heterogeneity across developing economies, the results suggest that efforts in the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) Negotiations should be directed at substantially reducing border protection.
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developing countries and a new round of WTO Negotiations
World Bank Research Observer, 2000Co-Authors: Thomas W Hertel, Bernard Hoekman, Will MartinAbstract:This article presents an approach to public policy in health that comes directly from the literature on public economics. It identifies two characteristic market failures in health. The first is the existence of large externalities in the control of many infectious diseases that are mostly addressed by standard public health interventions. The second is the widespread breakdown of insurance markets that leave people exposed to catastrophic financial losses. Other essential considerations in setting priorities in health are the degree to which policies address poverty and inequality and the practicality of implementing policies given limited administrative capacities. Priorities based on these criteria tend to differ substantially from those commonly prescribed by the international community.
